Infinite is a rock upon which all speculators have shivered their timbers-from Thales downwards. An atom confounds us.—Let us see now, how we stand intellectually with reference not to the mighty mass itself but even to the merest atom of it. "The mind is unable to realise in thought the possibility of an absolute commencement; it cannot conceive that anything which begins to be is anything more than a modification of pre-existing elements; it is unable to view any individual thing as other than a link in the mighty chain of being; and every isolated object is viewed by it only as a fragment, which to be known, must be known in connection with the whole of which it constitutes a part." "1 In short, the problem of the creation of any, even the merest, speck of matter is infinite-a Mystery, and one, therefore, to be severely left alone. What a pity that our Fichtes and Schellings. and Hegels and Cousins did not see this simple truth, and save us from their tortuous and foolish labours on the Absolute.2 And not only are we wholly unable to conceive the beginning of an atom, but, granted its existence, we are totally unable also, to conceive the annihilation of it. "We may turn aside from it; we may occupy our attention with other objects, and we may thus exclude it from our thoughts. This is certain: we need not think of it; but it is equally certain that thinking it, we cannot think it not to exist "i.e. to cease to exist. But, of course, whilst we find it impossible to think of an atom being annihilated, we have no difficulty in thinking of it as undergoing a change of form. "We can figure to ourselves the elements 1 Hamilton: Lectures, vol. i. pp. 66-7. Even the materialists acknowledge this truth: - Evolution "can throw no light on the genesis of matter, or on the origination of motion, or on the beginnings of life or of mind. It leaves great and small alike, a centre of impenetrable mystery." Clodd: The Story of Creation, pp. 231-2. 2 Their works on "the Absolute" read like horrible contrivances-metaphysical infernal machines, devised for our mental destruction. of which it is composed distributed and arranged and modified in ten thousand forms-we can imagine anything of it short of annihilation. But the complement or quantum of existence which is realised in any object, that we cannot represent to ourselves, either as increased without abstraction from other bodies, or as diminished without addition to them. In short, we are unable to construe it in thought that there can be an atom absolutely taken away from existence in general." 1 But the inconceivable in thought is not impossible in existence. Now, closely attend to this. We can neither conceive an atom as having an absolute beginning, nor as having an absolute non-beginning. Absolute beginning is totally inconceivable by us; absolute non-beginning is equally inconceivable—although these extremes stand in logical contradiction to each other. But we must not run away with the notion that what is inconceivable to us in thought must be impossible in existence. On the contrary: of logical contradictions one or other must be true. Hence we have Hamilton's great metaphysical dictum-“ All that is conceivable is a mean between two contradictory extremes, both of which are inconceivable, but of which, as mutually repugnant, the one or the other must be true." Whether the limbs of the disjunction be, respectively, conceivable or inconceivable, the atom either had a beginning or had not a beginning. No third alternative is possible. The right attitude of the Human Mind towards the Infinite.-Nor does our mind furnish us with any excuse for indulging in philosophic scepticism, even in the face of such contradictions. It simply says-"I am weak,-— I am finite, wholly unable to comprehend the Infinite. 1 Hamilton: Lectures, vol. ii. pp. 404-5: still more fully expressed, pp. 400, 410. Against Hamilton, Mill asserts that " we can conceive both a beginning and an end to all physical existence" (Examination, etc., p. 363)-in other words, that he could actually conceive the rise of things out of nothing and the disposal of things into nothing! 2 Ib. vol. i. p. 34. I know my own powerless- Put me not to such a task. ness to comprehend the Infinite." demonstrating that the limits of thought are not to be assumed as the limits of possibility, while it admits the weakness of our discursive intellect, re-establishes the authority of consciousness and vindicates the veracity of our primitive convictions. It proves to us from the very laws of mind that while we can never understand how any original datum of intelligence is possible, we have no reason from this inability to doubt that it is true. A learned ignorance is thus the end of philosophy as it is the beginning of theology."1 Even with respect to the question of divisibility, our atom or speck is an absolute mystery to us. A smallest possible exists or does not exist; yet each disjunctive is inconceivable. Our minds force us to the conclusion that all bodies are mathematically divisible (divisible in thought) down and down ad infinitum-down into absolute mystery. We are actually forced to assent to the proposition that even all the parts of bodies are mathematically divisible, although the very thought of a smallest is inconceivable. In fact we must leave the question of a smallest alone: we are quite unable to deal with it. The Infinite must ever be to the finite an infinitely greasy pole to climb. They are, so far, wise, who do not attempt to climb it; for all such attempts must inevitably terminate for the climbers in a mere pawing of the lower end of the pole—a task, alas, to which thousands of philosophers have barrenly devoted much of their foolish lives. They do not get up the pole far enough to enable them, even, to obtain a pleasant slide down to the ground. Think of the amazing ineptitude even of a Kant when he ventures to tell us that God even to Himself can never be an object of sensuous intuition.” 2 He would have been 1 Hamilton: Lectures, vol. i. p. 34. 3 Critique of Pu e Reason, p. 43. saved from such witless thoughts if he had only been wise enough to remember that "things infinite are too large for our capacity." I steadily hold that the infinite and the inapproachable should be reserved for the consideration of Gods or children. 3. Concerning the existence of the Supreme Being.-If even such things as we have noted are utterly mysterious in their ultimate nature, the existence of a Supreme Being, or a First Cause, with all its attributes must, a fortiori, be utterly mysterious. If the beginning of an atom be incomprehensible (which it is)—an operation absolutely baffling and confounding to human thought, obviously the existence of the Creator of the Atom must be a still deeper mystery: therefore the immeasurable folly of attempting to plumb this mystery; of being fond enough to suppose that we may understand God. Deep however, yea, unfathomable though that mystery be, it would neither justify us in coming to the conclusion. that a First Cause did not exist, nor that we cannot know anything of the nature of that First Cause. Causes may be partly known from their effects. A beautiful work of art carries our thoughts back to the idea of an artist with beautiful thoughts and deft manual powers; a wellcultivated field of grain carries our thoughts back to the idea of an intelligent and industrious farmer; a visit to the Forth Bridge immediately convinces us that there are admirable engineering intelligences among us; a visit to a cotton-mill with its thousands of whirring looms, immediately impresses us with the conviction of human ingenuity; a noble poem immediately gives rise to thoughts of the 1 Locke: A. C. Fraser, p. 35. Mr. W. L. Courtney makes a mistake similar to that of Kant when he says-"We ascribe consciousness to God, but we do not ascribe the limited consciousness of individuality." Constructive Ethics, p. 51. All such speculations are quite illegitimate. No human attempt to span Divinity can succeed. Is any poor man unfortunate enough to suppose that he really comprehends God, or has any chance of comprehending Him! noble mind that gave utterance to it. Such is our position also in view of the works of Nature; whilst it is apparent at a glance that the works of Nature are infinitely grander than the works of man. Then, just as we inevitably conclude a Mind behind a mill, and judge something, or apprehend something, of the Mind behind the mill, so in view of the works of Nature the natural Mind of man concludes the existence of a Mind behind the works of Nature; and as the works of Nature seem to be on the whole very clever, ingenious, useful, powerful, beautiful, sublime, thereupon, by parity of reasoning, we reach the conclusion arrived at by most of the wise men of most ages and nations, that there exists behind the works of Nature, a Mind very clever, ingenious, practical, powerful, beautiful, sublime: in a word, we bethink us of an Infinite God. Touching this great question, the existence of God, one of two conclusions, and only two, is open to us. Behind the veil of Nature, there is either a First Cause (i.e. God), or no Cause. If a First Cause, it is absolutely incomprehensible and scientifically inapproachable by us; if no Cause at all, the mystery of existence is no whit lessened. We are intellectually impotent to grapple with either alternative; but on the analogy of our human experience as just set forth, and on the authority of the Causal Judgment, which I propose to discuss in the next chapter, we are forced to the conclusion that there is a First Cause. In other words, arguing from the Known to the Unknown, an absolutely scientific rule of procedure, it is rational to suppose that there is a First Cause; and irrational to suppose that things are causeless or blindly determined. The fitness, beauty, magnificence and perfection apparent in so many of the known works of Nature, may well be taken, I submit, as a high warranty of the existence of a Power adequate to produce such Works. In other words, the analogy of the finite forces us |