Craig v. The State of Missouri. 4 P. form the consideration, shall be held valid. Is there an incompatibility in these provisions? Does the latter destroy the former, or render it ineffectual? Suppose a State should coin money, would such money not constitute a valuable consideration for a promissory note? Would not the intrinsic value of the silver, as bullion, be a sufficient consideration? Would such a construction conflict with the constitution? A State is prohibited from coining money, consequently the money which it may coin cannot be circulated as such. A creditor will be under no obligation to receive it in discharge of his debt. If any statutory provision of the State should be formed, with a view of forcing the circulation of such coin by suspending the interest or postponing the debt of a creditor where it was refused, such statute would be void, because it would act on the thing prohibited, and come directly in conflict with the constitution. Such would not be the case in reference to the obligation given for this coin. * In the first place, the act would be voluntary on the part of the purchaser; and, in the second, the consideration would be a [*461] valuable one. The statute sanctions not the coin, but the obligation which was given for it. The act of creating the consideration may be denounced and punished, as in the case of usury in Pennsylvania; and yet the obligation held good. Would this construction render ineffectual the prohibition of the constitution? This may be answered by considering how ineffectual this provision must be, if its efficacy depend on making void the contract. The loaning of this coin is only one of many modes which a State might adopt to circulate it. In the payment of its creditors, and in works of improvement, the State could always find the most ample means of circulation. Effect is given to this provision of the constitution, by limiting it to the thing prohibited. If a State emit bills of credit, or coin money, neither can pass as money, whatever may be the regulation on the subject. No penalties have been provided to prevent such a circulation; no sanctions to enforce it would be valid. But, it is contended, that the offence consists in circulating the bills; that being the meaning of the word "emit." Congress may issue bills of credit, and perhaps have done so in the emissions of treasury notes; is a State prohibited from circulating them? If not, it must be admitted the violation of the constitution consists, not in the circulation of such bills, but in their creation. The prohibition of the constitution was intended to act on the sovereignty of a State in its legislative capacity. But there is no power in the federal government which can act upon this sovereignty. Craig v. The State of Missouri. 4 P. It is only when its inhibited acts affect the rights of individuals that the judicial power of the Union can be interposed. If a state legislature pass an ex post facto law, or a law impairing the obligation of contracts, it remains a harmless enactment on the statute book, until it is brought to bear, injuriously, on individual rights. So, if a State coin money or emit bills of credit, the question of right must be raised before this tribunal, in the same man ner. The law of Missouri expressly sanctions the obligations given on a loan of these certificates. Had not this been done, and if the certificates were bills of credit within the * meaning [* 462 ] of the constitution, the obligations might have been considered void, as against the policy of the supreme law of the land. There is no pretence that there has been a failure of consideration for which the notes in controversy were given. The certificates have long since been received by the State as money, and the promisors have realized their full value. If they can avoid the payment of their notes, as they wish to do by the defence set up, it must be alone on the ground of the illegality of the consideration. Suppose the notes had been given, under the same circumstances, payable to an individual from whom the consideration had been received, could the defence be sustained? In such a case, there could be no allegation of a failure of consideration. The constitution prohibits the State from issuing the certificates, but the law of Missouri declares that obligations given for these certificates shall be valid. These notes, being given for a valuable consideration, may be enforced, unless the constitution makes them void. This it does not do by express provision; and can they be avoided by inference? An inference, which does not necessarily follow, as has been shown from the prohibition; because such a consequence is prevented by the act of Missouri. This act may be void as to the emission of the bills, but it does not follow that the part which relates to the notes must also be void. It would seem, therefore, that effect may be given to the provision of the constitution, so as to prevent the mischief, by operating upon the circulation of the bills, without extending the consequence so as to make void the contract expressly sanctioned by the law of Missouri. And if such a construction may be given, will not the court incline to give it, in order that both laws may be carried into full effect, where their provisions do not come directly in conflict? The passing of counterfeit money is prohibited under severe penalties by the laws of every State; and is it not in the power of a State to provide by law, that every obligation given for counterfeit Craig v. The State of Missouri. 4 P. * paper, known to be such by both parties, shall be valid? [* 463] This will scarcely be denied. And if a State may do this, under its sovereign power to regulate contracts, may it not give validity to the notes under consideration? Had not the State of Missouri a right to provide that every citizen who should voluntarily execute an obligation for the payment of money to the State, should be held bound to pay it, although given without consideration? If this do not come within the province of legislation in a sovereign State, I know not where its powers may not be restricted. And if this may be done, can the notes under consideration be held void. If the certificates were illegally created, they were of value, and under the law of Missouri constituted a valuable consideration for the notes given. In any view, the notes which were executed being sanctioned by law, and consequently valid even without consideration, cannot be less so when given for the certificates. I am, therefore, inclined to say, not without great hesitation, as I differ with the majority of the court, that the judgment should be affirmed on this ground. In the first place, then, from the consideration which I have been able to give this case, I am not convinced that the certificates issued by the State of Missouri were bills of credit, within the meaning of the constitution. And unless my conviction was clear on this point, my duty and inclination unite to sustain the judgment of the supreme court of Missouri. And secondly, as has been shown, it appears to me that the contract on which this action is founded is not void, even admitting that the certificates were bills of credit. All questions of power arising under the constitution of the United States, whether they relate to the federal or a state government, must be considered of great importance. The federal government being formed for certain purposes, is limited in its powers, and can in no case exercise authority where the power has not been delegated. The States are sovereign, with the exception of certain powers which have been invested in the general government, and inhibited to the States. No State can coin money, emit bills of credit, pass ex post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts, &c. If any State violate a provision of the consti tution, or be charged with such violation, to the injury of [* 464 ] * private rights, the question is made before this tribunal, to whom all such questions, under the constitution, of right belong. In such a case, this court is to the State what its own supreme court would be, where the constitutionality of a law was questioned under the constitution of the State. And within the delegation of power the decision of this court is as final and con Craig v. The State of Missouri. 4 P. clusive on the State as would be the decision of its own court in the case stated. That distinct sovereignties could exist under one government, emanating from the same people, was a phenomenon in the political world which the wisest statesmen in Europe could not comprehend; and of its practicability many in our own country entertained the most serious doubts. Thus far the friends of liberty have had great cause of triumph in the success of the principles upon which our government rests. But all must admit that the purity and permanency of this system depend on its faithful administration. The States and the federal government have their respective orbits within which each must revolve. If either cross the sphere of the other, the harmony of the system is destroyed and its strength is impaired. It would be as gross usurpation on the part of the federal government, to interfere with state rights, by an exercise of powers not delegated, as it would be for a State to interpose its authority against a law of the Union. The judiciary of a State, in all cases brought before them, have a right to decide whether or not an act of the federal government be constitutional, the same as they have a right to determine on the constitutionality of an act under the state constitution; but, in all such cases, this tribunal may supervise the decisions. It is often a difficult matter to define the limitations of the legislative, the executive, and the judicial powers of a State; and this difficulty is greater in defining the limitations of the federal government. In both cases, the respective constitutions must be looked to as the source of power; but in the latter, it is often necessary to determine, not only whether the power be vested, but whether it is inhibited to the State. Some powers in the general government are exclusive; others concurrent with the States. The experience of many years may be necessary to establish, *by practical illustrations, [* 465 ] the exact boundaries of these powers, if, indeed, they can ever be clearly and satisfactorily defined. Like the colors of the rainbow, they seem to intermix, so as to render a separation extremely difficult, if not impracticable. By the exercise of a spirit of mutual forbearance, the line may be ascertained with sufficient precision for all practical purposes. In a State where doubts exist as to the investiture of power, it should not be exercised, but referred to the people; in the general government, should similar doubts arise, the powers should be referred to the States and the people. 5 P. 248; 6 P. 41; 8 P. 40; 10 P. 368; 11 P. 257; 12 P. 657; 7 H. 833; 13 H. 190. 13* Hollingsworth v. Barbour. 4 P. HENRY HOLLINGSWORTH, Heir of LEVI HOLLINGSWORTH, Appellant, v. PHILIP BARBOUR and others, Appellees. 4 P. 466. A suit in equity was brought against the unknown heirs of a person who was alleged to have held the legal title in trust for the complainant, and notice having been published in certain newspapers, calling on such heirs to appear, the bill was taken for confessed, and a decree made for the complainant. Held, that as the statute authorized such notice only when the complainant claimed as locator, or by an instrument in writing, and the complainant did not so claim, the decree was made without notice, the court had not jurisdiction, and the decree was merely void. APPEAL from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. Sheffey, for the appellants. Wickliffe, for the appellees. [ * 467 ] This was a bill filed on the equity side of the court, by the appellants, setting forth that, on the 21st of February, 1784, a certain John Abel Hamlin entered with the proper surveyor for the district of Kentucky, 45,000 acres of land, lying in the county of Washington, by virtue of sundry treasury warrants issued by the State of Virginia. That a survey was made thereon, on the 13th of April, 1786; and a patent issued the 8th of June, 1798, to the said John Abel Hamlin. That previous to the date of such entry, the complainant had purchased from the said Hamlin the warrants on which the entry and surveys had been made, for the sum of $3,700, which he paid. That although the entries, survey, and patent were in the name of said Hamlin, they were for the benefit of the complainant, who alleged the equitable title thereto as belonging to him. That Hamlin being dead, without having made a conveyance, the complainant, in 1814, exhibited his bill in chancery, in the circuit court for the county of Washington, against the unknown heirs of said Hamlin, and obtained a decree of said court, ordering them to convey to him the legal title of said lands, by a day named in said decree; in default whereof the court appointed a commissioner for that purpose, who, by deed approved by the court, conveyed the same to the complainant, on the 15th of August, 1815; by virtue of which decree and conveyance, he became vested with the right, title, and interest of said Hamlin to all the lands embraced in the patent of the commonwealth to him. * BALDWIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The bill then sets forth that the defendants, sixty-six in number, |