spondent was not upon trial charged with the excessive use of intoxicating liquors, but for an entirely different offense. Guilt of an offense charged cannot be predicated upon testimony of guilt of an unrelated offense of which the party does not stand charged at the trial. That the minds of the jury would be influenced against respondent by such testimony and comment in a local-option town is scarcely to be doubted. Error is assigned upon the judge's charge, particularly that part of it which is as follows: "I charge you, as a matter of law, that if you believe the statement and testimony of the witness Bowen, to wit, that he went to this express office and to Mr. Converse, this respondent, and told him that he wanted two cases of beer, and that Mr. Converse told him it would be $5, and Mr. Bowen testifies that he does not remember whether he paid him the $5 at once, or only $2.50, but that in the end did pay him the $5, and that this beer came, and was stored there in Mr. Converse's possession, and Mr. Bowen went there from time to time and was allowed to take away quantities of this beer until it was gone, I charge you that such an act as that, under the law, would be keeping a place and furnishing beer contrary to the spirit and intent of the local-option law, and the respondent, if you find this to be true, would be guilty." The testimony of Clarence C. Bowen, on which the learned circuit judge based the foregoing charge, is, in part, as follows: 66 'During the month of July I procured two cases of beer. I ordered, and it came through his company. One case I got, and took away direct, and the other case I got. He had it in the back room, and I took it as I wanted it. It was not in his charge. It just sat out there in the back room-the stormhouse and later I came there and took a few bottles away as I wanted them. I think I made three different trips. * * *The two cases were ordered to be sent by the Pacific Express Company, and I came up and asked if they were there, and he said they were, and one I took away in its entirety. Do not know whether the other case was addressed to me on the box or not. I did not look to see, and that I took away in parcels. When I went there it was in the stormhouse, and I told him to leave it there so I could get it. He knew nothing of my intention to take it away in parcels. He had no way of finding out my intention. *** I desired to buy some beer and went to the express office for the purpose of purchasing an express order and sending for the beer. I paid him $2.50 and 5 cents for the money order and the stamp. When there I asked Converse where I could send for the beer and get it the quickest, and he told me I could get it quicker by buying at Copemish, * * and I then gave him money for the express order, and said, 'I will buy the stamp,' and further said, 'I don't know the man's name, and you write for it, but to send for it to Copemish and have it sent to me,' and I got both of the cases from the office myself." * It seems to us that a fair reading of this testimony warrants an entirely different construction than that placed upon it by the learned circuit judge in his charge to the jury. It is quite apparent that the ordering of the beer by respondent was simply for the reason that Bowen did not know the name of the man at Copemish to whom to write, and that the act was solely one of accommodation on the part of the respondent. The beer was consigned to Bowen. Section 5412, 2 Comp. Laws, being the section of the local-option act violation of which was charged, reads as follows: "That it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, himself or by his clerk, agent or employé, to manufacture, sell, keep for sale, give away or furnish any vinous, malt, brewed, fermented, spirituous or intoxicating liquors, or any mixed liquor or beverage, any part of which is intoxicating, or to keep a saloon or any other place where any such liquors are manufactured, sold, stored for sale, given away or furnished, in any county of this State on and after the first day of May next, following after the adoption by the board of supervisors of such county of a resolution prohibiting the same, as provided in section 13 of this act, so long as such resolution remains unrepealed; Provided, however, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to druggists, or registered pharmacists in selling any such liquors under and in compliance with the restrictions and requirements imposed upon them by the general laws of this State." This section does not either in terms or by construction prohibit common carriers from transporting or delivering intoxicating beverages within a local-option county when purchased outside thereof. No liability, therefore, attaches to express companies or their agents, under its provisions, for transporting or delivering to consignees in local-option counties spirituous, intoxicating, malt, brewed, fermented, or vinous liquors. There was, however, testimony tending to prove that respondent, not as agent for an express company, but on his own account, kept a place where liquors were furnished to others, and that liquors, furnished by him, were drunk by others on the premises. There should be a new trial. GRANT, OSTRANDER, MOORE, and MCALVay, JJ., concurred. LYLE v. CASS CIRCUIT JUDGE. MANDAMUS-JUDICIAL DISCRETION -CHANGE OF VENUE-APPEAL The denial of a motion for change of venue on the ground of local prejudice will not be reviewed and the change of venue compelled on mandamus, since a case involving an abuse of discretion is reviewable on writ of error. Mandamus by Frank W. Lyle and Ira B. Gage to compel L. Burget Des Voignes, circuit judge of Cass county, 157 MICH.-3. to grant a change of venue. Submitted February 16, 1909. (Calendar No. 23,232.) Writ denied May 26, 1909. James H. Kinnane, Dallas Boudeman, and J. E. Kinnane, for relators. Thomas J. Bresnahan and M. L. Howell, for respond ent. HOOKER, J. The relators were charged with conspiracy under an information duly filed. They moved for a change of venue upon the ground of local prejudice, which was denied, and they now ask us to compel the circuit judge to vacate his order and make another, i. e., one granting the motion. Were it competent for us to review his conclusion upon the merits, I should reach a different conclusion from his, but I think that it is not. A cardinal principle in mandamus is that judicial action will not be reviewed. We may compel a judicial officer to proceed, hear, and decide; but we can neither dictate his determination in advance nor review it after it is made. We held in People v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 1 Mich. 359, that: "A mandamus will be allowed to set an inferior court in motion, but not for the purpose of requiring it to come to any particular conclusion, or of retracing its steps where it has already acted, and this irrespective of the question whether the party has or has not another remedy." In U. S. v. Lawrence, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 42, it was unanimously held that: "Although they might command an inferior judge to proceed to judgment, yet they had no power to compel him to decide according to the dictates of any judgment but his own.' And in Ex parte Hoyt, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 290, that: "It has been repeatedly declared by this court that it will not, by mandamus, direct a judge what judgment to enter in a suit, but only will require him to proceed to render judgment." In the case of People v. Dutchess Judges, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 658, Bronson, J., said: "This presents an important question in relation to the appropriate office of the writ of mandamus. The court of common pleas, acting within the scope of its jurisdiction, has heard and decided a matter properly brought before it for adjudication, and the question is whether we can, by mandamus, require that court to undo what it has done, on the ground that the decision was erroneous. I am of opinion that we possess no such power. I shall not stop to inquire whether the order quashing the appeal was such a final judgment upon the rights of the parties as may be reviewed by writ of error, nor whether the relator has any other remedy. Commonwealth v. Judges of the C. P., 3 Bin. (Pa.) 273. I place my opinion upon the broad ground that the writ of mandamus cannot be awarded for the correction of judicial errors. This court, in the exercise of its supervisory power over inferior tribunals, can require them, by mandamus, to proceed to judgment; but we cannot dictate what particular judgment they shall render. Much less can we require them to retrace their steps and reverse a decision already made. Although ministerial officers and corporations may be required by this writ to act in a particular manner, or even to reverse what they have already done, the rule is otherwise in relation to courts of justice and other bodies acting judicially, upon matters within their cognizance. Their errors, if corrected at all, must be reached by some other process than the writ of mandamus." See, also, People, ex rel. Parker, v. Calhoun Circuit Judge, 24 Mich. 408; People, ex rel. Wells, v. St. Joseph Circuit Judge, 39 Mich. 21; George N. Fletcher & Sons v. Alpena Circuit Judge, 136 Mich. 511(99 N. W. 748). Many other cases might be cited. The circuit judge did not refuse to hear and decide the motion. He passed on this question judicially. It was a discretionary question to be tried on affidavits, and such will not ordinarily be reviewed. Johr v. People, 26 Mich. 427, and cases cited in note 1. In Greeley v. Stilson, 27 Mich. 153, 154, we applied this rule to a motion |