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must bear the loss. The important question arises, did that conversation change the relation of bailor and bailee to that of creditor and debtor, without regard to whether the money was used or not? The true rule is, as stated in 1 Add. Cont. 530, cited by counsel for plaintiff, and is as follows: "If a sum of money be bailed by one man to another under circumstances fairly leading to the presumption that the bailee has authority from the bailor to use it or not, as he may think fit, the bailee will stand in the position of a mere depositary, or he will be clothed with the increased duties and liabilities of a borrower, according as he may or may not have thought fit to avail himself of the privilege of user, impliedly accorded to him. If he puts the money in a coffer or bags, and refrains from using it, and so preserves its identity, with the intention of restoring it individuo to the bailor, he undertakes the duty of a mere depositary, and is bound only to take the same care of the deposit that he is in the habit of bestowing on his own money, and will not be responsible for loss by robbery, fire or any other casualty. But if he were to mix the sum deposited with his own money, with the intention of restoring an equivalent, and so destroy the identity and individuality of the subject-matter of the bailment, this would be a user of the money, which would at once alter the nature and character of the bailment, converting it into a loan for use and consumption, with its increased duties and responsibilities." We cannot see that there was an absolute loan of money created by the conversation between plaintiff and Fitzhenry. It was contingent upon the necessity for the use of the money. No consideration having passed, the plaintiff did not lose dominion over the money till its acceptance. Fitzhenry testifies that the contingency did not arise, and that the money remained in the safe as first placed till the robbery. We find a case directly in point, not cited by counsel, in Mississippi Reports, vol. 60, p. 330 (reported in American Reports, vol. 45, p. 410), Caldwell v. Hall, in which the opinion was rendered by the eminent Judge Chalmers, which says: "Appellee Hall placed in the iron safe of appellant Caldwell the sum of $35. It was contained in an open box, and to it and from it Hall added and withdrew at his pleasure, so that at one time he had on deposit as much as $700. The money was never mingled with Caldwell's, nor was any receipt given for it, nor any entry of it made upon his books. His bookkeeper, who carried the key of the safe, sometimes used small portions of it in making change, always dropping into the box tickets showing the amount so withdrawn, and always replacing them within a few days. His habit in this regard was known to and acquiesced in by both the depositor and depositary. Some months after the date of the original deposit Caldwell's safe was robbed, without any fault or negligence on his part. His own money was lost along with that of Hall and other depositors. Caldwell was not a banker, but a merchant, and the deposits belonged to friends and customers to whom he had not made himself liable. The day before the robbery his bookkeeper used $15 or $20 of Hall's money, which not having been replaced, he paid to Hall after the robbery. This suit is brought by Hall to recover the balance of the sum stolen. The right to recover is rested upon the statement testified to by Hall, but denied by Caldwell, that at the time of the first deposit it was understood and agreed between the parties that the money was to be used by Caldwell in his business, if he so desired, and that it was received on this basis. It is not claimed that Caldwell actually then became the borrower of the money, and that the relation of creditor and debtor then arose, but that Caldwell became a bailee of the money, with an agreement to re

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turn it in specie, or to use it and repay with other money at his option. ** In order for this suit to be successfully maintained, such a state of facts must be shown as will warrant the idea that Caldwell, when the money was deposited, became at once the debtor of the depositor; and testing the case by Hall's own testimony, it was evident that such was not the contemplation nor agreement of the parties. The true aspect of the case, under the facts testified to by him, is this: The money was received by Caldwell as a bailee, without reward, and was to be so held and accounted for by him, with permission however to use it in his business, if at any time thereafter he should elect to do so. If he did use it, he was to become at once the debtor of the depositor. If he did not, but on the contrary, it should continually remain on deposit, at all times subject to be drawn out by the depositor whenever he chose, and without consultation with Caldwell, the latter remained a bailee without hire, and bound only for that ordinary care demanded of persons occupying that position. It is not pretended by appellee that appellaut, at the time of the deposit, borrowed the money, or in any way indicated a present intention to appropriate it to his own use; and the subsequent manner of dealing with it by both parties shows that it continued to be regarded by them both as the property of the depositor. Under this state of facts there was no liability upon the depositary." Ariz. Sup. Ct., Sept. 1, 1887. Carlyon v. Fitzhenry. Opinion by Porter, J.

CONTRACT-PUBLIC POLICY AGREEMENT ΤΟ SECURE LOCATION OF POST-OFFICE.-A prominent member and local leader of a political party in control of the general government, contemplating the erection of a costly building, secured from an adjacent property owner a promise of a bonus, conditioned upon the location in the builing of the city post-office which was then, and had been for fifteen years past, on the next street. The promisee went to Washington, and induced the United States government to transfer the post-office to his building; but there was no testimony tending to show that he used any improper meaus to gain his point, or that he influenced any senator or representative in Congress or any other officer of the government to interfere in his behalf. Held, that the contract was valid, being founded on a valuable consideration, and according to the evidence in the case, not necessarily contrary to public policy. It is contended in an able argument by the counsel for the defendant that the contract is void as opposed to public policy. This argument is based upon the assumption that Beal, who was a prominent member and leader of the then dominant party in the nation, sold his influence with our senators, and that this contract was given in payment for such influence; that in consideration of the payment of the sum therein mentioned, Beal stipulated to exert his personal and party influence upon an officer of the government. And it is claimed that such personal influence cannot be a matter of bargain and sale to be enforced by the courts. He cites an extract from the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, in which it is said that "personal influence to be exercised over an officer of the government in the procurement of contracts is not a vendible article in our system of laws and morals, and the courts of the United States will not lend their aid to the vendor to collect the price of this article." We fully indorse this language, and we agree in much that was said upon the argument as to the deplorable effect of corruption in the governmental service, and the necessity of courts refusing in any and all cases any aid to those who are seeking to recover the price of their labors as lobbyists, either

before Congress or any department of the government. But the argument does not touch the present case. Mr. Beal had a perfect right to be heard before any officer of the government, or any department of the same, as to the merits of his building as a place for the location of the post-office. It is not shown by the findings or the evidence in the case that he used any improper means to gain his point, or even that he influenced any senator or representative in Congress, or any officer of the government, to interfere in his behalf. He went to Washington personally, and while there secured the location of the office where he wanted it; but there is not the slightest testimony that he used any undue means to accomplish his end. We cannot presume that he used his personal power, which is said to have been very great, in a corrupt or unseemly manner, or in violation of any public policy. For aught we know, he appeared, as any citizen might and has a right to do, before the proper office at Washington, and stated the merits of his claim so convincingly and conclusively that the location desired seemed to be the most proper and available one. Certainly there could be nothing wrong in this. It is true there is evidence in relation to some of the contracts, not in suit, that Beal boasted he could control the senators from his State, and that he must have money to go to Washington to do so; but there is no testimony that either one of them lifted a hand or said a word in his behalf. And there is nothing to show that in the present case he made any such representations to obtain the contract. Mich. Sup. Ct., Oct. 6, 1887. Beal v. Polhemus. Opinion by Morse, J.

PUBLIC POLICY - AGREEMENT FOR "LOBBY SERVICES."-It is against public policy for a person to hire himself out to perform "lobby services" with members of the Legislature, and a contract for such services is illegal and invalid. In Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274, the principle is thus stated: "It has been settled by a series of decisions, uniform in their reason, spirit and tendency, that an agreement in respect to services of a lobby agent, or for the sale by an individual of his personal influence and solicitations to procure the passage of a public or private law by the Legislature, is void, as being prejudicial to sound legislation, manifestly injurious to the interests of the State, and in express and unquestionable contravention of public policy. Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Marshall v. Railroad Co., 16 How. 314; Harris v. Roof's Ex'rs, 10 Barb. 489; Rose v. Truax, 21 id. 261; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200. The principle of these decisions has no relation to the equities between the parties, but it is controlled solely by the tendency of the contract, and it matters not that nothing improper was done, or expected to be done, under it. The law will not concede to any man, however honest he may be, the privilege of making a contract, which it would not recognize when made by designing, corrupt men. A person may, without doubt, be employed to conduct an application to the Legislature, as well as to conduct a suit at law, and may contract for, and receive pay for, his services in preparing and presenting a petition or other documents, in collecting evidence, in making a statement or exposition of facts, or in preparing or making an oral or written argument; provided all these are used, or designed to be used, either before the Legislature itself, or some committee thereof, as a body; but he cannot with propriety be employed to exert his personal influence, whether it be great or little, with individual members, or to labor privately in any form with them out of the legislative halls, in favor of or against any act or subject of legislation." In Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, supra, it is said: "It matters not that nothing improper was done, or expected to be done, by the plaintiff. It is

enough that such is the tendency of the contract that it is contrary to sound morality and public policy, leading necessarily, in the hands of designing and corrupt men, to the use of an extraneous secret influence over an important branch of the government. It may not corrupt all, but if it corrupts or tends to corrupt some, or if it deceives or tends to deceive some, that is sufficient to stamp its character with the seal of disapprobation before a judicial tribunal." And to the like effect is Brown v. Brown, 84 Barb. 533; Cook v. Shipman, 24 Ill. 614; Mills v. Mills, 36 Barb. 474; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441; Wood v. McCann, 5 Dana, 366; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; Harris v. Simonson, 28 Hun, 318; Usher v. McBratney, 3 Dill. 385, n.; Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45; McBratney v. Chandler, 22 Kans. 693. The last case cited states the rule thus: "The contract of an attorney for services as such, whether the services are rendered before a court, a department of the government, or a legislative body is valid, and upon performance of the service a recovery can be had. The contract of a 'lobbyist,' in the sense in which that term is now used, for his services as such, is against public policy and void. When there is a single contrect, and the services contracted for and rendered are partially those of an attorney and partially those of a lobbyist, and blended together as part and parcel of a single employment, the entire contract is vitiated. That which is bad destroys that which is good, and they perish together.'" Ore. Sup. Ct., Oct. 17, 1887. Sweeney v. McLeod. Opinion by Strahan, J.

CRIMINAL LAW- HOMICIDE- INSANITY. The defendant interposed the defense of insanity to the charge of murder in the first degree, and on the trial the court charged substantially that the test of the defendant's responsibility was whether, at the time of the homicide, he had capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act he was doing, and had power to know that the act was wrong and criminal, and would subject him to punishment. Held, that it was a proper instruction; and further, held, that the omis sion to charge, that if the defendant knew the act to be wrong, but was driven to it by an irresistible impulse arising from an insane delusion, he would not be responsible, was not error. The "right and wrong test" was approved by this court in State v. Nixon, 32 Kans. 205. It was there said that "where a person at the time of the commission of an alleged crime has sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and quality of the particular act or acts constituting the crime, and the mental capacity to know whether they are right or wrong, he is generally responsible if he commits such act or acts, whatever may be his capacity in other particulars; but if he does not possess this degree of capacity, then he is not so responsible." This test has received the almost universal sanction of the courts of this country. Lawson Insan. 231-270. The defendant urges that the instruction is erroneous, because it excluded the theory of an irresistible impulse or moral insanity. This question received the attention of the court, and was practically decided in State v. Nixon, supra, although the question was not fairly presented in that case. It is there recognized as a dangerous doctrine, to sustain which would jeopardize the interests of society and the security of life. Mr. Justice Valentine says that "it is possible that an insane, uncontrollable impulse is sometimes sufficient to destroy criminal responsibility, but this is probably so only when it destroys the power of the accused to comprehend rationally the nature, character and consequences of the particular act or acts charged against him, and not where the accused still has the power of knowing the character of the particular act or acts, and that they are wrong."

Further along he says "the law will hardly recognize the theory that any uncontrollable impulse may s0 take possession of a man's faculties and powers as to compel him to do what he knows to be wrong and a crime, and thereby relieve him from all criminal responsibility. Whenever a man understands the nature and character of an act, and knows that it is wrong, it would seem that he ought to be held legally responsible for the commission of it, if in fact he does commit it." In a very recent case the Supreme Court of Missouri considered the refusal of the trial court to charge, that if the defendant obeyed an uncontrollable impulse springing from an insane delusion, he should be acquitted. The court repudiated that doctrine, and Judge Sherwood remarked, in deciding the case, that "it will be a sad day for this State when uncontrollable impulse shall dictate a rule of action to our courts." State v. Pagels, 4 S. W. Rep. 931. It is true that a few of the courts have adopted this principle, but by far the greater number have disapproved of it, and have adopted the test which was given in the present case. Lawson Insan. 270, 308. Kans. Sup. Ct., Oct. 8, 1887. State v. Mowry. Opinion by Johnston, J.

TRESPASS PICKING MUSHROOMS.- The question for determination in this case is whether a person who gathers mushrooms growing in their natural state in a field, and who does no other damage or injury, except what may be done by the fact of gathering and carrying away the mushrooms themselves, can be found guilty of having "wilfully or maliciously" committed any damage, or injury, or spoil, to or upon any real or personal property of a public or private nature, within the intent and meaning of section 52 of the Malicious Injuries to Property Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict., chap. 97). It could not, in our judgment, be really contended that a person who merely picked mushrooms growing in a state of nature in a field was guilty of maliciously committing injury to real or personal property; but it is to be noticed that in this 52d section the words are not "wilfully and maliciously," but "wilfully or maliciously," and it is said that an offense is created by this section if a person wilfully commits the act even though he has no malice, or in other words, if he does the act complained of intentionally and on purpose. To this proposition we assent, but the question remains, whether the act complained of is damage, injury, or spoil to or upon real or personal property within the meaning of the act. It was argued that there are only two kinds of property, real and personal, and if the act complained of was not damage to personal property, which in this case it was not, it must consequently be injury to real property within the meaning of the act. To this we do not assent. The question is, do the words used in the act creating the offense mean damage, injury, or spoil to the realty itself, or to the product of the realty which may happen to be growing thereon at the time of the commission of the act. This it appears to me is the point in this case. In our judgment, the Legislature, in the group of sections commencing at section 16 and ending at section 24, deals with the products de fucto growing upon the realty itself as something distinct and apart from the realty. In our judgment, to constitute an offense within section 52 for committing damage, injury, or spoil to real property, proof must be forthcoming of actual positive damage (to use the words of Best, C.J.), to the realty itself, and if as in this case, proof of damage is confined solely to damage to the product growing upon the realty and consequent loss to the owner of such product, no offense is established within section 52 of the act. There are numerous sections in the act, as above pointed out, making it an offense to damage the product of realty, and in our judgment, unless a case is brought within those

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special sections relating to such products, damage done to the product alone, and not to the realty itself, is no offense within the act. The words of the act are damage "to real property," not "loss to the owner thereof." To hold otherwise would render a person liable to be convicted of a crime, and sent to hard labor for two months, for merely gathering primroses, blackberries, or the like, upon proof given of some actual loss to the owner thereof; whereas the Legislature by section 24 has created the penalty of one month only for maliciously destroying any cultivated root or plant used for the use of man. Can it be conceived that the Legislature intended that for simply gathering mushrooms growing wild in a field and uncultivated, a person might be liable to two months' hard labor, whereas for maliciously destroying cultivated roots or plants used for food of man, he was only to be liable to one month? It seems to us impossible. Q. B. Div., July 5, 1887. Smith, J. 57 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 265. Gardner v. Mansbridge.

INJUNCTION-BOND-BREACH OF.-A preliminary injunction was granted, on an undertaking to pay defendant's damages "by reason of the injunction, if the court should finally decide that plaintiff was not entitled thereto." The injunction was vacated on motion of defendants, and the action subsequently dismissed for want of prosecution. Held, that this constituted a breach of the undertaking which entitled defendant to a reference to assess his damages, There may be good reasons for saying that an order made, pending the suit, dissolving the temporary injunction, by no means determines that the party in whose favor it was granted was not entitled to it. The order may be reversed on appeal, or it may be decided on the final hearing, upon the merits, that the party obtaining it was entitled to that relief. The facts may be essentially changed by proofs subsequently introduced in the cause. So until the main action is finally disposed of, a reference to ascertain the damages may be premature. This seems to be the rule established in New York in the cases to which we were referred on the argument. Shearman v. New York Cent. Mills, 11 How. Pr. 269; Musgrave v. Sherwood, 76 N. Y. 195; Benedict v. Benedict, 15 Hun, 305; 76 N. Y. 600; Palmer v. Foley, 71 id. 106; Johnson v. Elwood, 82 id. 362. "There is no breach of the condition of the statutory undertaking, unless the court finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction, or unless something occurs equivalent to such decision." Palmer v. Foley, supra. "An order vacating the injunction and discontinuing the action entered by the plaintiff, is in effect a determination, or at least equivalent to a determination, that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction granted." Mail Co. v. Toel, 85 N. Y. 646. In the case at bar, the cause was never tried upon its merits, nor could it, for the reason that the plaintiff failed to prosecute. But the cause was out of court with an order upon the record that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction which he had obtained. We are at a loss to know what further decision or determination of that question could be had. As we have said, the cause was out of court beyond recall; nothing further remained for judicial determination. We do not think any of the decisions in New York sustain the contention of counsel that the order of reference in this case was premature. In Palmer v. Foley, supra, the defendant had consented to a discontinuance, and that an order to that effect might be entered, which was done; and it was held "that this was not equivalent to a final decision of the court, and that there was no brench and no right of action. * * *It was laid down that there was no judicial determination or opinion given upon the merits of the action, or the

right of the plaintiff in the action to the injunction, at the time it was granted, and that it was never finally determined by a judicial decision. An amicable and voluntary agreement to discontinue was not enough." The case of Dowling v. Polack, 18 Cal. 625, is quite similar to the present case. That was an action upon an injunction bond, brought after dismissal of the cause on motion of the defendants. The court say: "The suit was dismissed for want of prosecution, and with respect to the particular case, the judgment of dismissal had the same effect upon the rights of the parties as would have resulted from a trial upon the merits. It terminated the proceedings, and by its legal operation and effect set aside and discharged the injunction. It was the final action of the court, operating directly upon the injunction, and destroying the foundation upon which it rested." In that case a motion to dissolve the injunction had been denied, but the case is very much in point, as the statute of California is substantially like our own. See 3 Deer. Code & Stat., § 529. We are disposed to adopt the rule laid down in California as to the liability upon the undertaking, founded as it seems to me, on principle and good sense. Wis. Sup. Ct., Oct. 11, 1887. Kane v. Casgrain. Opinion by Cole, C. J.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-CIDER.- Code Iowa, chap. 6, tit. 11, § 1555, which defined the words "intoxicating liquors" wherever they occurred in the statute for the suppression of intemperance to mean alcohol, and all spirituous and vinous liquors, with a proviso expressly excepting cider made from apples, was repealed by the twentieth General Assembly, and the following section substituted: "Section 1555. Wherever the words 'intoxicating liquors' occur in this chapter, the same shall be construed to mean alcohol, ale, wine, beer, spirituous, vinous and malt liquors, and all intoxicating liquors whatever." Held, that cider made from apples was included in the terms, "all intoxicating liquors whatever." There can be no doubt as to the effect of this section. Before its enactment, cider manufactured from apples was expressly excluded from the operation of the prohibition against the sale of intoxicating liquors. It might lawfully be sold, although intoxicating. But the section thus excluding it was repealed by the one in question, and while the new section does not in express words name it as one of the liquors the sale of which is forbidden, it does, by unmistakable language, bring intoxicating liquors of every kind and variety within the operation of the prohibition. The words, "all intoxicating liquors whatever," in the first clause, also the closing words of the section, "and all other intoxicating liquors whatever," are incapable of any other construction; and this construction is in accord with the rule invoked by counsel for defendant, that when particular words in a statute are followed by general ones, the latter are to be held as applying to persons and things of the same kind as those which precede. Potter's Dwar. Stat. 236. But if it were otherwise, neither that nor any other recognized rule of construction would justify us in putting an interpretation on the language which would defeat the manifest intention of the Legislature; for it is the duty of the courts, in construing the language of a statute, to adopt that sense which will promote the apparent policy and object of the Legislature. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 12, 1887. State v. Hutchison. Opinion by Reed, J.

PARTNERSHIP - WHAT CONSTITUTES― AGREEMENT BETWEEN FIRMS.- An agreement between two firms that one should furnish the necessary money for the building of a lot of wagons, and the other do the work, make the sales, pay back the money to the first firm, and divide the profits, 'does not constitute the members of the first and second firms a copartnership, for

the reason that Seig & Williams did not share the losses, and had no control over the business, and were not held out to the world as partners. It is not claimed the plaintiff became security for Barnes & Sons under the belief that Seig & Williams were members of such partnership. Besides this, we find that the business was conducted between the two partnerships in precisely the same manner after as it had been prior to the 1st day of August, 1884. The following authorities support our conclusions: Richardson v. Hughitt, 76 N. Y. 55; Loomis v. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69; Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich. 188; S. C., 40 Am. Rep. 465; Williams v. Soutter, 7 Iowa, 435; Munson v. Sears, 12 id.172; Ruddick v. Otis, 33 id. 402; Mollwo v. Court of Wards, L. R., 4 P. C. 419. These citations could be greatly enlarged. We have examined the authorities cited by counsel for the appellant, and think they are distinguishable; but if mistaken in this, we regard the rule in this State to be established against the appellant in the cases cited. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 12, 1887. Clark v. Barnes. Opinion by Seevers, J.

STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

The committee appointed to make arrangements for the next annual meeting of the State Bar Association, to be held at the Capitol, Albany, January 17 and 18, 1888, have so far completed their labors as to be able to announce that they have envited the Hon. Daniel Dougherty, of Philadelphia, to deliver the annual oration; that the invitation has been accepted; that Hon. Martin W. Cooke, president of the association, will deliver an opening address; Hon. John Winslow, of Brooklyn, will read a paper on "The Collision between the Legislature and the Judiciary of Rhode Island, or The Trial of the Rhode Island Judge." Ex-Judge Charles A. Peabody, of New York, will deliver a memorial address on the late Aaron J. Vanderpoel. Assistant Attorney-General William A. Poste, of Albany, will read a thesis (subject to be announced hereafter). The reception to be given the members of the association by Governor Hill at the executive mansion on the evening of the 17th of January will supersede the annual association dinner. A full programme of the proceedings will soon be published.

H. G. DANFORTH, Chairman Committee Arrangements. ROCHESTER, Dec. 13, 1887.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ARREST AND TRIAL OF JESUS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The thanks of your readers are due to "W. J. G." for his interesting article on "The Arrest and Trial of Jesus." If any desire to read further on the subject, I would refer them to two papers contributed by Alex. Taylor Innes to the Contemporary Review of 1877. The first, published in the August number, deals with "The Hebrew Trial;" the other, which appeared in October, is on "The Roman Trial." (These articles were reprinted in Littell's Living Age for that year, Sept. 22, and Oct. 3. Mr. Innes refers to the work of a learned Spanish Jew, M. Salvador, who in 1822 in the first edition of his work, "Historie des Institutions de Moise," gave a dissertation to show that the Jugement de Jesus was according to law, and asserted and professed to prove that-admitting the facts stated in the gospel-the process followed, and the result arrived at, were alike necessary, if the Jewish tribunal adhered to its own law. M. Dupin (ainé), a distinguished member of the French bar, in a briliant

treatise, replied to Salvador; but he, as well as Mr. Greenleaf (according to Mr. Innes) devoted himself rather to the substantial injustice of the trial than to its form according to the jurisprudence concerned. In the third edition of his "Institutions, published in 1862, Salvador maintains and reprints the whole positions originally laid down by him.

At the end of his first article, Mr. Innes says: "Our conclusion on the question of Hebrew law must be this: that a process begun, continued, and apparently finished in the course of one night; with witnesses against the accused who were sought for by the judges, but whose evidence was not sustained even by them; commencing with interrogatories which Hebrew law does not sanction, and ending with a demand for confession which its doctors expressly forbid; all followed, twenty-four hours too soon, by a sentence which described a claim to be the Fulfiller of the hopes of Israel as blasphemy-that such a process had neither the form nor the fairness of a judicial trial."

He concludes his second paper as follows: "In considering the most famous of all trials from a merely legal, and indeed formal point of view, we have come to some conclusions. We have found that it was a double trial, and that both parts of it were conducted with a certain regard to the forms of the two most famous jurisprudences in the world. In both the judges were unjust, and the trial was unfair; yet in both the right issue was substantially raised. And in both that issue was the same. Jesus Christ was truly condemned on a double charge of treason. He died because in the ecclesiastical council He claimed to be the Son of God and the Messiah of Israel, and because before the world-wide tribunal (of Rome) He claimed to be Christ a King."

R. V. R.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

CAMPBELL'S SCIENCE OF LAW.

The Science of Law, according to the American Theory of Government; by E. L. Campbell, counsellor at law. Frederick D. Linn & Co., Jersey City, N. J., 1887.

This book belongs to that new class of books which purports to treat of the theoretical phases of jurisprudence, as contradistinguished from the practical phases.

In the preface the author expresses the opinion in substance, that no serious effort has been made toward an exposition of a national theory of law, government and jurisprudence. Of course, he means of the scientific phases of these topics. From this opinion we differ. Professor Terry's book is a much more acute example than any other American work.

But if the author has succeeded in any direction in his self-imposed task, we herald him as a rising legist; for even one good theory is worth a book. But has he succeeded? Let us see. What does he mean by an American theory of jurisprudence? In the first place jurisprudence if a science- is one in abstracto. It has no locality, it is equally relevant to all conditions of men irrespective of habitat or personal environment. Jurisprudence is not American, not English. But when this science becomes applied, it ceases to be a science of jurisprudence and becomes a system of positive law.

In this respect therefore a theory of a particular system is not a department of the science of jurisprudence. The book purports to be only a theory of a certain system of positive law, to-wit., that administered in the United States. It would we think therefore be better entitled, "Rationale of the law of the United States."

The brief discussion of theory of law in abstracto, which the author indulges in throughout his first chapter, belongs, we conceive, to works on jurisprudence and philosophy only, and has no place in a book treating of positive law.

The various theories of classification, which conclude the author's first chapter relating to the philosophy of law, are only concerned with the arrangement of some system of positive law, some corpus juris, and we do not know why they are blended with theories of law in abstracto, nor why they are particularly concerned with the American theory of government."

The classifications of Kent and Story for instance, are purely modal, they have no earthly relation to the theories of government of these authors, or to the American system of government. Classification is concerned with form, not with substance, and with a definite form, not with theories indefinite.

It is difficult to treat a work of this character seriously, for it belongs to the class of pseudo-scientific books of which the fashionable taste for speculation, is now bringing us too many. We confess that we see nothing original and nothing lasting in the work before us, although doubtless the author has read extensively, but he has written too soon.

If as we hope he has really succeeded in detecting the great theories which segregate the National law of America from the laws of other nations, he has very skillfully managed to conceal his discovery at least in this particular work.

SNYDER'S RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS, ETC.

Some eight years have elapsed since the first edition of this manual by Mr. William L. Snyder, and the enactments and decisions have now been brought down in a comely volume of some two hundred pages. The book includes also the important act concerning benevolent, charitable, scientific and missionary societies, and those relating to burial grounds and cemeteries, and it is discreetly annotated with reference to the decisions. Published by Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York.

MAY ON FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

A Treatise on the Statutes of Elizabeth against Fraudulent Conveyances; the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882; and the law of voluntary dispositions of property; with an appendix containing the above acts and some unpublished cases (1700-1733) from the Coxe and Melmoth U. S. Reports. By the late H. W. May, B. A. Second edition. By S. W. Worthington, M. A. London: Stevens & Haynes; Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1887. Pp. lxxv, 647.

This is an excellent and in every way admirable book for the practitioner in the English courts, but will have less value for the American practitioner. It is designed for the English market primarily, and has only occasional citations of American text-books and decisions. These are discreetly and intelligently made in every instance, but are not ample enough for exclusive reliance in this country. For example, there is no discussion of the peculiar and important doctrine of fraud as to subsequent creditors first laid down, we think, in Carpenter v. Roe, 10 N. Y. 227 and repeated in Case v. Phelps, 39 id. 164, as to solvency contingent on the stability of the market. But the work is so important in a historical and analytical view, and presents the English decisions so clearly, that we would recommend it to the profession in this country in connection with a distinctively American work, like Bump's. The book is a joy to the eye on accouut of the beauty of its typography, and the title-page

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