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1. CORPORATIONS - PLEADING VERIFICATION SUFFICIENCY.-Code Civ. Proc. 1912, sec. 207, provides that verification must be to the effect that the pleading is true to the knowledge of the person making it, except when it is made on information and belief, and that, when a corporation is a party, the verification may be made by any officer thereof. In an action by a corporation the complaint was verified by the assistant district manager, who deposed that it was true of his own knowledge. Held, that as the Code does not limit the verification to any particular officer, the verification was sufficient. 2. PLEADING VERIFICATION-NECESSITY.-Where the complaint was verified, plaintiff may, under Code Civ. Proc. 1912, sec. 206, providing that when any pleading is verified, every subsequent pleading except a demurrer must also be verified, return an unverified answer. 3. APPEAL AND ERROR-REVIEW-RECORD.-The refusal of the Court to permit defendant to file his answer cannot be reviewed; the record showing no motion for leave.

Before RICE, J., Hampton, June, 1914. Affirmed.

Action by the Southern Cotton Oil Company against W. Fred. Lightsey. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Mr. B. R. Hiers, for appellant, cites: Code Civil Proc., sec. 207; 10 Cyc. 923; 5 S. E. 478.

Mr. H. L. O'Bannon, for respondent, cites: Code Civil Proc., sec. 207; 9 Abb. 104; Voorhies N. Y. Ann. Code, sec. 157, p. 311; 206 Pa. St. 372; 133 N. Y. 270; 63 S. C. 186; Cook Corp. (5th ed.), sec. 719, p. 1791; 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 683; 24 How. Pr. 92; 2 Waits Pr. 343; 14 S. C. 228; 81 S. E. 181.

FOOTNOTE.-See notes in 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135 and 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 703 as to forms of verification by corporation.

Opinion of the Court.

[100 S. C.

February 10, 1915.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GARY.

The complaint herein was upon a promissory note, and was verified by J. W. Hohenstein, assistant district manager of the plaintiff, who swore that the complaint was true of his own knowledge. That the reason the verification was not made by the plaintiff in person, was that the plaintiff is a corporation, and the deponent is an officer thereof, to wit: its assistant district manager

The defendant served an unverified answer, in which he denied the allegations of the complaint, and stated therein that the answer was not verified, for the reason that the complaint was not sufficiently verified. That the proposed affidavit of verification was made by other person than party plaintiff, and failed to set forth therein his knowledge or grounds of belief on the subject.

The answer was promptly returned with the statement endorsed thereon, that it was returned because it was not verified.

Thereafter the plaintiff's attorney gave notive that he would make a motion for judgment by default; whereupon the defendant's attorneys gave notice of motion for an order, adjudging that the defendant had answered plaintiff's complaint :

1. Because defendant answered said complaint within twenty days from service.

2. Because complaint not being properly verified, defendant was at liberty to serve an unverified answer.

His Honor, the presiding Judge, sustained the plaintiff's motion, but refused the defendant's; whereupon the defendant appealed.

The first question for consideration is, whether there was error on the part of his Honor, the presiding Judge, in ruling that the complaint was properly verified.

Rep.]

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November Term, 1914.

Section 207 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, that when a corporation is a party, the verification may be made by any officer thereof. The assistant district manager swore that he was an officer of the plaintiff corporation.

The section of the Code is very broad in its language, and does not limit the right of verification to any particular officer. The officer who verified the complaint stated that its allegations were true of his own knowledge. The complaint was therefore properly verified.

Section 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, that when any pleading is verified, every subsequent pleading, except a demurrer, must be verified also. Therefore, as the complaint was verified, the defendant's answer was properly returned for want of verification.

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The remaining question is whether there was error on the part of his Honor, the Circuit Judge, in abusing his discretion, by refusing to permit the defendant to file his answer.

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In the first place, the record does not disclose the fact that there was a motion for leave to answer.

But apart

from that fact, there is nothing in the record showing that the defendant was entitled to such right.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL.-The exclusion from the courthouse, during the trial of a bastardy case, of negroes and boys drawn thither by only prurient curiosity, is within the discretion of the trial Judge. 2. BASTARDS-TRIAL-EXCLUDING SPECTATORS.-In the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion, defendant cannot complaint that, during

his trial for bastardy, the Court excluded from the court room all negroes and boys.

3. BASTARDS-EVIDENCE-ACKNOWLEDGMENT.-An acknowledgment by defendant in bastardy, though made prior to birth of the child, tending to show his relations with prosecutrix and that he had opportunity of being the father, is admissible.

4. BASTABDS-BURDEN TO COUNTY-EVIDENCE.-It is enough, on a prosecution for bastardy, that there be facts and circumstances in evidence from which an inference can be drawn that the child is likely to become a burden to the county.

5. BASTARDS APPEAL-EXCEPTION.-An exception, merely that the Court erred in giving a quoted charge, will not be considered; it not specifying wherein the charge was erroneous.

6. BASTARDS "ACCOMPLICE"-CORROBORATION.-Prosecutrix in bastardy is not an "accomplice," whose testimony must be corrobated.

Before HON. C. J. RAMAGE, special Judge, Florence, March, 1914. Affirmed.

The defendant, Luke Adams, indicted for bastardy.

At the June, 1914, term of the Court of Sessions for Florence county the defendant was tried under this indictment. A jury was empaneled, and his Honor, Judge C. J. Ramage, upon learning that it was a bastardy case, ordered the Court room cleared of all negroes and boys. There were present the usual number of spectators. The prosecutrix and three witnesses testified for the State. Upon the indictment the jury returned a verdict of "guilty." A motion was made for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence and because the verdict was not supported by the evidence. His Honor overruled the motion and pronounced sentence; the defendant appeals there from on the following exceptions:

It is respectfully submitted that his Honor, Judge C. J. Ramage, erred and invaded the right guaranteed to the

FOOTNOTE.-See notes in 9 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 111, and 20 Ib. 632, and in 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) and 27 Ib. 487 as to right of Court to exclude the public from court room during a criminal trial.

accused by the Constitution of the United States 1, 2 and of this State, of a public trial, by putting "all the negroes and boys out of the courthouse" during

the trial.

It is respectfully submitted that his Honor erred in permitting the witness, W. W. Floyd, to testify to an 3 alleged "acknowledgment" prior to the birth of the child over the objection of defendant, because said alleged statement was made prior to the date of said birth of the child.

It is respectfully submitted that his Honor erred in refusing to defendant a new trial upon the ground that there was no scintilla of evidence that the child was likely to become a burden to the county.

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It is respectfully submitted that his Honor erred in charging the jury as follows: "I charge you that it is for you to say whether or not you will take the testimony of the prosecutrix, whether or not you will believe her. That is a matter entirely for you. I charge you that in a prosecution of any kind in a Court of Sessions the only matter is to find out what is the truth of the matter. The jury may in its discretion believe one witness in preference to a dozen. A witness in a matter of this kind does not have to be corroborated. If you believe a party is telling the truth you may accept the statement of that witness in preference to the others. ***” Mr. Early: "I would ask your Honor to charge the jury that a verdict may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of the mother." The Court: "Yes, I have already practically charged that.” Because, (a) It is reversible error for the trial Judge to charge the jury that a conviction may be had upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix in a bastardy proceeding, it being respectfully submitted that it is the duty of the trial Judge to advise the jury against a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix.

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