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CHAPTER IV.

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO AND THE MARCH TO TALAVERA.

Reorganization of the Portuguese army: British officers appointed-Causes of the weakness of the French armies in the Peninsula - Distribution of the French armies-Soult's invasion of Portugal-The Portuguese army mutinies: Freire murdered-Overthrow of the Portuguese at Braga-Soult storms Oporto-Spanish defeats-Cradock superseded by Wellesley-Wellesley lands at Lisbon: his plans for the war-Situation of the French armies: Soult surprises AmaranteWellesley's resources -Wellesley marches against Soult-Conspiracy in the French army-Soult's outposts driven in-Soult prepares to retreat-Wellesley forces the passage of the Douro-The rout of the French army-The pursuit— Soult seizes Ponte Nova-Skirmish at Salamonde: the flight from Ponte Nova -Wellesley returns to the Tagus-Suchet defeated at Alcaniz: Blake routed at Belchite Character of the Spanish generals and soldiers-Relative state of the armies-Wellesley begins his first march into Spain-Cuesta impracticableWellesley resolves to return to Portugal-Soult's plan for co-operation-French concentrate-Cuesta retreats-Skirmishes at Torrijos and Alcabon-Battle of Talavera-March of the Light Division-Wellesley created Viscount Wellington -Joseph retreats-The British turn to meet Soult-Joseph again advances— Cuesta abandons the wounded in Talavera-Wellesley retreats across the Tagus -Skirmish at Arzobispo-Battle of Almonacid-Combat of Baños-Causes of the failure of both armies-Wellington refuses to co-operate with SpaniardsRetires to the Mondego-The siege of Gerona.

TH

HE Portuguese Government had offered the command of their army to a British officer; and it was conferred, after Wellesley had refused to undertake it, on Major-General William Carr Beresford (afterwards Viscount Beresford). An illegitimate son of the first Marquis of Waterford, he had received an ensign's commission in 1785; and after serving in Nova Scotia and in the 88

Reorganization
of the Portuguese
army: British
officers appointed

expedition to Toulon, he became a colonel in 1795. He served in the West Indies and in the expedition to Egypt; and under Baird he was conspicuous in the recovery of the Cape of Good Hope in 1806. As brigadier-general, under Whitelock, he commanded the troops who made the attempt on Buenos Ayres in 1807, which ended so disgracefully for the British. He took part in Moore's expedition, and commanded the rear guard at the embarkation at Coruña. On his accepting the command of the Portuguese army, he received from the Lisbon Regency the title of marshal, and from the British Government the local rank of lieutenant-general. His appointment naturally gave great offence to many of his seniors, but Beresford proved himself worthy of his position. He reached Lisbon early in March, 1809, and fixed his head-quarters at Thomar. The Portuguese army was in a very disorganized state, and the degradation of the native officers, the service being looked on with contempt, rendered any elevation of its tone almost hopeless. Beresford resolved to infuse a new spirit into the regiments by the appointment of English captains to the command. He issued a proclamation to the Portuguese, to whom he rightly gave credit for the possession of the highest military qualities in an undeveloped condition, appealing to them to submit to the requisite discipline, which would call forth their latent martial character and enable them to meet the invaders on equal terms. He at once began to recast the military system; and, the Portuguese being easily influenced for good or for evil, in a short time the force was fairly trained. Each regiment was placed under a British officer, and in course of time nearly every post of importance was filled by Englishmen, a system which ensured the thorough drilling of the soldiers, but which naturally caused considerable dissatisfaction among the Portuguese, incited the Regency to intrigues, and gave the French occasion to point their sarcasms at the servitude of Portugal.*

* ""

The nation was at war for its existence, the whole population in arms, the country lately ravaged by an enemy, the treasury quite empty. In such a crisis all

By the arrival of Mackenzie and Sherbrooke from the vicinity of Cadiz, Cradock's force was raised to 14,000 men, and he was therefore able to lead out 12,000 men to Lumiar and Saccavem to watch the development of the French plans, while stores were being collected at Coimbra and Abrantes.

When Napoleon left for France, he gave the command, in name at least, of the armies of Spain to Joseph; but, as Joseph was no general, Napoleon intended to carry out from a distance his own plans of the campaign, and the French marshals were severally allowed to correspond direct with him. This proved the chief source of the weakness of the French in the ensuing campaigns.

Causes of the weakness of the French armies in the Peninsula.

The commanders were jealous of each other: each was anxious to act by himself for personal distinction, and despised the King, who had neither the funds nor the authority to maintain even outward respect and state. Another great cause of weakness to the French armies in the Peninsula was that Napoleon always insisted on the maxim that war should pay itself. The magazines were reserved for expeditions. The troops, being compelled to find their own subsistence in the districts in which they were quartered, were neces

military situations were more or less places of 'emolument and importance,' England paying the greatest part of the army. Lord Wellington, Admiral Berkeley, and Mr. Stuart were members of the Regency. The first was also captain-general of the Portuguese forces, regular or irregular. The second was admiral of the fleet in the European waters. Marshal Beresford commanded the regular land armies. Sir Thomas Hardy was commandant of the port and arsenal of Lisbon.

Colonel Trant was Governor of Oporto; Colonel Cox Governor of Almeida; Colonel Austin, of Algarve; General Blunt, of Peniché. Sir Robert Wilson commanded the Lusitanian Legion; Trant, John Wilson, and Miller were at the head of different brigades of militia and ordenança; Colonel Grant and Major Fenwick commanded smaller bodies of the same species of troops; Colonel D'Urban, Colonel John Campbell, and Colonel Madden had high commands in the cavalry; Generals Hamilton, Spry, Harvey, Pack, Ashworth, and Collins commanded divisions or brigades of the regular infantry; others held high commands in the artillery; Hardinge, Arbuthnot, Warre, &c., were on the staff; and nearly all the regiments of the line were commanded by Englishmen, or had English majors, captains, or subalterns" (NAPIER).

It was

sarily spread over a wide area in strong detachments. impossible to concentrate suddenly, and the moment the re-assembling began, the guerrillas became active and harassed the troops at every favourable point on the line of march. As the country became exhausted the distribution of the troops necessarily became more extended; and the French had by no means that power available which their numbers appear to indicate. It was a prominent feature of Wellington's system of warfare to compel concentrations, by which the troops were weakened and the magazines exhausted.

Distribution of the French armies.

In the spring of 1809 the French troops in the Peninsula available for the field (the garrisons being numerous) were 100,000, divided in four armies, viz. (1). The army of Soult, who was in Galicia, and was to march through Oporto to Lisbon; (2). The army of Baron Lapisse, who was to march from Salamanca through Ciudad Rodrigo to Abrantes; (3). The army of Marshal Victor, who was to march from the vicinity of Talavera through Merida, and send on any help that Soult might require for the reduction of Lisbon, and subsequently (on Lisbon being taken) proceed with Lapisse against Cadiz; and (4). The army under King Joseph in Madrid, which was ready to send out reinforcements in any direction.

Soult had obtained possession of Ferrol by surrender immediately after the fall of Coruña, and was relieved in Galicia by Ney with 17,000 men. Soult's corps of 24,000 was thus set free for the march into Portugal. After some delay, from want of money and supplies, the marshal began his march from the north in the first week in March, but his progress was greatly interfered with by the heavy storms of rain. Having left garrisons in Tuy and Vigo, he found the passage of the Minho near its mouth defended by the Portuguese, and he was therefore obliged to go round by Orense. As Soult advanced, Romana's forces, who had threatened his flank, withdrew from their positions towards Puebla de Senabria. General

Soult's invasion of Portugal.

Franceschi was sent with the cavalry and some infantry in pursuit, and overtook the rear column as it was passing a rugged mountain. More than 1,200 were ridden down and the rest were captured. Romana continued to retreat with great haste upon Bragança without making any attempt to co-operate, by way of Chaves, with Silveira's Portuguese army. A detachment of 2,000 from Silveira's army had, during the operations against Romana, been beaten in an attack upon the French at Villaça; and Silveira, whose men were now in a mutinous state and threatened him with death for treachery, fell back upon a commanding mountain behind Chaves, which, contrary to the wishes of his troops, he had resolved to abandon to its fate. Chaves was invested and surrendered in two days, and Soult established a depôt in the town.

The raw levies of ordenanças and the volunteer bands of peasantry were indignant at the prudent resolution of their generals not to engage a veteran army, and when Freire gave orders to the outposts in front of Braga to withdraw on the approach of the enemy, their mutinous clamours, incited by agents of the faction of the Bishop of Oporto, became so loud that Freire left the army; but he was seized at an adjacent village and brought back under

The Portuguese army mutinies: Freire murdered.

arrest. Baron Eben, who was in the British service, and held command of a Lusitanian brigade which had been posted in front of Freire's army, thus describes in his report to Sir John Cradock the mutiny and the murder of the general. "I did not reach Braga until nine o'clock on the morning of the 17th. I found everything in the greatest disorder: the houses shut, the people flying, and part of the populace armed with pikes. Passing through the streets I was greeted with loud vivas. Though the people knew me, I could not guess the meaning of this. At the market-place I was detained by the increasing populace, who seized my reins, crying out loudly they were ready to do anything to defend the city, requesting me to assist them, and speaking in the lowest terms of their general. I promised to do all in my power to aid their patriotic zeal, but said I must first speak to him. Upon this they suffered me to

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