Caldwell v. Taggart. 4 P. templation, and in one or the other or both those rights, to have the property placed in the hands of a receiver, that the income may be applied to extinguish prior incumbrances and leave the property free to satisfy this claim. The bill also contains the prayer for general relief, but the specific claim must first be disposed of before the general prayer can be considered. The court below sustained the allegations of the bill relative to the promise to mortgage the specific property, and decreed Caldwell to execute a mortgage accordingly, to secure the principal sum of $15,760. It then goes on to order the interest calculated to the date of the decree, amounting to $7,500, to be paid by a day prescribed, or, in default thereof, that the property so ordered to be mortgaged to secure the principal, shall be sold to raise the interest. We think it clear that there is an error in this, since the * interests of those in remainder would thus be sacrificed to [ * 201 ] the first taker. And although there is no appeal taken in their behalf, yet the court, while interfering to prevent the breach of a trust in behalf of the father, can hardly be expected to pass over without noticing an omission in the father, amounting to a breach of trust, to the prejudice of his infant children. In an instance, therefore, in which a decree so obviously needs reforming, it is without reluctance that the court lays hold of such legal grounds for reversing it as may be considered under the appeal taken by the defendant. The complainants in their bill set out that soon after the receiving and using the release before mentioned, Caldwell purchased the five sevenths of the interest in the Sulphur Springs, and shortly after mortgaged the same to Sullivan and others to secure certain large sums which they had assumed for him; that this mortgage was foreclosed according to the laws of Virginia, and finally lifted and assigned to Mr. Richard Singleton, who advanced thereon, for the relief of Caldwell, $23,000, to secure which the latter executed a trust deed to A. Stevenson and F. Bowyer, which it appears became absolute by failure of payment more than a year since. And when the defendant, Caldwell, as well as Frances Bedford, come to answer to the allegation of the purchaser of the property in question, we find that, although Caldwell has repeatedly executed deeds conveying or incumbering five sevenths of the whole, he does not pretend to make title to more than one seventh, to wit, the share of James Bowyer. The rest are either vested in his wife or his children, or incumbered with prior liens, which will probably sweep the whole. His answer also introduces into the cause a deed of partition, or Caldwell v. Taggart. 4 P. one partaking of that character, executed by the parties interested in this property, bearing date in 1810, by which a division or distribution has been agreed upon adapted to the nature of the property, and in which every individual has so distinct an interest that it may well be questioned whether, until it is in some way carried [* 202] into execution, it will be possible for any purchaser to know what he is buying. This deed has not been copied into the record sent up, but it is presumed that it could hardly have been passed over in the court below. Of the interests thus introduced into the cause by the answer, that of the children of Thomas Bowyer, as set out in Mrs. Bedford's answer, and that of the children of Mrs. Caldwell and Mrs. Copeland, as shown by the will of William Bowyer, are wholly unrepre sented. And as to the interest of Mrs. Copeland or her representatives, although there was an order for a decree nisi, the decree nowhere appears to have been entered, nor evidence of the service or return of the rule exhibited in the record. In reply to all these grounds of reversal, for want of parties or for want of due maturation for a final hearing, it has been urged that nothing is ordered to be mortgaged or sold beside Caldwell's own interest, whatever that may be. But this we conceive to be an insufficient answer. It is not enough that a court of equity causes nothing but the interest of the proper party to change owners. Its decrees should terminate and not instigate litigation. Its sales should tempt men to sober investment, and not to wild speculation. Its process should act upon known and definite interests, and not upon such as admit of no medium of estimation. It has the means of reducing every right to certainty and precision, and is therefore bound to employ those means in the exercise of its jurisdiction. There is no want of learning in the books on this subject. The general rule is laid down thus: "however numerous the persons interested in the subject of a suit, they must all be made parties plaintiffs or defendants in order that a complete decree may be made; it being the constant aim of a court of equity to do complete justice by embracing the whole subject, deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested in the subject of a suit; to make the performance of the order perfectly safe to those who have to obey it, and to prevent future litigation." And again, "all persons are to be made parties who are legally or beneficially interested in [*203] the subject-matter and result of the suit," extending, in most cases, to heirs at law, trustees, and executors. * Caldwell v. Taggart. 4 P. Thus, in a case in which a remainder-man in tail brought a bill against the tenant for life, to have the title-deeds brought into court, and there were annuitants on the reversion, and a child interested under a trust term of years prior to the limitation to the plaintiff, that is, incumbrances prior and posterior to the plaintiff, Lord Hardwicke, 3 Atk. 570, refused a decree without first making them parties. So, where husband, tenant for life, remainder to his wife for life, remainder over, brought his bill without joining the wife, the objection was made and sustained, on the ground that, if there was a decree against the husband, it would not bind the wife. 1 Atk. 289. So, if an under mortgagee brings his bill to foreclose the original mortgagor, he must make the first mortgagee a party. 3 P. W. 643. This is the relation in which the complainants here seek to place themselves in reference to Mr. Singleton. And there are various cases in which, though the heir at law is not a necessary party, he is made such in practice, and the reason assigned is to free the estate from every blame that may lessen its value at the sale. 2 Ves. 431; 3 P. W. 91; 3 Br. Ch. Rep. 229, 365. And so in cases of indefinite or blended interests, all the participators are necessary parties, as where a residue is devised to several, or even devised by specified shares. It is clear, then, that this cause must go back, as well to have the necessary parties made as to have the decree reformed and reduced to legal precision. It is true this course might have been avoided, if this court, upon looking through the complainants' case, and allowing the full benefit of every thing that has been legally established, had seen that a decree might now finally be rendered against the appellant. It would then have been nugatory to send it back for parties. But such is not the conclusion to which this court has arrived. It has already expressed the opinion that, to a certain extent, it is a very clear case for relief, and all the difficulties arise upon the nature of the * relief prayed and granted. There is no knowing what [ * 204 ] new aspect may be given to the cause when all the necessary parties come in and answer. But as it is now presented, had the prayer for specific relief upon the Sulphur Springs been out of cause, it would not have been sent back without such a decree against the defendant, Caldwell, as the court below ought to have rendered. the 13 P. 360. Lloyd v. Scott. 4 P. JOHN LLOYD, Plaintiff in Error, v. CHARLES SCOTT, Bailiff of WILLIAM S. MOORE, Defendant. 4 P. 205. A bona fide purchase of an annuity, even if the vendor has the option to repurchase at a certain sum, and though the effect be to give to the purchaser a greater rate of compensation for his money than the rate of interest allowed by law, is not usurious, unless it is a mere device to cover a usurious loan; this is a question of intent dehors the papers. If a usurious loan, by way of an annuity, with a right of repurchase, is charged on real property as a rent, and distress is made for arrears after the premises have been sold, the purchaser may set up the usury, and thus invalidate the distress. ERROR to the circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. E. J. Lee and Swann, for the plaintiff. Taylor and Jones, contrà. [ *221 ] This is an action of replevin, brought to replevy certain goods and chattels which the defendant, as bailiff of William S. Moore, had taken upon a distress for rent claimed to be due upon certain houses and lots in Alexandria, owned and possessed by the plaintiff. The sum for which the distress was made is $500. * M'LEAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The declaration is in the usual form, and the damages are laid at $1,000. The defendant filed his cognizance, in which he acknowledges the taking of the goods specified in the declaration, and states that a certain Jonathan Scholfield, being seised in fee of four brick tenements and a lot of ground in the town of Alexandria, by his indenture, dated the 11th of June, 1814, in consideration of $5,000, granted, bargained, and sold to William S. Moore one certain annuity or yearly rent of $500, to be issuing out of and charged upon the said houses and ground, and paid to the said Moore, his heirs and assigns, by equal half yearly payments of $250, on the 10th of December and on the 10th of June in each year forever thereafter, to have and to hold the said annuity or rent charged and payable as aforesaid, to the said William S. Moore, his heirs and assigns forever. It also states that the said Scholfield, for himself and his heirs and assigns, did, by the said indenture, among other things, [* 222 ] * covenant well and truly to pay to the said Moore, his heirs and assigns, the said annual rent of $500, by equal half yearly payments, forever. And if the rent should not be paid as it became due, it should be lawful for the said Moore, his heirs and Lloyd v. Scott. 4 P. assigns, to make distress for it; that Moore was seised of the rent on the 11th of December, 1814, and has since remained seised thereof. The cognizance further states that, on the 29th of October, 1816, the said Jonathan Scholfield, by his deed of bargain and sale, conveyed to Lloyd, the plaintiff, forever, certain tenements and lots of ground in the town of Alexandria, whereof the said four brick tenements and lot of ground were parcel, and subject to the rent-charge stated; that Lloyd has been seised ever since and possessed of the same; and that on the 10th of June, 1824, $250, a part of the rent, was due, and on the 10th of December following, $250, the balance of the annual rent, was due and unpaid, for which sums the defendant, as bailiff, levied a distress. The cognizance is concluded by praying a judgment for $1,000, being double the amount of the rent in arrear. Moore covenants in the deed that if Scholfield, his heirs or assigns, "shall, at any time after the expiration of five years from the date of the deed, pay to the said Moore, his heirs or assigns, the sum of $5,000, together with all arrears of rent, and a ratable dividend of the rent for the time which shall have elapsed between the half year day then next preceding and the day on which such payment shall be made, he, the said Moore, his heirs and assigns, will execute and deliver any deeds or instruments which may be necessary for releasing and extinguishing the rent or annuity hereby created, which, on such payment being made, shall forever after cease to be payable.” Scholfield covenanted for himself, his heirs and assigns, that he would keep the buildings in repair, have them fully insured against fire, and would assign the policies of insurance to such trustee as Moore, his heirs or assigns, might appoint, that the money may be applied to the rebuilding of the houses destroyed [* 223 ] by fire, or repairing any damage which they might suffer. * To this cognizance, the plaintiff filed a special demurrer, which in the argument he abandoned, and relies upon the special pleas of usury. To each of the four pleas the defendant demurs specially, and assigns for causes of demurrer 1. That the said pleas do not set forth with any reasonable certainty the pretended contract which is alleged to have been usurious, and do not show an usurious contract. 2. That they do not state the time the said pretended loan was made. 3. That they do not state the amount of interest reserved or intended to be reserved on the said pretended contract. 4. That they do not set forth any loan or forbearance of any debt. 5. That they neither admit nor deny the sale and conveyance of |