though regular on its face, is a forgery or an entire fabrication of the officer, is admissible even as against an innocent purchaser for value and without notice." While the certificate of acknowledgment is entitled to a strong presumption in favor of its truth, in this state it is only prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument. Wilkins v. Moore, 20 Kan. 538; Heil v. Redden, 45 Kan. 562, 26 Pac. 2; Heaton v. Norton County State Bank, supra. The following language from the opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer, in Wilkins v. Moore, supra, while dictum in that case, is undoubtedly a correct statement of the law: "Of course, the matter is still open for further testimony, either written or oral, for the acknowledgment is not con| As implied in the general rule as stated above, a certificate cannot be impeached even for fraud or duress when the grantee was not cognizant of the fraud or duress. Moses v. Dade, 58 Ala. 211; Donahue v. Mills, 41 Ark. 421; McHenry v. Day, 13 Iowa, 445, 81 Am. Dec. 438; Johnston v. Wallace, 53 Miss. 331, 24 Am. Rep. 699; Homoeopathis Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 32 N. J. Eq. 103; Riggan v. Sledge, 116 N. C. 87, 20 S. E. 1016; Nimocks v. McIntyre, 120 N. C. 325, 26 S. E. 922; Wachovia Nat. Bank v. Ireland, 122 N. C. 571, 29 S. E. 835; Butner v. Blevins, 125 N. C. 585, 34 S. E. 629; Marsh v. Griffin, 136 N. C. 333, 48 S. E. 735; Baldwin v. Snowden, 11 Ohio St. 203, 78 Am. Dec. 303; Moore v. Fuller, 6 Or. 272, 25 Am. Rep. 524; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rook, 84 Pa. 442, 24 Am. Rep. 204; Shields v. Netherland, 5 Lea, 193; Finnegan v. Finnegan, 3 Tenn. Ch. 510; Hartley v. Frosh, 6 Tex. 208, 55 Am. Dec. 772; Pool v. Chase, 46 Tex. 207; Davis v. Kennedy, 58 Tex. 516; Henderson v. Terry, 62 Tex. 281; Miller v. Yturria, 69 Tex. 549, 7 S. W. 206; Webb v. Burney, 70 Tex. 322, 7 S. W. 841; Gray v. Shelby, 83 Tex. 405, 18 S. W. 809; Summers v. Sheern, Tex. Civ. App. 37 S. W. 246. And see under II. b, as to cases where there was fraud known to the grantee, but unknown to his subgrantee. clusive evidence." p. 540. In § 534 of vol. 1 of the second edition of Devlin on deeds, it is said: "The certificate standing by itself, without other proof, is prima facie evidence of all that it rightfully contains. While not conclusive, it is entitled to the utmost consideration." With respect to the character of proof necessary to overcome the certificate of an acknowledging officer, where the parties have actually appeared and signed an instrument and afterwards attempt to contradict the certificate as to what took place, the rule is that the evidence to impeach the acknowledgment must be clear and convincing. Gabbey v. Forgeus, 38 Kan. 62, 15 Pac. 866. There the wife admitted her signature to the instrument, and it was duly acconveyance, and can no more be contradicted by parol than any other part of the deed; it cannot be set aside even for fraud when the grantee is not cognizant of such fraud and does not participate in it. Baldwin v. Snowden, 11 Ohio St. 203, 78 Am. Dec. 303. In Hall v. Patterson, 51 Pa. 289, it is stated that a purchaser bona fide and without notice of the fraud or coercion is excepted from the rule that a certificate of a wife's voluntary acknowledgment of her conveyance of real estate is not conclusive in cases of fraud or constraint, but the court holds that the evidence of fraud or coercion should be admitted even without offer to follow it up with proof of knowledge, for the latter can be made a subject of subsequent proof. So, although a wife may be coerced by her husband into signing and acknowledging a mortgage, if the mortgagee does not know of that fact, it will not overthrow the fact and effect of her acknowledgment. Long v. Branham, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 552, 99 S. W. 271. And the presence and undue influence of the husband at the ceremony of the privy examination will not vitiate a certificate which is in all respects regular, unless the grantee has notice of that fact, and the burden is upon the other party to show such notice. Davis v. Davis, 146 N. C. 163, 59 S. E. 659; Brite v. Penny, 157 N. C. 110, 72 S. E. 964. and the instrument was incorrectly interpreted as a mortgage instead of a deed, but the grantee was ignorant of that fact, and the certificate was upheld. De Arnaz v. Escandon, 59 Cal. 486. "The certificate of the officer of privy examination of a married woman shuts off all inquiry as to fraud, duress, or undue influence in the treaty, unless participated This rule was applied where an acknowl in by the grantee or his agent. It also pre-edgment was taken through an interpreter, cludes all inquiry into fraud or falsehood in the factum of the privy examination itself, unless the feme covert can make it appear, by clear, cogent, and convincing proof, either that no such examination was had at all, or that on such examination she refused to give her voluntary assent to the execution of the instrument, and so ex pressed herself to the officer at the time he undertook to examine her." GreenleafJohnson Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 145 N. C. 339, 59 S. E. 134. A certificate is more than prima facie evidence; it is an essential part of the The same rule was applied where the duress of the husband was unknown to the grantee, and the wife, by her own subsequent voluntary acts, gave the public to understand that the deed was valid. Marston v. Brittenham, 76 Ill. 611. So, although a wife was induced by coercion of her husband to sign and acknowledge, yet, if the grantee is not cognizant of knowledged and certified by a proper officer. | carefully scrutinized, is admissible to imIt was held that, to sustain the defense peach the certificate, and is entitled to the of duress, the burden of proof was on the wife, and that "the genuine signature and duly certified acknowledgment of the mortgage could not be resisted by doubtful and unsatisfactory statements and circumstances. The evidence to impeach them should be strong and convincing." Syllabus. See also Winston v. Burnell, 44 Kan. 367, 21 Am. St. Rep. 289, 24 Pac. 477. Here the wife denies the execution of the instrument, and alleges that she neither signed nor acknowledged it. Her testimony was competent, and stands as the testimony of any other interested witness. The general rule is stated in 1 Cyc. 624, as follows: "The testimony of parties to the suit, while that fact, and she professes to act of her own free will, and the grantee gives up a valuable consideration, she may not later repudiate. Ladew v. Paine, 82 Ill. 221. But if the grantee is wilfully blind when in a position to know of the fraud, in order to profit by it, the certificate will be overcome. Pierce v. Fort, 60 Tex. 464. And a grantee having every opportunity to know the facts, that there was and could have been no sufficient privy examination of the wife because of her mental incapacity, who negotiates and trades with the husband without consultation with the wife at the time the law demanded that he should consult her in order to protect himself, is at least culpable, and though not active in the fraud, must abide the result of a bad certificate. Garth v. Fort, 15 Lea, 683. And a married woman so imposed upon need not prove notice in case of a mortgagee who is himself a conveyancer and who holds other mortgages against her; he should consult her before advancing more money on a new mortgage upon her separate property. Michener v. Cavender, 38 Pa. 334, 80 Am. Dec. 486. And in Minnesota, duress and threats of the husband will overcome the certificate, even where the mortgagee is entirely ignorant and innocent. He should make inquiry. Edgerton v. Jones, 10 Minn. 427, Gil. 341. But although there may have been fraud or duress practised upon the grantor, and participated in or known to the grantee at the time of the execution or acknowledgment of the instrument, it has been held that if the rights under the instrument so acknowledged have passed from the immediate grantee to a bona fide holder without notice of such fraud or duress, as against him, the certificate must stand, and it cannot be impeached by showing the fraud. Kerr v. Russell, 69 Ill. 666, 18 Am. Rep. 634 (forgery); Pribble v. Hall, 13 Bush, 61; Williams v. Baker, 71 Pa. 476 (dictum); Coleman v. Satterfield, 2 Head, 259: Summers v. Sheern, Tex. Civ. App. same weight as that of any other interested witness." Moreover, the testimony of Mrs. Fletcher was not wholly uncorroborated. There were circumstances in connection with it which may have had more or less weight with the court in determining its truth. The husband testified that she was not present when he signed the lease. The original instrument was in evidence and compared with her own signature, and there was a variance in the spelling of her name as it was written in different parts of the instrument and the acknowledgment. On the trial the court called a jury in an advisory capacity, and submitted to them certain special questions, and gave an in- 37 S. W. 246; Forbes v. Thomas, Tex. Civ. App. —, 51 S. W. 1097. c. No separate examination of married woman. In several cases where the statute re quired a separate or privy examination of the married woman grantor, and the certificate of the acknowledgment recited that such an examination had been made, it has been held that this recital may be cortradicted by parol. Allen v. Shortridge, 1 Duv. 34; Stevenson v. Brasher, 90 Ky 23, 13 S. W. 242; Dodge v. Hollinshead, 6 Minn. 25, Gil. 1, 80 Am. Dec. 433; Annan v. Folsom, 6 Minn. 500, Gil. 347; Edgerton v. Jones, 10 Minn. 427, Gil. 341; Wannell v. Kem, 57 Mo. 478; Sharpe v. McPike, 62 Mo. 300 (dictum); Steffen v. Bauer, 70 Mo. 399; Belo v. Mayes, 79 Mo. 67; Rust v. Goff, 94 Mo. 511, 7 S. W. 418; Barrett v. Davis, 104 Mo. 559, 16 S. W. 377 (charge not proved); Knowles v. McCamly, 10 Paige, 342; Burgess v. Wilson, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 306; Benedict v. Jones, 129 N. C. 470, 40 S. E. 221; Davis v. Davis, 146 N. C. 163, 59 S. E. 659; Wester v. Hurt, 123 Tenn. 508, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 358, 130 S. W. 842, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 329; Eldridge v. Hunter, 125 Tenn. 309, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 628, 143 S. W. 892; Countz v. Geiger, 1 Call. (Va.) 190; Harvey v. Pecks, 1 Munf. (Va.) 518. And this is true, no matter whether her acknowledgment is in opposition to or in accordance with her husband's wishes. Allen v. Shortridge, 1 Duv. 34. And it would seem that such proof may overcome the certificate, even as against an innocent purchaser. Wannell v. Kem, 57 Mo. 478; Rust v. Goff, 94 Mo. 511, 7 S. W. 418;_ Benedict v. Jones, 129 N. C. 470, 40 S. E. 221. But it seems that falsity in this respect may well be considered to be a form at least of fraud, and in Eldridge v. Hunter, 125 Tenn. 309, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 628, 143 S. W. 892, the court said in effect that such false statement did amount to fraud. struction that the burden was on the plain- | set, and offered the evidence of expert wittiffs to prove the due execution of the lease nesses to prove that the signature of Mrs. by the fair weight and preponderance of Fletcher was genuine. The case was tried the evidence. It is claimed that this was by the court with the aid of a jury, and, error, and that the court evidently mis- since all the evidence either side had to conceived the law, and, in adopting the offer was introduced, it will be assumed findings, failed to give proper weight to that the court, in adopting the findings of the evidence. Conceding that the instruc- the jury, gave proper weight to all the tion was erroneous, it has been often held competent evidence. We have carefully that the disposal of the burden of proof examined the claim of error in the adis of slight importance, and, where all the mission of evidence, and find nothing which evidence has been introduced, it becomes would warrant a reversal. The questions immaterial where the burden rests. Mc- objected to were proper cross-examination. Cormick v. Holmes, 41 Kan. 265, 21 Pac. It is quite apparent that the court attached 108; Badger Min. & Mill. Co. v. Ellis, 76 considerable importance to the defense that Kan. 795, 92 Pac. 1114. The procedure the lease was altered after it was signed followed in this case is a fair illustration. | and acknowledged. Five of the six quesPlaintiffs assumed the burden at the out- tions submitted to the jury hinged upon And in an early Texas case it is held that the statute providing the method whereby a married woman may dispose of her property, not expressly declaring absolutely void any other mode of conveyance, had for its object the securing of freedom of will and action on her part, and where this was fully shown, it was sufficient, although in that case there was admittedly no privy examination. Womack v. Womack, 8 Tex. 397, 58 Am. Dec. 119. Idaho-Wilson v. Wilson, 6 Idaho, 597, 57 Pac. 708. Ill.-McDowell v. Stewart, 83 Ill. 538; Lewis v. McGrath, 191 Ill. 401, 61 N. E. 135. Iowa-Tatum v. Goforth, 9 Iowa, 247; Morris v. Sargent, 18 Iowa, 90; Simms v. Hervey, 19 Iowa, 273 (obiter). Md.-Davis v. Hamblin, 51 Md. 525. Miss.-Johnston v. Wallace, 53 Miss. 331, 24 Am. Rep. 699. Mo.-Pierce v. Georger, 103 Mo. 540, 15 d. No acknowledgment at all by person S. W. 849. in question. A certificate of acknowledgment has been said to be conclusive unless proved to be untrue. Rexford v. Rexford, 7 Lans. 6. Neb.-Phillips v. Bishop, 31 Neb. 853, 48 N. W. 1106. N. Y.-Hollohan v. Rempe, 141 App. Div. 71, 125 N. Y. Supp. 760, reversing 66 Misc. 27, 120 N. Y. Supp. 901. N. C.-Spivey v. Rose, 120 N. C. 163, 26 S. E. 701; Davis v. Davis, 146 N. C. 163, 59 S. E. 659. Ohio-Williamson v. Carskadden, 36 Ohio St. 664. Pa. Michener v. Cavender, 38 Pa. 334, But it is always admissible to show that grantors in alleged deeds or mortgages never actually appeared before the officer purporting to have taken their acknowledg ments, and that they made no acknowledg ment at all, even as against a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee without notice, and relying on the acknowledgment. This sit-80 Am. Dec. 486; Smith v. Markland, 223 uation is analogous to a judgment void Pa. 605, 132 Am. St. Rep. 747, 72 Atl. for want of jurisdiction. There is a wide 1047; Gustine v. Westenberger, 224 Pa. distinction between this and the admission 455, 73 Atl. 913; Reineman v. Moon, 12 Pittsb. L. J. N. S. 167. of an appearance before the officer, but a denial of the occurrence of certain material incidents recited in the certificate. This rule is announced in the following cases: Fed.-Paxton v. Marshall, 18 Fed. 361; Bouvier-Iaeger Coal Land Co. v. Sypher, 186 Fed. 644. Ala.-Barnett v. Proskauer, 62 Ala. 486; Grider v. American Freehold Land Mortg. Co. 99 Ala. 281, 42 Am. St. Rep. 58, 12 So. 775; Giddens v. Bolling, 99 Ala. 319, 13 So. 511; Cheney v. Nathan, 110 Ala. 254, 55 Am. St. Rep. 26, 20 So. 99; Chattanooga Nat. Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Vaught, 143 Ala. 389, 39 So. 215; Russell v. Holman, 156 Ala. 432, 47 So. 205. S. D.-Vesey v. Solberg, 27 S. D. 618, 132 N. W. 254. Tenn.-Wester v. Hurt, 123 Tenn. 508, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 358, 130 S. W. 842, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 329. Tex.-Wheelock v. Cavitt, 91 Tex. 679, 66 Am. St. Rep. 920, 45 S. W. 796. Especially is such evidence admissible after the purported grantors, the grantee, and the certifying officer are all dead, and the sole evidence of the existence of the instrument lies in the record of it made nineteen years before. Bouvier-Iaeger Coal Land Co. v. Sypher, 186 Fed. 644, affirmed in 111 C. C. A. 673, 191 Fed. 1006. And no fraud upon the part of the granCal. Le Mesnager v. Hamilton, 101 Cal. tee need be shown by the party whose ac532, 40 Am. St. Rep. 81, 35 Pac. 1054; Ho-knowledgment is thus in question, nor noman v. Waver, 9 Cal. App. 123, 98 Pac. 80. Conn.-Smith v. Ward, 2 Root, 374, 1 Am. Dec. 80. tice of the falsity of the certificate to the grantee. Le Mesnager v. Hamilton, 101 Cal. 532, 40 Am. St. Rep. 81, 35 Pac. 1054. There are reasons, however, which render it unnecessary to consider or determine what kind of alterations will avoid a written instrument of this character. Irrespective of whether the Fletchers were either or both of them bound by the lease, there still remained the other defense that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with its terms. They admitted their failure to comply within the time stipulated, and Likewise, a forged deed and acknowledg ment by a stranger impersonating the grantor cannot affect the owner of the prop erty, even as against a bona fide purchaser who has relied upon such acknowledgment. Smith v. Markland, 223 Pa. 605, 132 Am. St. Rep. 747, 72 Atl. 1047. of the notary, and he never had the paper in his possession thereafter; the officer in such a case is without jurisdiction. Che ney v. Nathan, 110 Ala. 254, 55 Am. St. Rep. 26, 20 So. 99. the fact of alteration, and the court adopted [tion was not such a one as would avoid the the findings which were all against the instrument, because it was a correction plaintiffs on that issue, which was wholly which expressed the intent of both parties, immaterial if the plaintiffs' contentions are and was not a material alteration. 2 Cye. correct as to the law in respect to the 148, D, and cases cited. alteration of written instruments. If it were necessary to decide the question, we would be inclined to hold with the plaintiffs that, since Joseph Fletcher testified that it was his intention at the time he executed the lease, and also the intention of the notary, to have the lease cover the northwest quarter of section 20, and it appeared beyond question that the figure "4" in the typewritten lease was the result of a mere typographical error, the alteraStatutory changes in the rules of evidence may also make this rule necessary for the protection of landowners, as the following South Dakota case emphatically points out. In the words of the court: "The common-law rule requiring that there must be strong, clear, and convincing testimony to overcome the recitals of the cer- The rule was also applied where the tificate of acknowledgment to a title deed officer attached his certificate before the grew up with, and was applicable along by grantors signed, and afterwards, when he the side of, and in connection with, the presented the instrument, one grantor reother common-law rule requiring the party fused to sign or acknowledge, but the inoffering a deed to produce the original instrument was signed later in the absence strument and prove its due execution; and when the statute of this state abrogated the common-law rule requiring the production of the original instrument and proof of its execution, and substituted in place thereof a recorded copy, without proof of execution, some of the reasons for the rule requiring such strong, clear, and convincing evidence to overcome the recitals of the certificate of acknowledgment ceased to exist, in so far as the same appertains to an instrument claimed to be forged, and any evidence that is sufficient to overcome, to the satisfaction of the jury or trial court, any other ordinarily controverted issuable fact, should be sufficient to overcome the recitals of the recorded copy of the certificate of acknowledgment, where the original instrument and the original certificate of acknowledgment are not produced. Under the rule of this statute the real owner of the land, in case of a forged deed, is at a great disadvantage, and, if his own testimony is not to be weighed and given credence as against the certificate of acknowledgment to the forged instrument, would often be at the mercy of those claiming under the forged deed. . . . The statute has the effect of even denying to the landowner the opportunity of seeing what is claimed to be his own signature to the instrument which deprives him of his title. Under these circumstances the strict rule in regard to the sacredness of the certificate of acknowledgment should be relaxed." Vesey v. Solberg, 27 S. D. 618, 132 N. W. 254. And in this case evidence of grantors and their grown son was held sufficient to overcome the certificate. This was a case of forgery. . A certificate attached by the officer upon the mere statement of the grantee that the instrument had been executed, and not upon any act or admission of the grantor, is void. Mays v. Hedges, 79 Ind. 288. And the casual admission in the presence of the notary that the grantor has executed the deed, but with no thought of se knowledging, does not authorize the notary to certify that he has acknowledged; such a certificate is false in fact and a nullity in law. Breitling v. Chester, 88 Tex. 586, 32 S. W. 527. But a certificate made without requir ing the personal presence of the grantor, but upon a previous verbal authorization given by her, accompanied at the time with her written signature, to the effect that the notary should make the certificate when a deed might be presented by her husband with her signature affixed, was held good as against parties who, being ignorant of all this, had loaned money upon the strength of it. McHenry v. Day, 13 Iowa. 445, 81 Am. Dec. 438. Evidence that the notary examined a married woman privately over the telephone is sufficient to overcome the certificate. He must have a personal interview and be in her presence, for her manner, appearance, and demeanor may become more potent factors in ascertaining the truth as to her understanding and freedom from restraint than mere formal answers to questions. Wester v. Hurt, 123 Tenn. This sought to avoid the effect thereof by showing on that issue, and the plaintiffs neglecting facts constituting a waiver and estop-ed to ask the court to make further findings pel on the part of the Fletchers. raised an issue of fact upon which the evidence was conflicting, the Fletchers contending that they used the gas not with the intent to ratify the lease, but relying upon the promises of the plaintiffs to have a new and satisfactory lease executed. The court found all the issues in favor of the defendants. If there had been a special finding in favor of plaintiffs on the question of estoppel, the general finding would have been narrowed down so as to appear conclusively to rest on the defense of alteration. But there is no special find 508, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 358, 130 S. W. 842, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 329. But under § 1187 of the California Code it has been held that evidence that the acknowledgment of a married woman was taken through the telephone while she was 3 miles from the officer should not be admitted to contradict the certificate, where there was no fraud and the above fact was not known to the grantee. Banning v. Banning, 80 Cal. 271, 13 Am. St. Rep. 156, 22 Pac. 210. And the grantor's unsupported testimony is not sufficient to overthrow a deed on the ground of actual nonappearance before the officer, especially where no fraud or collusion is shown between the certifying officer and the grantee. Kennedy v. Security Bldg. & Sav. Asso. Tenn. 57 S. W. 388. But in these cases, the certificate of an officer who is dead may also be considered by the jury for what it may be worth. Russell v. Holman, 156 Ala. 432, 47 So. 205. In Birkhead v. Kyle, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 301, in a mere memorandum without any statement of facts or of authority, it is said that the acknowledgment of a married woman to a deed or mortgage cannot be invalidated by proving an alibi on her part. e. Jurisdiction of officer. In many cases, the certificate has been attacked because the officer, while authorized in general to take acknowledgments in a certain territory, has, as was alleged, attempted to act outside his jurisdiction. When the jurisdiction appears in the caption, it will be presumed that the officer acted within his jurisdiction, although that fact does not appear in express terms in the body of the certificate. Douglass v. Bishop, 45 Kan. 200, 10 L.R.A. 857, 25 Pac. 628; Douglass v. Carmean, 49 Kan. 674, 31 Pac. 371; Bradley v. West, 60 Mo. 33: Sidwell v. Birney, 69 Mo. 144; People v. Snyder, 41 N. Y. 397; Sullivan v. Gum, 106 Va. 245, 55 S. E. 535, 10 Ann. Cas. 128; Bensimer v. Fell, 35 W. Va. 15, 29 Am. St. Rep. 774, 12 S. E. 1078; Doe ex dem. McKenzie v. Mosher, 15 N. B. 355. or to modify those made. They are therefore bound by the findings which the court did make. Cowling v. Greenleaf, 33 Kan. 570, 6 Pac. 907; Shuler v. Lashhorn, 67 Kan. 694, 74 Pac. 264. There was evidence sufficient to support a finding that the Fletchers were not estopped, and a finding to this effect is necessarily included in the general finding of the court, from which there is no escape for the plaintiffs. The judgment is affirmed. Petition for rehearing denied. And it has been held that the omission to state what county the officer was authorized to act within would not invalidate a certificate, for he is presumed to have acted within the scope of his authority. Deery v. Cray, 5 Wall. 795, 18 L. ed. 653; Shattuck v. People 5 Ill. 478: Livingston v. Kettelle, 6 Ill. 116, 41 Am. Dec. 166; Chamberlain v. Pybas, 81 Tex. 511, 17 S. W. 50; First Nat. Bank v. Hicks, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 269, 59 S. W. 842. It may be shown that the recital as to where the acknowledgment was taken is untrue, and that the officer actually acted outside his jurisdiction. Edinburgh American Land Mortg. Co. v. Peoples, 102 Ala. 241, 14 So. 656; Ferebee v. Hinton, 102 N. C. 99, 8 S. E. 922; Garth v. Fort, 15 Lea, 683. And it seems that such proof has been admitted in the following cases: Grove v. Todd, 41 Md. 633, 20 Am. Rep. 76; Brown v. McCormick, 28 Mich. 215; Tenn. Bostick v. Haynie, 36 S. W. 856. In Thurman v. Cameron, 24 Wend. 87, it is said that a certificate describing the proper officer acting in the proper place is taken as proof both of his character and jurisdiction, although this may be rebutted. And in Jackson ex dem. Wyckoff v. Humphrey, 1 Johns. 498, it is said that, as between the grantee and third persons, it may be shown to overcome the certificate that the acknowledgment was actually taken outside the officer's jurisdiction. But in Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Corey, 135 N. Y. 326, 31 N. E. 1095, reversing 54 Hun, 493, 7 N. Y. Supp. 939, the court refuses to extend the application of this rule to cases arising between the parties themselves. It is competent to show by the certificate of the county clerk that the one before whom an acknowledgment was taken was not at that time, so far as the county records show, an authorized officer; although not conclusive, since he may have been an officer de facto, it tends to show lack of authority. Ross v. Hole, 27 Ill. 104. It may be shown, in order to overcome a certificate, that the instrument was not signed or that the grantor was not in the officer's presence when the latter affixed |