Barosa heights, without communicating by signal with Zayas, or stating his plans to Graham, ordered General Lardizabal to advance to the mouth of the Santi Petri. Lardizabal succeeded in doing this, and in joining Zayas after a sharp encounter with Villatte, who retired from the Bermeja heights to near the bridge over the Almanza creek. La Peña then ordered Graham to follow.

The

British had been under arms nearly twenty-four hours, without refreshments, and they had been, contrary to the Spanish general's promise, brought up by forced marches, though the roads were bad and imperfectly known to the guides. Graham therefore desired to remain on the Barosa heights, but he was peremptorily ordered by La Peña to march through the wood to Bermeja. Graham advanced, but under the belief that La Peña himself with the centre was to remain on the Barosa heights. Leaving the baggage on the heights with a slender guard-the detached companies of

the 9th and 82nd, under the command of Major Brown-Graham entered the pine wood. Scarcely had he done so when La Peña marched off his infantry, followed by Whittingham's cavalry, along the sea-road to the Santi Petri, leaving the baggage with the English companies at Barosa.

Victor had kept so close in the woods that the allies were not aware of his proximity. He was carefully watching for his opportunity, which was now presented by the scattered state of the allies. He directed his centre under Laval against the British in the wood, and sent his left under Ruffin to attack the rear guard on the Barosa heights, and to intercept the Spanish detachment which was coming up the Medina-Sidonia road. Major Brown retreated in good order from the height to the sea, while the camp-followers fled in all directions at the sudden apparition of an overwhelming force. Brown, by no means daunted, sent off a message to Graham for instructions. The general, believing La Peña to be near the baggage, sent back the laconic answer, "Fight!" and immediately wheeled round to try to recover possession of the key of the battle-field, the Barosa heights.

As the British emerged from the woods, 10 guns under Major Duncan opened on Laval's brigade, while the infantry formed two masses in such haste that the distinctions of brigades were ignored. One mass, under General Dilkes, hurried across the hollow to attack Ruffin; the other, under Colonel Wheately, assailed Laval. The fierce charge of the 87th Royal Irish Fusiliers-the "Faugh-aBallaghs" ("Clear the way")-overthrew the first line, which in its retreat threw the second line into confusion, and both fell back in increasing disorder, the reserve of grenadiers covering their retreat. Dilkes' column arrived almost breathless at the edge of the hill, where they were met with a shower of bullets from Ruffin's division, with which Major Brown had been gallantly maintaining the contest. Whole sections of the columns were swept away by the artillery and musketry fire, but still the men pressed on with ardour, and, closing with the enemy, engaged in a furious, and for some time doubtful, struggle. Ruffin and Colonel Chaudron-Rousseau of the Grenadiers

fell mortally wounded, and at length the British musketry prevailed. The French were driven from the heights and three guns were taken. The defeated columns, moving concentrically from the field, again formed, and advanced to renew the action. But Duncan's deathdealing guns made huge gaps in their ranks, and the attempt to dispute the victory was abandoned. The French retired in a body to the woods towards the west of the lagoon of Puerco, the British being too exhausted, by their twenty-four hours' fast and fifteen hours' march, to pursue them. Ponsonby's small body of German Hussars charged and put to flight the 250 French horsemen whom Victor had brought with him, captured two guns, and bore down upon the retiring Grenadiers, but their number was too small for them to effect anything when the Grenadiers faced about.

The battle of Barosa lasted less than an hour and a half, but the British lost over 1,200 men, and the French loss was much greater,—two generals, 2,000 killed and wounded, 400 prisoners, six guns, and an eagle of the light infantry, the first eagle captured in the Peninsular War. It was taken by Sergeant Masterton of the 87th: he was rewarded for his exploit with an ensigncy, and the regimental flag has since borne an eagle with a wreath of laurel above the harp and crown.

As the British had no means of transport, the wounded of both nations lay on the field till next day. Chaudron-Rousseau's body was found by his dog, a poodle, which remained by his grave for three days, when it was taken away by Graham himself.

La Peña had halted his men along the coast road, and quietly surveyed the desperate struggle without dispatching any aid to his allies, or attempting in any way to threaten the French flank. Whittingham's cavalry, too, by La Peña's express orders, remained passive, with the exception of two regiments and some irregulars, who galloped off without orders to the field, but arrived when the

* The name "Barossa" is inscribed on the colours of the Grenadier Guards, the Coldstream Guards, the Scots Guards, the 28th (North Gloucestershire), 67th (South Hampshire), 87th (Royal Irish Fusiliers), and the Rifle Brigade.

action was over. If the Spaniards had pursued, the French army might have been cut to pieces. Graham waited some hours on the heights, expecting La Peña would advance to follow up the victory. But finding that the captain-general was as averse as other Spanish commanders to shed the blood of their countrymen when the British was present to fight for them, Graham withdrew his men across the pontoon-bridge to the Isle of Leon, and in a few days he marched back to Cadiz. La Peña remained on the Bermeja heights till the 8th March, and then crossed to the isle. The French being now able to renew the blockade without molestation, the whole object of the expedition was lost, and violent disputes on the subject arose in the Cortes. La Peña impudently claimed the victory as due to himself, and ascribed the failure to Graham's withdrawal to the isle; and the chief of his staff, Lascy, issued false accounts and erroneous plans of the engagement. General Graham compelled Lascy to apologize for remarks personally offensive disgusted with the conduct of the Spaniards, he declined the honours voted by the Cortes, resigned his command to General Cooke, and proceeded to join Lord Wellington.

Privations of
Masséna's army.

Wellington's
reinforcements.

During Soult's operations at Badajos the situation at Santarem had remained unchanged. Wellington was waiting for reinforcements from England-which contrary winds delayed—to make an attack. Masséna's army was suffering from a daily increasing difficulty of obtaining food. The disorganization resulting from unrestrained plundering, famine, and its attendant sickness, and the discord among his generals (the St. Cyr conspiracy not yet being extinct) did not admit of his waiting any longer for Soult's aid. He was reduced to the alternative of either retreating or forcing a passage of the Tagus in the face of Hill and Beresford, who had 14,000 regulars, besides militia and ordenança, and who could, from the number of boats, be easily joined by Wellington's army before the French could effect a passage. Masséna had met the remonstrances of his generals on his delay with the promise that he would begin the retreat as soon as only enough provisions

remained for the march. On learning that the English reinforcements had arrived at Lisbon on the 2nd March, he broke up his encampment and began a disastrous retreat.

Masséna retreats from Portugal.

It was open to him (1.) to proceed by fair roads on the right or western bank of the Zezere, on to Coimbra, and thence either to Oporto or Almeida; or (11.) to cross the Zezere and march past the Sobriera Formosa range to Castello Branco, where he had a choice of two routes, (A) either through Coria and Plasencia to Madrid, to join Joseph, but on this line the roads were bad, and the allies, from their position commanding the left bank of the Tagus, could attack him in flank, or, by a short route, move in advance of him and intercept him; or (B) through Pena Macor and Sabugal to Almeida, a route on which also the roads were bad, and there was the risk of the allies attacking him in flank or rear. He therefore adopted the line of retreat to the Coimbra district.

To conceal his design, Masséna made a feint of crossing the Zezere and attacking Abrantes. Immediately afterwards he blew up the bridge works he had been constructing, and destroyed some stores, and the guns for which he had not horses. Gathering in his "locust host," he began the retreat under cover of night in two columns, the one under Junot, with Ney in the rear, marching through Torres Novas, Leiria, and Coimbra, the other under Reynier, marching through Thomar and Espinhal to Murcella. Wellington did not ascertain till four days had passed that the French were actually in retreat to the north. He then moved his troops in two divisions to Pombal, one through Leiria, and the other through Thomar, a brigade being sent from the latter place to follow Reynier towards Espinhal.

The pursuit was hot, and the French suffered greatly, not only from the attacks of the allies, but from starvation in the devastated districts through which they passed. Exasperated with the Poituguese, they wantonly burnt the villages in their course, and Masséna himself ordered the destruction of Leiria and of the splendid convent of Alcobaça, "the Westminster Abbey of Portugal," by fire.