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governor, lieutenant-governor, senators, or represent the Legislature has not the right to make any reasonatives, and who shall have paid, by himsell, or his able, uniform, and impartial regulation of the mode parents, master, or guardian, any State or county tax, of exercising the rigbt of suffrage, and also of ascerwhich shall, within two years next preceding such taining the qualifications of voters. He denies that election, have been assessed upon him, in any town or the seventh section of the statute under discussion is district of the Commonwealth; and also every citizen of this character. The leading case, not only in this who shall be by law exempted from taxation, and who Commonwealth, but in the whole discussion that has shall be in any other respects qualified as above meu-1 taken place in this country in regard to the right of tioned, shall have a right to vote in such election of legislatures to provide for judging the qualifications governor, lieutenant governor, senator, and represen- of voters, and for regulating the exercise of their tatives; and no other person shall be entitled to vote privileges by them as these are prescribed by the Conin such election." Article 3, Amend. A reading and stitutions of the States respectively, is Capen v. Foster, writing qualification was established in 1857, by article 12 Pick. 485. It was there held that the acts of 1821, 20, Amend Const. But this it will not be necessary chap. 110, and 1822, chap. 104, providing for a registo consider in the present discussion.

tration of voters in Boston, and requiring that preThe qualifications of voters are thus defined with vious to an election, the qualifications of voters should clearless and precision. Without the possession of be proved, and their names be placed on an alphabetithese, the citizen or inhabitant cannot exercise the cal list or register, was not to be regarded as prescribprivilege of voting; aud as whoever possesses them is ing a qualification in addition to those which by the by the Constitution entitled to their privilege, legisla Constitution entitled a citizen to vote, but only as a tion cannot deprive him of it. By the Constitution, reasonablo regulation of the mode of exercising the pt. 3, chap. 1, art. 4, full authority and power is given right of voting, which it was competent for the Legisto the general court, “from time to time, to make, lature to make. But while it is held to be within the ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and proper limits of legislative power to provide suitable reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, regulations for exercising the right of suffrage in a directions, and instructions, either with penalties or prompt, orderly and convenient manner, the court, without, so as the same be not repugnant or contrary speaking through Chief Justice Shaw, is careful to to this Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the add: “Such a construction would afford no warrant good and welfare of this Commonwealth, and for the for such an exercise of legislative power, as under the government and ordering thereof, and of the subjects pretense and color of regulating should subvert or of the same, and for the necessary support and defense injuriously restrain the right itself. * * * It (the of the government thereof." To the provisions of the Constitution) fixed the qualifications of voters with Constitution all legislation is thus made subordinate, precision, and left all the rest to be regulated by law. and it cannot add to nor diminish the qualifications of * * * The Constitution, by carefully prescribing a voter which that instrument has prescribed. Blan the qualifications of voters, necessarily requires that chard v. Stearns, 5 Metc. 298; Williams v. Whiting, 11 an examination of the claims of persons to vote, or the id. 433.

ground of possessing these qualifications, must at some This provision of the Constitution," says Opinion time be had by those who are to decide upon them. of Justices, 5 Metc. 592, referring to article 3 of the * * * If then the Constitution has made no pri)amendment above quoted, “being irrepealable by ans vision in regard to the time, place and manner in act or ordinary legislation, must be obeyed and car- which such examination shall be had, and yet such an ried into effect according to its plain intent and mean examination is necessarily incident to the actual en. ing, so far as that can be ascertained." The plaintiff, joyment and exercise of the right of voting, it constiaccording to the allegations of his declarations, pos- tutes one of those subjects respecting the mode of sessed, when he offered himself for registration, all exercising the right in relation to which it is compethe qualifications of a voter required by the Constitu tent to the Legislature to make suitable and reasontion. Any legislation by which the exercise of his able regulations, not calculated to defeat or impair rights is postponed, diminishes them, and must be un- | the right of voting, but rather to facilitate and secure constitutional, unless it can be defended on the ground | the exercise of that right.” that it is reasonable and necessary, in order that the If the seventh section of the statute of 1885 were rights of the proposed voter may be ascertained and general in terms, and allowed no person to register as proved, and thus the rights of others (which are to be a voter until he had possessed the requisite qualificaprotected as well as his own) guarded against the tions for a period of thirty days, it would be difficult danger of illegal voting. The Constitution, while pro to maintain its constitutionalty. It would still providing for the qualifications of voters, contemplates | vide for adding another qualification to those required that equal and reasovable rules will be made by legis. by the Constitution, as much as if the period of lation as to the method of exercising the privilege, and I domicile within the town or the Commonwealth, realso that somewhere, and at some time, under properquired by the Constitution before voting, were extenregulations, there will be an inquiry whether those ded to a longer period. State v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308; offering to vote possess the requisite qualifications. Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485. The Constitution does not This inquiry involves an investigation of various facts; provide that the qualification18 it requires shall be as those in regard to the proposed voter's age, sex, possessed by the voter for any period before the elecresidence, payment of taxes, etc. It is not an un- | tion, nor bas it ever been held that this was necesreasonable provision that all persons entitled as voters sary. To add this requiremeut before one can be shall be registered as such previous to depositing their registered as a voter is certainly to increase the qualiballots; and if the Legislature deems that such an in- | fications. Bridge v. Lincoln, 14 Ma88. 367; Humphrey quiry could not proceed concurrently with the actual v. Kingman, 5 Metc. 162-165; Kilh am V. Ward, 2 voting or election, and both be conducted in a deliber- | Mass. 236. ate and orderly manner, it is not unreasonable tbat In an opinion of the justices (124 Mass. 597), in reply it should provide that such an inquiry should termi- to an inquiry by the House of Representatives as to nate before the election actually commences, at a time whether one who had been, but had ceased to be a previous sufficiently long to make proper preparations pauper, must have ceased to be such for any definite therefor.

period before he could exercise the right of suffrage. The plaintiff in the case at bar does not contend that it was said: “It is no more required that the voter shall have ceased to be a pauper, or under guardian- constitutional provision, or which should impose upon ship, a year or six months before the election, than a particular class of citizens conditions and requirethat he shall have been a citizen or of age during a like ments not required of all others, would be void." period. It has never been doubted that minors, having It was suggested at the argument that the section of the other requisite qualifications, become qualified to the statute here in question might be upheld as a voto immediately upon arriving at full age; and by reasonable regulation to protect the public from posuniform usage, recognized and approved in an opinion sible fraud in obtaining certificates of naturalization, given to the honorable house last year, persons other and that the delay of thirty days before naturalized wise qualified, who have been naturalized at any time | citizens are permitted to register allows this investigabefore the election, have been deemed entitled to vote. tion. But the board of registrars is not competent to The necessary conclusion appears to us to be that by pass upon the question whether a certificate of the third article of amendment of the Constitution of naturalization was erroneously granted, nor can such the Commonwealth, the disqualification of pauperism a certificate be attacked before them thus collaterally. or guardianship, like that of alienage or ponage, is not The only question upon this part of their inquiry into required to have ceased to exist for any definite period the qualifications of the applicant is whether he is in of time in order to entitle a man actually free from fact the person named in the certificate he produces, every such disqualification, and duly qualified in point if such certificate be itself properly authenticated.. It of residence and of paymevt of taxes, to exercise the is a question of identity solely. right of suffrage."

No argument in favor of the constitutionality of the Nor if such a law were general, is it easy to see how section can be founded upon any peculiarity in the it could be defended upon the ground that is was a situation of naturalized citizens, which renders an inreasonable regulation for the purpose simply of ascer quiry in regard to their qualifications different from taining qualifications, and determining whether an ap similar inquiries when applied to all other citizens. plicant actually possessed them. Every system of The regulation which it assumes to make is partial, registration of voters contemplates that the registra- | and calculated injuriously to restrain and impede, in tion will be completed, and that the list of voters will the exercise of their rights, the class to whom it apbe prepared before voting actually commences. No plies, in that it denies them for the period of thirty system would be just that did not extend the time of days the exercise of a right which the Constitution has registration up to a time as near that of actually de- conferred upon them. There is no warrant for this positing the votes as would be cousistent with the within the just and constitutional limits of the legislanecessary preparation for conducting the election in tive power, which permits reasonable and uniform an orderly manner, and with a reasonable scrutiny of regulations to be made as to the time and mode of the correctness of the list. While cases may be con- exercising the right of suffrage, and as to the ascertainceived where the right to vote might depend on a ment of the qualification of voters. somewhat oomplicated inquiry, ordinarily the facts on We must therefore pronounce the seventh section of which it depends are simple, and susceptible of rapid chapter 345, acts 1885, to be unconstitutional. It folinvestigation. Because a difficult inquiry is possible, lows that this action can be maintained. Kilham v. to provide that all citizens proving themselves to pos- | Ward, ubi supra; Lincoln y. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350sess the requisite qualifications as voters should not 353; Blanchard v. Stearns, ubi supra; Larned v. be allowed to register as such for thirty days there- Wheeler, 140 Mass. 390; S. C., 50 Am. Rep. 483. after, and thus be obliged to show in addition that The case will stand for trial, and the entry will be, they had possessed them for that lenght of time, might demurrer overruled. be held an unreasonable regulation in regard to the [See Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Obio St. 548; S. C., 54 exercise of the privilege of suffrage. In many instances Am. Rep. 832, and note, 483; People v. Hoffman, 116 tbe right to vote might itself accrue, as by expiration | Ill. 587 ; S. C., 56 Am. Rep. 793; Dells v. Kennedy, 49 of time, by payment of taxes, etc., within thirty days Wis. 555; S. C., 35 Am. Rep. 786.-ED.] which precedes the registration.

But serious as these objections would be to the constitutionality of a general law applicable to all classes of citizens, it is not necessary now to consider them,

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. as the section of the statute in question presents an even more serious difficulty. It undertakes to prevent

EJECTMENT-PARTJES-INFANT REMAINDER-MEN.a single class of citizens, namely, those who are natu

A wife acquired title to a lot by deed, subject to a ralized, possessing all the qualifications established by

reservation to the grantor of certain described lands. the Constitution of the Commonwealth, from exerois

At her death the lot went to her infant children as ing the right with which that Constitution invests

remainder-men subject to the life-estate of her hus. them, for a period of thirty days, by forbidding the

band. An action of ejectment was brought against the registrars of voters to register them during that period.

husband and infants for the premises included in the

reservation. The wife had never claimed these premises All citizens must stand equal before the law, and the statute, assuming them to be citizens, imposes this

nor was there any evidence that the infants had ever

asserted title to them, or were in possession of them, prohibition upon them as a citizens of a specified

while in their answer they expressly denied baving any class. A statute regulating the exercise of the right

interest in the lands demanded. Held, that they were of suffrage, or the ascertainment of the qualifications of voters, must not only be reasonable in its character,

not bound by any acts of their father, and that their but uuiform and impartial in its application. If it

joinder as infant defendants was not authorized by

section 1503, Code N. Y., which provides that any perwere possible to impose a period of probation upon all qualified citizens before they were entitled to exercise

son claiming title to, or the right to the possession of, the privilege, it certainly is not possible, under the

real property sought to be recovered in an action, as Constitution, to select a single class, and impose it on

remainder-men, etc., adversely to the plaintiff may be them alone.

joined as defendant. June 7, 1887. Sisson v. Cum"A registry act," says Mr. McCrary in his work on

mings. Opinion by Andrews, J. Elections, & 8, “which should undertake to require EVIDENCE-WITNESS-CROSS-EXAMINATION-HARMa longer residence, prior to tho time of voting, than LESS ERROR.— It is always competent to bring out, on that required by the ('onstitution, or which should re-cross-examination, what relations exist between a quire the payment of taxes not required to be paid by party and his witness, for the purpose of showing bias or prejudice on the part of the witness, and it is at its principal office. He did so, and was supplied by error to refuse to allow a question, looking to that end, the secretary with blanks for “proofs," which he gave to be put; but where the evidence in chief is wholly to the representatives of the absured, with instrucimmaterial upou all the material issues of the case, tions to return them to him when filled out. This such refusal is harmless error. June 7, 1887. Teets v. was done. He kept them several months, and then Village of Middletown. Per Curiam.

sent them back for correction. When they came into MUNICIPAL BONDS — TAXATION — SINKING FUND —

his hands again he held them back several weeks beDUTY OF COUNTY TREASURER ---PETITION-CONSTITU

fore sending them to the home office, which retained TIONAL LAW.-- (1) Laws N. Y. 1869, chap. 807, § 4, as

them without objection that they came too late. amended by Laws 1871, chap. 383, providing that all

Held, that the company had treated the agent as havtaxes, except for schools and roads, assessed upon and

ing authority to receive proofs, although the policy paid by any railroad in a town which has issued bonds

required notice to the home office, and that it was not in aid of such railroad, shall be applied by the county

in a position to exact a forfeiture for failure to give treasurer to the purchase of certain bonds to be held

"immediate notice." May 27, 1887. Travellers' Ins. by him as a sinking fuud for the redemption of such

Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Edwards. Opinion by Milaid bonds, applies not only in the case of railroads

ler, J: constructed under the aot of 1869, but to all towns

REMOVAL OF CAUSE-RAILROAD-INCORPORATIONbonded in aid of railroads oopstructed in or through DIFFERENT STATES. -The act of Tennessee of Decemthem. (2) It is the duty of the county treasury, under ber 4, 1851, entitled "An act to incorporate the Louisthe act, to set aside and invest all such taxes paid to ville & Nashville Railroad Company,' granted to that him, although by doing so a deficiency is left in other company, which had been incorporated by the Legisfunds, and he will not have money enough to pay the lature of Kentucky by the act of that State of March obligations of the county to the State, and to the 5, 1850, a right of way within designated limits, for the county officials and county creditors. (3) Ample construction of a railroad, with all the rights, eto., and power is conferred upon the county judge, by the act, to subject to all the restrictions, etc., prescribed in its ascertain the correct amount of the tax to be set aside

cbarter, and fixed the terms and conditions upon for the sinking fund; and it is no valid objection to a

which it was to exercise the franchise given it. Held. petition of a tax-payer to compel the treasurer to make that the act did not make the company a corporation the investment as provided by the act that it states of Tennessee. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black. the amount to be less than it really is. (4) The act of 286, 293, 397; Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65, 83; 1869 is not in confiict with Const. N. Y., art. 7, § 8,

Railroad Co. v. Vance, 96 U. S. 450; Memphis & C. R. providing that “no moneys shall ever be paid out of Co. v. Alabama, 107 id. 581, 584. In the recent case of the treasury of the State or any of the funds under its | Pennsylvania Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 118 management, except in pursuance of an appropriation U. S. 295, 296, the general question now before us reby law," etc. The money in the hands of the county

ceived careful consideration. It was there said: “It treasurer cannot be regarded as in the treasury of the

does not seen to admit of question that a corporation State, nor as belonging to the State, or to any fund

of one State, owning property and doing business in under its management. (5) Nor does the act of 1869

another State, by permission of the latter, does not violate Const. N. Y., art. 3, § 20, which provides that

thereby become a citizen of this State also. And so a "every law which imposes * * * a tax shall dig

corporation of Illinois, authorized by its laws to build tinctly state the tax, and the object to which it is to

a railroad across the State from the Mississippi river be applied, and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any

to its eastern boundary, may by permission of the other law to fix such tax or object. The act in ques- State of Indiana, extend its road a few miles within tion simply specifies what may be done with a tax the limits of the latter, or indeed through the entire which has been legally imposed. (6) Still less is the act State, and may use and operate the line as one road unconstitutional as imposing on the other towns of

Imposing on the other towns of by the permission of the State, without thereby be. the county a tax for the benefit of the town through

coming a corporation or a citizen of the State of India which the railroad in question runs. As to such other ana. Nor does it seem to us that an act of the Legistowns, it is practically the same as if the railroad

lature conferring upon this corporation of Illinois, by property was exempt from taxation. June 7, 1887. In

its Illinois corporato name, such powers to enable it re Petition of Clark. Opinion by Earl, J.

to use and control that part of the road within the VENDOR'S LIEN – MORTGAGE – PRIORITY – GOOD State of Indiana, as have been conferred on it by the FAITH - BURDEN OF PROOF.- As between an assignee

State which created it, constitutes it a corporation of of a mortgage, taken by the original mortgages with

Indiana. It may not be easy in all such cases to dis

Indiana. It may not be notice of an outstanding vendor's lien, and the

tinguish between the purpose to create a new corporaunpaid vendor in possession at the date of the assign

tion, which shall owe its existence to the law or statment, seeking to enforce his lien, and charging fraud ute under consideration, and the intent to enable the on the part of the vendee in putting the deed on corporation already in existence, under the laws of record, the burden of alleging and proving innocence

another State, to exercise its functions in the State and good faith is upon the assignee, and in the absence

where it is so recei ved. To make such a company a of such pleading and proof his mortgage will be post- corporation of another State, the language used must poned to the lien. June 7, 1887. Seymour V. Mc

imply creation, or adoption in such form as to confer Kinstry. Opinion by Danforth, J.

the power usually exercised over corporations by the State, or by the Legislature, and such allegiance as a State corporation owes to its creator. The mere grant

of privileges or powers to it as an existing corporation UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AB

without more does not do this, and does not make it STRACT.

a citizen of the State conferring such powers." So

that the essential inquiry here must be, whether INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-PROOFS-WAIVER--AGENCY. within the doctrine established in the cases we have -An agent of an accident insurance coinpany who cited, the State of Tenuessee, by her legislation, had served in that capacity for ten years, and who granted a mere license to the Louisville & Nashville had written the risk, when told by a friend of the as- Railroad Company to exercise within her limits all or

Railroad Company to exerci sured of his death, undertook to notify the company some of the powers conferred upon it by the State of Kentucky, or established a new corporation over 221; S. C., 3 Nev. & P. 319; Howcutt v. Bonser, 3 which she could exert such direct control and author Exch. 491 ; Cawley v. Furnell, 12 C. B. 291; Everett v. ity as is usually exerted by a State over corporations Robertson, above cited. The law upon this subject of her own creation. The solution of this question has been well summed up by Vice-Chancellor Wigram, depends upon the intent of the Legislature of Ten as follows: “The legal effect of an acknowledgment nessee, as gathered from the words used in the stat of a debt barred by a statute of limitations is that of utes now to be examined. Looking at the body of the | a promise to pay the old debt, and for this purpose the Tennessee act of December 4, 1851, we find no language old debt is a consideration in law. In that sense, and clearly evincing a purpose to create a new corporation for that purpose the old debt may be said to be reor to adopt one of another State, in such form as to es vived. It is revived as a consideration for a new tablish the same relations in law between the latter promise. But the new promise, and not the old debt, corporation and the State of Tennessee, as would ex- is the measure of the creditor's right. If a debtor ist in the case of one created by that State. Taking simply acknowledges an old debt, the law implies the whole of that act together, we are satisfied that it from that simple acknowledgment a promise to pay was not within the mind of the Legislature of Ten it; for which promise the old debt is a sufficient connessee to create a new corporation, but only to give sideration. But if the debtor promises to pay the old the assent of that State to the exercise by the defend- debt when he is able, or by installments, or in two ant, within her limits, and subject to certain condi years, or out of a particular fund, the creditor can tions, of some of the powers granted to it by the State claim nothing more than the promise gives him." creating it. Upon the authority of the cases cited, Phillips v. Phillips, 3 Hare, 281, 299, 300; Buckmaster and for the reasons herein stated, we are of opinion v. Russell, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 745, 750. In the most rethat the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company is a cent English case that has come under our notice corporation of Kentucky, and not of Tennessee, and Lord Justice Bowen said: “Now, first of all, the acconsequently that the action was removable, upon its knowledgment must be clear in order to raise the impetition and bond, into the Circuit Court of the plication of a promise to pay. An acknowledgment United States. May 27, 1887. Goodlett v. Louisville wbich is not clear will not raise that inference. Sec& N. R. Co. Opinion by Harlan, J.

ondly, supposing there is an acknowledgment of a STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - ACKNOWLEDGMENT

debt, which would, if it stood by itself, be clear enough

still, if words are found combined with it which preNEW PROMISE.-S., being indebted to T. on a promisgory note secured by a deed of trust, executed an in

vent the possibility of the implication of the promise strument to the following effect, after the note was

to pay arising, then the acknowledgment is not clear barred by the statute of limitations : The writing be

within the meaning of the definition;” “because the gan with a reference, by way of consideration only,

words express the lesser in such a way as to exclude to the original debt, designating it as “the indebted

the greater." Green v. Humphreys, 26 Ch. Div. 474, ness described in the deed of trust." A. pledge then

479, 480; S. C., 53 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 625, 628. In the followed of a certain claim of S. against the national

light of the principles established by the authorities government and its proceeds, to secure the payment

above referred to, it is quite clear that the instrument

signed by the defendant on June 21, 1877, did not take of “said indebtedness, with interest thereon," etc.; the interest being mentioned, not as a part of the

the plaintiff's debt out of the statute. Although the consideration, or of the original debt, or as any thing

old debt is expressly called, as it is in law, the consid

eration for the new agreement, thiy agreement, and for which S. was liable, but only as something to the payment of which the claim pledged should be ap

not the old debt, is the measure of the plaintiff's right.

The provisions for the payment of the debt and interplied. The writing concluded with a promise of S. that the proceeds of the claim pledged should “be ap

est out of a particular fund exclude any implication

of a personal promise to pay either. The whole inplied to the payment of said indebtedness, with in

strument clearly evinces the defendant's intention in terest as aforesaid," etc. Held, that the instrument

executing it to have been that the property pledged was not an express promise of S. to pay the note, nor

should be applied, so far as it would go, to the payan express acknowledgment of the note from which a

ment of the debt and interest, and not that his own promise to pay it might be inferred. King v. Riddle, Cranch, 168; Clementson v. Williams, 8 id. 72; Bell

personal liability should be increased or prolonged in v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351; Moore v. Bank of Columbia,

any respect. To imply from the terms of this instru6 id. 86; Randon v. Toby, 11 How. 493; Walsh v.

ment a promise of the defendant to pay the debt himMayer, 111 U. S. 31; Fort Scott v. Hickman, 112 id.

self would be, in our opinion, to construe it agaiust

its manifest intent, and to fritter away the statute of 150. In full accord with these views are the decisions in England under the statute of 9 Geo. IV, ch. 14,

| limitations. May 27, 1887. Shepherd v. Thompson. known as “Lord Tenterden's Act,' whicb only re

Opinion by Gray, J. stricts the mode of proof by requiring that in order TAXATION - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DISCRIMIto continue or revive the debt, an "acknowledgment

NATION-NATIONAL BANK STOCK-LEGISLATIVE POWER or promise shall be made by or contained in some -- REMEDIAL STATUTE – 1) A county assessor aswriting to be signed by the party chargeable thereby," sessed the stock of all the banks in the county, The English judges have repeatedly approved the

both State and national, at the par value. The statement of Mr. (afterward Chief Justice) Jervis, actual value of the shares of the National Althat the writing must either contain an express prom. bany Exchange Bank was from twenty-five to ise to pay the debt, or be “in terms from which an un- thirty per cent above par. The actual value of the qualified promise to pay it is necessary to be implied.". shares of all the banks in the county, with one excepEverett v. Robertson, 1 El. & El. 16, 19; Mitchell's tion, was above par, varying in that respect from ten Claim, L. R., 6 Ch. 822, 828; Morgan v. Rowlands, L. to over one hundred per cent. In a suit by a shareR., 7 Q. B. 493, 497 ; citing Jervis New Rules (4th ed.), holder of the uational bauk referred to, to cover the 350, note. And it has been often held that when the amount paid upon his stock on the ground of disdebtor, in the same writing by which he acknowl. crimination, held, that the discrimination not being edged the debt, without expressly promising to pay designed by the assessor, the assessment--considering it, agrees that certain property shall be applied to its the nature of the property, the fluctuations in value to payment, there can be no implication of a personal which it was subject, and the fact that the method promise to pay. Routledge v. Ramsay, 8 Adol. & E. was applied to all banks, State and national-oame as nearly as practicable to securing between them equality | not stand if they were deprived of that opportunity. and uniformity of taxation, and was valid; follow- But it is not perceived why it might not be legalized ing Stanley v. Supervisors Albany Co., infra. (2) and confirmed by the Legislature giving to them such Where by statute the assessors are required to com- opportunity after the time originally designated had plete the assessment roll by a certain date, and to expired. No just right of the tax payer would thereby make oath to it in a prescribed form, and it is essen be defeated. The assessment of the shares of the bank tial that these requirements should be observed to for the years 1876, 1877 and 1878 was held invalid for enable notices to be published specifying a time when the reason stated, under the laws of the State, althey would meet for the purpose of reviewing the as though from what we have said it would not be open sessments on the application of any person aggrieved, to objection as being in conflict with the act of Condefects arising through the non-completion of the as gress. It is only in view of its invalidity for want of sessment roll by the specified date, and departure conformity to the laws of the State that the validating from the prescribed form of oath, may be cured by act becomes of importance. That act declares that remedial statute subsequently enacted, providing the the assessments contained in the assessment rolls of right of the tax payers aggrieved by the assessment to the wards of the city for the above years are “in all have their objections passed upou be saved. The ir things legalized and confirmed, subject to the rights regularities in the assessment for the years 1876, 1877 of the shareholders, or their personal representatives, and 1878, in that no entry of any assessment of the in national or State banks which were located in said shares of the plaintiff, and of the stockholders whose city, during those years, and the assessments against claims were assigned to him, was made on the assess whom, by reason of their ownership of such shares, ment roll of those years, until after the 1st of Septem were collected by process of law, to claim a deduction ber, and after that time for revising and correcting from or cancellation of such assessments." It required the assessment had passed, and in the defect of the the assessors, within ten days after the passage of the oath annexed, in its averment as to the estimate of act, to publish in the official papers of the city daily the value of real estate, were, in our judgment cured for three weeks, Sundays and holidays excepted, a noby the validating act of April 30, 1883. The power of tice to the stockholders that the assessors would be in taxation vested in the Legislature is, with some ex attendance in their office in Albany for three weeks ceptions, limited only by constitutional provisions de subsequent to the last day of publication of the nosigned to secure equality and uniformity in the as tice, and hear applications for the deduction from the sessment. The mode in which the property sball be assessments of any amount which such stockholders appraised, by whom its appraisement shall be made, or their personal representatives would have been enthe time within which it shall be done, what certifi titled to deduct under the law as it existed in the cate of their action shall be furnished, and when par year when the assessment was placed on the roll, had ties shall be heard for the correction of errors, are such application then been made. And the act promatters resting in its discretion. Where directions vided that such shareholders, or any one representing upon the subject might originally have been dis them, might appear before the assessors and apply for pensed with, or executed at another time, irregulari. a deduction or cancellation of the assessment upon any ties arising from neglect to follow them may be reme ground which would have been a legal one when the died by the Legislature, unless its action in this re assessment was placed on the roll, and the assessors were spect is restrained by constitutional provisions pro- | empowered to grant such reduction or cancellation as hibiting retrospective legislation. Is is only necessary the shareholders would have been legally entitled to at therefore in any case to consider whether the assess that time. The act also made provision for the collecment could have been ordered originally without re tion and payment to the parties of the amount found quiring the proceedings, the omission or defective to be due them, with interest. It is difficult to see on performance of which is complained of, or without what plausible ground the validity of this act can be quiring them within the time designated. If they questioned, unless the power of the Legislature to were not essential to any valid assessment, and there cure by legislative act any irregularities of the assessfore might have been omitted or performed at another | ment be denied. Every right of the shareholder who time, their omission or defective perfermance may be had paid taxes on the assessment-and it does not apcured by the same authority which directed them, pear that there were any others--was secured. He provided al ways that intervening rights are not im could present any claim he might have for a reduction paired. Such is the conclusion of numerous adjudi or cancellation of the assessment, and be heard recations by the State courts upon the effect of curative specting it. He occupied the same position he would acts, and of this court in Mattingly v. District of Co bave held if the assessment of his shares had been lumbia, 97 U. S. 087, 690. Hart v. Henderson, 17 placed on the assessment roll within the time required Mich. 218; Musselman v. Logansport, 29 Ind. 533; --that is, before the 1st of September-and the oath Griin v. Weissenberg School Dist., 57 Penn. St. 433. andexed had been without any fault or omission in The completion of the assessment roll in the case at its averments. The plaintiff and the other sharebar before the 1st of September in the years men holders were bound, as owners of property, to bear tioned, and the form of oath annexed, were not so their just proportion of the public burdens, and if in vital to the assessment itself as necessarily to render ascertaining what that proportion should be, some the defect arising from a later return or a deficient steps in the proceeding were omitted which iuvalioarh incurable. The completion of the assessment dated the assessment, it would seem but just that the roll by that date was deemed essential by the court defect should be cured, if practicable, and the sharebelow, because the law required the assessors forth holders not be allowed to escape taxation, and thus with to cause notices to be published in three of the entail the burden they should bear upon other tax public newspapers of the city for twenty days, speci payers of the community. May 23, 1887. Williams v. fying a day at their expiration when they would meet Board of Supervisors of Albany. Opinion by Field, J. and remain in session five days for the purpose of reviewing their assessments on the application of any -- NATIONAL BANKSTOCK - UNIFORMITY – one aggrieved. The requirement was desigued to af. VALUATION-RULE OF ASSESSORS-RELIEF.- (1) The ford tax payers whose names were on the roll an op New York statute of April 23, 1866, ch. 761, providing portunity for the examination and correction of the for the taxation of shares of stock in national banks is assessment of their property. The assessment could in conflict with the act of Congress (Rev. St., 8:5219)

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