a posteriori, is to be measured. If a doctrine should harmonise with these psychological criteria, it is established as a truth, a priori or a posteriori, according to its quality. If a doctrine be out of harmony with such criteria, it must be rejected as false; whilst if for any reason we are unable to apply our criteria to any doctrine, the question of its truth or falsehood must, on that account, remain unanswered.

In the last resort, all truth, in so far as we can apprehend it, resolves itself into agreement with one's own mind; whilst all falsehood resolves itself into disagreement with one's own mind. There is no heterodoxy but thisdishonesty-disloyalty to one's own convictions. Agreement with oneself is, perhaps, the finest harmony obtainable; disagreement with oneself, the most terrible discord. He falls below the dignity of true manhood who does not strive to be true to his own convictions in the teeth of all the world. To be true to self is to be true to God; to be false to self is to be false to God.

CHAPTER IX

RECAPITULATION OF PRINCIPLES

To recapitulate :-(1) The true philosopher must recognise the existence of a criterion of truth; (2) he must find that criterion in consciousness; (3) he must accept and interpret consciousness in its integrity; (4) he must recognise that, in their qualities and manifestations, mind and matter are mutually incommensurable; (5) he must recognise the distinction between the finite and the infinite, and submit to the lessons implied in that distinction; (6) he must observe the distinction between necessary and contingent truth; and (7) he must recognise the individual to be the chief and ultimate witness of all basal truth.

Those seven propositions embody some of the axioms and first principles of a rational psychology; and they seem to be implicity recognised by all men-even those by whom they are explicitly denied. You cannot rationally open your mouth to discuss the foundations and sanctions of science without yielding an implicit, if not an explicit, recognition of those principles and axioms. The frank acceptance of such, followed by a loyal and steadfast adherence to them in speculation and practice, would go far, I believe, not only to protect seekers of truth from error, but also to abolish the most mischievous of the false theories which now pester the world.

CHAPTER X

DFFINITION AND END OF PHILOSOPHY

Definition of Philosophy.-So far, I have not attempted to give any definition of Philosophy, but have treated it in a general manner as synonymous with knowledge and the pursuit of it-interest in the Universal. Strictly speaking, What is Philosophy?

Pythagoras called it "the knowledge of things existing"; Bacon, "the interpretation of Nature." If, says he, "any man think Philosophy and Universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from them, served and supplied";1 and in his Apophthegms, he quotes with approbation the saying of Aristippus that "those who studied particular sciences and neglected Philosophy, were like Penelope's wooers that made love to the waiting women." 2 Hobbes in one place calls it "the study of wisdom"; and again, "such knowledge of effects or appearances as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes and generation and again of such causes or generations as may be from knowing first their effects." 4 Under the definition he excludes Theology and what he calls "the doctrine of God's worship," from the consideration of Philosophy, as being "not to be known by natural reason, but by the authority of the Church; and

:

3

1 Advancement of Learning, Bk. ii.; Works, vol. i. p. 70.

2 Works, vol. ii. p. 452.

3 English Works, vol. i., Ep. to the Reader, p. xiv.

4 Works, vol. i. p. 3.

as being the object of Faith and not of Knowledge": SO far adrift can men be wafted when they cut the tether of Common Sense, and dishonour those faculties with which they have been so beneficently endowed.

Philosophy has also been defined as "the science of things divine and human and of the causes in which they are contained "the science of sufficient reasons";

'the science of things possible inasmuch as they are possible";" the science of things evidently deduced from first principles," and so on.2 Relative to knowledge, Sir William Hamilton takes it to mean the knowledge of effects in their causes. Such, he says, is "philosophical knowledge in its most extensive signification: and, in this signification, all the sciences occupied in the research of causes, may be viewed as so many branches of philosophy." 3 Indeed, the words science and philosophy are frequently used as if they were quite interchangeable.

4

These words should not be synonymised. Science has a well-defined meaning. "Whenever a man is convinced of anything, and the principles are known to him, he knows it scientifically"-as expressed by Aristotle; or as Hamilton defines it," A science is a complement of cognitions having in point of form, the character of logical perfection; in point of matter, the character of real

1 Works, vol. i. pp. 10-11. A mistake made as commonly to-day, perhaps, as in the time of Hobbes: e.g. "Christianity does not charge Reason itself but unregenerate Reason, with incapacity to discover the things of the spirit.” Fisher Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, p. 352. As if two kinds of Reason could exist! How desirable that such error should be destroyed! 2 Quoted by Hamilton: Lectures, vol. i. pp. 49-50.

3 Ib. pp. 60-61.

4 Nic. Ethics, Bk. vi. c. iii. 4. Jacobi defines Science as a "systematic register of cognitions mutually referring to one another—the first and last point in the series is wanting." The Logic of Hegel (Wallace), p. 406. Lewes tells us that the method of theology is subjective; that of science, objective. History of Philosophy, vol. i., Intro. p. xx. Clearly an erroneous distinction. Science, properly speaking, is inclusive of all reasoned knowledge.

truth." 1 The word science seems to be amply sufficient to cover all knowledge of the "why" of anything, and might be used to connote all reasoned knowledge whatever whilst the word philosophy might be profitably restricted to denote what it signifies etymologically, namely, the love and pursuit of knowledge and wisdom - knowledge and wisdom in the most comprehensive

sense.

Thus, for instance, instead of speaking of "mental philosophy" and "natural science," as many do, science might be taken as the genus embracing all reasoned knowledge, whether of matter or mind. It would then naturally present itself to us in two great leading divisions, namely, science of mind and science of matter; and these main divisions would, in turn, offer themselves for further scientific division and subdivision. The generic word science would thus embrace all reasoned knowledge-from knowledge of a speck of dust up to a knowledge of the Universe; from knowledge of insects up to knowledge of the Deity. Thus the whole of Science would be the answer to three questions: (1) "What are the facts or phenomena to be observed? (2) What are the laws which regulate these facts, or under which these phenomena appear? (3) What are the real results, not immediately manifested, which these facts or phenomena warrant us in drawing?" 2 The mind of man might be regarded as a

kind of scientific mirror to all Nature.

The word science having been restricted to its proper etymological signification of knowledge, the word philosophy could then be employed in its etymological

1 Lectures, vol. iv. p. 2.

2 Hamilton assigns this task to Philosophy: Lectures, vol. i. p. 121. So Lewes -Philosophy "has always had one aim, that of furnishing an explanation of the world, of man and of society. To solve the problems of existence and to supply a rule of life, have constituted its purpose more or less avowed." History of Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 689. This should rather be regarded as the programme of Science.