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as there was yet time to swing the draw, had it been in good order, when the tender signaled his inability to do so. The tug, casting off the schooner, passed under the bridge, while the schooner collided with it, and injured her masts. There was evidence that the city superintendent of bridges had notice of the defective condition of the lock. Held, that the tug was not in fault for not slacking its speed as soon as it discovered that the draw was not swinging, and the city is solely liable for the collision.

2. SAME-SIGNALS TO OPEN BRIDGE-ANSWER.

Though the ringing of the bell on the bridges across the Chicago river, just before the draw is swung, is intended as a signal to persons on the street and bridge, it may be treated by an approaching vessel as an answer to her signal to open the bridge, and she is not in fault in proceeding on the strength of it, although the draw may not be swung immediately.

In Admiralty.

H. W. Wolseley, for libelant.

M. W. Robinson and Schuyler & Kremer, for respondents.

BLODGETT, J. The libelant, as the owner of the schooner City of Toledo, brings this suit to recover damages which the schooner sustained by a collision with the Clark-Street bridge, across the Chicago river, on the evening of Sunday, the 21st day of September, 1889, the schooner at the time of such collision being in tow of the tug Satisfaction, owned by the respondent the Vessel Owners Towing Company. The proof shows that the schooner was taken in tow at the entrance to Chicago harbor by the tug Satisfaction, and that the tug, with the schooner in tow, was proceeding up Chicago river at a safe rate of speed, and, soon after passing through the draw of State-Street bridge, whistled for the opening of Clark-Street bridge, the Dearborn-Street bridge being open, and no question is made but what this signal was given in ample time to have enabled the bridge to be opened, if in good repair. The signal of the tug was answered by the ringing of the bell upon the bridge, indicating that the bridge was about to open, and the tug proceeded with her tow, without materially slackening her speed, until near the east end of the protection of the Clark-Street bridge, when the bridge tender, who had made efforts to open the bridge, called out to the tug that he was unable to open it, whereupon the tug cast herself loose from the schooner and passed under the bridge, and the schooner came in collision with the bridge, breaking her foremast, and injuring her mainmast and standing rigging. The proof shows that the lock of the bridge was out of order, so that, when the attempt was made to swing the bridge, they were unable to unlock it, and hence were unable to swing it in response to the signal of the tug. The proof also shows that if, for any reason, the bridge tender is unable to open the bridge, or does not intend to open it, on a signal to do so from an approaching craft, a red ball should be displayed in the day-time, and a red light in the night-time. such signal was displayed on this occasion until just an instant before the collision, and about the time the bridge tender hailed the tug and said he could not open the bridge, when a red light was hoisted on a pole on the west side of the bridge, and in such position as not to be visible to those in charge of the tug. The proof also shows that, on receiving the signal from the tug to open the bridge, the bridge tender

No

rung his bell, and attempted to unlock the bridge preparatory to opening it, when he found the lock out of order. He had then ample time to have run up the red light as a signal to the tug to stop, but, instead of doing so, he waited to ascertain the difficulty with the lock, and took so much time to investigate the condition of the lock that the tug with the tow was close upon the bridge before he gave up his efforts to unlock and swing the bridge. Here was the fatal mistake of the bridge tender which brought about the collision. His plain duty was to have hoisted his red light, without an instant's delay, as soon as he found the lock would not work, instead of wasting time in futile attempts to open it, or in trying to find out why the lock would not work. I conclude from the proof that the bridge tender became aware that the lock was out of order when the tug was passing the Dearborn-Street draw, and, if his red light had been promptly displayed at that time, the tug would have had no difficulty in stopping her tow before she reached the Clark-Street bridge, while it is manifest from the proof that there was not time to have stopped the schooner after those in charge of the tug were told by the bridge tender that he could not swing the bridge. In fact, any attempt by the tug to stop the schooner after the hail would only have endangered the tug. The proof also shows that this lock had been for some time out of repair before the collision in question, and that the city's superintendent of bridges had notice that it was in bad order. Under these circumstances, I can see no reason why the tug was not justified in proceeding with her tow up to the time the call was made from the bridge notifying them that the bridge could not be swung. The bridge in question is operated by steam-power, as the proof shows, and swings very rapidly, so that, even if the bridge had been unlocked, and the steam-power applied at the time when the bridge tender called out to the tug that he could not swing the bridge, it could have been swung with sufficient rapidity to have been got out of the way of the schooner, and, in the absence of any signal that the bridge would not be swung, the tugmen are excusable for not stopping. I cannot, therefore, from the proof, affix any blame to those in charge of the tug, and certainly those in charge of the schooner were in no way blameworthy, because the schooner was entirely in the hands of the tugmen. The proof, therefore, satisfies me that the fault for the collision lies wholly with the employes of the city. The fact that the lock was out of order, and was liable to fail to operate at any time, is brought home to the city by proof of the knowledge of the superintendent of the bad condition of the lock; while the failure of the bridge tender to give warning to the tug to stop as soon as he found the lock refused to work is clearly a fault attributable to the city.

It is also urged, on the part of the city, that the ringing of the bell on the bridge, on a signal from a craft to open it, is not a response to the signal from such craft and a notice to the craft that the bridge will be opened, but is a mere warning to persons on the bridge that it is to be swung. Certainly there should and must be some responding signal to that given by the approaching craft for the opening of the bridge, and

the proof shows that the ringing of the bridge bell has always been accepted by tugmen as an assurance that the bridge will be opened. And, while the ringing of the bridge bell is a signal to persons on the street to keep off, and for persons on the bridge to get off, it is also a signal that the bridge will be opened; so that, as I have already said, the ringing of the bell was properly construed by those in charge of the tug as an indication that it would be opened. A decree will, therefore, be entered dismissing the libel as against the Vessel Owners Towing Company, and finding that the collision occurred solely by the fault and negligence of the city, and that the damages sustained by the schooner be paid by the city.

THE BAY OF NAPLES.1

HALL et al. v. THE BAY OF NAPLES.

(District Court, E. D. New York. November 19, 1890.)

1. SALVAGE-FIRE IN OIL CARGO.

A vessel, loaded with case oil and ready for sea, caught fire about 12 o'clock at night, while lying anchored in the harbor of New York. A passing tug went to her assistance, at the same time signaling for more help. Her signals collected seven other tugs and a ferry-boat, all of the available boats in the vicinity, and lastly came the police-boat Patrol, which had been sent for by the first tug to arrive. All of these boats pumped water on the fire, and extinguished it at about 5 o'clock in the morning. But 283 out of the 55,600 cases of oil were damaged. The saving to the owners of vessel and cargo, without considering freight, was $81,400. There was no extraordinary labor or exposure or peril to life. Held, that the salving vessels should collectively recover $20,000 as salvage.

2. SAME

IMMINENT PERIL-PROMPTNESS OF SALVORS.

At the outset of the fire moments being of the greatest importance, the salvage was divided among the tugs with reference to the time of their arrival at the scene of the fire, and also their capacity for pumping.

9. SAME-FERRY-BOAT AS SALVOR.

When a ferry-boat abandons a regular trip to go to the aid of a vessel in distress, the peculiar nature of her employment is to be considered in determining the amount of her award.

In Admiralty.

Suits by various tugs and a ferry-boat against the ship Bay of Naples and cargo, to recover compensation for salvage services. The different suits were consolidated on motion of claimants.

Carpenter & Mosher, for the Moran, the Garlick, and the Pratt.

Wing, Shoudy & Putnam, for the Leader, the Talisman, and the Indian.
Peter S. Carter, for the Harvey W. Temple.

McCarthy & Berier, for the John Sylvester.
R. D. Benedict, for the Charm.

Butler, Stillman & Hubbard, for claimants.

BENEDICT, J. On the night of September 2, 1889, while the ship Bay of Naples was lying in the harbor of New York, at anchor below Bedloe's

1 Reported by Edward G. Benedict, Esq., of the New York bar.

island, in the channel, and loaded for a voyage to sea, with a cargo consisting of 55,600 cases of kerosene oil contained in tin cans,-two cans being inclosed in a box of pine wood, and making a case,-fire broke out in the cargo in the between-decks near the fore-hatch. The time when the fire broke out was 11:30 or 11:40, and at this time the tugs that navigate the harbor were laid up fast to the docks for the night. The ship lay where the fire-boats of the corporations of New York and Brooklyn would not go. She was at anchor, and not at dock, and she was in imminent danger of total destruction. Shortly after the fire broke out, it was discerned by the steam-tug Moran, then bound to sea with a vessel in tow. The Moran at once abandoned her tow, and proceeded to the assistance of the ship, at the same time blowing her whistles loudly. Soon she was followed by the following named tugs, which arrived at the ship in the following order: After the steam-tug Moran, at 12:10, came the John Sylvester at 12:15; the Leader and the Talisman. at 12:30; the Harvey W. Temple at 1; the Pratt at 1:15; the Indian at 1:30; the Garlick and the Charm at 1:45. All of these tugs were provided with powerful pumps, some having a greater pumping capacity than others, and each commenced to pour water into the ship as soon as possible after arrival, and continued until the fire was extinguished. The Pratt, as soon as she arrived, passed a hawser to the ship, and towed her across the harbor to the flats below Governor's island, and there began to pump water into her. The other eight tugs continued their pumping until 5 o'clock, when the fire was completely extinguished, and the tugs were dismissed. By the fire only 283 of the cases out of 55,600 composing the cargo received any damage. The oil left in the 283 damaged cases filled 211 new cases, so that the actual loss of oil was only 72 cases. It cost to restore the vessel and cargo to its original condition $27,638. The sound value of the vessel was $57,500, and the value of the cargo $51,430, making a total of $108,930. I do not include the freight. The saving to the owners was $81,400. The nine tugs now sue for salvage compensation. Unquestionably the service rendered by the tugs to this ship was a salvage service of a high order. It seems certain that in the absence of these tugs the ship would have been destroyed by fire, or at least scuttled and sunk in deep water. In support of the contention of the claimants that 6 per cent. of the value of the property saved is sufficient compensation, it is said the evidence shows that after the arrival of the Leader, upon the suggestion of the master of the Leader, the blowing of signals was stopped on all tugs. This, it is claimed, shows an intention on the part of the salvors to suppress information as to the distress of the ship for their own benefit, and was an act of bad faith on the part of the salvors, which should greatly reduce their compensation. But as against this fact should be stated the fact that, as soon as the Moran arrived at the ship, she not only blew loud signals, and sent men in their boat to bring the Garlick, but she sent the Temple to notify the police-boat, and all the tugs blew alarm whistles until nine boats had arrived or were on their way to the ship, and, as the result showed, the assistance at hand was sufficient to save the ship. While

the evidence showing the discontinuance of those signals certainly deserves attention, still I am of the opinion that it cannot be held in the present case to prove bad faith on the part of the salvors for the reason that, at the time the signals were discontinued, the assistance which had actually arrived or was on the way was sufficient to control the fire and save the ship. As nothing was gained by the tugs, nor anything lost by the ship, through the discontinuance of the whistles, I feel able to pass over the act under the circumstances of this case.

Again, it is said in behalf of the claimants that the result in this case shows petroleum oil of high grade and in tin cans and wooden cases, such as this cargo, to be not particularly inflammable, and the peril to the ship was therefore more apparent than real; but, in my opinion, the result in this case does not touch the question whether a cargo of petroleum packed in cases is highly inflammable or not, but rather shows what control over fire in a cargo highly inflammable can be obtained by prompt application of water by powerful tugs.

Again it is said that evidence as to the presence of the police-boat Patrol should largely modify the libelant's estimation of the peril to the ship. The proofs show that the Patrol, after being notified of the fire by the Temple, started for the ship, but passed her, and did not arrive along-side of her until 1:45. Before the Patrol arrived, the vessel had grounded on the flats, and, although the fire was still burning in her, it was under complete control, and was certain to be entirely extinguished by the tugs. The Patrol was a powerful fire-boat, and by throwing three of her eight streams into the ship she no doubt hastened the end, but no more. In this case, therefore, the proofs show that the police-boat furnished no substantial assistance to the ship, and her presence cannot affect the salvage.

Again, it is said the service involved no peril to life or to the tugs themselves. They did nothing but pump, and they were constructed to do that. It is not to be denied that the service in question was rendered without peril, and without any extraordinary exertion. The time occupied was five hours. The weather was fair. There was no extraordinary labor, nor any exposure, nor peril to life. These considerations must, of course, tend to diminish the amount of the salvage award. Nevertheless, the service rendered was voluntary; it was rendered promptly to a ship in great danger; and it was eminently successful, and should be compensated by a liberal amount. The fact of controlling importance in determining the amount of award is the danger to which the vessel was exposed. Here a peculiar danger arose out of the time when the fire broke out. If the fire had broken out in the daytime, the first signal from the ship, situated where she was, would have literally filled the surface of the water about her with tugs willing and able to aid. But this fire broke out at a time when the tugs are laid up, and scarcely a vessel about, except a few ferry-boats; and, with fire in such a cargo as this, it was a question of minutes. It may well be believed that a delay of 30 minutes in obtaining aid would have given the fire a headway that would have put it beyond control. As it was, the

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