P. Wms. R. 409. Adair v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & Lef. 263. Jones v. Walkup, 5 Sneed's [Tenn.].R. 135.) In these cases, when the husband is sued as the administrator of his wife, to recover debts due from the wife dum sola, the court will decree payment to the extent of what the husband has received since his wife's death as her administrator, and he will be declared liable for so much only. If, however, the husband make a settlement upon the wife, in consideration of his wife's fortune, which is expressly secured to him it would not be subject to her debts dum sola, not being collected during coverture. In that case the creditor would be remediless unless he collect his debt during the life of the wife. Mitford, 9 Ves. R. 87.)

(Mitford v.

The bankruptcy of the husband does not take away the right of the wife's creditors dum sola to look for payment to her property, which has been fraudulently conveyed away; nor will his discharge in bankruptcy destroy the creditor's right to enforce the debt against the property of the wife. (Hamlin v. Bridge, 24 Maine R. 145.)

upon his

It may be remarked that the husband administrator deceased wife's estate is not accountable to her heirs for the assets, although he have a balance in his hands. Such assets belong absolutely to the husband. (Clay v. Irvine, 4 Watts & Serg. [Pa.] R. 232. Whitaker v. Whitaker, 6 Johns. [N. Y.] R. 112.)

The husband is entitled to administer upon the intestate wife's estate, and takes all her personal property, after payment of her debts; and he cannot, of course, be cited to account by her next of kin. This is the rule at common law, and always prevails unless expressly changed by statute. (Shumway v. Cooper, 16 Barb. R. 556.) If the husband, without taking out letters of administration, obtain possession of his wife's personal property, he may retain it against his wife's next of kin; and if administration be granted to a third person, the administrator of the wife is trustee to the husband. (Whitaker v. Whitaker, supra.) But more of this hereafter.

The husband is liable for a devastavit committed by his wife dum sola; that is, whatever assets came to her hands as the personal representative of a deceased person, and were wasted by her previous to the coverture, he is chargeable with as for her debt during coverture. (Adair v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & Lef. 263, 267. In re Mc Williams, Ib. 172. Carroll v. Cannott, 2 J. J. Marsh. [Ky.] R.

199. Phillips v. Richardson, 4 ib. 215. Graves v. Downey, 3 Mon. [Ky.] R. 355. Chaplin v. Simmons, 7 ib. 339. Moore v. Henderson, 4 Dessau. [S. C.] R. 459. Knox v. Picket, Ib. 92. Gratz v. Phillips, 1 Penn. R. 333.) So also the husband is liable for the acts of his wife before coverture as executrix de son tort, that is, "of her own wrong." (Hubble v. Fogertie, 3 Rich. [S. C.] R. 413.) But here again the rule comes in that the husband must be prosecuted during coverture, for he is not liable for the devastavit of his wife committed before marriage. (Maffit v. Commonwealth, 5 Barr's [Pa.] R. 359. Elliot v. Lewis, 3 Edw. [N. Y.] Ch. R. 40, 45.) However, if judgment be had against husband and wife for a devastavit by the wife as executrix dum sola, and she die before execution issues, it may be executed against the husband after her death. (Eyre v. Coward, 1 Sid. R. 337.)

If the husband dies before the wife's debt is recovered, the wife surviving is liable for the debt. (Woodman v. Chapman, 1 Camp. R. 189.) But it has been held that the wife surviving is not liable in such case, if the husband, during coverture, obtained a certificate in bankruptcy, for the certificate discharges the wife's debts as well as his own. (Lockwood v. Salter, 27 Eng. C. L. R. 82. Miles v. Williams, 1 P. Wms. R. 249.) On the contrary, it has been held in the State of New York, that the discharge of the husband in bankruptcy does not discharge the wife, the court of appeals holding that the bankruptcy of the husband extinguishes the liability as to him; but it revives against the wife if she survive her husband. (Vanderheyden v. Mallory, 1 N. Y. R. 452.) This is, undoubtedly, the true rule in equity, however the rule may be at law.

§ 219. If a judgment be recovered against the wife previously to her marriage, for her debt while single, and she die before the execution is sued out, the husband will be discharged from the demand. But if the demand be sued after marriage, and a judg ment is recovered against both husband and wife, and the wife dies before execution, the husband will continue charged for the demand; because by the judgment the nature of the debt was altered, and from that time it became his own debt. (O'Brian v. Ram, 3 Mod. R. 186. Eyre v. Coward, supra. Treiban v. Lawrence, 2 Ld. Raym. R. 1050.) And for the same reason, if judgment be recov ered against the wife while sole, and a scire-facias be brought upon the judgment after the marriage against both husband and wife,

and a judgment be obtained on the scire facias, the husband will not be discharged after the wife's death. This is, manifestly, the doctrine as laid down in an early English case, though differently understood by Mr. Bright, as stated in his treatise on the Rights of Husband and Wife. (O'Brian v. Ram, 3 Mod. R. 186. 2 Bright's Ilus. and Wife, 3.) But the husband is liable if the demand is put into judgment during coverture, though not collected until after the death of the wife; and as a scire-facias is treated as a new action, and in cases where other parties than those named in the original judgment became interested in the execution of the judgment, as by marriage, the scire-facias is resorted to, to make the new person a party to the judgment, the husband will become bound by the judgment originally entered against the wife. It is very clear, therefore, that the judgment entered against the husband and wife upon scire-facias brought upon the judgment against the wife while sole, will bind the husband, though no execution issue until after the death of the wife, and the husband will still continue to be charged. So, also, a judgment recovered against the husband for the debt of his wife dum sola, may be enforced against his estate after his death, and a scire-facias may issue against his executor. (Burton v. Burton, 5 Harring. [Del.] R. 441.)

$220. The statutes of several of the states have changed the liability of the husband with respect to the debts of his wife existing at the period of the marriage. Thus, in the State of New York, it is provided by statute that an action may be maintained against the husband and wife, jointly, for any debt of the wife contracted before marriage, but the execution on any judgment in such action can only issue against, and such judgment will only bind, the separate estate and property of the wife; except that when the husband acquires the separate property of his wife, or any portion thereof, by any antenuptial contract, or otherwise, he is made liable for the debts of his wife contracted before marriage, to the extent only of the property so acquired. (Laws of 1853, ch. 576. 4 Stat. at Large, 514, 515.)

In the State of Maine, the property of the husband cannot be taken in execution upon a debt contracted by his wife before marriage, but the property of the wife is alone liable for such debts. (Laws of 1852, ch. 291. R. S. 1857, tit. 5, ch. 61, § 4.)

In the State of Massachusetts, it is expressly provided by statute, that the property of the wife is alone liable for her antenuptial

debts. (Laws of 1855, ch. 304. Gen. Stat. 1860, ch. 108, § 8.) The law is the same in Pennsylvania. (Purdon's Dig. of 1861, pp. 669, 670, § 14. LeFevre v. Witmer, 10 Penn. R. 505.)

In the State of New Hampshire, it is provided by statute, that in case the wife dies intestate, the husband shall take all of her personal property subject to her debts, contracted both before and after marriage. (Comp. Laws, tit. 18, ch. 159, § 17.) In the State of Connecticut, the husband is not liable for the antenuptial debts of his wife. (Gen. Stat. 1866, tit. 13, ch. 2, § 31.)

In the State of Georgia, the property of the husband is not liable for the antenuptial debts of his wife, further than the property received by him through his wife will satisfy such debts. (Laws of 1855, 1856, tit. 19, § 176, p. 229.)

In Florida, the property of the wife alone is liable for her debts contracted before marriage, or for any antenuptial obligation. (Thompson's Dig., 2 div., tit. 5, ch. 1, § 2.) And the same is the law in Alabama. (Code of 1852, § 1981.)

In the State of Mississippi, the husband cannot be made liable for the antenuptial debts of his wife, until her separate property is exhausted. (Hutch. Code, ch. 34, art. 7, § 8. R. S. of 1857, ch. 40, art. 25.)

In the State of Kentucky, the separate estate of the wife is alone liable for her antenuptial debts and obligations, except that the husband may be made liable for such debts to the extent only of the personal property which he may receive through her. (2 R. S., ch. 47, art. 2, §§ 1, 3.)

In the State of Indiana, the husband is liable for the debts and obligations of his wife contracted before marriage, only to the extent of the wife's property, and this liability continues after the wife's death. (2 R. S. 1862, ch. 77, §§ 1, 2.)

In Missouri, the property of the husband, owned before marriage, or acquired afterward by descent, gift, grant, or devise, and the use and profits of it are not liable for the antenuptial debts of his wife. (Laws of 1849, pp. 67, 68.)

In the new State of Nevada, the separate property of the husband cannot be reached for the debts of his wife, contracted before marriage. (Laws of 1864, 1865, ch. 76, § 13.)

In the State of California, the separate property of the wife is alone liable for her antenuptial debts; and in an action brought to recover such debts, the husband need not be joined with the

wife as a party defendant. (Comp. Laws 1853, ch. 147, p. 812. Bostie v. Love, 16 Cal. R. 69.)

It is probable that similar provisions exist with respect to the antenuptial debts of the wife, in some of the states not here mentioned; but if there are, the statutes must have been passed quite recently.

§ 221. Every man is under obligation by the common law to supply his wife with necessaries, suitable to his degree and circumstances, and if he neglects this duty, the law affords a remedy. The wife in such case may have recourse to any friend for necessaries, and the husband is bound to pay for them; for when the law imposes a duty, it raises a promise on the part of the person upon whom it is imposed to discharge it. It is a settled principle in the law of husband and wife, that, by virtue of the marital relation, and in consequence of the obligations assumed by him upon marriage, the husband is bound for the supply of necessaries to the wife, so long as she is not guilty of adultery or elopement. (Vide Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. R. 558.) The plea of infancy of the husband is no answer to a claim for necessaries furnished to the wife, as a minor is liable in such a case the same as an adult. (Contine v. Phillips, 5 Harrington's [Del.] R. 428. Cole v. Seeley, 25 Vt. R. 220.)

The husband is bound by the contracts of his wife, for ordinary purchases, from a presumed assent on his part, but, if his dissent be shown, the presumption, of course, is rebutted, and then he is not liable, unless the seller shows the absolute necessity of the purchase for her comfort. (Etherington v. Parrott, 1 Salk. R. 118.) And this doctrine is fully recognized in this country, and is believed to be founded on correct principles of justice. (Theriott v. Bangioli, 9 Bosw. R. 578.) Therefore, in these cases, if it appear that the husband has given notice not to sell to his wife on his account, a subsequent promise to pay by the husband must be shown, or that the goods furnished were actually necessary, in order to make him liable.

So long as the parties cohabit as husband and wife, the husband is liable for the necessaries of his wife, suitable to his degree and estate; and the misconduct, or even adultery, of his wife, in that situation, does not excuse him from the liability. The wife possesses no original power to bind the husband for her necessaries; but, the very circumstance of cohabitation, and from the goods