LANDLORD AND TENANT-Continued.
in repair during the entire term of the lease, since de-
fendant may not plead his own wrong. Id. 608.
12. Defendant may not evade liability on the legal fiction that
there was a re-entry and a re-letting at the time de-
fendant began the holding over; the tenancy being a con-
tinuing one. Id.
13. Evidence offered by defendant to show that by implication
or by verbal understanding he was relieved of the ob-
ligation to repair was properly refused, since said agree-
ment was without consideration and unenforceable. Id.
14. The question of the sufficiency of plaintiff's efforts to find
another tenant was properly left to the jury. Id.
See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (2).
1. In a prosecution for the larceny of certain automobile
tires from a railroad company's warehouse at point of
destination, evidence, held, sufficient to sustain an in-
ference that the tires were not only delivered to the
railroad company at the shipping point, but that they
were also received at its warehouse from which it is
claimed by the people they were stolen. People v. Har-
mon, 11.
2. The admission in evidence of the shipping bill, bill of
lading and the checking list, after sufficient identification,
held, proper.
3. Where the defense was that the tires alleged by the
people to have been stolen had been found by defendant
upon land leased by him, and had been removed by him,
to preserve them, a requested instruction to the effect
that under such circumstances, defendant had no duty to
inquire or search for the owner, held, properly refused,
in view of 2 Comp. Laws 1915, §§ 7446, 7450, requiring the
finder of property to advertise same. Id.
4. In a prosecution for larceny from the person, where the
complaining witness identified defendant as the one who
took his pocketbook from his pocket, a motion for a di-
rected verdict in favor of defendant, on the ground that
there was no evidence connecting him with the trans-
action, was properly refused. People v. Lowrey, 431.
See CRIMINAL LAW (16-18, 28).
LAW CASES NOT HEARD DE NOVO IN SUPREME COURT-
See APPEAL AND ERROR (13).
LEASES-See BROKERS (2); LANDLORD AND TENANT; SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE (2).
LEGAL AND EQUITABLE TITLES-See INTERPLEADER (1).
LEGISLATIVE INTENT-See MASTER AND SERVANT (4).
LEGISLATIVE QUESTION-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (6).
LESSER OFFENSES-See HOMICIDE (1, 4).
LESSOR'S REMEDY FOR ILLEGAL USE OF PREMISES-See
LANDLORD AND TENANT (4).
LEVER ACT-See SALES (3, 4).
LIABILITY FOR LOST BAGGAGE-See CARRIERS (1).
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER-See MASTER AND SERVANT (9).
LICENSE-See EASEMENTS (1).
LICENSES-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2, 3, 7).
If the agreement of the life tenant to pay the taxes and
upkeep of the premises be held to be in the nature of
a covenant, a breach thereof would not authorize a court
of equity to declare a forfeiture, nor, if it be considered
as a condition subsequent, would nonperformance work
a forfeiture, where forfeiture was not provided for in the
lease. Schuman v. Schuman, 185.
See PERPETUITIES (4); WILLS (9).
LIFE INSURANCE-See INSURANCE (1-5, 15-19).
LIMITATION BEYOND TWO LIVES IN BEING VOID See
PERPETUITIES (1).
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-See EASEMENTS (2, 4); MASTER AND
SERVANT (14, 26).
LOST PROPERTY-See LARCENY (3).
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT-See MASTER AND SERVANT (11).
1. In mandamus proceedings by the prima facie secretary of
an agricultural society to require his predecessor to de-
liver to him all the books, papers, records, etc., belong-
ing to such office, allegations in defendant's answer that
the election was fraudulent and that he himself received
a majority of the votes cast at said election were im-
material and irrelevant, and not pleadable, since the
issue thereby raised involved trial of title to the office,
which may be tried only by quo warranto. Carpenter v.
Clark, 63.
2. Failure by plaintiff to answer immaterial and irrelevant
allegations in defendant's answer did not constitute an
admission that the same were true, under the provisions
of the judicature act (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 13440), pro-
viding that all material facts stated in the return not
specifically denied shall be taken as admitted to be true.
Id. 64.
3. Mandamus will lie to compel delivery of books, papers, etc.,
to the person showing a prima facie right to the office
against one in possession other than a de facto officer
acting under color of law based on appointment or
election. kd.
4. Where a mandatory injunction was granted to a labor
union enjoining an employer from breaching a contract
to employ only union labor at union wages, the effect of
which would be to compel him to discharge 200 employees
and employ 300 union workers at union wages, mandamus
will issue to stay proceedings under the injunction pend-
ing appeal. Schwartz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 384.
5. Where the bill of exceptions erroneously settled and
signed by the circuit judge has come to the Supreme
Court upon writ of error, mandamus will not issue to
compel him to strike same from the files, but motion to
strike same from the files of this court is granted, with
leave to defendant to make such use of the writ of error
as he can without a bill of exceptions. Miley v. Grand
Traverse Circuit Judge, 416.
6. Mandamus will issue to compel the circuit judge to dismiss
an appeal by an executor from the decision and report
of commissioners on claims where no appeal bond was
filed in accordance with 3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 14152.
Jamison v. Isabella Circuit Judge, 582.
See EXECUTION (2); QUO WARRANTO.
MANSLAUGHTER-See HOMICIDE (5).
MARRIAGE-See DIVORCE (1).
MARRIED WOMEN-See WITNESSES (2).
1. If plaintiff was wrongfully deprived of his right to act as
manager and to receive compensation therefor he has an
adequate remedy at law for his damages. Palmer v.
Pokorny, 284.
2. While, in proceedings under the workmen's compensation
act, the findings of fact by the industrial accident board,
in the absence of fraud, are conclusive under section 12,
pt. 3, of the act, the Supreme Court, on certiorari, will
review such findings to ascertain whether they are sup-
ported by competent evidence or inferences fairly de-
ducible therefrom. Kirkley v. General Baking Co., 307.
3. Although the board erroneously found that defendants had
waived proof that claim for compensation was made with-
in six months of the date of the accident, as required by
the act (section 16, pt. 2), an award to plaintiff will be
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
affirmed, on certiorari, notwithstanding said erroneous
finding, where it appears by undisputed testimony that
the claim was seasonably made, and the board should
have so found; it being the duty of this court, under
section 12, pt. 3, of the act, "to make such further orders
in respect thereto as justice may require." Id.
4. Where the words, "justifiable cause," have a well-defined
meaning in this State when applied to the separation of
husband and wife, it must be assumed that the legislature
intended that said words should be interpreted and un-
derstood as so used in Act No. 64, Pub. Acts 1919, amend-
ing the workmen's compensation act, providing that a wife
is wholly dependent for support upon a husband from
whom she was "living apart for justifiable cause" at the
time of his death, in the absence of anything in said act
to show a contrary intention. Id. 308.
5. Testimony that, about 15 years before his death, deceased
husband left his home, and, without plaintiff wife's con-
sent, made his home in another city; that he visited her
occasionally for a few days at a time, at which times
marital relations were resumed; that his last visit was
made about two years prior to his death; that he brought
and sent money and provisions for her support, the last
contribution being made within a year of his death;
that plaintiff was at all times ready and willing to have
him return to her home or she to go to his home had
he so requested, held, to justify a finding by the board
that plaintiff was "living apart from her said husband
for justifiable cause," and was a dependent under the pro-
visions of the workmen's compensation act as amended by
Act No. 64, Public Acts 1919. Id.
6. Defendants' contention that the delegation of power to the
board to determine when a wife was so "living apart"
from her husband for "justifiable cause" is a delegation
of judicial power contrary to section 1, Art. 7, of the
Constitution, providing that the judicial power of the
State shall be vested in the courts, cannot be sustained,
since such quasi-judicial powers are necessary to the
board to carry into effect the purposes of the act, and the
question is controlled by the decision in Mackin v. Detroit-
Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8. Id.
7. Where an employee was injured in the course of his em-
ployment, and both he and the employer were subject to
the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, his
remedy was a claim for compensation thereunder, and he
is barred from maintaining an action at law for any
damages resulting from said injury (2 Comp. Laws 1915,
§ 5426). Oleszek v. Ford Motor Co., 318.
8. Where the immediate agency causing the death or second
injury is one which the first injury rendered it essential
to employ, the employer is liable, under the workmen's
compensation act, for the resulting death or injury. Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
9. The loss of plaintiff's leg, due to infection in a wound
received during the course of his employment, was direct-
ly traceable to the original injury, and was not an in-
dependent cause, and failure of the hospital employees to
so treat the wound as to prevent or arrest the infection
would not defeat his right to compensation under the
act, which makes it the employer's duty to provide medical
or hospital services to an injured employee (2 Comp.
Laws 1915, § 5434). Id.
10. On certiorari to review a further award to an injured
employee on his petition for review of an award under the
workmen's compensation act, the finding of the industrial
accident board that plaintiff's injuries were more serious
than had at first been apprehended, held, supported by the
record. Norbut v. I. Stephenson Co., 345.
11. Although an award to plaintiff of $1 a week for 154
weeks was paid by a lump sum settlement under the
provisions of 2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5452, the board was
not thereby precluded from reviewing said award under
2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5467, and awarding further com-
pensation on a showing that plaintiff's injuries were more
serious than had at first been apprehended, where said
lump sum settlement amounted to no more than a com-
mutation of deferred weekly payments under the second
provision of said section 5452. Id.
12. To justify an award under the workmen's compensation
act, the requirements that the accident arise out of and
in the course of the employment must both be met. Sich-
terman v. Kent Storage Co., 364.
13. Where a traveling salesman, covering his territory by
automobile, while on his way to his home city at night,
got out of his automobile for the purpose of rendering
assistance to another traveler who had met with an acci-
dent, and while on the highway was struck by another
automobile and injured, the accident did not arise out of
the employment, and an award of compensation therefor
is not justifiable under the workmen's compensation act.
Id.
14. Where, shortly after an employee was accidentally killed in
the course of his employment, a claim on behalf of his de-
pendents living in a foreign country was made by an at-
torney, and the employer answered the claim without at-
tacking its sufficiency, such claim was sufficient to stop the
running of limitations, although the authority of the at-
torney to make the claim was afterwards repudiated by the
attorney in fact of the dependents. Kottari v. Empire
Iron Co., 376.
15. Where a workman standing on a ledge five feet above
the floor fell through a hole therein to the bottom of
a tunnel 20 feet below, and was dead when picked up,
evidence supporting plaintiff's theory that death was
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