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No sooner did the picks strike the hard earth than the garrison of the fort was aroused, peals of artillery and musketry burst forth on the stillness of night, and, the men being without any shelter, many were killed or wounded as they were using their picks or depositing the gabions. Throughout the night they worked assiduously, though the shells continued to be showered upon their position. By daybreak some cover was obtained; but the French gunners rapidly acquired such precision in firing, that the shells dropped into the trenches, which became almost as unsafe as the open ground. From the 8th to the 10th May Captain Squire worked hard at the construction of the battery against St. Christoval. But the works against the castle, on the left bank, were not sufficiently advanced to keep it in play: the shot and shell destroyed more than 300 men, and 400 fell in the sallies which were made from St. Christoval. A second battery against St. Christoval was begun on the night of the 12th May, and on the morning of the 14th a spirited fire opened; but the guns were much inferior to those of the enemy in number and calibre; several were soon dismounted, the muzzles of others were battered, and only one 24-pounder was left in a serviceable state. But the advance of Soult now necessitated the suspension of the siege operations.

Beresford had treated all previous rumours regarding the approach of a relieving army as idle; but on the night of the 12th he received reliable news that Soult was on the march from Seville. A conference was held with the Spanish generals on the 13th. Both

Advance of Soult. Beresford offers battle.

Blake and Castaños were anxious to fight immediately, to improve the discipline and spirit of their troops, who were reduced to such straits that their regular diet was horse-flesh. Beresford was averse to battle; but his officers, who had not been in any of the recent great engagements, were eager for glory, and, against his better judgment, he yielded, although a defeat would necessarily recall Wellington's army to Lisbon, to save the capital from Soult, would ruin Spain, and would prostrate Portugal. It was resolved to receive battle at Albuera. Orders were therefore given to remove

the artillery and platforms from the trenches, and at midnight on the 14th all the guns and stores were transferred from the St. Christoval side to the left bank of the Guadiana, the fascines and gabions were burnt, and the flying bridge was removed, the 4th division and the Spaniards masking these operations.

On the morning of the 15th May the British and Portuguese took possession of the Albuera ridge, which rises in gentle undulations, and extends about four miles. Along its eastern base, which is practicable for cavalry and artillery, the river Albuera (an affluent of the Guadiana) flows, with the Feria rivulet, which joins the river just above a fine stone bridge; and on the west of the ridge there is a brook, the Aroya. The hamlet of Albuera stands on the east of the hills, below the stone bridge, and at the points where the roads from Talavera Real (on the north-east) and Valverde (on the west) strike the high road from Badajos to Seville. A little below the village the river is spanned by an old narrow bridge. The heights across the Albuera are densely wooded.

Battle of
Albuera.

The centre of the Anglo-Portuguese army was commanded by Major-General William Stewart-"Auld Grog Willie," as he was familiarly termed in the Scottish regiments, from his frequent orders for extra allowances of grog-and consisted of Colborne's (the 2nd) division, and two brigades of Cole's (the 4th) division, the latter force coming up when the battle was well advanced: it rested on the village of Albuera, a battery commanding the stone bridge, and General (Baron) Charles Alten's German brigade holding the village itself. The cavalry, which had been on the other side of the Albuera, retired, not having been supported by any infantry, before the enemy's light horsemen on the afternoon of the 15th, and after being temporarily drawn up on the right, were placed with the artillery behind the centre, and part in front. The allies' right, the hill on the Valverde road, was the key of the position, as it commanded the only line of retreat. It was reserved for the large body of Spaniards under Blake and Castaños; but though they were ordered to hasten up from Almendral, to which they had

retired on Soult's advance, it was midnight before the Spanish van reached the position. Beresford, a brave man, but without the capacities of a great general, committed a fatal blunder in leaving unoccupied an isolated hill which trended on the Spanish right, back towards the Valverde road, and overlooked the rear of the allies' line, and he thus gave to the enemy an opportunity of cutting off his retreat. The left, stretching away beyond the Badajos road, was occupied by the Portuguese-the artillery, Hamilton's and Collins' infantry, and Otway's cavalry.

On the arrival of Cole's two brigades on the morning of the 16th May the allies numbered 30,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 38 guns; but the British, who had to bear the brunt of the battle, did not exceed 7,000, the Spaniards being 16,000, and the Portuguese 8,000. Soult had with him 19,000 picked infantry, 4,000 veteran cavalry, and 40 guns; but his inferiority in mere numbers was amply compensated for by his superiority in tactics to Beresford, and by the want of agreement between Beresford and Blake, for these two were not on speaking terms.

The withdrawal of the allies' cavalry from the roads by the wooded heights on the eastern side of the Albuera enabled Soult to conceal his movements, and to place behind the height opposite the allies' right a force of 15,000 men (Girard's 5th corps and Latour-Maubourg's heavy cavalry) and 30 guns within ten minutes' march of Beresford's right wing. His design was to seize the hill which trended back towards the Valverde road, push the allies' centre into the valley behind, and cut them off. To distract the centre and left, Godinot's brigade with 10 guns-Werle's brigade being in reserve-and light cavalry, were placed in the woods near the junction of the Feria with the Albuera, to attack the bridge and village.

At nine o'clock in the morning of the 16th May the 10 guns and Godinot's brigade issued from the wood and opened a sharp cannonade and musketry fire on the bridge. Werlé followed for some distance, and the cavalry attempted to cross, the lancers above the stone bridge and General Briché's two hussar regiments

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