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peremptorily, then they are necessarily the jury to dence ou that account. And upon this point the Sutry the case. Now in this instance, the defendants preme Court of the State, iu that part of its opinion have no more peremptory challenges, and the chal which has beeu printed with the motiou papers, reJeuge which they have made for cause is overruled; marks as follows: "The objection that the letter was therefore so far as the defendants are concerned, he is obtained from the defendant by an unlawful seizure a juror to try the case.” This was accepted by both is made for the first time in this court. It was not parties as a true statement of the then condition of made on the trial in the court below. Such an objecthe case; and after some further examination of the | tion as this, which is not suggested by the nature of juror, which elicited nothing of importance in con the offered evidence, but depends upon the proof of nection with the present inquiry, no peremptory chal an outside fact, should have been made on the trial. lenge having been interposed by the State, Sanford The defense should have proved that the Most letter was sworn as a juror, and the panel was then complete. was one of the letters illegally seized by the police,

This so far as we bave been advised, presents all there and should then bave moved to exclude or oppose its is iu the record whicb this court can consider touch admission on the ground that it was obtained by such ing the challenges of these two jurors by the defend illegal seizure. This was not done, and therefore we ants for cause.

cannot consider the constitutional question supposed In Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U.S. 145, 156, we said, "that to be involved.” upon the trial of the issue of fact raised by "a cbal Even if the court was wrong in saying that it did lenge to a juror, in a criminal case, on the ground that not appear that the Most letter was one of the papers he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the illegally seized, it still remains uncontradicted that issues to be tried, “the court will practically be called objection was not made in the trial court to its admisupon to determine whether the nature and strengthsion on that account. To give us jurisdiction under of the opinion formed are such as iu law necessarily to section 709, Rev. Stat., because of the denial by a State raise the presumption of partiality. The question thus court of any title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed presented is one of mixed law and fact, and to be tried, under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of the so far as the facts are concerned, like any other issue United States, it must appear on the record that such of that character, upon the evidence. The fiuding of title, right, privilege, or immunity was “specially set the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set up or claimed " at the proper time, and in the proper aside by a reviewing court, unless the erroris manifest. way. To be reviewable here, the decision must be * * * It must be made clearly to appear, that upon against the right so set up or claimed. As the Suthe evidence, the court ought to have found the juror preme Court of the State was reviewing the decision had formed such an opinion that he could not in law of the trial court, it niust appear that the claim wag be deemed impartial. The case must be one in which made in that court, because the Supreme Court was it is manifest the law left nothing to the conscience only authorized to review the judgment for errore or discretion of the court." If such is the degree of committed there, and we can do no more. This is not, strictness which is required in the ordinary cases of as seems to be supposed by one of the counsel for the writs of error from one court to another in the same petitioners, a question of the waiver of a right under general jurisdiction, it certainly ought not to be re- the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, laxed in a case where as in this the ground relied on but a question of claim. If the right was not set up for the reversal by this court of a judgment of the or claimed in the proper court below, the judgment of highest court of the State is that the error complained the highest court of the State in the action is concluof is so gross as to amount in law to a denial by the sive, so far as the right of review here is concerned. State of a trial by an impartial jury to one who is ac. The question whether the letter, if obtained in the oused of crime. We are unbesitatingly of opinion that manner alleged, would have been competent evidence, no such case is disclosed by this record.

is not before us, and therefore no foundation is laid We come now to consider the objection that the de- under this objection for the exercise of our jurisdicfendant Spies was compelled by the court to be a wit

tion. ness against himself. He voluntarily offered himself As to the suggestion by counsel for the petitioners as a witness in his own behalf, and by so doing he be Spies and Fielden - Spies having been born in Gercame bound to submit to a proper cross-examination many, and Fieldeu in Great Britain — that they have under the law and practice in the jurisdiction where been denied by the decision of the court below rights he was being tried. The complaint is that he was re guaranteed to them by treaties between the United quired on cross-examination to state whether he had States and their respective countries, it is sufficient to received a certain letter, which was shown, purport say that no such questions were made and decided in ing to have been written by Johann Most, and ad either of the courts below, and they cannot be raised dressed to him, and upon bis saying tbat be bad, the in this court for the first time. Besides, we have not court allowed the letter to be read in evidence against | been referred to any treaty, peither are we aware of him. This it is claimed was not proper cross-exami any, under which such a question could be raised. nation. It is not contended that the subject to which | The obiection that

The objection that the defendants were not actually the cross-examination related was not pertinent to present in the Supreme Court of the State at the time the issue to be tried; and whether a cross-examination sentence was pronounced, cannot be made on the must be confined to matters pertinent to the testimony- | record as it now stands, because on its face it shows in-chief, or may be extended to the matters in issue, that they were present. If this is not in accordance is certainly a question of State law, as administered with tbe fact, the record must be corrected below, not in the courts of the State, and not of Federal law. here. It will be time enough to consider whether the

Something was said in argument about an alleged objection presents a Federal question when the corunreasonable search and seizure of the papers and I rection has been made. property of some of the defendants, and their use in Being of opinion therefore that the Federal quesevidence on the trial of the case. Special reference is tions presented by the counsel for the petitioners, and made in this connection to the lotter of Most about which they say they desire to argue, are not involved which Spies was cross-examined; but we have not in the determination of the case as it appears on the been referred to any part of the record in which it ap- face of the record, we deny the writ. Petition for pears that objection was made to the use of tbis evi- writ of error is dismissed.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. owner, and a delivery to him protects the carrier, up

less he has been notified to the contrary, do not apCARRIERS-WRONGFUL DELIVERY - LIABILITY--NO

ply here. The opinion of the learned judge at the TICE.-Plaintiff's assignors delivered freight to a car

General Term proceeds, it seems to us, upou the errorier in Norfolk, Va., for shipment to Denver, Col., re

neous theory that the defendant was only bound to ceiving a receipt therefor describing the goods as

know what was imparted to it by the directions on “marked 'Y'-order notify Zucca Bros.," Denver,

the goods and the papers it received from its immeCol. The goods were delivered by an intermediate diate predecessor, and that from such papers it discarrier to defendant company with a “transfer

charged its obligations by delivering to Zucca Bros. sheet," " Consignee ·Y,' order Hup. Zucca Bros., Den

Even on the papers received from the Hannibal & St. ver, Col.," and were delivered by defendant to Zucca

Joseph Railroad we do not think the defendant was Bros. without demanding the production of the bill

justified, without inquiry, in making the delivery, of lading. The bill of lading had been attached to a

and we do not think that a carrier situated like dedraft drawn on Zucca Bros. for the price of the goods,

fendant can safely rely upon the papers received which was dishonored and the bill of lading returned,

from its immediate predecessor, when it delivers and indorsed. If there were no bill of lading, inquiry

without a bill of lading (where one is made out), and would develop that fact, and in all probability would

to the wrong person, although justified in its delivery also show who was the proper party to whom to make

by the papers received from its predecessor, which delivery, Until this was done the goods could be

differed as to the consignee from the person properly placed in store, as was stated to be the true

named in the bill. These papers are made out for the course in Bank v. Bissell, 72 N. Y. 615. Our Factors'

convenience of the carriers as between themselves. Act makes it the duty of a carrier, etc., not to deliver

The owner or consiguor of the goods has nothing to goods except upon production and caucellation of

do with them, and probably never sees them. If he the bills of lading; and for a delivery to a consignor

has placed a direction upon the property showing without the production of the bill of lading which pro

where it is to be transported, and obtained a bill of vided for a delivery to him, but which he had in the

lading for it, he has the right to assume that delivery meantime indorsed and negotiated, the carrier was

will only be made in accordance with the terms of the held liable to the holder of the bill. Colgate y. Penn

bill, and the duty of carrier is only thereby dissylvania Co., 102 N. Y. 120. If this delivery had been

charged. In this case Zucca Bros. were not conmade in this State therefore there would have been

signees, and the whole loss was sustained by the negno doubt of the propriety of the recovery in this ac

ligence of the defendant in not demanding the bill of tion, assuming that Zucca Bros. were not the con

lading before delivering the property, which bill Zucca siguees. We think that the common law makes it

| Bros. could not bave produced unless they had paid the duty of the carrier to deliver in accordance with

the draft which accompanied it. By neglecting this the bill of lading, and if delivered without it, the car

plain duty the defendant caused the loss, and by fail. rier runs the risk of showing a delivery in accordance

ing to deliver on plaintiff's demand it has converted with its directions. It is argued here that even by

the goods, and it should therefore be responsible for the terms of the original bill of lading, Zucca Bros.

their value. Oct. 4, 1887. Furman v. Union Puc. Ry. were the consignees, and that being such, they were

Co. Opinion by Peckham, J. presumptively the proper parties to whom to make

CONTRACT-PERFORMANCE — PLEADING — PRESUMP. delivery, and that there was no written or any notifi

TION-WAIVER OF OBJECTION.-(1) A complaint which cation to the contrary, and hence defendants were

does not allege when the coutract sued on was to be justified in such delivery. We do not agree to the

performed, nor performance, or tender of performcorrectness of this construction of the bill of lading.

ance by complainant within the time, is defective. (2) It acknowledges the receipt of the goods, their weight,

Where no time for performance is mentioned in a conand states the amount of freight to their destination,

tract the legal presumption is that the engagement is Denver, Col., and says the goods are marked “Y-or

to be performed within a reasonable time. (3) A comder notify Zucca Bros." Here is no statement that

plaiut did not allege when the contract sued on was Zucca Bros. are the consignees. The very presence

to be performed, nor performance, or tender of perof the word “notify" in its relation to them shows

formance, by complainant within the time. Held, that that they are not intended as the consignees. If they

such defect was not waived because the objection was were, the word is wholly uunecessary. It is the duty

pot taken by demurrer or auswer, under the Code of of the carrier to notify the consignee of the arrival of

New York, $ 499, which provides that if objections to the goods. Price v. Powell, 3 N. Y. 322. To place in

grounds of demurrer, appearing on the face of the the bill of lading a direction to notify certain persons

complaint, are not taken, either by demurrer or anto whom, if consignees, it was the carrier's duty to de

swer, the defendant is deemed to have waived such liver, or at least to notify of the arrival of the goods,

objections, “except the objection to the jurisdiction is a plain notice that (in the absence of further direc

of the court, or the objection that the complaint does tions) they are not the consignees. In this bill no one

not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of acis named as consignee, and that makes it obvious that

tion.” Oct. 4, 1887. Pope v. Terre Haute Car & no delivery should be made to any one who does not

Manuf'g Co. Opinion by Andrews, J. produce it. The words, “Y-order notify Zucca Bros.,” in the order in which they are written, show Costs - EXTRA ALLOWANCE – PERCENTAGE OF that the goods are not to be delivered to the order of | AMOUNT INVOLVED-APPEAL.-(1) Under the Code of Zucca Bros., because after the word “order," in rela. | Civil Procedure of New York, providing that in diffition to Zucca Bros., is the word “ potify," which no. | cult or extraordinary cases, where a defense is made, tification is all the duty the defeudant had to per the court may, in its discretion, allow extra costs to form under the bill. The word “order " therefore either party, not to exceed five per cent “upon the must relate to what preceded, and it must have meant sum recovered or claimed, or the value of the subjectthat the delivery was to be made to the order of the matter involved," in a suit for a partnership account. consignors, or else to the order of “Y," which being ! ing, where the summons gave notice that on default altogether fictitious, does not mean to the order of judgment would by taken for $65,000, and the comZucca Bros., unless they produce the bill of lading. | plaint specified sums as received or invested by de. Zucca Bros., not being the consignees, therefore all the fendant's intestate,amounting to not less than $200,000, cases showing that prima facie the consiguee is the profits of the firm business, on dismissal of the case for failure to prove the fact of partnership, held, that one court, defendant caused to be published, in a news, half of the $200,000 constituted the subject-matter in- | paper published in the city where the court was sitvolved, and that it was in the court's discretion to al ting, a telegraph dispatch falsely stating that persons low defendant extra costs accordingly. (2) The allow. | named had made a wager tbat owing to the influence ance of costs in difficult or extraordinary cases where

of adverse claimants, the Supreme Court would reverse a defense is made, under the Code of Civil Procedure its former decision in the Smoke-House cases. Held, of New York, $ 3253, is reviewable on appeal to the a contempt at common law. The defendant disclaims General Term. Oct. 4, 1887. Adams v. Arkenburgh. in his affidavit any intention to treat the court with Opinion by Dauforth, J.

the slightest contempt in publishing said telegram; but the court is not bound by such disclaimer, but

may inquire into the truth of the matter. “The ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE

meaning and intent of the defendant in publishing CISIONS.

the dispatch must be determined by a fair interpretation of the language used.” “The construction and

tendency of the publication, as bearing upon its ACTION — CONTRACT – JOINT LIABILITY.- A con

character as a contempt, are matters of law for the tract executed and delivered the same day as the lease

court." Henry v. Ellis, 49 Iowa, 205; People v. Wilson, on the back of which it was written, was as follows:

61 Ill. 195, and also numerous authorities cited in the “In consideration of the letting of the premises in the

latter case. The defendant says in his affidavit that foregoing instrument described, and for the sum of

in making the publication in the Independent” he “inone dollar to me paid, I do hereby become surety for

tended no disrespect or improper conduct toward the the punctual payment of the rent and performance of

court; but on the contrary, was prompted solely to so the covenants in said instrument mentioned, to be

publish the same as an item of news, and apprise the paid and performed by the second parties therein

court of what had transpired, that it might act in the named; and if any default shall at any time be made

premises as it saw proper." He further says that therein, I do hereby promise and agree to pay unto

Murphy and Canpon were copartners in the real-estate Wallace A. Preston, one of the parties of the first part

business, and on that account interested in having the named in said instrument, the said rent and arrears

surface claimants succeed in said cases; that Murphy thereof that may be due, and fully satisfy the con

stated to him in substance and effect the facts pubdition of said instrument, and all dangers that may

lished in the "Independent,” and he was thus informed occur by reason of the non-fulfillment thereof, with

of the wager at the time he sent the dispatch. On the out requiring notice or proof of the demand being

hearing of this case, the defendant voluntarily put made. Witness my hand and seal this 5th day of

himself upon the witness stand, and among other January, 1885. Geo. W. Platt, Jr. (L. S.]” Held,

things swore that his object in sending that telegram the two instruments formed a joint obligation, and on

was “to bave the thing generally discussed to have a default by the lessees, a joint action thereon could be

chance to make wagers, as he was satisfied the decismaintained. It is plain that the contract of George

iou would not be reversed." He further discloses the W. Platt, Jr., is not one of guaranty. He binds him

fact that Cannon and Murphy had made no wager at self in terms as a surety, and his undertaking is to

all, but that he had procured a simulated one to be pay the rent upon default. If the rent is not paid, he

made. It is seldom we find as many contradictions is at once liable. There is no possible contingency

and as much falsehood in so short a record as the case where the other defendants become liable to pay rent

before us contains. The dispatch itself is false. or damages, but he is also liable, and to the same full

Cannon aud Murphy had made no wager. Murphy extent that they are. If they pay the rent the day it becomes due, and fully perform the covenants of the

it himself. He says his sole purpose was to publish it lease, there can exist no right of action against them

as an item of news, and apprise the court of what had on the part of the lessors. Oply upon their default

transpired, that it might act in the premises as it saw suit be brought against them, and immediately upon

proper. Then again he says his purpose was to have such default George W. Platt's promise is the same as

the matter generally discussed, that he might have a theirs, and his liability to the lessors is the same, and

chance to make wagers on the decision. We do not co-extensive with theirs. I can see no good reason

believe that any of the reasons given is the true one; why he cannot be sued jointly with the other two de

but we will consider what the motive was. In the confendants for the rent due upon the lease and upon his

versation he had with Murphy, the latter told him contract. And his contract must be considered a part

that the counsel for the claimants in the Smoke-House of the lease. It was executed the same day, under

cases had developed some new points that he believed seal, and upon the same paper, as the lease, and delig.

would cause the court to decide his suits then pendered at the same time. It was in law executed at the

ing before it against him. In this is to be found the same time as the lease. The whole contract - the

real motive that moved the defendant to send the lease, and his undertaking upon the back of the same

telegram. In the words "that owing to the influence - took effect from a single delivery. The same con

of some surface olaimants on the Smoke-House lode sideration governed the undertaking of the three de

the Supreme Court would reverse its former decision" fendants, and their promise was in legal effect the

lurks the insinuation that undue influence was being same, a joint obligation. See Stage v. Olds, 12 Ohio

brought to bear upon the court by his adversaries in said 160; Leonard v. Sweetzer, 16 id. 1; Scott r. Swain,

suits. He expected in this way to make the public be(Penn.) 8 Atl. Rep. 24; McLott v. Savery, 11 Iowa, 323;

lieve that Cannon & Murphy,a firm of real-estate dealers Watson v. Beabout, 18 Ind. 281; Smith v. Sheldon, 35

in the city of Butte, would not make a wager of $500 Mich. 42; Dye v. Mano, 10 id. 295. Mich. Sup. Ct.,

that some of the “surface claimants" would so influOct. 6, 1887. Preston y. Huntingdon. Opinion by

ence the court that it would reverse its former decisMorse, J.

ion, without having strong grounds for believing it CONTEMPT — INSINUATING THAT COURT WOULD BE was true. He intended, by sending the telegram to CORRUPTLY INFLUENCED.— Defendant was a party the “Independent,” and publishing it in the city where to certain actions in the Supreme Court, known as the the court was then sitting, to reach the court. He says Smoke-House cases, all of which were of a similar | himself in his affidavit, that his purpose was to apprise character, and part of which had been decided in his the court of what had transpired, that it might act in lavor. While a part of them were pending before the the premises as it saw proper. He fabricated a false. hood, attributed it to other parties, and published it, the right to punish for constructive contempt in Engto apprise the court of what had transpired,- to influ- | land and America, see Respublica v. Passmore, 3 ence its decision in the suits then peuding before it in Yeates, 441; Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319; Maswhich he was a party. He hoped by informing the ters v. Edwards, 1 Caines, Term R. 515; Tenney's case, judges that it was believed that the defendants to the 3 Fost. 162. In the case of Neel v. State, 50 Am. Dec. suits in which he was plaintiff were bringing influence 209, the court say: “This power extends at common to bear upon them 80 that they would reverse their law, not ouly to acts which directly and opeuly insult former decision, to make them feel that they could or resist the power of the court, or the purposes of the not afford to do so, lest it would be said of them by | judges, but to cousequential, indirect, and construc. the public that they had been induced by corruption tive contempts, which obstruct the process, degrade to make such decision. His purpose to reach one of the authority, or contaminate the purity of the court." the judges, and to influeuce him to stand firm in his Mont. Sup. Ct., Oct. 15, 1887. Territory v. Murray. former holding, is as obvious as if he had sent the dis Opinion by McConnell, C. J. patch to each of them personally, instead of publish. ing it in a newspaper, where he knew they were bound

CONTRACT - COVENANT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE to read it. If the telegram had been true, he might

SALE OF LIQUOR ON PREMISES.— A deed contained the have been execused upon the ground of an honest

clause, “No intoxicating liquors are to be sold on said motive. But what could have induced him to manufac

premises in less quantities than five gallops." Held, ture a falsehood, and send it, but a corrupt motive to

that the restriction was not such a restraint of trade influence the court? Must a court that sits to try

as to make it invalid. It was one of the most ancient causes be insulted by the very parties to the (suits

rules of the common law that all contracts in restraint which they are trying, by a covert and cowardly in

of trade were void. We learn from the Year Books sinuation of official corruption, and have no power to

that this was considered as settled law in England as punish auch parties for contempt? To deprive them

early as the year 1415; and its courts would not then of such power is to take away from them the rigbt of

tolerate the least infraction of this rule. It was enjudicial self-defense. There can be no doubt but that

forced with much judicial severity, and doubtless grew his conduct is a contempt of court at common law.

out of the law of apprenticeship, under which no one Mr. Bishop, iu his work on Criminal Law, vol. 2, & 245,

iu that country could earn a livelihood at any trade says: “And according to the general doctrine, any

until after long service, and then he must continue in publication, whether by parties or strangers, relating

the oue adopted by him, or have none. For 200 years to a cause in court, if it has & tendency to prejudice

the rule existed, without exception, that all contracts

in restraint of trade were void. It was qualified howthe publio respecting its merits, and to corrupt the administration of justice * * * may be visited as

ever as the law of apprenticeship broadened; and a

distinction was then drawn by the cases of Broad v. a contempt.” In 2 Hawk. P. C. 220, contempts are classified as contempts in the face of the court, and

Jollyfe, 3 Cro. Jac. 596 and Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P.

Wms. 181, between a general and a limited restraint contemptuous words or writings coucerning the court.

of tradu. Other decisions followed, until it became Blackstone says contempts may be committed “ by

the settled English rule that while a contract not to speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges acting in their judicial capacity, * * * aud

do business anywhere is void, yet one stipulating not by any thing, in short, that demonstrates a gross want

to do so in a particular place, or within certain limits,

is valid. This has always beeu the rule in this counof that regard aud respect which, when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority is entirely lost

try. The wisdom of the rule as qualified cannot be among the people." 4 Cooley, Bl. Com. 285. The

doubted. It is eminently suited to the genius of our Supreme Court of Illinois has defined contempts to be

institutions. It prevents the building up of monopo“ direct," such as are offered in the presence of the

lies, and the creation of exclusive privileges. Concourt while sitting indicially, or" constructive," such,

traots in general restraint of trade produce them; though not in its presence, as tend by their operation

they tend to destroy industry and competition in a to obstruct and embarrass or prevent the due admini

country, thus enhancing prices, and diminishing the stration of justice." Stuart v. People, 3 Scam. 395.

products of skill and energy; they impair the means And in this case the court bold that such acts would

of livelihood, and injure the public, by depriving it of be considered as done in its presence. Courts are

the services of men in useful employments. The law organized for the administration of justice, and the

therefore guards against these evils by declaring such whole doctrine of contempt grows out'of the necessity

contracts void. Pyke v. Thomas, 4 Bibb, 486. This

reasoning however does not apply to such as impose of removing every obstruction in its way, by visiting summary punishment upon those who undertake to

but a special restraint; as not to carry on trade at a defeat it. The right to punish for contempt is inher

particular place, or with certain persons, or for a ent in all courts of justice. It is a part of their very

limited reasonable time. The party contracting is life, and a necessary incident to the exercise of judi.

then left free to exercise his trade or transact busicial power. U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Woodb.

ness at other places, other times, and with other per& M. 407; State v. Johnson, 1 Brev. 155; Yates v. Lan

BOU8. Indeed, a particular trade may be promoted by sing, 9 Jobps. 416; Casat v. State, 40 Ark. 514; U. S.

being limited for a short period to a few persons, and v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; State v. Doty, 90 Am. Dec.

the public benefited by preventing too many from 674. In the case of Stuart v. People, 3 Scam. 395, the

engaging in the same calling at the same place. Il

therefore the limitation be a reasonable one, it will be construotive contempts would necessarily be included

upheld. Grundy V. Edwards, 7 J. J. Marsh. 368; all acts calculated to impede, embarrass, or obstruct

Toruer v. Johnson, 7 Dana, 435. The one now under the court in the administration of justice." Such acts

consideration is 80. lt related to the use and occupawould be considered as done in the presence of the

tiou of the property. It was a covenant running with court. Contempts committed out of the court's pres

the land, and therefore effective against a tenant or ence are often held to have been constructively com

assignee of the vendee; and the appellants were when mitted in its presence. It makes no difference whether

enjoined, engaged in the willful violation of it. Steph. the defendant was in Butte or Helena, in the court

N. P. 1113. Ky. Ct. App., Oct. 13, 1887. Sutton v. Head. house in the presence of the court, or out of it; when

| Opinion by Holt, J. he publisbed the obnoxious dispatch, the authority to CRIMINAL LAW - SALE OF BEER FOR MANUFACTURE punish for it is equa!)" clear at common law. Upon OF SODA-WATER. - Where one, holding a perm it from the county board of supervisors to sell intoxicating the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL at a later day. A copy of liquors for mechanical, medicinal, culinary and sacra the programme will also be transmitted to ench memmental purposes, sells beer by the keg, to be used in the ber of the association by mail. manufacture of of a beverage kuown as “I. M. Soda- A communication from Governor D. B. Hill was reWater," it is a violation of the permit. The statute ceived, inviting the members of the association to a is not designed merely to preveut intoxication, but reception to be given them by him at the Executive

ny extout of intoxicating liquor as a bever-Mansion on the evening of Jan. 17, 1888. age. It is only in exceptional cases that the use of A resolution accepting Governor Hill's invitation intoxicating liquor as a beverage results in intoxica- was unanimously adopted. The secretary of the tion. It is not usually drunk in sufficient quantity association was appointed a committee to wait on to intoxicate. But the sale of liquor to be used as a l his excellency and present him a copy of the said beverage is a violation of the law, regardless of the quantity in which it is to be used at one time, or the In view of the governor's reception, a resolution was extent to which it is to be diluted. A large part of the adopted dispeusing with the usual annual association evil attendant upon the use may be done, though the dinner. particular use may not result in intoxication. The Tbe members of the committee expressed themselves habit and appetite may be formed. Evils are some- bigbls gratified with the exceedingly prosperous contimes dangerous in proportion to their insidiousness. dition of the association, and in the very large addition The name " Soda-Water" has a very inoffensive sound, to its membership during the past year. and might easily commend the drink to the inexperienced and unwary. We do not think the statute is designed to sanction the use of it as a beverage if it

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. contains an intoxicating ingredient. The sale of the beer, in the case at bar, was a sale of it to be used as a

| THE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, beverage, and we are not able to see that the precise way in which it was to be used detracted much from

1 Nov. 29, 1887: ite objectionableness. The beer contained an intoxica

Conviction and sentence reversed and new trial ting ingredient, and was capable of doing the injury of

granted-People v. Jacob Sbarp-Opinion by Danforth, intoxicating liquor, in part at least, though so diluted

J., all concurring and a supplemental opinion was that the use would not result directly in intoxication.

written by Peckham, J.- Judgment affirmed with Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 6, 1887. State v. Yager. Opinion costs-Ellen Urquhart, respondent, v. City of Ogdensby Adams, C. J.

burgh, appellant. — Judgment affirmed without costs

-John J. Serviss, appellant-respondent, v. Lucy MoEVIDENCE-NEGLIGENCE-SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS.--Iu

Donnell, respondent-appellant, and others.—Order an action agaiust a horse railroad company to recover

of General Term and Surrogate's Court reversed and damages for injuries sustained in a collision between

letters revoked with costs, as expressed in the opinion one of its cars, on which the plaintiff was a passenger,

-In re Estate of ex-Gov. John B. Page, deceased.and a hook and ladder truck of the fire department,

Order of General Term dismissing appeal reversed, it is not competent to show that directly after the ac

and appeal ordered to be heard on the merits by that cident brakes were put on this and other city trucks.

court-Ithaca Agricultural Works, appellant, v. Judah The object of the evidence was to show that there

Eggleston, respondent, and Allen B. Eggleston, conwas a defect in the truck, so that it could not be read

testant. - Judgment affirmed with costs-Charles L. ily stopped. The materiality of this testimony is not

Picket, appellant, v. Edward C. Bartlett and another, obvious. The court held, in effect, that whether the

respondent, Judgment of General Term modifying truck was driven with care or not was only significant

judgment entered in report of referee reversed, and as bearing upon the question whether the accident was

that of referee affirmed with costs- Wm. B. Cooper, unavoidable; that it was no excuse for negligence on

appellant, v. The Hong Kong and Shangbai Banking the part of the driver of the street car that those in

Corporation, respondents.- Judgments of courts becharge of the truck were also negligent, or driving at

low reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event a rapid rate. The principle is familiar that all persons

-Jacob Miller, appellaut, v. Phenix Mutual Life Inwho act together in committing a tort are jointly and

surance Company, respondent.-Judgment reversed, severally liable therefor. So even if the collision was

new trial granted, costs to abide event-Agnes L. caused by the joint negligence of the driver of the

Reid, respondent, v. Samuel L. Mulford, appellant, street car and those in charge of the truck, still the

and others.- Judgments of General Term and Cirdefendant is responsible for the injury. Wis. Sup. Ct.,

cuit Court reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide Oct. 11, 1887. Heucke v. Milwaukee City Ry. Co. Opin event-The Yew York Rubber Company, V. John ion by Cole, C. J.

Rotheroy and another, respondents.--Judgment affirmed with costs-Florence McPherson, respondent,

v. Patrick Rollins and another, impleaded, etc., ap-ANNUAL MEETING OF THE STATE BAR

pellants. — Judgment affirmed with costs-John W. ASSOCIATION.

Gilbert, v. Henry S. Deshon, appellant, and another.

- Judgment affirmed with costs-Sally M. Jeffers The committee charged with the duty of making and another, appellants, v. Robert N. Jeffers, rearrangements for the next annual meeting of the New spondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Martha York State Bar Association, to be held in the Senate Albert, respondeut, v. Delaware and Hudson Railroad Chamber, Capitol, Albany, January 17 and 18, 1888, Company, appellant. — Judgment affirmed with costs met in the rooms of the association, Capitol, on -John Greso, respondent, v. Benjamin J. Hall, apMonday, Nov. 28.

pellant.- Judgment affirmed with costs—The DisThe following members of the committee were pres-count and Deposit Bank of Clarence, respondent, v. ent: Henry G. Danforth, Rochester; Matthew Hale, Samuel F. Osterhoudt, appellant. — Judgment af. Albany: Wm. H. Arnoux, New York; A. T. Clear firmed with costs-George A. Manchester and another, water, Kingston; Hamilton Harris, Albany: Arthur respondents, v. Philip Braeudin, appellant.- Judg. L. Andrews, Albany; Charles R. Hall, Norwich. ment affirmed with costs, Isabella Smith, appellant,

Au interesting programme of the proceedings of the v. City of Brooklyn, respondent. — Judgment afannual meeting was adopted, which will appear in Armed with costs-Wm. W. Ensign and others, v.

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