by drunkenness. The prisons, almshouses and institutions for the care of orphanage, insanity and afflic tion are largely filled by the vice. These are evils, but not all of the evils, of the alcohol habit, affecting the social condition of the people, and their comforts and good morals. But other evils attending the use of intoxicating beverage affect the State and its goverument. It is the prolific source of crime, pauperism and insanity, and thereby entails taxation to defray the expenses of the conviction and punishment of criminals, and the support of almshouses, asylums and hospitals. It deteriorates mentally and physically the human stock, rendering its victims, as well as their progeny, less capable of bearing arms in defense of their country, and of discharging other duties of the citizens. Soldiers are unfitted for duty by it, and thereby battles have been lost, and the liberty of nations, if not lost, has been imperilled. Tradition perpetuates, if history does not fully record, the evils which have flowed from the alcohol habit of officers and soldiers of our own armies. Washington struggled with difficulties occasioned by it, and other commanders of later days have had a like experience, while patriotic soldiers have suffered on account of inebriety of officers in all branches of the military service. The appetite for strong drink, possessed by so many of our countrymen, demands constant gratification, and the expenditure therefor of enormous sums of money, thus creating a business-the keeping of saloons and dram-shops, in which are employed an immense number of men. Their business and their relations with the idle and dangerous classes of society give them great influence in public affairs. The municipal governments of the cities, often burdened with debts, and robbed by unfaithful and mercenary officers, in all departments, give evidence of the direction in which this influence is exerted. Thinking men of this day largely concur in the opinion that the influence of the saloon, and the idleness and vice of the multitude of its clientage, united, constitute the great peril of American institutions. We think none will deny that nothing but evil flows from this source.

That the State possesses the power, in the exercise of its police authority, to strike at the alcohol habit by regulating or totally suppressing the sale of intoxicating liquors for use as a beverage, is admitted on all hands. We do not understand that counsel for defendants deny it. All the courts of the Union, Federal and State, which have passed upon the question, unite in sustaining this authority. See, for a citation of these cases, Cooley Const. Lim. 582, 583, and notes, and the first series and annual volumes of the United States Digest. The power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors has been exercised by many States, and traffic therein with Indians has been prohibited by statutes of the United States, and of this and other States. The preservation of order in the Indian tribes and peace between them and the frontier settlers, the prevention of famine and disease, and the preservation of the very existence of these savages, are the humane objects of these statutes.

The same purpose demands legislation to protect the inebriates among our own countrymen, probably equalling in number all the Indian tribes, from the destructive consequences of the gratification of their appetites for strong drink, which is no less uncontrollable in them than in the Indians. Surely humanity and patriotism demand that the same protection be extended to this unfortunate class of citizens of the United States which is secured to the savage wards of our government.

In the exercise of the power to suppress saloons and prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, the Legislature of this State, in the constitutional ex. eroise of its discretion, has forbidden the manufac

ture of intoxicating liquors, except for sale for mechanical, medicinal, culinary and sacramental purposes, under regulations as prescribed by the statute. The prohibition of the manufacture is a means to effectuate the prohibition of the sale. The use of all means to accomplish the end, not forbidden by constitutional restriction, rests in the discretion of the legislative department of the State government. The courts cannot review the exercise of this discretion.

But the prohibition of the manufacture of intoxicating liquor may be supported upon the ground that per se it has a deleterious effect upon good order, and the peace, comfort and morals of the people of the State. The manufacture of an article so pernicious in its use as a beverage cannot be consistently authorized while its sale is forbidden. It would be as an effort to stay the flow of a stream, when its very source should be destroyed. The manufacture in the State would offer inducements for the violation of the law prohibiting sales, and would afford opportunities for the creation and gratification of the appetites by, at least, those engaged in and connected with it. For other reasons, which need not be stated, the Legislalature esteemed the manufacture to be an evil which ought to be suppressed.

But counsel insist that alcohol, which was alone manufactured by defendant, is not commonly used as a beverage. The statement may be admitted to be true. But it is largely so used by people of some nationalities who have become citizens of the United States, and often used by others. By the simple process of dilution of alcohol a beverage is made palatable enough to the victims of the appetite for strong drink, which may become the common drink of inebriates.

Counsel argue, as we understand them, that as the manufacture of alcohol is permitted for sale for lawful purposes within the State, it does, when manufactured for exportation, not a lawful purpose, become property, and then its exportation, a purpose forbidden by the statute, becomes lawful on the ground that the restriction upon its use is an interference with the rights of property. But conceding that alcohol, without regard to the purpose of its manufacture, is property, it does not follow that its uses may not be restricted by the State in the exercise of its police authority. While the State may not deprive the citizen of his property, it may forbid its use for purposes which are subversive of the peace, order and morals of the people, and destructive of health and life. Counsel refer to statutes forbidding the manufacture of oleomargarine and glucose, and express the opinion that they are not in conflict with constitutional provisions upon which they rely, to defeat the statute under consideration in this case. We can discover no distinction between the statute under consideration and the statutes referred to by counsel, which are doubtless based on the ground that the articles prohibited are detrimental to health, or their production is in conflict with the interests of the people and the policy of the State enacting them.

But the use of property may be restricted for purposes connected with trade and other interests of the people. An illustration of legislation of this character is found in our game law, which forbids the transportation out of the State of any game killed within it. Yet the killing of game is permitted, with restrictions as to time and quantity or number killed. The sportsman may lawfully kill the prescribed number within the lawful time. The game becomes his property, yet he cannot transport it out of the State. We have never heard doubts expressed as to its constitutionality. A little consideration will disclose its close similarity to the statute forbidding the transpor tation of intoxicating liquor.

'Section 1. That it shall be lawful for the Staten Island Rapid Transit Company, a corporation existing under the laws of the State of New York, and the Baltimore & New York Railroad Company, a corporation existing under the laws of the State of New

& N. Y. R. Co.

The act of Congress of June 16, 1886, authorizing the Staten Island Rapid Transit Company, a corporation of New York, and the Baltimore & New York Railroad Company, a corporation of New Jersey, or either of them, to construct and maintain a railroad bridge across the Staten Island Sound, known as "Arthur Kill," and establishing "the same as a post-road," is within the power "to regu late commerce " vested in Congress by the Constitution of the United States, and may be exercised without the consent or concurrence of the States in which the structure is authorized by the act to be placed.

The grant is, in effect, a grant of the mere use of the soil needed for the structure, and not an assumption of exclusive jurisdiction over such territory. Cession of the soil by the State in which the land lies is therefore not necessary to the exercise of the privilege. The New Jersey act of April 6, 1886, prohibiting any person or corporation from erecting any bridge, etc., over or in any part of the navigable waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and separating that State from other States with-out permission from the Legislature of that State, is unconstitutional as against the Staten Island Rapid Transit Company, claiming to exercise the privilege conferred upon it by the above act of Congress.

The shore and lands under water of the navigable streams and waters of New Jersey, which prior to the Revolution, belonged to the king of Great Britaiu as part of the jura regalia of the crown, passed to the State at the close of that war, but the State succeeded to them as trustee of the people at large; and the right of the State therein not being such property as is susceptible of pecuniary compensation, it is not "private property" within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, amend. 5, providing that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

John P. Stockton, attorney-general, Barker Gummere and Cortlandt Parker, for informant.

maintain a bridge across the Staten Island Sound, or Arthur Kill, from New Jersey to Richmond county, New York, for the passage of railroad trains, engines and cars thereon, and to lay on and over said bridge railway tracks for the more perfect connection of any railroads that are or shall be constructed to the said sound at or opposite said point; and in case of any litigation concerning any alleged obstruction to the free navigation of said sound on account of said bridge, the cause may be tried before the Circuit Court of the United States of either of said States in which any portion of said obstruction or bridge touches, and that all railway companies desiring to use the said bridge shall have and be entitled to equal rights and privileges in the passage over the same, and in the use of the machinery and fixtures thereof, and of all the approaches thereto, for a reasonable compensation, to be paid to the owners of said bridge under and upon such terms and conditions as shall be prescribed by the secretary of war upon hearing the allegations and proofs of the parties, in case they shall not agree.

Sec. 2. That said bridge shall be constructed as a pivot draw-bridge, with a draw over the main channel of the sound at an accessible and navigable point, and with spans of not less than two hundred feet in length in the clear on each side of the central or pivot pier of the draw; and said spans shall not be less than thirty-two feet above mean low-water mark, measuring to the lowest member of the bridge superstructure; and provided also that said draw shall be opened promptly upon signal, except when trains are passing over the said bridge, for the passage of boats whose construction shall not be such as to admit of their passage under the draw of said bridge when closed; but in no case shall unnecessary delay occur in opening the said draw after the passage of trains; and the said company or corporation shall maintain at its own expense, from sunset to sunrise, such lights or other signals on said bridge as the lighthouse board shall prescribe.

ants.

BRADLEY, J. This case was commenced by information filed by the attorney-general of New Jersey, in the Court of Chancery of that State, praying for an injunction to restrain the defendants from erecting a bridge across Arthur Kill, between New Jersey and Staten Island, in the State of New York, upon the lands of the State situate on the shore, and under the waters of said kill. The chancellor granted a preliminary injunction upon the bill any affidavits. The defendants have removed the case to this court, as one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and have filed an answer. Motion was then made to dissolve the injunction, but after argument, the parties stipulated to submit the case as upon final hearing on bill and answer. There are no controverted facts in the case.

structure, and shall be recognized and known as a post-route, upon which also no higher charge shall be made for the transmission over the same of the mails, the troops, and the munitions of war of the United States than the rate per mile paid for their transportation over the railroads or public highways leading to said bridge, and the United States shall have the right of way for postal telegraph purposes acros8 said bridge.

"Sec. 4. That the plan and location of said bridge, with a detailed map of the sound at the proposed site of the bridge, and near thereto, exhibiting the depths and currents, shall be submitted to the secretary of war for his approval, and until he approve the plan and location of said bridge it shall not be built; but upon the approval of said plan by the secretary of war, the said companies, or either of them, may pro

within the scope of its terms, may have such effect given to it as comports with the power of the legislative body which enacted it; just as a deed of couveyance may operate as a grant, a bargain and sale, a release, or a confirmation, according to the interest of the grantor on the one hand, and of the grantee on the other. The construction of the act therefore depends on the power of Congress, which will be examined hereafter.

Another question of a preliminary character relates to the capacity and right of the defendant, the Staten Island Rapid Transit Railroad Company, to perform any acts and transact any business as a corporation in New Jersey. It is argued that corporations, as such, have no legal existence outside of the State by whose laws they are created, and cannot transact business in another State except by the comity of its laws, which is not accorded in the present case. This doctrine is subject to much qualification. The habits of business have so changed since the decision in the case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, and corporate organizations have been found so convenient, especially as avoiding a dissolution at every change of membership, that a large part of the business of the country has come to be transacted by their instrumentality; while their most objectionable feature, the non-liability of corporators, has in most instances been abrogated in whole or in part; and to deny their admission from one State to another in ordinary cases, at the present day, would go far to neutralize that provision in the fourth article of the Constitution, which secures to the citizens of one State all the privileges and immunities of citizens in another, and that provision of the fourteenth amendment which secures to all persons the equal protection of the laws. So strongly is this felt, that in the recent case of Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 396; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132, the doctrine that corporations are not citizens or persons, within the protective language of the Constitution, was unanimously disapproved, and the court expressly held that they are entitled, as well as individuals, to the equal protection of the laws, under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.

It is undoubtedly just and proper that foreign corporations should be subject to the legitimate police regulations of the State, and should have, if required, an agent in the State to accept service of process when sued for acts done or contracts made therein. In reference to some branches of business, like those of banking and insurance, which affect the people at large, they may also be subject to more stringent regulations for the security of the public, and may be even prohibited from pursuing them except upon such terms and conditions, not unlawful in themselves, as the State chooses to impose. But in the pursuit of business authorized by the government of the United States, and under its protection, the corporations of other States cannot be prohibited or obstructed by any State. If Congress should employ a corporation of ship-builders to construct a man-ofwar, they would have the right to purchase the necessary timber and iron in any State of the Union. And in carrying on foreign and inter-State commerce, corporations, equally with individuals, are within the protection of the commercial power of Congress, and cannot be molested in another State by State burdens or impediments. This was held and decided in the case of Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. 8. 204; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826, and affirmed in the recent case of Philadelphia S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1118; and although the decision in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, conformed to the doctrine of Augusta Bank v. Earle, the following striking language was used by the conrt, to-wit: "At the

time of the formation of the Constitution a large part of the commerce of the world was carried on by corporations. The East India Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, the Hamburgh Company, the Levant Company and the Virginia Company, may be named among the many corporations then in existence which acquired, from the extent of their operations, celebrity throughout the commercial world. This state of facts forbids the supposition that it was intended, in the grant of power to Congress, to exclude from its control the commerce of corporations. The language of the grant makes no reference to the instrumentality by which commerce may be carried on; it is general, and includes alike commerce by individuals, partnerships, associations and corporations."

We may fairly supplement this language by adding, that when the Constitution was adopted, it could not have been supposed that the regulations of commerce to be made by Congress might be of no avail to commercial corporations, or at least might be rendered nugatory with regard to them, in consequence of State restrictions upon their power to act as corporations in any other State than that of their origin.

At all events, if Congress, in the execution of its powers, chooses to employ the intervention of a proper corporation, whether of the State, or out of the State, we see no reason why it should not do so. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent it from making contracts with or conferring powers upon State corporations, for carrying out its own legitimate purposes. What right of the State would be invaded? The corporation thus employed, or empowered, in executing the will of Congress, could do nothing which the State could rightfully oppose or object to. It may be added that no State corporation more suitable than the defendant could be empowered to build the bridge in question in this case, since one-half of the bridge is in the State of New York, and the railroad of the defendant is to connect with it on the New York side. In our judgment, if Congress itself has the power to construct a bridge across a navigable stream for the furtherance of commerce among the States, it may authorize the same to be done by agents, whether individuals or a corporation created by itself, or a State corporation already existing and concerned in the enterprise. The objection that Congress cannot confer powers on a State corporation is untenable. It has used their agency for carrying on its own purposes from an early period. It adopted as post-roads the turnpikes belonging to the various turnpike corporations of the country, as far back as such corporations were known, and subjected them to burdens, and accorded to them privileges arising out of that relation. It continued the same system with regard to canals and railroads when these modes of transportation came into existence. Nearly half a century ago it constituted every railroad built, or to be built, in the United States a post-road. This of course involved duties, and conferred privileges and powers not continued in their original charter. In 1866 Congress authorized every steam railroad company in the United States to carry passengers and goods on their way from one State to another, and to receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other States, so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the same to the place of destination. The powers thus conferred were independent of the powers conferred by the charter of any railroad company. Surely these acts of Congress cannot be condemned as unconstitutional exertions of power.

In the present case the corporate capacity of the Staten Island Rapid Transit Railroad Company is admitted by making it a defendant. It is not excluded from the State by any want of comity in the laws of the State. Its alleged want of power under those

laws to build the bridge in question does not arise from any thing peculiar to it as a foreign corporation, but from the general prohibition of the State law of April 6, 1886, which is applicable to all persons and corporations, and declares "that no bridge, viaduct or fixed structure shall be created by any person or corporation over or in any part of the navigable waters separating this State from other States, where the tide ebbs and flows, without express permission of the Legislature of this State, given by statutes for that purpose."

This prohibition, in its broadest sense, inhibits the erection of such a bridge as is described therein by Congress itself, or (which is the same thing) by any person or corporation acting under the authority of Congress, and of course is to that extent void if Congress has power to erect such a bridge. But if it is not to be taken in this broad sense, but as subject to the condition in law of being inoperative as against the paramount power of Congress, then the authority of the defendant is unaffected by it, inasmuch as the defendant has express power from Congress to build the bridge. So that we are brought back to the question of the power of Congress to build the bridge, and whether that power is independent of the consent and concurrence of the State government. And in our judgment this question must be answered in the affirmative.

The power to regulate commerce among the several States is given by the Constitution in the most general and absolute terms. The "power to regulate," as applied to a government, has a most extensive application. With regard to commerce, it has been expressly held that it is not confined to commercial transactions, but extends to seamen, ships, navigation and the appliances and facilities of commerce. And it must extend to these, or it cannot embrace the whole subject. Under this power the navigation of rivers and harbors has been opened and improved, and we have no doubt that canals and water-ways may be opened to connect navigable bays, harbors and rivers with each other, or with the interior of the country. Nor have we any doubt, that under the same power, the means of commercial communication by land as well as by water may be opened up by Congress between different States whenever it shall see fit to do so, either on failure of the States to provide such communication, or whenever in the opinion of Congress increased facilities of communication ought to exist. Hitherto, it is true, the means of commercial communication have been supplied, either by nature in the navigable waters of the country, or by the States in the construction of roads, canals and railroads, so that the functions of Congress have not been largely called into exercise under this branch of its jurisdiction and power, except in the improvement of rivers and harbors, and the licensing of bridges across navigable streams. But this is no proof that its power does not extend to the whole subject in all its possible requirements. Indeed it has been put forth in several notable instances which stand as strong arguments of practical construction given to the Constitution by the legislative department of the government. The Cumberland or National Road is one instance of a grand thoroughfare projected by Congress, extending from the Potomac to the Mississippi. After being nearly completed it was surrendered to the several States within which it was situate. The system of Pacific railroads presents several instances of railroads constructed through or into different States, as Iowa, Kansas and California. The main stem of the Union Pacific commences at Council Bluffs, in Iowa, and crosses the Missouri by a bridge at that place erected under the authority of Congress alone. In 1862 a bridge was authorized by Congress to be constructed across the

Ohio river at Steubenville, between the States of Virginia and Ohio, to be completed, maintained and operated by the railroad company authorized to built it, and by another company named, "any thing in any law or laws of the above-named States to the contrary notwithstanding." 12 St. 569.

Still it is contended that although Congress may have power to construct roads and other means of communication between the States, yet this can only be done with the concurrence and consent of the States in which the structures are made. If this is so, then the power of regulation in Congress is not supreme; it depends on the will of the States. We do not concur in this view. We think that the power of Congress is supreme over the whole subject, unimpeded and unembarrassed by State lines or State laws; that in this matter the country is one, and the work to be accomplished is national; and that State interests, State jealousies and State prejudices do not require to be consulted. In matters of foreign and inter-State commerce there are no States.

It is very true that in some cases of bridges authorized to be erected and other things authorized to be done, Congress may have required that the consent of the State should be first obtained. But the power of the United States cannot depend on the consent of the States; it is only to be found in the Constitution. The consent of a State may sometimes facilitate the execution of a power, as the consent to the use of the prisons, court-houses, and other public buildings of the State; but it can never confer power. Particular States have sometimes consented to the employment of their courts and judicial machinery by the officers of the United States for condemning land for public purposes. But if the United States had no power to take land by condemnation, such consent could not give it. So where, in any case, Congress may have authorized the construction of a railroad or a bridge upon the condition of obtaining the consent of the State, it is clear that such consent was not required for the purpose of supplementing the power of Congress to authorize the structure to be made, but rather for the purpose of manifesting a disposition of comity and good-will toward the State. For if Congress had not the power to authorize the structure, consent could not give it. All those cases therefore in which Congress has given such authority, whether with or without the consent of the State, are precedents for affirming the power of Congress. They are all instances of practical construction of the Constitution in favor of it.

The most strenuous objection however to the exercise of the power in this case, and in the manner proposed, is based on the fact that the piers of the bridge are to rest and the bridge is to stand on land which belongs to the State, and that no compensation is proposed to be made for the taking thereof. It is contended, that if the land of the State can be taken at all (which is denied) it can, at most, only be taken, like other private property, after just compensation has been made.

First. It is denied that the land of the State can be taken at all without voluntary cession or consent of the State Legislature. If this is so, we are brought back to the dilemma of requiring the consent of the State in almost every case of an inter-State line of communication by railroad, for hardly a case can arise in which some property belonging to a State will not be crossed. It will always be so at the passage of a navigable stream. This shows that the position can not be sound, for it brings us to a reductio ad absurdum. It interposes an effectual barrier to the execution of a constitutional power vested in Congress. It overlooks the fundamental principle that the Constitution, and all laws made in pursuance thereof, are