Clerks moreover are more easily reached by im-ute, as that theory has already been thus changed in proper influences than judicial officers. The Bar Association bill provided for judges as well as clerks. The governor's objection was that the clerks were opposed to it. It may therefore be assumed that had the clerks been left out of the bill it would have been less objectionable to his Excellency, and herein I agree with him.

The Albany Law Journal. called natural equity, inherent justice, the police

ample, they have statutes against using abusive, insulting or obscene language in the presence of women. In Weaver v. State, 79 Ala. 279, the defendant, whose wife had left him, went to the house in which her daughters by a former marriage lived, searching for her, and on leaving was told by one of them not to come there again; to which he re

make a damn bit of difference where it is;" held, that these words were insulting.

At the suggestion of the governor of New York, a circular signed by him and by the governors of Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, has been addressed to the governors of all the other States and Territories, inviting a conference of representatives of the States and Territories, at the Murray Hill Hotel, in the city of New York, on the 23d of August, to consider the ques-plied, "I'll go where I damn please, and it don't tion of adopting a uniform system of rules and practice in the inter-State extradition of fugitives from justice. The circular states, and we have no doubt, correctly, that criminals often escape and that vexatious delays and expense often occur by reason of the want of mutuality in extradition regulations. The wisdom of such a system is apparent without argument, and the end is easily attainable by compact between the various State departments without legislative action. The business of extradition in this State is enormous, amounting to nearly one warrant every day. In 1881 an act was passed by the Legislature amending the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect to such proceedings, and a very minute and careful system of rules of practice was adopted and has been in force since 1885. To adopt some such uniform practice would undoubtedly be useful in simplifying, cheapening and expeditng the business, and would effect justice in this very important department. It is stated that Dr. Spear and Prof. Dwight will be present at the conference.

There is an injurious tradition that women talk too much. We doubt that they talk any more than

men.

Take lawyers' wives, for example; they certainly do not talk so much as their husbands, and very seldom talk what they know to be nonsense, like their husbands. One would suppose that men would encourage women in listening, but such is not the theory of the law. Just now in Philadelphia the grand jury have found an indictment against a woman for listening too much - eavesdropping, they call it. The following is the indictment: "That Louisa Ehrline on the 21st of June, 1886, and on each and every day thence continually until the day of the finding of this indictment was and is a common eaves-dropper, and on each and all of said days and times did listen about the houses and under the windows and eaves of the houses of the citizens then and there dwelling, hearing tattle and repeating the same in the hearing of other persons, to the common nuisances of the citizens of this Commonwealth and against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." We believe it was in Pennsylvania possibly it was New Jersey - that they used to duck women for scolding. Well, after all it is true that sin came into the world through Eve's listening — probably that is what suggested the name of the common-law offense and it may be well to make an example of over-curious Louisas. In some other communities they are sedulous to protect women against being compelled to listen to certain kinds of talk. In the gallant south- Alabama, for ex

An inquiry comes to us, from a Canadian law student, whether Canadian lawyers have a greater knowledge of law than American?" This is a deep and delicate inquiry. It reminds us of a good clergyman - Dr. B., of Troy who on Sunday announced a Sunday school picnic on the next Wednesday, if fair, and if not, on the first fair day thereafter. Wednesday was cloudy, and a little boy, rushing breathlessly through the streets, being asked where he was going, replied, "To see Dr. B., to find out if it's going to rain." It occurs to us that on certain subjects the Canadians must be the better lawyers; in regard, for example, to controversies concerning the chief commercial products of that country, such as ice, codfish, beaver, seals (those with legs), blubber, train oil, shingles, etc. So as to certain forms of conveyances- sledges, for instance. But we have very little acquaintance with Canadian lawyers. Our only acquaintance among them is our only rival in the art of trying to find some fun in the law, Mr. R. V. Rogers, Jr., of Kingston. We suppose there are plenty of good lawyers there as here. But comparisons are odorous. We suspect that if we put it to a vote, each country would stand up for its own. According to our custom in the few instances when we are in any doubt, we took advice on this momentous question. We asked Mr. Moak his opinion, and while the learned gentleman was rather non-committal (for him), he did say that the ablest lawyer he ever knew was a Canadian- the late James Bethune, of Toronto.

Judge Barrett is reported as saying that he will try no more "boodle cases, because he has acquired a decided opinion against the prisoners. This is fairer than Judge Noah Davis' conduct, who, on a similar intimation from counsel in the Tweed case, lectured them roundly and fined them for contempt. Judge Gresham recently kept his temper on a similar suggestion. But judges differ.

NOTES OF CASES.

'N State v. Yopp, North Carolina Supreme Court,

bidding every person to use upon a certain turnpike road a bicycle, * * * without the express permission of the superintendent of said road," etc., does not deprive the owners of bicycles of the use

* * *

other like vehicles, embraced by the prohibitory clause of the statute in question, it is his plain duty to allow them to do so at such times. The authority is not his. He is simply made the agent of the law for a lawful purpose, and he is amenable as such for any prostitution of the power so vested in him.

And the creation of the discretion

implies that there may be occasions or times or seasons when bicycles may be used on the road. It not infrequently happens that statutes require particular things to be done, or not to be done, that must be made to depend upon the judgment and discretion of a designated agent or commissioner or officer, and the discretion in such cases is not arbitrary; it is lawful, and must be lawfully exercised."

In Webber v. Barry, Michigan Supreme Court, June 9, 1887, defendant led a body of men upon the premises of plaintiff, who was running a sawmill, while plaintiff and his men were at work, to find out whether plaintiff's men were satisfied with the number of hours they were working, or whether they wanted to join the movement for ten hours. Held, that the defendant was a trespasser from the moment he entered the premises of plaintiff, and that he would be held responsible for acts of vio

of their property "without due process of law," in violation of the fifteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The court said: "There is no reason why the owner of a particular kind of vehicle, which because of its peculiar form or appearance, or from the unusual manner of its use, frightens horses, or otherwise imperils passengers over the road, or their property properly there, shall not be forbidden to use such vehicle on the road. He has no right to use it to the prejudice or injury of others who are lawfully exercising their rights in the use of it. If it be said, when shall one person be restrained in doing as he will with his own property - from going, for example, on the highway with his own vehicle, of whatever kind?-the answer is, whenever in the ordinary lawful course of things in that connection he would, by the use of his property - his vehicle, in the case suggested interfere materially in any respect with another in the ordinary, lawful use of his property or rights. The purpose of this statutory provision is not to destroy the defendant's property, his bicycle, or to deprive him of the use of it in a way not injurious to others, but to prevent him from using it on a particular road, that mentioned, at a particular time or season, when it would, by reason of its peculiar shape and the unusual manner of using it as a means of locomotion, prove in-lence committed by his men at the mill, though he jurious to others, particularly women and children constantly passing and repassing in great numbers over the particular road mentioned, in carriages and other ordinary vehicles drawn by horses. The evidence tended strongly to show that the use of the bicycle on the road materially interferred with the exercise of the rights and safety of others in the lawful use of their carriages and horses in passing over the road. In repeated instances the horses became frightened at them, and carriages were thrown into ditches along the side of the road. It was not uncommon for horses to become frightened at them and become unruly, if the evidence is to be believed. The statute did not deprive the defendant of the use of his property. He might have gone another way. He might have gone at an opportune time, with the express permission of the superintendent of the road. case, he had no right to go, using his bicycle, at the peril of other people, he giving rise to such peril. The statute did not therefore in any just sense destroy his property as contended, or deprive him of the proper and reasonable use of it, nor was such its purpose. Its purpose was lawful, and in our judgment it does not provide an unreasonable police regulation; certainly not one so unreasonable as to warrant us in declaring it void. * * * The discretion vested in the superintend-upon the premises of plaintiff, or into the mill, for ent is not arbitrary. He is made the agent of the law as well as superintendent, and he is bound to exercise the discretion vested in him honestly, fairly, reasonably, and without prejudice or partiality, for the just purpose of effectuating the intention of the statute. If there be times or seasons or occasions when persons wish to use bicycles or

In any

told them not to commit any violence, halted them two hundred feet from the mill, and did what he could, after they had violated his instructions, to prevent further injury. The court said: "I am fully satisfied that the defendant Barry had no right to lead a gang or mob of men upon the premises of defendant, to interfere in any manner or to consult with the men who were in the employ of plaintiff. If he did so he must be held responsible for their acts of violence, notwithstanding that he halted them two hundred feet from the mill, and told them to remain there until he came back. The trouble with Barry's case is that he had no business himself upon the premises of plaintiff for the purpose that he admits he was there. It was none of his business whether the men working for plaintiff were satisfied to work eleven or eleven and a half hours per day or not. The real animus of his visit was, as can plainly be seen, to induce the employees of plaintiff to join the men already gathered in a strike for ten hours. Whatever right he may have had to influence these men to quit work, unless the ten-hour demand was acceded to by their employer, while they were not at work, he certainly had no right to enter upon the premises of such employer to influence these men while they were at work. He had no license, by custom or otherwise, to enter

any such purpose, and he was a trespasser the very moment he did so. He also well knew the character and intent of the crowd he took with him. He was its acknowledged leader, and in taking them where he had no right to take them he became responsible for their acts, whether done by his consent or against his protests. It cannot be said that

Barry, according to his own testimony, was there for any lawful purpose. No man has a right to enter upon the premises of another for the purpose of inducing persons in the employ of that other to leave their employment to the injury of the employer, for the purpose of getting higher wages or working less hours for the same pay, or for any other reason. The man who so enters is a trespasser. No matter if by the custom of this free country, license is impliedly given to all persons to enter our private grounds or places of business, that license is nevertheless considered revoked the moment the person so entering interferes unlawfully with our rights or our property. He then becomes a trespasser ab initio. Much less can he lead a crowd of two hundred men upon my premises, and then excuse himself for their wrong-doing because he told them not to injure my property, when the avowed purpose of their entrance was to interfere between the men in my employ and myself. A crowd of this size is liable at any moment to become a mob, and an excited mob can seldom be controlled by ony one. Even their leaders become powerless ofttimes to prevent not only the destruction of property but the shedding of blood. Mr. Barry must suffer the consequences of his ill-advised and unlawful entrance with this body of men upon the premises of plaintiff, who has a right to be protected in his property, and to be recompensed for the damages he has suffered. It does not help the laborer to countenance such acts as these. The unlawful interference with the rights of others, and the destruction of property, cannot aid any one. The law cannot be taken in our own hands to remedy our wrongs by inflicting wrongs upon others. He who goes outside the law to obtain his rights, whether fancied or real, will find in the end that the law he has spurned or violated will yet, and in justice, compel him to respect it, by taking from him what he has gained in disregard of it, and forcing him to recompense those he has illegally damaged by his conduct." Sherwood, J., dissent- APPEAL from Louisville Law and Equity Court.

tion. The jury had before it the evidence as to what the age of the prosecutrix was, and we hardly think that we should be justified in reversing upon such grounds. As however the case is to be remanded for another trial, we feel called upon to say that the use of the words in question is not, we think, without objection. While they could hardly be regarded as sufficient to mislead the jury in regard to the prosecutrix's age, they might be understood as evincing a feeling on the part of the court against the defendant. The court used the words in a strained sense. The case was certainly not one of a girl yielding to the embraces of a man, nor on the other hand, was it a case, as the defendant claims, of a woman yielding to the embraces of a boy. There does not appear to have been any thing in the respective ages of the parties to justify any allusion to the subject." Women seldom complain of being called girls. Perhaps the judge remembered that Dame Quickly resented being called a woman. The dictionary says a "girl" is "a young woman," and it has recently been judicially decided in England that a "young woman" is a female under thirty.

ing. This reminds us of the celebrated balloon and garden-sauce case of Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381.

In State v. Richards, Iowa Supreme Court, June 15, 1887, an action for seduction, the court said: "The court, in its instructions to the jury spoke of the prosecuting witness as 'the girl.' It is stated by the defendant's counsel that the court used these words nineteen times. We have not verified the statement by count, but observe that the words were used frequently. The evidence shows that the prosecuting witness, at the time of the alleged seduction, was twenty-four years old. The defendant claims that she was in no proper sense a girl, and that the court improperly designed to suggest an explanation of what was contended by the defendant to be incredible, that a chaste woman should yield to a man's embraces on a promise of marriage, without previous courtship, and within about five minutes from the time of first solicita.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMINENT DOMAIN

-STREET-ELEVATED RAILROADS.

KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS.
MAY 21, 1887.

BULTON V. SHORT-ROUTE RY. TRANSFER CO.* The Legislature has the constitutional right to authorize the construction of a steam railroad along a public street in a city, and it is immaterial whether the fee in the street is owned by the city or by the abutting lot-owners. The latter have no claim for compensation against the railroad, unless it is so constructed or operated as to deprive them of the reasonable use of the street. Any injury to the rights of air, light and support must be redressed in an action for nuisance.

A. Barnett and T. W. Bullitt, for appellant.

Temple Badley and Woolley & Buckner, for appellee. HOLT, J. The charter of the Short-Route Railway Transfer Company, granted by the Legislature in 1873, provides:

"Sec. 2. Said corporation is hereby granted the exclusive privilege to build, construct, maintain and operate a railway trausfer company, by steam or animal power, for the transportation of passengers and freight by the car-load or otherwise, including that portion of the city of Louisville north of Main street, from the east side of First street to the west side of Fourteenth street, for a period of ninety-nine years, dating from January 1, 1873.

"Sec. 3. Said corporation shall have the right, by and with the consent of the General Council of the

city of Louisville, to the use of or right of way to

such streets and alleys, and such portion of the city's wharf within the limits named in the second section of this act, as the interests of said corporation may require, and in such manner and under such reasonable restrictions and conditions as may be agreed

*12 S. W. Rep. 332.