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2. A general agent of a manufacturing establishment gave a certificate that a certain
amount was due on settlement, from the firm whose agent he was; held to be admis-
sible evidence against his principals, when connected with circumstances which
tended to prove that the debt was contracted for materials used by him in the man-
ufacture. Barry v. Foyles, 592.
3. A judgment recovered on an account against the principal, is evidence of the
amount due from him, in an action against a guarantor of the account. Drummond
v. Prestman, 323.
4. If the execution of an original paper be admitted, and it is in the defendant's pos-
session, a copy, in the defendant's handwriting, may be used in evidence without
notice to produce the original. Carroll v. Peake, 428.
5. The affidavit of a party is competent evidence of the loss of a paper; it is not con-
clusive, but it is to be weighed by the court in connection with the circumstances.
Tayloe v. Riggs, 713.
6. When the contents of a written contract are to be proved by parol, vague, or uncer-
tain recollections are not sufficient; the substance of the agreement must be satis-
factorily proved. Ib.
7. Parol evidence is admissible to prove that all the parties to a negotiable note agreed
that payment should be demanded of the maker at a particular bank, the note being
silent as to the place of payment or demand. Pearson v. The Bank of the Melrop-
8. Though declarations of aged and deceased members of a family, concerning its
pedigree, are not admissible if made post litem motam, yet this rule applies only
when the lis mota concerns the pedigree, not some other question involved in the
title. Elliott v. Piersoľs Lessee, 601.
9. A letter having been written to the defendant by a third person, requesting the
defendant to ship sugars to the plaintiff, and the defendant having added to the
letter the word “agreed,” and signed his name — held, that parol evidence was ad-
missible to prove that the plaintiff agreed to advance moneys to the third person on
the faith of the shipment; that this agreement and the letter and the assent of the
defendant were parts of one transaction; and the written paper was made for the
purpose of being delivered to the plaintiff, and was so delivered; and this being
proved, it was further held that the contract of the defendant was not within the
statute of frauds of New York. D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 672.
10. A witness may be asked whether he was agent for the plaintiff before any evidence
of the manner of creating his agency. Conard v. The Atlantic Insurance Co. of
New York, 637.
11. Proof of the signature of one of the parties, to a joint and several bond, is sufficient
to make title as against him. Ib.
BILLS OF Exchange, &c. 11 ; Bond, 9; CORPORATION, 1; DEED, 3; EXCEPTIONS,
2; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1 ; SLAVES, &c. 1 ; Will, 2.
1. The court is not bound to modify the instructions prayed for by counsel ; if not
correct in point of law as prayed, they may rightfully be rejected. Buck v. The
Chesapeake Insurance Company, 508.
2. A court is not bound to do more than to respond to a motion to reject evidence in
the terms in which it is made. If the motion be to reject all, and some is competent,
it is not error to deny the motion. Elliott v. Peirsoľs Lessee, 601.
3. If a bill of exceptions does not contain some paper offered in evidence and certified
by the clerk below to have been accidentally lost, such lost paper will be presumed:
• to contain what was necessary to support the judgment, if such a presumption is
possible. Carroll v. Peake, 428.
Bond, 15; JUDGMENT, &c. 8.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
1. To an action of debt on a judgment recovered by the plaintiff as administrator, ne
unques administrator, or any thing equivalent to it, is not a good plea in bar. Biddle
v. Wilkins, 770.
2. In such an action, the plaintiff may declare personally and not in his representative
character, and is not bound to make profert of his letters of administration. Ib.
APPEAL, LIMITATIONS, &c. 2.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5–8; PUBLIC LANDS, 1.
1. A claim having been admitted, the prosecutor must file an exceptive allegation, if the
proceeding be in the admiralty, or a plea in abatement, if it be by an information at
law, in order to put in issue the claimants' right to appear. The United States v.
422 Casks of Wine, 691.
2. The court may, in its discretion, refuse to restore property to a claimant, if the
evidence at the hearing shows he ought not to receive it, though no forfeiture be
EQUITY, 2; INFORMATION; PRACTICE, 2; REVENUE Laws.
INJUNCTION, 3; SALE, 2.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
1. An item inserted in an account stated and settled, in the handwriting of the vendor,
and signed by the vendee, in the words and figures following: “By my purchase of
your half E. B. wharf and premises, this day agreed on between us, $7,578.63,” is
a sufficient memorandum within the statute of frauds, and parol evidence is admis-
sible to fill up the initials. Barry v. Coombe, 743.
2. If the vendee under such a contract, gives notice he will not be bound by it, if the
vendor does not pay the balance due on the account, and the vendor does not adopt
the alternative tendered to him, the contract is not at an end. 16.
PUBLIC LANDS, 1-3.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Though a feme covert, abandoned by her husband, may contract debts as a feme sola,
she cannot, under the law of Maryland, convey her lands by her separate deed.
Rhea v. Rhenner, 478.
DEED, 3. 4.
1. A contract to sell to a third person three years previous, which has manifestly been
abandoned by him, so that he could not compel a specific performance, is not a valid
objection to a title. Greenleaf v. Queen, 499.
2. Nor is a claim for dower, if the purchaser knew or had the means of knowing its
existence, and was aware he was purchasing of a trustee. 16.
SLAVES, &c. 4–9; TRIAL.
1. In general, a libel in rem for a forfeiture, which alleges the offence in the words of
the statute, is sufficient. The Palmyra, 1.
2. In a libel in rem, under the acts of March 3, 1819, and May 15, 1820 (3 Stats. at
Large, 510, 600,) for piratical aggressions, it is not necessary to allege or prove a
conviction of the person for the criminal offence. The Palmyra, 1.
1. An injunction out of the circuit court, to stay proceedings on a judgment at law, in
that court, may issue, notwithstanding the pendency of a writ of error on the judg-
ment in this court. Parker v. The Judges of the Circuit Court of Maryland, 358.
2. An injunction issued by order of the district judge, expires at the next term of the
court, unless continued by the court; but the denial of several successive motions to
dissolve the injunction, may, under circumstances, be considered as equivalent to an
order for renewing it. Ib.
8. A judgment creditor agreed with his debtor to resort for payment to a fund created
by a deed of trust, which, without the knowledge of the creditor, contained a limita-
tion of time for parties to come in, and the time had expired; held, that the debtor
could not enjoin the judgment without first enabling the creditor to come in under
the deed. The Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Lynn, 633.
BOND, 13. 14; EQUITY, 2.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-3; UNITED STATES.
1. A policy "at and from A. to T. and two other ports in the West Indies, and back
to her port of discharge, in the United States, upon all lawful goods," &c., being
construed with reference to the known course of the trade, covers the return cargo.
The Columbian Insurance Company v. Catlett, 234.
2. Delay to accomplish the objects of the voyage by selling the cargo reasonably, and
according to the known course of the trade, is not a deviation. Ib.
8. If a sale of a perishable cargo becomes necessary, in consequence of a peril of the
sea, before arrival at the port of destination, it is a case of constructive total loss. Ib.
4. Though a policy requires sixty days' notice of an abandonment, the same letter con-
taining the notice may operate as an abandonment at the end of sixty days. Ib.
5. Where a specific sum was insured on cargo for a round voyage, the whole sum was
at risk, though part of the outward cargo had been landed, that amount of property
being on board. The Columbian Insurance Company v. Catlett, 234.
6. Pro rata freight is not a charge on salvage money abandoned to the underwriter.
7. It is not necessary to aver an abandonment in the declaration. Ib.
8. Insurance effected by an owner after a loss, in good faith, is not vitiated by the fact
that the master concealed the loss from the owner, with intent to have him procure
insurance. The General Interest Insurance Company v. Ruggles, 254.
9. If the insurer make no inquiry as to the neutrality of the interest, an insurance
"for whom it concerns” covers belligerent property. Buck v. The Chesapeake In-
surance Company, 508.
10. Insurers are presumed to know the state and incidents of the trade in which prop-
erty covered by them is represented to be embarked, and this may include a prac-
tice for neutrals to cover belligerent property. Ib.
11. But if an express representation is made that the property is neutral, a policy" for
whom it concerns” does not cover property of a belligerent. Buck v. The Chesa-
peake Insurance Company, 508.
12. A master, being the legal owner of the whole cargo and the equitable owner of
part of it, has an insurable interest in the whole. Ib.
13. Certain statements held not to amount to a representation of neutrality of prop-
14. Seaworthiness for lying in port may be quite a different thing from seaworthiness
for a voyage. M'Lanahan v. The Universal Insurance Company, 518.
15. Seaworthiness and deviation are mixed questions of fact and law, and the aid of a
jury is generally necessary to their decision. 16.
16. If a party who has ordered insurance has information of a loss, he is bound to use
due and reasonable diligence to make it known to his agent, and to countermand his
17. What is such diligence depends on the circumstances of each case, and is princi-
pally matter of fact for a jury. Ib.
18. The question of materiality of the time of sailing, to the risk, is a question of fact
for the jury. 16.
19. So are the questions, whether an omission to state the time was fraudulent, and
whether it misled the underwriter. 16.
BOND, 11. 12.
JUDGMENT AND DECREE.
1. A prior judgment lien, during the time fixed by law for its existence, is not displaced
by delay and a levy under a subsequent judgment lien. Rankin v. Scott, 104.
2. In Virginia, a confession of judgment is a release of errors. Mandeville v. Holy,
3. A discharge, by the secretary of the treasury, of the principal debtor taken on a
ca. sa. pursuant to the act of June 6, 1798, (1 Stats. at Large, 561,) does not release
his sureties from the judgment, nor operate as a satisfaction thereof. The United
States v. Stansbury, 704.
Bills OF EXCHANGE, &c. 14; Bond, 10. 13. 14; DEED, 1; EVIDENCE, 3; EXECU-
TORS, &c.; INJUNCTION, 1. 3; PUBLIC LANDS, 7; VERDICT; WRIT OF ERROR, %
The jurisdiction of a county court may be inquired into by a circuit court of the
United States when the proceedings of the former are relied on in the latter; and
if no jurisdiction existed the proceedings are void. Elliott v. Piersols Lessee, 601.
DEED, 2; INSURANCE, 15–19; LAW AND Fact; NoNsUIT.
CURTESY; PUBLIC LANDS, 11; WILL, 2.
LAPSE OF TIME.
SLAVES, &c. 1.
LAW AND FACT.
When a matter of fact necessary to a defence is controverted, it is error to direct the
jury that the matters produced in evidence are sufficient to bar the action, and the
jury ought to find for the defendant; for this instruction withdraws the fact from
the jury. The United States v. Tillotson, 106.
DEED, 2; INSURANCE, 15-19.
ADMIRALTY, 1. 2; JUDGMENT, &c. 1; MECHANICS' BANK OF ALEXANDRIA;
LIMITATIONS OF SUITS.
1. To remove the bar of the statute of limitations by a new promise, it must be deter-
minate and unequivocal; and if a new promise is to be raised by implication of law
from an acknowledgment, there must be an unqualified acknowledgment of a sub-
sisting debt which the party is liable and willing to pay. Bell v. Morrison, 612.
2. A declaration by the personal representatives of the original debtor, deceased, that
he had no funds to pay the debts of the testator, will not take the case out of the
statute of limitations. Thompson v. Peter, 361.
8. One partner cannot deprive the firm of the bar of the statute of limitations, after a
dissolution of the partnership. Bell v. Morrison, 612.
EQUITY, 3; EVIDENCE, 5; EXCEPTIONS, 3.
This court will not grant a mandamus to revise the proceedings of a circuit court as to
the pleadings. This can only be done by a writ of error after a final judgment. The
Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, 701.
BOND, 10; Costs, 2.
ALIEN; HUSBAND AND WIFK.