unfathomable, all-pervading domain of Mystery, which is everywhere under our feet and among our hands; to whom the Universe is an Oracle and Temple as well as a Kitchen and Cattle-stall, he shall be a delirious mystic; to him, thou with sniffing charity wilt protrusively offer thy handlamp, and shriek, as one injured, when he kicks his foot through it? Armer Teufel! Wert thou not born? Wilt thou not die? Explain me all this, or do one of two things: Return into private places with thy foolish cackle; or, what were better, give it up and weep, not that the reign of wonder is done, and God's World all disembellished and prosaic, but that thou hitherto art a Dilettante and Sand-blind Pedant."1 Conclusion of the matter.-In a word, we are finite; and in all its attempts and attacks upon the Infinite, the finite is simply baffled and driven back in chaotic confusion. Speculatively, the highest thing we can do, is to stand over against the Infinite in the high consciousness of intelligent, though limited, recognition. The philosopher realising his finitude, must leave the Infinite alone-speculatively. "A world of false and pestilent and presumptuous reasoning, by which philosophy and theology are now equally discredited, would be at once abolished in the recognition of this rule of prudent nescience." 2 The Power which the Universe manifests to us, is utterly inscrutable." 3 5. Summary of this Chapter.—It clearly appears, then, I think, that the Universe stands to us intellectually, in one or other of these four relationships: either as I. The Known; or II. The Knowable; or III. The Unknowable through inaccessibility of evidence; or IV. The Unknowable in itself,-the Inscrutable, the Mysterious. 1 Sartor Resartus, Bk. i. c. x. 3 Spencer First Principles, p. 46. 2 Hamilton: Discussions, p. 621. Provinces to which the Philosopher should confine his operations. The student, then, ought clearly to confine his operations within the fields of I. and II. Intellectually, he might as well get bitten by a mad dog as trudge off with his horn-lantern, tapes, callipers and compasses to explore the territories of III. and IV. Sound Sense will teach him to regard both of these latter regions not merely as terra adhuc incognita, but as terra likely to remain incognita. Far better for a philosopher to play with a child's rattle than set off upon any expedition into the Infinite. If the Universe were hung with turnip-lanterns, instead of suns and systems, he could not fully explain it, all turnips and candles even, being, in the last resort, inscrutable. In the year 1553, the Company of Merchant Adventurers was chartered for "the discovery of regions, dominions, islands and places unknown "a perfectly reasonable proceeding in those days: but no philosopher need charter himself to explore the Infinite. All that he can profitably do is to consider what may be properly inferred from what he actually knows,-actually experiences, as to what is beyond and above experience.1 1 What Hamilton called Ontology, or "Inferential Psychology" (Lectures, vol. i. p. 125)—logical deductions from facts of consciousness. "An articulate knowledge of the necessary implications of axiomatic truth." Cook: Monday Lectures (2nd Series), p. 58. CHAPTER VI WE MUST OBSERVE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NECESSARY AND CONTINGENT TRUTH It is very important that the philosopher should note the great distinction that exists between Truth Necessary and Truth Contingent. This distinction will be found to yield great consequences, more especially in the Science of Religion. The distinction observed by Plato.-This distinction seems to have been observed, vaguely, at least, as far back as Plato, who, in the Timaeus, discrimates between that "which is ever existent" and has no generation, and that "which is in a state of generation or becoming." The former, he says, "is apprehended by reflection united with reason," and "always subsists according to sameness": whilst the latter is, as he phrases it, only "perceived by opinion united with irrational perception." 1 In the Introduction of Alcinous to the Doctrine of Plato, it is said that Reason is twofold. "One part of it is conversant with things perceptible by the mind; the other about things perceptible by a sense; of which the one conversant with things perceptible by the mind is science and scientific reason; but the other conversant with things perceptible by a sense, is opinionative and opinion. From whence the scientific possesses a firmness and stability, as being conversant with principles firm and stable; but the credible and opinionative possess probability as being conversant about things not stable." 2 1 Timaeus, ix. 2 Introduction of Alcinous, c. iv. By Aristotle.-So Aristotle :-"Common to all first principles is the being the original from whence either a thing is, or is produced, or is known. But of these principles, some, indeed, are inherent and others are extrinsic." By the words inherent and extrinsic, we may, I think, apprehend that the necessary and the contingent are meant. Again he says:-" There are two divisions of the rational part (of the soul); one by which we contemplate those existing things, the principles of which are in necessary matter; the other, by which we contemplate those, the principles of which are contingent." "2 By Bacon. The distinction was also seen by Bacon: -"Physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter and therefore transitory; and metaphysic, that which is abstracted and fixed. . . . Physic should handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving; and metaphysic should handle that which supposeth further in nature, a reason, understanding and platform." Physic treats of the causes, "but variable or respective causes; and metaphysic the fixed and constant causes." 3 By Hobbes.-Hobbes recognised "primary or most universal propositions which are manifest of themselves." 4 By Descartes.-Descartes wrote:- "Whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true that two and three make five, and that a square has but four sides; nor does it seem posssible that truths so apparent, can ever fall under a suspicion of falsity." 5 A philosopher, I think, would be better employed in sucking a toothing-ring than in combating such a proposition. "5 By Leibnitz.-Leibnitz, criticising Locke, says-In that philosopher's work, "There are some particulars not illexpounded, but on the whole, he had wandered far from the 1 Metaphysics, Bk. iv. i. 3 Adv. of Learning, Bk. ii.; Works, 2 Nic. Ethics, Bk. vi. i. 4. 5 Meditations, i. gate; nor has he understood the nature of the Intellect. Had he sufficiently considered the nature of necessary truths or those apprehended by demonstration, and those which become known to us by induction alone, he would have seen that those which are necessary could only have been approved to us by principles native to the mind; seeing that the senses indeed inform us what may take place, but not what necessarily takes place. The senses never give us more than examples, that is to say, particular or individual truths. Now all the examples which confirm a general truth, how numerous soever they may be, are insufficient to establish the universal necessity of the same truth: for it does not follow that what has happened, will happen always in like manner. For example, the Greeks and Romans and other nations have always observed that during twenty-four hours, day is changed into night, and night into day. But we should be wrong were we to believe that the same rule holds everywhere, as the contrary has been observed during a residence in Nova Zembla. Hence it appears that the necessary truths such as we find them in pure mathematics, behove to have principles, the truth of which does not depend upon examples, and consequently, not on the evidence of (corporeal) sense." By Hume, inconstantly.2-Hume, in an imperfect way, quite insufficient for his own guidance, had also some glimmering of this great distinction. "That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the Universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their 1 Quoted by Hamilton, Lectures, vol. ii. pp. 353-5. 2 I say "inconstantly," because Hume is continually contradicting himself on psychological questions. |