Harcourt v. Gaillard. 12 W. that Spain could not acquire by conquest a territory within the limits claimed by an ally in the war. But there was another reason. There was no territory within the United States that was claimed in any other right than that of some one of the confederated States; therefore, there could be no acquisition of territory made by the United States distinct from or independent of some one of the States. We are then referred to the belligerent rights of South Carolina and Georgia; and it is immaterial to the question here, to which of those States the territory appertained. Each declared itself sovereign and independent, according to the limits of its territory, and both extended their claims of territory to the 31st parallel of north latitude. There is no evidence that either, at that time, had acquiesced in the extension of the territory of Florida beyond that line. The facts upon which the right of the governor of Florida to issue grants beyond the 31st degree of north latitude rested are these: After the proclamation of 1763, the board of trade of Great Britain, which, at that time, had the affairs of the colonies committed to them, passed a resolution, of the date of March, 1764, in which they advise the king to extend the limits of West Florida up to a line drawn from the mouth of the Yazoo, east to the Chatahouchee. It does not appear that the king ever made an order adopting this recommendation. No proclamation was issued in pursuance of it; but it appears that, from that time, the commissions to the governors of West Florida designated that line as the northern limit of that province; notwithstanding which, Governor Wright continued to preside over Georgia, under his commission of 1763, which embraced in its limits the whole of that country, bounded south by the 31st degree of north latitude. Thus stood the rights of the parties at the commencement of the Revolution; and when, by the treaty of peace,1 the southern boundary of the United States was fixed at the ancient boundary of South Carolina or Georgia, (it matters not which,) Georgia insisted on that line as the limit which she was entitled to, and which she had laid claim to when she declared herself independent; or which the United States had asserted in her behalf in the Declaration of Independence. But as there had been nothing very unequivocal * done at the time of the declaration [527] of independence, as to designating the limits of the United States, it is still contended that the tract of country in which the grant lies had been legally separated from Georgia before the Revolution, and attached to West Florida; and that, therefore, a grant by the governor of the latter province was valid, if made at any time. previous to the treaty of peace. 18 Stats. at Large, 80. Harcourt v. Gaillard. 12 W. Two questions here occur, first, whether this separation had taken effect by any valid act; and, secondly, if it had, whether it made any difference in the case upon international principles. On both these points we are of opinion that the law is against the validity of this grant. It is true that the power of the crown was at that time admitted to be very absolute over the limits of the royal provinces; but there is no reason to believe that it had ever been exercised by any means less solemn and notorious than a public proclamation. And although the instrument by which Georgia claimed an extension of her limits to the northern boundary of that territory, was of no more authority or solemnity than that by which it was supposed to have been taken from her, it was otherwise with South Carolina. Her territory had been extended to that limit by a solemn grant from the crown, to the lords proprietors, from whom, in fact, she had wrested it by a revolution, even before the rights of the proprietors had been bought out by the crown. But this is not the material fact in the case; it is this, that this limit was claimed and asserted by both of those States in the Declaration of Independence, and the right to it was established by the most solemn of all international acts, the treaty of peace. It has never been admitted by the United States that they acquired any thing by way of cession from Great Britain, by that treaty. It has been viewed only as a recognition of preëxisting rights, and on that principle, the soil and sovereignty within their acknowledged limits were as much theirs at the declaration of independence as at this hour. By reference to the treaty, it will be found that it amounts to a simple recognition of the independence and the limits of the United States, without any language purporting a cession or relin[* 528 ] quishment of *right, on the part of Great Britain. In the last article of the treaty of Ghent,' will be found a provision respecting grants of land made in the islands then in dispute between the two States, which affords an illustration of this doctrine. By that article, a stipulation is made in favor of grants before the war, but none for those which were made during the war. And such is unquestionably the law of nations. War is a suit prosecuted by the sword; and where the question to be decided is one of original claim to territory, grants of soil made flagrante bello by the party that fails, can only derive validity from treaty stipulations. It is not necessary here to consider the rights of the conqueror in case of actual conquest; since the views previously presented put the acquisition of such rights out of this case. The remaining question is whether the parties plaintiffs have been established in their rights by any act or treaty of the United States. 18 Stats. at Large, 218. Harcourt v. Gaillard. 12 W. The treaty of peace contains no stipulation in their favor. Nor does the treaty with Georgia, since all the reservations there made in favor of British or Spanish grants, and inchoate titles, are expressly confined to the case of actual settlers. But the spontaneous bounty of the United States has gone further, and confirmed a great variety of questionable titles, emanating from British and Spanish authority. Is this one of the titles embraced within the provisions of the statutes passed upon this subject? It is obvious that it is not. It is true that the act of the 3d of March, 1803,1 although making no express provision in favor of British or Spanish grants unaccompanied with possession, does seem to proceed upon the implication that they are valid; recognizing the principle that a change of sovereignty produces no change in individual property, yet it imputes to them only a modified validity, since by the 5th section it imposes a positive necessity upon the proprietors to record such grants, and makes expressly void all the rights claimed under the first three sections of that act, or the Georgia treaty, if the duty so imposed be not complied with. And with regard to all *other [* 529 ] evidences of title not recorded in the time limited, declares that they shall never be admitted in evidence against any grant derived from the United States. The first section of the Supplementary Act of 27th of March, 1804,2 extends the time for recording British grants, and vests in the board of commissioners a power of examining and confirming the claims to be filed under its provisions, as extensive as that given by the previous act over the rights claimed under the cession from Georgia, or the first three sections of that act. But the grant to Harcourt appears neither to have been recorded, nor passed upon by the commissioners; it has, therefore, nothing to claim from the bounty of the United States; and that provision in the 5th section of the act of 1803, which forbids its being received in evidence as against American grants, would certainly have operated against it in any case clearly within the provisions of that act. Here, it is contended that the court anticipated the question and rejected the grant, before it was possible that the question could arise, whether the same land had passed under an American grant. On this subject it must be observed that neither of the acts of 1803 or 1804 contains an express recognition of the validity of any British grants beside those which were accompanied with possession; and, for that reason, coming within the Georgia treaty, and those which should be confirmed by the commissioners under the first sec Henderson v. Poindexter's Lessee. 12 W. tion of the act of 1804, with regard to which there seems to be a very general power given to that board. All others must rest upon their validity according to the principles of the modern law of nations. Upon these principles it has been shown that the grant to Harcourt was invalid, and, if so, it was not admissible as evidence to sustain the plaintiff's action under any circumstances. The rule, therefore, applies to this case that a plaintiff must recover by the strength of his own title, not the weakness of his adversary's; for which reason, we think the grant was properly rejected, and that the judgment below must be affirmed, with costs. 6 P. 691; 12 P. 410, 657; 14 P. 353; 19 H. 393. HENDERSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. POINDEXTER'S LESSEE, Defendant in Error. 12 W. 530. Spanish grants made after the treaty of peace of 1782, between the United States and Great Britain, within the territory east of the River Mississippi, and north of a line drawn from that river, at the 31st degree of north latitude, east to the middle of the River Appalachicola, have no intrinsic validity, and the holders must depend for their titles exclusively on the laws of the United States. No Spanish grant, made while the country was wrongfully occupied by Spain, can be valid, unless it was confirmed by the compact between the United States and the State of Georgia, of the 24th of April, 1802, or has been laid before the board of commissioners constituted by the act of congress of the 3d of March, 1803, (2 Stats. at Large, 229,) and of March 27, 1804, (2 Stats. at Large, 303.) THIS cause was argued by Webster and Coxe, for the plaintiff in error, and by Ogden, for the defendant in error MARSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of error to a judgment rendered in the court of the United States for the district of Mississippi, in an ejectment brought by the defendant in error. George Poindexter, the lessor of the plaintiff, claimed title to the premises in controversy, by virtue of several patents regularly issued to him under the laws of the United States. If the lands were, at the time, grantable, his title is unquestionable. Consequently, the case depended, in the district court, on the title of the defendant in that court. Under several opinions given by the judge to the jury, to which bills of exceptions were taken, a verdict was found [*531] *for the plaintiff in ejectment, the judgment on which has been brought before this court. The case must depend on the correctness of the opinions given by the district judge; but, as those opinions bring the title of the defendant in ejectment before this court, the case will be best understood by taking a general view of the principles on which that title stands. Henderson v. Poindexter's Lessee. 12 W. The defendant gave in evidence a grant from the government of Spain for 1,000 acres of land, bearing date on the 20th of June, 1795, with a plat and certificate of survey annexed; under which grant he claimed so much of the land in controversy as it covered. He also offered in evidence a duly certified copy of a certificate of survey and patent issued thereon to David Pannell, for 500 acres, the residue of the premises in controversy; the certificate by the Spanish surveyorgeneral, Carlos Trudeau, dated the 25th of March, 1795, and the patent issued December 7, 1797, by Manuel Gayoso, the Spanish governor of West Florida, with a deed of release and confirmation from David Pannell to him, dated January 19, 1820. It was admitted that the originals of the plat and certificate of survey, and of the patent thereon, of which copies were offered, were not in his possession, nor under his control. These papers were rejected, and a bill of exceptions was taken to the opinion rejecting them. The defendant also read the deposition of Tessias, to prove the fairness of the grants under which he claimed, and that they were regularly issued by the proper officers of the Spanish government, at the time they bear date respectively. To rebut this testimony, the plaintiff in ejectment produced a letter of instructions found among the papers of William Atcheson, deceased, the deputy surveyor, by whom the lands in controversy were surveyed. This letter was directed to William Atcheson, and was proved to be in the handwriting of William Dunbar, who is also dead, and who was proved to be the principal surveyor of the district of Natchez, under whom Atcheson acted. The signature appears to have been torn off. This paper tended to show that the surveys and grant were not made at the time they bear date, but afterwards. The defendant objected to its admission, but his objection was overruled, [* 532 ] and to this opinion, also, he took an exception. The defendant prayed the court to instruct the jury 1. If they should find that, at the time of the sale by the United States, of the premises in question, the defendant was in full possession thereof, under an adverse title or color of title, such sale was void, and passed no title on which the plaintiff could recover. 2. If they should find that the defendant, and those under whom he claimed, had the uninterrupted and quiet adverse possession of the premises, claiming under a Spanish title legally and fully executed, prior to October 27, 1795, under which the possession was originally taken, that the plaintiff cannot recover. 3. If the jury should find that, on the 20th of June, 1795, a patent emanated from the Spanish government to Joseph Pannell, under whom the defendant claimed, then such patent constituted a good |