she cannot, under the law of Maryland, convey her lands by her separate deed.
Rhea v. Rhenner, 478.
1. A contract to sell to a third person three years previous, which has manifestly been
abandoned by him, so that he could not compel a specific performance, is not a valid
objection to a title. Greenleaf v. Queen, 499.
2. Nor is a claim for dower, if the purchaser knew or had the means of knowing its
existence, and was aware he was purchasing of a trustee. Ib.
INDICTMENT.
SLAVES, &c. 4–9; TRIAL.
1. In general, a libel in rem for a forfeiture, which alleges the offence in the words of
the statute, is sufficient. The Palmyra, 1.
2. In a libel in rem, under the acts of March 3, 1819, and May 15, 1820 (3 Stats. at
Large, 510, 600,) for piratical aggressions, it is not necessary to allege or prove a
conviction of the person for the criminal offence. The Palmyra, 1.
1. An injunction out of the circuit court, to stay proceedings on a judgment at law, in
that court, may issue, notwithstanding the pendency of a writ of error on the judg-
ment in this court. Parker v. The Judges of the Circuit Court of Maryland, 358.
2. An injunction issued by order of the district judge, expires at the next term of the
court, unless continued by the court; but the denial of several successive motions to
dissolve the injunction, may, under circumstances, be considered as equivalent to an
order for renewing it. Ib.
3. A judgment creditor agreed with his debtor to resort for payment to a fund created
by a deed of trust, which, without the knowledge of the creditor, contained a limita-
tion of time for parties to come in, and the time had expired; held, that the debtor
could not enjoin the judgment without first enabling the creditor to come in under
the deed. The Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Lynn, 633.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-3; UNITED STATES.
INSPECTOR-GENERAL.
ADJUTANT, &c.
1. A policy "at and from A. to T. and two other ports in the West Indies, and back
to her port of discharge, in the United States, upon all lawful goods," &c., being
construed with reference to the known course of the trade, covers the return cargo.
The Columbian Insurance Company v. Catlett, 234.
2. Delay to accomplish the objects of the voyage by selling the cargo reasonably, and
according to the known course of the trade, is not a deviation. Ib.
3. If a sale of a perishable cargo becomes necessary, in consequence of a peril of the
sea, before arrival at the port of destination, it is a case of constructive total loss. Ib.
4. Though a policy requires sixty days' notice of an abandonment, the same letter con-
taining the notice may operate as an abandonment at the end of sixty days. Ib.
5. Where a specific sum was insured on cargo for a round voyage, the whole sum was
at risk, though part of the outward cargo had been landed, that amount of property
being on board. The Columbian Insurance Company v. Catlett, 234.
6. Pro rata freight is not a charge on salvage money abandoned to the underwriter.
Ib.
7. It is not necessary to aver an abandonment in the declaration. Ib.
8. Insurance effected by an owner after a loss, in good faith, is not vitiated by the fact
that the master concealed the loss from the owner, with intent to have him procure
insurance. The General Interest Insurance Company v. Ruggles, 254.
9. If the insurer make no inquiry as to the neutrality of the interest, an insurance
"for whom it concerns" covers belligerent property. Buck v. The Chesapeake In-
surance Company, 508.
10. Insurers are presumed to know the state and incidents of the trade in which prop-
erty covered by them is represented to be embarked, and this may include a prac-
tice for neutrals to cover belligerent property. Ib.
11. But if an express representation is made that the property is neutral, a policy “for
whom it concerns" does not cover property of a belligerent. Buck v. The Chesa-
peake Insurance Company, 508.
12. A master, being the legal owner of the whole cargo and the equitable owner of
part of it, has an insurable interest in the whole. Ib.
13. Certain statements held not to amount to a representation of neutrality of prop-
erty. Ib.
14. Seaworthiness for lying in port may be quite a different thing from seaworthiness
for a voyage. M’Lanahan v. The Universal Insurance Company, 518.
15. Seaworthiness and deviation are mixed questions of fact and law, and the aid of a
jury is generally necessary to their decision. Ib.
16. If a party who has ordered insurance has information of a loss, he is bound to use
due and reasonable diligence to make it known to his agent, and to countermand his
order.
17. What is such diligence depends on the circumstances of each case, and is princi-
pally matter of fact for a jury. Ib.
18. The question of materiality of the time of sailing, to the risk, is a question of fact
for the jury. Ib.
19. So are the questions, whether an omission to state the time was fraudulent, and
whether it misled the underwriter.
JOINT DEFENDANTS.
BOND, 11. 12.
1. A prior judgment lien, during the time fixed by law for its existence, is not displaced
by delay and a levy under a subsequent judgment lien. Rankin v. Scott, 104.
2. In Virginia, a confession of judgment is a release of errors. Mandeville v. Holy,
3. A discharge, by the secretary of the treasury, of the principal debtor taken on a
ca. sa. pursuant to the act of June 6, 1798, (1 Stats. at Large, 561,) does not release
his sureties from the judgment, nor operate as a satisfaction thereof. The United
States v. Stansbury, 704.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 14; BOND, 10. 13. 14; DEED, 1; EVIDENCE, 3; EXECU-
TORS, &c.; INJUNCTION, 1. 3; PUBLIC LANDS, 7; VERDICT; Writ of Error, 2
The jurisdiction of a county court may be inquired into by a circuit court of the
United States when the proceedings of the former are relied on in the latter; and
if no jurisdiction existed the proceedings are void. Elliott v. Piersol's Lessee, 601.
DEED, 2; INSURANCE, 15-19; LAW AND FACT; NONSUIT.
CURTESY; PUBLIC LANDS, 11; WILL, 2.
LAPSE OF TIME.
SLAVES, &c. 1.
When a matter of fact necessary to a defence is controverted, it is error to direct the
jury that the matters produced in evidence are sufficient to bar the action, and the
jury ought to find for the defendant; for this instruction withdraws the fact from
the jury. The United States v. Tillotson, 106.
DEED, 2; INSURANCE, 15-19.
ADMIRALTY, 1. 2; JUDGMENT, &c. 1; MECHANICS' BANK OF Alexandria;
1. To remove the bar of the statute of limitations by a new promise, it must be deter-
minate and unequivocal; and if a new promise is to be raised by implication of law
from an acknowledgment, there must be an unqualified acknowledgment of a sub-
sisting debt which the party is liable and willing to pay. Bell v. Morrison, 612.
2. A declaration by the personal representatives of the original debtor, deceased, that
he had no funds to pay the debts of the testator, will not take the case out of the
statute of limitations. Thompson v. Peter, 361.
3. One partner cannot deprive the firm of the bar of the statute of limitations, after a
dissolution of the partnership. Bell v. Morrison, 612.
LOST INSTRUMENT.
EQUITY, 3; EVIDENCE, 5; EXCEPTIONS, 3.
This court will not grant a mandamus to revise the proceedings of a circuit court as to
the pleadings. This can only be done by a writ of error after a final judgment. The
Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, 701.
MARSHAL.
BOND, 10; Costs, 2.
MECHANICS' BANK OF ALEXANDRIA.
The Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, under its charter, has no lien, for debts of a
trustee, on stock held in trust, with the knowledge of the board of directors. The
Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Seton, 585.
1. The act of February 28, 1795, (1 Stats. at Large, 424,) which confers power on the
President to call forth the militia in certain exigencies, is a constitutional law, and
the President is the exclusive and final judge whether the exigency has arisen
Martin v. Mott, 10.
2. A requisition by him is an order, and it is not necessary in pleading to set out the
order; it is enough to aver that it was made. Ib.
3. Disobedience of an order of the President calling forth the militia, renders a citizen
liable to trial by a court-martial. Ib.
4. Such a court-martial is not required to be organized according to the rules and
articles of war, under the acts of congress, nor did its authority expire with the war.
Ib.
MISDEMEANOR.
SLAVES, &c. 6.
Where parties deliberately agree not to secure a debt by mortgage, but to give and
receive a power of attorney authorizing the creditor to sell certain property of the
debtor, and apply its proceeds to the payment of the debt, and the power is annulled
by the death of the debtor, a court of equity will not direct a new security to be
given, or fix a lien on the property as security for the debt, though satisfied that the
parties acted in ignorance of that rule of law which makes the death of the constit-
uent a revocation of the power. Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Administrators, 419.
Equity does not treat a mortgage as a mere lien, but considers the mortgagee a trustee
for the mortgagor. Conard v. The Atlantic Insurance Co. of New York, 637.
1. On a motion for a new trial, if, upon the whole case, justice has been done, and the
verdict is substantially right, no new trial is granted, though some mistakes may
have been made. M'Lanahan v. The Universal Insurance Company, 518. ·
2. Aliter on a writ of error, for then the judgment must be reversed if any erroneous
ruling appears by the record to have entered into it. Ib.
DEVISE, &c. 2. 5. 6; EVIDENCE, 9.
NOLLE PROSEQUI
BOND, 11. 12.
NONSUIT.
A circuit court of the United States has not power to order a peremptory nonsuit
against the will of the plaintiff.
Elmore v. Grymes, 668.
He has a right to have his case submitted to a jury
D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 672.
NORTH CAROLINA,
PUBLIC LANDS, 10.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 6. 7; Bond, 15.
1. Though the rules as to parties in equity are somewhat flexible, yet where the court
can make no decree between the parties before it, upon their own rights, which are
independent of the rights of those not before it, it will not act. Mallow v. Hinde,
2. An objection for want of parties ought not to prevail at the hearing, on appeal,
except when the party is indispensably necessary. The Mechanics' Bank of Alex-
andria, v. Seton, 585.
3. To a bill for specific performance of a contract to convey land, the vendor is a
necessary party, though he has parted with all title, and his grantees are made parties.
Findlay v. Hinde, 552.
4. A legacy being given jointly to several families, whose individual members were not
ascertained by the will, all the legatees are necessary parties to a bill for payment
of the legacy. Pray v. Belt, 760.
5. A trustee, in whose name bank stock stands, and who is willing to transfer it to his
cestuis que trust, is not a necessary party to a bill against the bank to compel it to
allow a transfer. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Seton, 585.
6. Where the chief magistrate of a State is sued, not by his name, but in his official
character, and the claim is made upon him solely by reason of his holding the office
of governor, and no decree could be made against him personally, the State must be
considered as the real party on the record. The Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 481.
ABATEMENT, 2; ARBITRATION, 3. 4; LIMITATIONS, &c. 3.
1. A replication to a plea of general performance, in an action on a bond should
assign a special breach; but, after verdict, the omission to do so cannot be taken
advantage of. Minor v. The Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 445.
2. A general averment in a declaration, of readiness to perform an agreement to take a
lease, is good after verdict. Carroll v. Peake, 428.
3. An allegation that the lessor of the plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Missouri is
sufficient, without an averment that Missouri is one of the United States. Wright v.
Hollingsworth's Lessee, 515.
4. When a new count is filed, the defendant has a right to plead de novo; but if he
goes to trial on the old plea, which puts the whole declaration in issue, there is no
Ib.
ATTACHMENT; EQUITY, 3; EXECUtors, &c.; Insurance, 7.
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