King, as a body politic, cannot be a minor. (Bing. on Inf. 3, and cases there cited.)

So it has been adjudicated that an infant may be a mayor, and on the same principle the acts by the mayor and commonalty cannot be avoided by reason of the nonage of the mayor. (Cro. Car. 556.) And if a parson, improperly admitted under age, make a lease with the due requisites, it will be binding on his successor; for the parson made the lease in his capacity of corporation sole. (Bro. Age. Bing. on Inf. 4.) On the same principle, the acts of no public officer can be repudiated or avoided by reason of the nonage of the incumbents, although there are certain offices, as we shall presently see, which a minor cannot properly hold.

6. There are some general disabilities imposed on an infant, for the security of others. He is considered incapable of holding or exercising any office which relates to the administration of justice, though he may exercise those offices that require only skill and diligence; thus in England an infant cannot sit in the house of lords,* or be elected a member of the house of commons, or be a judge, juror or bail. (Hob. 325. Cro. Eliz. 637. Jenk. 319.) Neither can an infant in England be a common informer, nor a sheriff''s officer. (Maggs v. Ellis, Buller's N. P.196. 3 Steph. N. P. 2059. Cuckson v. Winter, 17 Eng. C. L. R. 306.) Nor can he be legally appointed clerk of a court of requests, when it is a part of the duties of that officer to receive the money of suitors. (Claridge v. Evelyn 7 Eng. C. L. R. 32.) Neither can an infant exercise the office of burgess of a borough or town. (Rex v. White, 2 Selw. N. P. 1068, n.) And in Connecticut an infant cannot serve a writ as an indifferent person (Tyler v. Tyler, 2 Root's R. 519),

* In ancient times, minors appear frequently to have taken upon themselves to sit in Parliament. It appears by a speech of Waller, reported by Gray in his Debates, that the poet sat in Parliament when he was but sixteen years of age; and in Newton's Fragmenta Regalia, there is a passage stating that "about the 10th of James I, there were accounts taken of forty members not above twenty years of age, and some not exceeding sixteen." It is also stated in Gray's Debates, that Lord Torrington, son of the Duke of Albemarle, was but fourteen years of age at the time when he took part in a debate, as member of the House of Commons. (Macpherson on Infants, 449, note t.) And it appears from the life of Fox, the great statesman and orator, that he was elected from Midhurst when he was but nineteen, took his scat in Parliament, and made his first speech when he was but twenty years old. (Vide New American Cyclopedia, tit. Charles James Fox.) It is now, however, expressly enacted that no person shall be capable of being elected as a member of Parliament who is not of the full age of twenty-one years (7 and 8 Wi7. 3, ch. 25, § 8); and it has been decided that the election and return of an infant is vexatious, and the votes given for an infant candidate, after notice of his being ineligible, are thrown away. Macph. on Inf. 450.)

though in New Hampshire it has been held that he may be legally deputed by the sheriff to serve and return a particular writ of attachment. (Morse v. Graves, 3 N. H. R. 408.)

In the State of New York it is provided by statute that no person shall be capable of holding a civil office, who, at the time of his election or appointment, shall not have attained the age of twenty-one years. (1 R. S. part 1, ch. 5, tit. 6, § 1. 1 Stat. at Large, 106. People v. Dean, 3 Wend. R. 438. Green v. Burke, 23 ib. 490. In the State of Rhode Island, infants are expressly prohibited from holding a public office by the constitution of the commonwealth. (State Const. art. 9, § 1, and art. 2, §1.) And this is the law in Tennessee (Code of 1858, § 748), and in nearly or quite all of the American States, and of the Federal Government, although in some few instances minors have held high and responsible offices by federal appointment.

For example, Stevens T. Mason was appointed by President Jackson secretary of the territory of Michigan in 1831, when he was but nineteen years of age, and upon the translation of General Cass, the governor, to the war department at Washington, he became the acting governor, and during his gubernatorial term he distinguished himself, though but a mere youth, by the calmness, ability and courage with which he maintained the rights of the territory. Other similar instances have occurred in various parts of the Union; and it is proper to remark that in all cases the acts of a public officer are binding upon the public until the appointment, if improvidently made, shall be declared void. In England, an infant may be a clerk of the peace. (Crosby v. Hurley, 1 Alcock & Napier's [Irish] R. 431.) He cannot be an innkeeper, so as to be charged on the custom of the realm for negligence. (Bac. Abr. Infancy, E. Carthen, 161.)

In the United States there is no objection to the election of minors to be commissioned officers of any rank in the militia and in the army and navy. Under the laws of Massachusetts, it has been held that the infancy of a person over eighteen years of age does not disqualify him for the office of clerk of a company in the militia. (Dewey, Petitioner, 11 Pick. R. 265.)

If an infant commit any wrongful act in an office which he is capable of holding, he will, of course, be liable therefor.

An infant cannot be made a bankrupt; and a commission of bankruptcy against an infant would be absolutely void. (O'Brien

v. Currie, 14 Eng. C. L. R. 307. Belton v. Hodges, 23 ib. 309.) An infant cannot, of his own choice, change his domicile. He is not sui juris-of his own right. (Ex parte Bartlett, 4 Brad. R. 221.)

An infant cannot be naturalized on his own petition. (Le Forrester's case, 2 Mass. R. 419.) Nor can he acquire a settlement by commorancy; so held in the State of Connecticut. (Sterling v. Plainfield, 4 Conn. R. 114. Huntington v. Oxford, 4 Day's R. 189.) But he may gain a residence by living and service with his father. (King v. Chillesford, 10 Eng. C. L. R. 279.) An infant. may be a witness if proved to have sufficient discretion and understanding of the obligation of an oath. The test universally is, that the child feel the binding obligation of the oath from the general course of his religious education, it being held that the effect of an oath upon the conscience of the child should arise from religious feelings of a permanent nature, and not merely from instructions confined to the nature of an oath, recently communicated for the purpose of the trial. (Rex v. Williams, 32 Eng. C. L. R. 524.) And in one case in New York, where a child nine years old, though very intelligent, did not understand the nature of an oath, nor the moral penalty of false swearing, the court instructed her on the spot, and then allowed her to be sworn. (Jenner's case, 2 City Hall R. 147, 8, 9.) Children of ten, nine, seven, and even five years of age have been held competent. (Regina v. Perkins, 38 Eng. C. L. R. 236. Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 10 Mass. R. 225. State v. Whittier, 21 Maine R. 341. Rex v. Brasier, 1 Leach Cr. Cas. 237. State v. Le Blanc, 1 Const. [S. C.] R. 354.)

It is adjudicated that, before a child should be admitted to testify, the judge must be satisfied that the child feels the binding obligation of an oath from a general course of religious education. (Rex v. Williams, supra.) The adverse party may require that a witness of tender years shall be examined as to his understanding of the nature and obligation of an oath. (People v. McNair, 21 Wend. R. 608.)

7. It has also been held in England that an infant is not capable of the stewardship of a manor, or of the stewardship of the courts of a bishop; nor can he take a grant of those offices in possession or reversion. This disability is put upon the ground, not only that by intendment of law the infant has not sufficient knowledge, experience and judgment to use the office, but also that by law he

cannot appoint a deputy. (Bing. on Inf. 4.) By the common law an infant cannot make a will of lands, and this is the rule in all, or nearly all, of the American States. He may, however, make a testament of chattels, if a male, at the age of fourteen, and if a female, at the age of twelve years, except in some of the States the rule is varied by statute. The civil law gave this power to the infant at the age of seventeen years, and this is the period which is fixed by the statute of Connecticut.

In the State of New York the period adopted, is the age of eighteen in males and sixteen in females. (2 R. S. part 2, ch. 6, tit. 1, § 21. 2 Stat. at Large 61, as amended by ch. 782, Laws of 1867, § 4.)

None under full age can devise their property, real or personal, in Vermont, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maine, Indiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Mississippi, Texas and Florida.

In Rhode Island, Maryland, Missouri, Oregon and Virginia, the required age is eighteen for a testament of personal property. (Vide the Statutes of the several States.)

In the new State of Nebraska none but adults can make a valid will of either personal or real estate, except that a married woman under age may execute a will with the consent of her husband. (R. S. ch. 14, §§ 123, 126.)

In the State of Illinois none but adults can make a valid will of real estate, except females at and above the age of eighteen, and unmarried; and all persons at and above seventeen years of age may make a will of personal estate. (Gen. Stat., 1858, page 1180.)

In the State of South Carolina an infant at the age of eighteen may make a valid will of personal estate by conforming to the Statute of 1824 upon the subject. (Posey v. Posey, 3 Strobh. R. 167.)

An infant cannot be a public attorney for prosecuting suits at law and equity, though he may be a private attorney, for the purpose of performing acts so merely ministerial as to require little or no judgment, experience or skill. (Vide Bing. on Inf. 4, note m.)

Neither can an infant be a bailiff, factor or receiver, because he is not to be charged in any account, though it would seem that an infant might be appointed a factor, on his friends giving security for his accounting. (Bing. on Inf. 5, and case cited.) He cannot

be an administrator, because a bond is required to insure faithful administration, and the deed of an infant is not binding on him.

In case of a bailiff, the disability is that of stating an account, and in case of an administrator, the privilege is that of avoiding his bond. When the infant is entitled to administration in New York, as being next of kin to the intestate, letters must usually be granted to the guardian of the minor, who is in other respects competent. (2 R. S. part 2, ch. 6, tit. 2, § 33. 2 Stat. at Large, 77.) But should administration be granted to the minor, where there was no positive statute to forbid it, the administration could not determine until the infant attained to the age of majority. (Bing. on Inf. 5.)

An infant at common law may act as an executor at the age of seventeen, and his acts as such will bind him, unless they be acts which would amount to devastavit-to waste; and this is the rule in all of the states, except when changed by positive enactment. In New York, an infant is declared incompetent to act either as executor or administrator. (2 R. S. part 2, ch. 6, tit. 2, § 3. 2 Stat. at Large, 71.)

It may be stated, in general terms, that when the act of the infant is void, the incident of infancy is regarded as a disability but when the act is simply voidable, the incident is a privilege.

CHAPTER II.

WHAT ACTS OF AN INFANT ARE ABSOLUTELY VOID· -THE CRITERION OR TEST CASES ILLUSTRATING THE PRINCIPLE.

8. THE method taken in law to protect an infant against the effects of his own weakness has been to consider his acts as not binding, and allow him to rescind all contracts entered into by him, with certain exceptions, which will be hereinafter specifically noticed. There are, however, two degrees in which his acts or instruments appear to be not binding. First, by being considered as if they had never existed, viz.: wholly void; and, secondly, as being defeasible, at the election of the party with whom they originated, that is voidable only. (Bing. on Inf. 8.)