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CHAPTER X.

THE INVASION OF FRANCE-THE BIDASSOA, NIVELLE, NIVE,

BEFORE BAYONNE.

Napoleon's disasters in Germany-Passage of the Bidassoa—Soult's entrenchments: Suchet's inactivity-Position of the allies-Surrender of Pampeluna-Wellington's difficulties with the Spaniards and Portuguese as to supplies-Soult's difficulties-Physical features of the south-west of France-French position on the Nivelle: Wellington's plan of attack - Battle of the Nivelle-Repression of marauding: the Spaniards sent back-Difficulties of the allies' situation-Soult's lines on the Nive-The passage of the Nive-Dangers of the allies' positionThe battles before Bayonne. Arcangues-Barrouilhet-Soult moves against the right-Battle of St. Pierre-Results of the Nive and Bayonne actions-Soult's new lines-The allies in winter quarters-Spanish marauders: Basque warfare -Relations with Spain: Treaty of Valençay-Soult's difficulties increased: the population supports Wellington.

THE

Napoleon's
disasters in
Germany.

HE armistice in Germany expired on the 10th August; the war was resumed by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and in the vicinity of Dresden three great battles were fought. Napoleon had achieved the last of his great victories, and in a few days disasters came thick upon him. Vandamme, who pursued the retiring allies, was totally defeated, and himself taken prisoner. Oudinot was beaten back, and Berlin was saved by Bernadotte, who, now become King of Sweden, had joined the allies; and on the 6th September Ney also was beaten in the battle of Dennewitz; Bavaria was being compelled to join Russia and Prussia; and there now remained nothing for Napoleon but to fight his way through Leipsic to the Rhine.

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Passage of the
Bidassoa.

When the tide of fortune was thus turning against Napoleon, the allied sovereigns had been very anxious that the British army should not merely rest content with having Soult's attacks, but should carry the war into France to strike at the rear of the Napoleonic army. Wellington's own views turned towards Catalonia— where Lord William Bentinck was at the head of the Anglo-Sicilian force against Suchet—as a more suitable theatre of operations after the expected fall of Pampeluna; for the country beyond the Bidassoa had scanty supplies, and Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port must be captured or efficiently blockaded before any serious advance was possible, and no sufficient means could be obtained for that purpose in the then temper of the Admiralty. However, Wellington yielded so far to the popular feeling as to prepare to cross the Bidassoa, the boundary river.

The Bidassoa flows through a beautiful and romantic valley.. "At every bend in the river the road along its banks brings us suddenly on some new and striking feature. The pleasing combination of wood and rock, overhanging the beautifully winding stream, contrasted with the barren grandeur of the mountain summits which tower above them, present an infinite number of delightful prospects. The oak, the chestnut, and the walnut are the most conspicuous trees along the valley and the slopes of the inferior hills; whilst among the crevices of the rocks, the evergreen box-tree grows with surprising luxuriance, and by its deep verdure relieves, while it contrasts in a very beautiful manner, the bright silver tints of the surrounding rocks, clothed with lichens" (BATTY). The French occupied the dizzy heights of the immense mountain group, the Rhune, the Commissari, and the Bayonette; their line of entrenchments had been strengthened on the most vulnerable points by abattis, that is, breastworks formed of trees felled, and, the softer twigs being cut off, laid side by side with the branches directed towards the enemy, and for the construction of these defences the numerous orchards in the district had been cut down. Wellington's design was, with his left and centre to storm

the entrenchments on these mountains, which pointed towards the French centre; and to separately assail Maucune's divisions in Reilles' corps and Taupin's divisions in Clausel's corps, with such speed that their reserves could not be brought into action in time. By this skilful combination, the river road from Irun to Vera would be gained, and the port of Fuenterabia must necessarily fall into the hands of the allies. All the preparations were made with secresy, and the depths of the fords had been ascertained by fishermen, whose movements in fixing the marks had been mistaken for their ordinary avocations. Several feints were made to deceive Soult as to the real point of attack, and the French continued busy with their entrenchments.

Taking advantage of a thunder-storm on the night of the 6th7th October, Wellington placed guns and howitzers on the St. Marcial ridge, and disposed his troops partly behind the ridge between the Biriatu fords and the broken bridge of Behobia, partly at the Great Jonco ford below the Behobia bridge, and partly behind the embankment opposite Andaya. The tents were left standing, and no change was visible in the disposition of the allies till, on a rocket being sent up from the steeple of Fuenterabia as the signal, at seven o'clock in the morning of the 7th October, the columns moved from their places of concealment upon the several points of passage. So unexpected was the movement, that the passage was completed and the allies' lines were drawn up on the right bank of the Bidassoa before a single French gun was fired. Soult was absent at Espelette. The sound of the heavy cannonade revealed to him the point of real attack, and he hurried back to his right; but before his arrival the encampments on the Bidassoa were lost. The 1st division drove back the enemy's right to the Croix des Bouquets heights: these, the key of the position, were won by a furious charge of the 9th regiment. Above Biriatu the entrenchment was defended successfully in front, but its left was turned by Freyre's Spaniards, the Mandale mountain was carried; and now Reille's corps, thrown into disorder along its whole line, fell back by the royal road of Bayonne, with the loss of 400 men

and eight guns. In this engagement the allies lost 600 men, of whom half were Spaniards. Farther up the river in the second combat of Vera, Clausel's divisions were equally surprised, but maintained their position with greater obstinacy. The Boar's rock, an isolated ridge, was simultaneously assailed at both ends when the rocket appeared, and, when the ridge was won, a concentric movement was made upon the redoubt on the higher range behind. The wooded hollows re-echoed the shouts of the combatants and the rattle of musketry, and the white wreaths of smoke veiled as with mist the hill-sides: soon the riflemen issued from the forest recesses out upon the open slopes, and closed upon the redoubt; but the French rushed out and with a rough sally scattered them. At that instant the invincible 52nd regiment appeared in full career. The French turned and ran back in a mob to the redoubt: the 52nd entered along with them, the riflemen rallied, and in a few minutes the French were driven out and took refuge in the second entrenchment. This was next carried by Colborne; but a heavy fire was kept up on the Bayonette crest till, after five hours' fighting, three ridges were carried, the Bayonette, Commissari, and Puerto de Vera. The enemy retired by their left to the Rhune. Here the Hermitage rock was quite impregnable: the enemy rolled down enormous masses of crag to crush the advancing columns; and, when night fell, Clausel's regiments still held the Rhune. The possession of the line being in consequence insecure, Wellington on the following day (the 8th) ordered a combined attack upon the left flank of the mountain, which was accessible, and upon the camp of Sarre. Clausel, fearing to be cut off, at once abandoned the flanks of the Rhune, the St. Barbe fort, and all the other works in the basin below, and concentrated on the ridge behind Sarre, but leaving his right on the lesser Rhune, and two regiments on the Hermitage. These two regiments, also afraid of being isolated, abandoned the Hermitage rock in the night, and moved off to their right. The operations were closed on the following day, the 9th, by a rash attempt of the 7th division

to seize the village of Sarre, and a serious disaster was avoided only by the rapid advance of Spanish battalions.

The total loss of the French in the actions comprised in the "Passage of the Bidassoa" was 1,400; the loss of the allies was 1,600 (of whom half were Spaniards), but many had straggled from their corps to plunder, and were captured, in a state of intoxication, by the French.

Soult's entrenchments. Suchet's

inactivity.

Soult, finding that the allies did not intend to advance farther, continued to employ his men on the entrenchments behind the Nivelle, and the St. Barbe fort, which properly belonged to the French position, as it commanded the ground between the Rhunes, and the Nivelle was recovered by the enemy by a surprise on the night of the 12th October. The Spaniards, who were in or near it, went off in disorder, and next day their attempt to retake it was repulsed with the loss of 500 men. Soult's position was more concentrated after the Bidassoa actions; Reille held the right in two lines, Clausel the centre, and D'Erlon the left; a chain of entrenched camps was being constructed behind Clausel and D'Erlon; Villatte's reserve was in the vicinity of St. Jean de Luz; General Paris was covering St. Jean Pied de Port; and Foy was at Bidarray to watch the passes from the Baygorry valley. The immense entrenchments were designed to present as impregnable a barrier to the advance of Wellington as the lines of Torres Vedras presented to Masséna; but there was a difference in the quality of the defenders-the French had lost heart by repeated defeats. While his army was occupied in constructing the entrenchments, Soult entered into a correspondence with Suchet, with a view to bringing about a common offensive movement upon Aragon, which would have compelled Wellington to repass the Ebro or fight a great battle against superior numbers; but Suchet, magnifying the strength of Bentinck and the Spaniards in Catalonia, and depreciating his own strength, declined the proposed combination.

Wellington now fixed his head-quarters at Vera, and organized his army in three divisions: the right, under Sir Rowland Hill,

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