any and all proceedings for seduc-|
tion arising out of, or in any way
connected with, said case of bas-
tardy.

Held, in a suit on one of said notes,
the award being all the evidence in
relation to the consideration there-
of, that the maker could not claim
that such consideration had failed
by the death of the child. Eaton et
al. v. Burns et al........... ....390
7. Same.-Sale.-Suit on a note. An-
swer, that the defendant bought
of the payee a certain number of
fruit trees; that it was agreed by
them that said trees should be in
good condition, and that if any of
them should not grow, the seller
would replace them with other good
trees; that on the day the note was
given (in November), the seller de-
livered said trees, and represented
them to be as provided for by said
contract; that the defendant, not
being experienced in the nursery
business, believing the trees to be as
represented, in consideration there-
of, executed the note, and properly
set out the trees; that the same were
not in good condition, but were
wilted, and in bad condition, and
wholly worthless; that defendant did
not and could not know their con-
dition till long after the note was
executed; that they did not grow, of
which the seller had notice on the
1st day of the next June; yet he
had wholly failed to replace them.
Ileld, that the answer was good on
demurrer. Morehead v. Murray et
al............
...418

CONSOLIDATION.
See RAILROAD, 13.
CONSTABLE.

See JUSTIFICATION, 2, 3.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1.

See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 1, 2.
Liquor Law.-Sunday.-Section 8 of
the act to regulate the license and
sale of intoxicating liquors, &c., (12.
G. & H. 616) as amended in 1865
(Spec. Sess. 197), prohibits the sale
on Sunday of any quantity of in-
toxicating liquor by a licensed re-

Consideration.—Promise for Bent-
fit of Third Person.-Where a de-
fendant-surety in a judgment which
he is in danger of being compelled
to pay (it being a lien on land be-
longing to him, and the principal
defendant being insolvent) agrees to
give up as canceled and satisfied a
note which he holds against the prin-
cipal defendant, if the judgment-
plaintiff will accept such other sure-
ty as the principal defendant can
procure and will release and satisfy
the judgment as to such defendant-
surety, and, thereupon, the plaintiff
enters satisfaction of the judgment
and accepts other personal security
procured by the principal debtor;
there is a valuable consideration
moving to the defendant-surety from
the judgment-plaintiff, and also
from the new surety; and the pria-
cipal defendant, not a party to the
agreement, may, whether it be made
with the judgment-plaintiff or with
the new surety, if it be intended for
his benefit, but not otherwise, avail
himself of it in an action against
him on the note by such defendant-
surety. Mathews v. Ritenour et al.31
Principal and Surety.-Extension
of Time-An oral agreement by
the payee of a promissory note with
the principal maker, without the
knowledge or consent of the surety

whose suretyship is known to the
payee, to extend the time of pay-
ment during a definite period be-
yond the maturity of the paper, is
valid, and releases the surety, if
founded upon a sufficient consider-
ation. Pierce v. Goldsberry.......52
3. Same. Consideration.-Interest.-

4.

5.

The oral agreement of the principal
debtor to pay merely the same in-
terest that the note would have
borne if the indulgence had been
given voluntarily, is a sufficient con-
sideration for such a promise of for-
bearance.....
......Ibid.

Mental Capacity.-Mere dullness
of intellect, from whatever cause,
does not amount to incapacity to
contract. Henry v. Ritenour.....136

Same. Intoxication. Where a
party to a contract is voluntarily in-
toxicated at the time of making it,
to the extent only that he does not
clearly understand the business, this
does not render his contract void or
voidable where no advantage is
gained by dealing with him....Ibid.
G. Consideration. It is a sufficient

7.

consideration for a promissory note
that the payee, to procure its execu-
tion by the maker, surrenders a val-
id and subsisting demand for a like
amount against a third person.. Ibid.

Same.-Failure of Consideration.-|
A. being indebted to B., and C. to
A. in a certain like amount, and D.
being indebted in a like sum to C.
on account of certain land conveyed
by C. to D. by deed with covenants,
by the agreement of all the parties
D. gave his note to B. for such sum,
B. released A., and A. released C.
Held, in a suit on the note by the payce
against the maker, that, where there
was no express agreement by the
payee before or at the time of the
making of the note that it should
not be collected if the title to the
land should fail, such failure of title
could not prevent the payee from
recovering on the note............Ibid.
8. Practice.-Partics-Written agrec-
ment, as follows: "Whereas there
is an action now pending in the Bar-
tholomew Common Pleas Court
wherein A. is plaintiff and the un-
dersigned and others are defendants,
wherein said A. sues for money ex-
pended by said A. at their request
in obtaining recruits under a call

made by the President of the Uni-
ted States; and whereas the under-
signed are desirous of compromising
said cause and paying to said A.
whatever sum may be found duc
him; and whereas B., C., and D. are
trying to compromise said cause and
ascertain the sum due to A., in order
to pay the same to him; now, there-
fore, we, the undersigned, agree to
and with said B., C., and D. that if
they should compromise said cause
and ascertain the amount due to
said A., upon any compromise they
may make, to pay to said parties or
to said A. the proportional interest
due from each of the undersigned
as the ascertained amount due to
said A.; and should said B., C., and
D. agree upon the amount due to
said A. and pay the same to him, or
in any way satisfy the same, each
of the undersigned promise and
agree to pay to him the proportional
amount due from them, and several-
ly promise to pay their several pro-
portions of said amount that may
have been so paid to said A., with-
out relief from valuation or appraise-
ment laws, and agree to indemnify
them against all loss or damage in
any way in making said compro-
mise; and said B., C., and D., are
left to compromise said cause in
such manner as they may think
best." Suit on this agreement
against the signers thereof by B.,
C., and D., alleging a compromise
by them with A. by giving him their
note for a certain sum which B. had
paid with his own funds, &c.
Held, that the defendants were prop-
erly joined in the same action. Coy
et al. v. Stucker et al.................161
Release.-The fact that defendant
E. paid a certain portion of a judg-
ment against the plaintiffs on said
note, and defendants E. and F. be-
came replevin bail on such judg-
ment, upon the agreement of B. to
release E. and F. from liability upon
the contract in suit, was a good de-
fense as to E. and F., but not avail-
able as to the other defendants. Ibid.

9.

.Ibid.

11. Parol Evidence.- Contradiction of
Written Contract.-It could not be
set up in defense to such suit on
said agreement that there were oth-
er parties defendants in said action
by A. than those who signed the
agreement, and that plaintiff's agreed
to get all said defendants to sign it,
and failing to do so the agreement
was to be void, and that it was upon
that express condition it was deliv-
cred to plaintiffs......
12. Pleading.-Partial Defense.—An-
swers by certain of the defendants
alleging that the indebtedness, to
compromise which the contract in
suit was executed, was one in which
the plaintiffs were equally involved
with the defendants, and pleading
certain payments made by these de-
fendants, and asking that they might
be considered in fixing the final lia-
bility.

Held, that the answers were good to
the extent and purpose for which
they were pleaded................. Ibid.
13. Compromise.-Doubtful Question
of Law.-Answer by one of the de-
fendants that there was a doubtful
question of law as to his liability
under the contract in suit, and that
a compromise was therefore made
and a less sum given in discharge of
a greater liability.
Held, that the answer was bad... Ibid.
14.

Carrier. Collections.- Bill of
Lading.-A bill of lading recited,
that the goods were "to be delivered
without delay, &c., at the port of,
&c., to., &c., or assigns, he or they
paying freight for said goods at the
rate of, &c.; charges payable when
collected by boat; charges to be col-
lected" a certain sum, being the
value of the goods.

Held, that if the carrier delivered the
goods without collecting such char-
ges, he was liable therefor to the
person who so contracted with him
and delivered the goods to him.
Meyer v. Lemcke et al...............208
15. Liquidated Damages-Where a
party covenants for the abstaining
from doing, or for the performance
of, some particular act or acts which
are not measurable by any exact
pecuniary standard, and it is agreed
that the party so covenanting shall
pay a stipulated sum for a violation
of any of such covenants, that sum

16. Same.-Bond.-Restraint of Trade.-
Liquor Trafic.- Bond for $1,000,
conditioned that the obligor should
sell no more spirituous or malt li-
quors or wine, within a county
named, after a specified date, or
cause the same to be sold within
said county, either directly or indi-
rectly, after the time specified, or
manufacture or obtain any spirituous
or malt liquors or wine, or cause to
be sold, in said county, by himself
or any other person, either directly
or indirectly, after said date; that
he should settle a certain obligation
calling for liquors, payable to a third
person named, of a certain sum men-
tioned so that the liquors should not
be brought to a town named, in said
county; and should use his influence
to prevent any person or persons
from bringing any of the aforesaid
liquors to said town with the inten-
tion of selling the same within the

town.

Held, that such a bond is valid in this
State.

Held, also, that said sum of $1,000
was liquidated damages, and not a
penalty.

Held, also, that the failure of the ob-
ligor to deliver any liquor in ful-
filment of his contract with such
third person, would not have been
a breach of the condition of the
bond......

...........Ibid.
17. Party- Wall.-A. purchased of B.
a portion of a certain lot, a part of
the consideration, as shown by a
written agreement between said par-
ties, being, that A. promised to build
thereon, within a short time, a first
class three-story brick building; and
it was agreed that one of the walls
of the building should be a party-
wall, each owning one moiety there-
of and giving an equal amount of
the ground; and that "whenever B.
or his heirs or assigns use said wall
by erecting a building on the lot ad-
joining on the said A.'s, B. or his heirs
or assigns putting the joists of their
building in said wall, then said A.
or his heirs or assigns is to receive
one-half of the actual cost of the
building of said wall from B. or his
heirs or assigns." A. complied with

Pleading.-Answer.-In a suit to en-
force the entering of satisfaction of a
mortgage, a party defendant against
whom no relief is sought, but who
is made a defendant merely to an-
swer as to his pretended interest in
the subject matter of the suit, must
file an affirmative answer if relief is
sought by him. The general denial
by such a party puts the plaintiff to
such proof as will place such defend-
ant in the wrong. He may save
himself from costs by disclaiming
any interest. Paine et al. v. The
Lake Erie & Louisville R. R. Co.283

COUNTER-CLAIM.

See JURISDICTION, 12, 13.

COUNTY AUDITOR.

See OFFICE AND OFFICER, 3, 4, 5.

COUNTY CLERK.

See FEES; OFFICE AND OFFICER, 1, 2.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.

See BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

1. Jurisdiction.-Title to Real Estate.
Where the main object of a com-
plaint in the court of common pleas
is to have satisfaction entered of a
mortgage of real estate, there is no
error in overruling a motion made
by the defendant before answer to
transfer the cause to the circuit
court on the ground that the title to

2.

real estate is in issue. Paine et al. T.
The Lake Erie & Louisville R. R.
Co.....

.283
Alteration of Districts.- Vacancy.
Election. Statutes Construed.- By
act of 1859 (2 G. & II. 20, sec. 3),
the counties of Tippecanoe, Benton.
White, and Carrol, were made a
common pleas district, in which it
was required that a judge should be
elected on the second Tuesday of
October, 1860, and every fourth year
thereafter. By act of 1861 (2 G. &
H. 653), this district was required
to be designated and known as the
fifteenth district. By act of 1867
(Acts 1867, p. 92), the twenty-third
district was created, consisting of the
counties of Tippecanoe and Warren,
and it was enacted that the then
elected judge of the fifteenth district
should be, and perform the duties of,
judge of the twenty-third district,
until the expiration of his term of
office.

Held, that by said act of 1867, the re-
maining counties, White, Benton,
and Carrol, did not cease to be the
fifteenth district, but a vacancy was
thereby created on its bench, to be
filled by appointment by the Gov-
ernor till the general election of
1867, then by election for the un-
expired term, till October, 1868,
when a judge of that district was
required to be elected. Reed v. Ba-
ker, Governor.......

COVERTURE.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

425

CRIMINAL LAW.
See FEES; WITNESS, 2.
1. Information.-Arrest of Judgment.
An information which is so uncer-
tain that upon a plea of guilty the
court cannot know what punishment
it may affix, is bad on motion in ar-
rest of judgment. Vogel v.
The
State

2. Same.-Sunday.- Liquor Law.-
Information charging, that “A., at,
&c., being over four fourteen years
of age, on, &c., that being the first
day of the week, commonly called
Sunday, was found unlawfully at
common labor and engaged in his
usual avocation, to wit, selling and