NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. MARCH-APRIL, 1877. ABT. I. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND ITS BEARINGS. II. DEMONOLOGY. BY RALPH WALDO EMERSON III. CHRISTIAN POLICY IN TURKEY. BY LAURENCE OLIPHANT. 190 IV. WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. BY RICHARD GRANT WHITE . . 213 With a Memoir of his Life and Selections from his Letters V. ENGLISH ARCTIC EXPEDITION (with Circumpolar Map). By VI. POETRY AND VERSE-MAKING. BY CHARLES T. CONGDON . The Fall of Virtue: Being a Paraphrase of the whole The Napolead. In Twelve Books. By THOMAS H. GENIN. The Vendetta, and other Poems. By THOMAS BROWER Suicide, considered Practically and Philosophically. By 229 246 VII. THE INSURANCE CRISIS. BY SHEPPARD HOMANS . ART. PAGE Benedicti De Spinoza Opera Quæ Supersunt Omnia. Editionibus Principibus Denuo Edidit et Prefatus Est CARO- LUS HERMANNUS BRUDER.. Vol. I. - III. Ad Benedicti De Spinoza Opera Quæ Supersunt Omnia Spinoza. Ein Denkerleben. Von BERTHOLD AUERBACH. 1. Walker's Wages Question, 305. - 2. Ferrier's Functions of the Brain, 310.—3. Balzac's Correspondance, 314. 4. Spear's Religion and the State, 318. - 5. Lange's Commentary on Ezekiel and Daniel, 320. 6. Morris's Sigurd the Volsung, 323. —7. Daudet's Sidonie, 325. 8. Kismet, 327. 9. Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law, 328. — 10. Bixby's Physical and Religious Knowledge, 330.11. Preston's Troubadours and Trouvères, 331.-12. Loring's Farmyard Club of Jo- tham, 333.-13. Warner's Eastern Travels, 335.-14. The Atlantic NORTH AMERICAN No. CCLV. REVIEW. MARCH-APRIL, 1877. ART. I. — THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND ITS BEARINGS. Now come the President and Vice-President of Mexico to our hospitable shores-the latest fugitives from the "halls of the Montezumas"-to repeat to us the old, old story of revolution in a Spanish-American state over a disputed Presidential election. The latter, to an enterprising reporter at San Francisco, hastened to disburden himself of the precious tale of a coerced election, a broken law, successful revolt, fleeing officials, and a dictator installed in power; and he foresees another sham election in the near future, and fresh outbreaks following it. More recently the former, upon arriving at New York, gave his version of the same transactions, including his own grievances and expulsion from power. When Mr. Bancroft, in his eulogy upon Lincoln, in a voice which penetrated to the farthest corners of the Representatives' Hall, and startled the diplomatic representatives of foreign powers, exclaimed, "Mexico shall rise again!" his audience broke into loud applause. His voice sounded in their ears as the voice of the New World to the Old, pronouncing the utter expulsion of monarchy from an American state, and warning all Eastern powers against meddling with Western institutions. The end soon came of the Mexican monarchy: Maximilian was slaughtered by Escobedo, and Juarez reigned in his stead; and thereat all the people rejoiced, regarding the event as a gracious deliverance of their country from foreign interference, and a signal vindication of their right of self-government. But the hopes of orderly free governVOL. CXXIV.NO. 255. 11 ment then indulged in by the Mexican nation have not been realized. Disturbed political conditions have characterized that country ever since, the latest phases of which have been, as above mentioned, described to us by our fugitive guests, Iglesias and Lerdo, who appear to look hopefully forward to fresh convulsions and changes as means for the redemption of their country from the despotism of their successor. But this most recent story of republican turbulence in Mexico does not differ in its general features from former ones which we have heard from other Spanish-American states. In all those states the revolutionary disease appears to be chronic, manifesting itself repeatedly, unsettling the business pursuits of the people, and constituting a great obstacle to all improvement and progress in wealth and civilization. In the dozen of them south of us, between 1858 and 1861, or within a period of three years, there was revolt against government in all but two, in every case arising more or less directly from a disputed presidential election. Admonished by these examples, by our own civil war as connected with the election of 1860, and by the recent peril in the ascertainment of electoral returns, we may well turn our attention to our electoral system for the choice of President and Vice-President, to ascertain wherein it has been shown to be defective by time and trial, and prepare ourselves, without delay, for its correction and amendment. It was the intention of the framers of the Constitution of the United States to remove the election of President from popular excitement and controversy, by vesting the power of choice in select bodies of men distinguished by experience and wisdom. But the provisions directed to that end have entirely failed of their purpose. It is, therefore, very generally agreed that electors and electoral colleges, as features of our system, are useless, if not pernicious, and may be properly dispensed with in future, if some convenient and acceptable substitute for them can be provided. It is also generally agreed that some regulations, constitutional or statutory, should be provided for the orderly and just decision of contested returns of elections. But no complete view of the subject of amendment can be obtained without a preliminary examination of all the main defects of the present system, and a consideration of the evils and dangers to which they lead. Such examination cannot be here fully made, but it may be made as to several defects which have an intimate connection with remedial propositions to be presently mentioned, the statement of which is the principal object of this article. 1. Our system permits the election of candidates who receive a minority of the popular vote, so that upon occasion the spectacle may be presented of a complete inversion of the republican principle that the greater number of voices at an election shall prevail. It will always be impossible to reconcile the mass of the people to results in flat contempt of the majority rule, applied to popular elections, and persistent defiance of that rule must lead to ultimate disaster. A candidate for President who shall receive a clear majority of the whole popular vote of the country cannot be excluded from office without much dissatisfaction among the people and a weakening of confidence in republican institutions. 2. It permits plurality candidates, and even those not highest in vote as such, to obtain majorities in electoral colleges; in fact, the vote of candidates in those colleges bears no just proportion to the popular vote which they have received. A notable illustration of this is furnished by the election of 1860, in which each electoral vote cast for Mr. Douglas represented 114,596 popular votes, while each electoral vote for Mr. Lincoln represented but 10,369; and in 1864 the popular ratio for the Lincoln electors was 10,292, and for McClellan electors, 86,274. 3. Another practical result of our system, quite unforeseen by the framers of the Constitution, and one greatly to be deprecated, may occur at any election, and did very nearly occur in the election of 1860, above mentioned. The Constitution provides that in case no candidate shall receive a majority of all the electoral votes, the House of Representatives, voting by States, shall choose the President from among the three candidates highest in vote. Turning to the election returns of 1860, we obtain the following statement: In proportion to the popular vote, Mr. Lincoln should have had 121 electors, Douglas 89, Breckenridge 55, and Bell 38. If there |