control it as such. The property was, during coverture, reduced to money, and all her money was then loaned and notes taken therefor in the husband's name; but they were always regarded and treated by him as her separate property, and she kept them in a separate parcel and room from that belonging to him. Shortly before the intestate's death, his wife, being about to leave home temporarily, left her parcel of notes in her husband's care for safe keeping, and they were found among his papers by his administrator and inventoried by him as belonging to the intestate's estate, the widow, however, claiming them as her own. On this state of facts the court held that, as against the heirs of the husband, the notes were, in equity, the sole property of the wife; and the administrator was therefore allowed, in the settlement of his account, to credit himself with their full amount, which he had realized and paid over to the widow. (Richardson v. Merrill, 32 Vt. R. 27. Vide also Porter v. The Bank of Rutland, 19 ib. 410.) So also it was held that when both husband and wife have always treated as the latter's separate property, and as under her entire control, money and notes taken for the loan of money belonging to her before, or accruing to her during, coverture, her right to hold and dispose of the same as she may choose will be recognized and protected by courts of law as well as of equity. She may, therefore, make such notes the subject of a donatio mortis to her husband as trustee for other persons; and, even though the husband do not reduce them to possession during her life, the delivery of them to him by her for that purpose will vest in him a good legal title to them as against her administrator. (Caldwell v. Renfrew, 33 Vt. R. 213.)

502. The mere delivery to the husband, by the makers of a promissory note, given for the purchase of the real estate of the wife, and payable to her or bearer, which the husband immediately afterward delivers to the wife, who thereafter retains the same in her possession, it has been held, does not constitute such a reduction of the note to possession by the husband as divests the property of the wife therein. To constitute such a reduction to possession of the choses in action of the wife, the husband inust do some positive act to reduce them to his own possession. (Barber v. Slade, 30 Vt. R. 191.)

So, also, it is held that the mere fact that a note is made payable to a married woman during coverture, and is expressed to be for

value received, imports prima facie, that the consideration proceeded from her or her real or personal estate, and the note is her chose in action, and passes to her administrator unless reduced to actual possession by the husband before her death. (Stearns v. Stearns, 30 Vt. R. 213.)

A wife who voluntarily and without good reason, has, for a considerable period, lived apart from her husband, and has supported herself without any assistance from him, may, if the husband does not previously claim her earnings, receive them herself, and after they have been paid to her, the husband cannot recover them of the person from whom they were due. (Norcross v. Rogers, 30 Vt. R. 588.)

The plaintiff and his wife had difficulty and separated, and he subsequently told her that "if she was not going to live with him again she might have a part of the household furniture," but nothing was said as to what articles, or how much, she should have; the court held that this language did not import a license to the wife to go to the plaintiff's house in his absence and take away whatever she pleased without his knowledge or consent; and the defendant having, in such a case, assisted the wife in a wrongful taking and removal of the husband's household furniture, the court further held, that, in an action of trover against such defendant therefor, the rule of damages was correctly held to be the value of the property, with the interest, notwithstanding it had been in the exclusive use and occupation of the plaintiff's wife. (Crump v. Oaks, 38 Vt. R. 566.)

Under a deed to a husband and wife to hold during their lives and the life of the survivor of them, the husband, in an action of ejectment, may recover to the extent of the interest of both, without joining his wife as co-plaintiff. (Park v. Pratt, 38 Vt. R. 545.)

§ 503. With respect to the Vermont homestead law, the courts have held that the property is subject to the payment of the owner's debts contracted before the act took effect, December 1, 1850, or the purchase of the homestead. (Perrin, Administrator, v. Sargeant, 33 Vt. R. 84.)

The owner of a homestead, having a wife, may convey it by his own deed, and pass the title thereto during his life-time. After his death, and not before, the wife, if she survives him, may assert her right to it, provided it has not been lost by acquiring another homestead. (Davis v. Andrews, 30 Vt. R. 678.)

Under the act, it has been held, that after the decease of the housekeeper or head of the family, his widow has the right to hold, control and enjoy the homestead as a home for herself, without restraint or abatement by any of the children of her deceased husband, who are not members of her family. The clear design of the law, the court holds to be to continue the homestead entire, as the home of the widow, or of the widow and children constituting the family at the decease of the husband, and no rights of the children become operative to sever or divert such homestead from full occupancy and enjoyment, as the family home, so long as the widow, or widow and children, see fit to continue it as such family home. (Keyes v. Hill, 30 Vt. R. 759.)

The provisions of the statute relating to homesteads are held to be sufficiently broad and comprehensive to include and establish a homestead right in lands in which the housekeeper or head of the family is the owner of an undivided share as tenant in common with others; and the provisions of the statute are adequate to ascertain and set out the homestead right in cases where the title is thus special and limited. The incumbrance of the homestead right is attached, not to the land, but to the husband's estate in the land; and his widow and minor children are entitled to a full homestead right in his moiety or share in the common property. The right does not attach to the whole of the real estate owned in common. (McClary v. Bixby, 36 Vt. R. 254.)

Under the provisions of the statute, the exemption of the homestead applies only to the house and the land connected with it, and will not include a distinct and separate parcel not adjoining the house lot. (Mills v. Grant, 36 Vt. R. 269.)

The products of a homestead are exempt from attachment and execution absolutely and without any qualification or exception, even if the debtor has received an equivalent from other portions of his possessions. (Jewett v. Guyer, 38 Vt. R. 209.)

The act of 1857, providing for relief in certain cases where the homestead cannot be conveniently set out in severalty, applies as well to the homestead left by a deceased person, as to that of persons in life. (Chaplin v. Sawyer, 35 Vt. R. 286.) Under the laws of the state relating to the homstead, in force in 1858, both homestead and dower may be set up in the same estate, but the dower is to be reduced by the amount of the widow's interest in the homestead. (Chaplin v. Sawyer, supra.)

CHAPTER XXXIV.

STATUTORY POLICY OF THE NEW ENGLAND STATES RELATING TO MARRIED WOMEN AND MARITAL RIGHTS--LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS-LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND-LAWS OF CONNECTICUT―JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND DECISIONS.

§ 504. In the State of Massachusetts, the property both real and personal, which a married woman owns as her sole and separate property, that which comes to her by descent, devise, bequest, gift or grant, that which she acquires by her trade, business, labor, or services, carried on or performed on her sole and separate account, or received by her for releasing her dower by a deed executed subsequently to a conveyance of the estate of her husband; that which a woman, married in the state, owns at the time of her marriage, and the rents, issues, profits, and proceeds of all such property, are declared by statute to be her sole and separate property, and may be used, collected, and invested by her in her own name, and are not subject to the interference or control of her husband, or liable for his debts. The husband and wife may, by their joint deed, convey the real estate of the wife which is not her separate property, in like manner as she might do by her separate deed if she were unmarried, but the wife will not be bound by any covenant contained in such joint deed. (Gen. Stats. 1860, ch. 108, §§ 1, 2.).

§ 505. A married woman in Massachusetts may bargain, sell and convey her separate real and personal estate, enter into any contracts in reference to the same, carry on any trade or business, and perform any labor or services on her sole and separate account, and sue and be sued in all matters having relation to her separate property, business, trade, services, labor, and earnings, in the same manner as if she were sole. But no conveyance by her of shares in a corporation or of. any real property, except a lease for a term not exceeding one year, and a release of dower executed subsequently to a conveyance of the estate of her husband, will be valid, without the assent of her husband in writing, or his joining with her in the conveyance, or the consent of one of the judges of the supreme judicial court, superior court, or the probate court, granted on her petition in any courts on account of the sickness, insanity, or absence from the state of her husband, or other good cause; and

the husband if within the state must have such notice of the petition as the judge may order. (Gen. Stat. ch. 108, § 3.)

§ 506. Trustees may be appointed by the supreme judicial court, on the petition of a married woman having separate property, to hold the same in trust for her, and she may thereupon convey the same to the trustee upon such trusts and to such uses as she may declare. The trustee may prosecute and defend all actions in relation to such property brought by or against her, founded on any cause of action relating to the same; and the property in his hands is made liable to be attached or taken on execution in any such action.

The contracts made by a married woman in respect to her separate property, trade, business, labor, or services, will not be binding on her husband, nor render him or his property liable therefor; but she and her separate property will be liable for such contracts in the same manner as if she were sole.

Payment may be made to a married woman for wages earned by her labor, and her receipt for the income of property held in trust for her, or for the principal where the same is payable to her, or for the payment to her of money deposited by or due to her, before or after marriage, will be a valid receipt and discharge, although her husband does not join therein.

The real estate and shares in any corporation standing in the name of a married woman, which were her property at the time of her marriage, or which became her property by devise, bequest, or gift, of any person except her husband, are not liable to be taken on execution against her husband for any debt contracted or cause of action arising after the third day of June, 1855. (Gen. Stat. ch. 108, §§ 4, 5, 6, 7.)

§ 507. A married woman having a separate estate may be sued for any cause of action which originated against her before marriage, and her property is made liable to be attached and taken on execution in the same manner and with the same effect as if she were sole. The husband of a wife married in the state after the third day of June, 1855, is not liable to be sued for any cause of action which originated against her before marriage.

A married woman may make a will of her real and separate personal estate, in the same manner as though he were sole; but such will cannot operate to deprive her husband of more than onehalf of her personal property without his consent in writing.