CHAPTER II THAT CRITERION OF TRUTH IS ONLY TO BE As soon as he understands the question which he is called upon to decide, every adult and sane person will admit that the existence of some criterion of truth must be admitted before any question whatever can be rationally debated. I now lay down the proposition that the required criterion of truth can only be found in our own consciousness, consciousness being taken as inclusive of the whole series of our sentient states,1 simple or complex, as they assert or deny anything, or confirm or correct one another or, in the words of Sir William Hamilton, as "the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections." 2 (A) HISTORIC EVIDENCE All mankind have acted and do act on the explicit or implicit assumption and belief that, to the extent of their faculties, they carry within themselves the criterion of truth. I lay down this proposition in its broadest form, and do not think that it can possibly admit of any exceptions. Written opinions that consciousness is and must be the criterion of truth, might be abundantly 1 Cf. Brown: Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i. p. 226. 2 Lectures, vol. i. p. 201. As to the use of the word consciousness, Sir William says "The employment of the word conscientia, of which consciousness is a translation, is in its pyschological significance, not older than the philosophy of Descartes"; and that previously to his time the word was almost exclusively used in the ethical sense of conscience. Ib. p. 196. adduced from all kinds of writers, ancient and modern. For a useful series of such opinions, I would refer the reader to Sir William Hamilton's Dissertations appended to his edition of Reid.1 Indeed nobody speaks or writes a word without an inner conviction that he possesses a personal standard of truth to the full extent of his faculties; and at the same time, everybody holds an equally strong conviction that the person he addresses is likewise possessed of such a standard. Yet from early times, many philosophers have denied this truth,-men who, as Montaigne said of the Pyrrhonians, have seemed to aspire to the high point of dubitation." There have actually been large schools of philosophers who have asserted that seeing was not believing-who have tried to make out that the evidence for the existence of bricks is quite defective. "It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy reason by argument and ratiocination," Hume admits, yet is this, says he, "the grand scope of all their inquiries and disputes. They endeavour to find objections both to our abstract reasonings and to those which regard matter of fact and existence." 2 Even Scepticism presupposes the conscious criterion.-To all such persons let us repeat that in denying the veracity of consciousness, they still implicitly, and in self-contradiction, presuppose its veracity; for their denial is merely a negative assertion, and all assertion implies a consciousness, a criterion, "a recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts." Nothing could give us a keener appreciation of the general belief in the veracity of consciousness than the sight of a complete library of scepticism. Indeed to deny its veracity, is to deny the possibility of knowledge, which denial itself is logically self-destructive, for an 1 Pp. 770-803. 2 Hume: An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Essays Moral, etc., vol. ii. pp. 127-8 (Green and Grose's ed. 1898). alleged illusion can only be proved by contrasting it with a postulated reality. All judgment of illusion, whether of subjective or objective illusion, assumes and must be founded upon a postulated and known reality. Thus an ontological scepticism is impossible and absurd,-for ever, not only incapable of proof, but self-destructive, since it is seen that the sceptical Pantaloon requires a real basis upon. which to execute his antics, no less exigently than the realist Toiler requires a real basis upon which to execute his works. In other words, he who asserts that anything is false or unknown, necessarily presupposes in his assertion, that his individual consciousness is true. He who asserts that everything is false and that nothing can be known, necessarily stultifies himself in the assertion and renders unwitting or unwilling homage to his own consciousness.1 Sceptics should imitate Cratylus.-In view of these facts, all persons who profess to deny the veracity or the authority of consciousness, should, to be consistent, imitate the conduct of the sceptic Cratylus who, according to Aristotle, was of opinion that "one ought to speak of nothing," and "merely moved his finger and rebuked Heraclitus for saying that it was not possible to enter the same river twice, for he himself was of opinion that you could not do so once":2 from which it would appear that Cratylus was the most consistent member of the dubitational School of philosophers. Yet in rebuking Heraclitus, it is quite obvious that the facts of life were too strong for his illusionary theory, since the rebuke itself presupposed in himself a standard of reality and judgment, and admitted the existence of another philosopher besides himself,-thus cancelling his sceptical hypothesis. 1 It is allowed by Hume himself that "if there be any suspicion of an author's insincerity, these oblique propositions discover his real opinions better than his more formal and direct assertions." Essays Moral, etc., vol, i., note, p. 441. 2 Metaphysics, Bk. iii. c. 5 (Bohn tr.). However, we might well wish that all the sceptical fraternity, ancient and modern, had condescended to imitate his instructive example, as in the case recorded, and had, as a rule, been contented to wag their fingers merely, instead of their tongues and pens. It seems to lie beyond dispute that the speaking and writing ones among them have enormously increased the difficulties of philosophy; and instead of helping to instruct, vitalise and ennoble humanity (the right task of the philosopher), they have only succeeded in confusing the human mind and in casting dark and deadly shadows upon life. Just think of it. We cannot, as we have seen, sell or buy, and do not attempt to sell or buy, a pair of boots without reference to, and confidence in, a standard of truth of some kind-a standard that appeals to our own consciousness; and yet some men propose to deal with affairs of life and death without a standard and in contravention of standards! They wish to become philosophers not merely through want of sense, but by opposition to sense! Never did the jack-pudding execute such strange antics as the sceptical philosopher. (B) PERSONAL EVIDENCE But let us pass from external authorities on the subject from what other persons say to what you yourself say. If you wish to learn the mechanism and the principles upon which a watch works, it is not sufficient to hear what somebody says about it, but you must, on your own account, turn up the watch and make a personal examination and study of it. So with your mind. Don't merely listen to what people say about it, but turn up the thing itself, so to speak, and observe its constitution for yourself very closely-not refusing, of course, the guidance of approved wise men in your investigation, and conclude about it for yourself. In this way alone can you ever hope to have a competent knowledge either of watches or anything else. Your own individual mind is your ultimate and highest authority on all questions. Your prime concern is with truth as you yourself know it or may know it, not with a wilderness of talkers about truth. "Small have continual plodders (pedants) ever won, Peter Smith's testimony.-To illustrate the case, assume that you are Peter Smith. Take the question of your personal identity. Suppose I ask-"How do you know that you are Peter Smith ?" Your highest and last answer will necessarily be, "I know that I am Peter Smith." All the illusionist philosophers in the world cannot persuade you to the contrary. Take the question of sensation and external perception. You are wearing a pair of boots. An illusionist philosopher asks "How do you know that you are wearing them?" Your final answer must be, I know that I am wearing them; I both feel and perceive that I have them on my feet." The philosopher further asks," How do you know that they are not an illusion—a tertian quiddity, or an hallucination, or a mental modification of some kind?" You look at the philosopher in astonishment: you properly take him to be joking or gone mad. Your consciousness assures you that they are neither a mental modification, nor a tertian quiddity, nor an illusion of any kind whatever, but that they are what they are, namely, a pair of boots; and so with all your other sensations and external perceptions. Not only, indeed, is your personal conviction on the subject, your highest warranty for the fact, but you will find, if you try, that you cannot conceive a more convincing warranty. Or take internal perception. "You say that "two and two are four." Our philosopher asks, How do you know that two and two are four? How do |