LANDLORD AND TENANT-Continued.
in repair during the entire term of the lease, since de- fendant may not plead his own wrong. Id. 608.
12. Defendant may not evade liability on the legal fiction that there was a re-entry and a re-letting at the time de- fendant began the holding over; the tenancy being a con- tinuing one. Id.
13. Evidence offered by defendant to show that by implication or by verbal understanding he was relieved of the ob- ligation to repair was properly refused, since said agree- ment was without consideration and unenforceable. Id. 14. The question of the sufficiency of plaintiff's efforts to find another tenant was properly left to the jury. Id. See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (2).
1. In a prosecution for the larceny of certain automobile tires from a railroad company's warehouse at point of destination, evidence, held, sufficient to sustain an in- ference that the tires were not only delivered to the railroad company at the shipping point, but that they were also received at its warehouse from which it is claimed by the people they were stolen. People v. Har- mon, 11.
2. The admission in evidence of the shipping bill, bill of lading and the checking list, after sufficient identification, held, proper.
3. Where the defense was that the tires alleged by the people to have been stolen had been found by defendant upon land leased by him, and had been removed by him, to preserve them, a requested instruction to the effect that under such circumstances, defendant had no duty to inquire or search for the owner, held, properly refused, in view of 2 Comp. Laws 1915, §§ 7446, 7450, requiring the finder of property to advertise same. Id.
4. In a prosecution for larceny from the person, where the complaining witness identified defendant as the one who took his pocketbook from his pocket, a motion for a di- rected verdict in favor of defendant, on the ground that there was no evidence connecting him with the trans- action, was properly refused. People v. Lowrey, 431. See CRIMINAL LAW (16-18, 28).
LAW CASES NOT HEARD DE NOVO IN SUPREME COURT- See APPEAL AND ERROR (13).
LEASES-See BROKERS (2); LANDLORD AND TENANT; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (2).
LEGAL AND EQUITABLE TITLES-See INTERPLEADER (1).
LEGISLATIVE INTENT-See MASTER AND SERVANT (4).
LEGISLATIVE QUESTION-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (6).
LESSER OFFENSES-See HOMICIDE (1, 4).
LESSOR'S REMEDY FOR ILLEGAL USE OF PREMISES-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (4).
LEVER ACT-See SALES (3, 4).
LIABILITY FOR LOST BAGGAGE-See CARRIERS (1).
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER-See MASTER AND SERVANT (9).
LICENSE-See EASEMENTS (1).
LICENSES-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2, 3, 7).
If the agreement of the life tenant to pay the taxes and upkeep of the premises be held to be in the nature of a covenant, a breach thereof would not authorize a court of equity to declare a forfeiture, nor, if it be considered as a condition subsequent, would nonperformance work a forfeiture, where forfeiture was not provided for in the lease. Schuman v. Schuman, 185.
See PERPETUITIES (4); WILLS (9).
LIFE INSURANCE-See INSURANCE (1-5, 15-19).
LIMITATION BEYOND TWO LIVES IN BEING VOID See PERPETUITIES (1).
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-See EASEMENTS (2, 4); MASTER AND SERVANT (14, 26).
LOST PROPERTY-See LARCENY (3).
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT-See MASTER AND SERVANT (11).
1. In mandamus proceedings by the prima facie secretary of an agricultural society to require his predecessor to de- liver to him all the books, papers, records, etc., belong- ing to such office, allegations in defendant's answer that the election was fraudulent and that he himself received a majority of the votes cast at said election were im- material and irrelevant, and not pleadable, since the issue thereby raised involved trial of title to the office, which may be tried only by quo warranto. Carpenter v. Clark, 63.
2. Failure by plaintiff to answer immaterial and irrelevant allegations in defendant's answer did not constitute an admission that the same were true, under the provisions of the judicature act (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 13440), pro- viding that all material facts stated in the return not
specifically denied shall be taken as admitted to be true. Id. 64.
3. Mandamus will lie to compel delivery of books, papers, etc., to the person showing a prima facie right to the office against one in possession other than a de facto officer acting under color of law based on appointment or election. kd.
4. Where a mandatory injunction was granted to a labor union enjoining an employer from breaching a contract to employ only union labor at union wages, the effect of which would be to compel him to discharge 200 employees and employ 300 union workers at union wages, mandamus will issue to stay proceedings under the injunction pend- ing appeal. Schwartz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 384. 5. Where the bill of exceptions erroneously settled and signed by the circuit judge has come to the Supreme Court upon writ of error, mandamus will not issue to compel him to strike same from the files, but motion to strike same from the files of this court is granted, with leave to defendant to make such use of the writ of error as he can without a bill of exceptions. Miley v. Grand Traverse Circuit Judge, 416.
6. Mandamus will issue to compel the circuit judge to dismiss an appeal by an executor from the decision and report of commissioners on claims where no appeal bond was filed in accordance with 3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 14152. Jamison v. Isabella Circuit Judge, 582.
See EXECUTION (2); QUO WARRANTO.
MANSLAUGHTER-See HOMICIDE (5).
MARRIAGE-See DIVORCE (1).
MARRIED WOMEN-See WITNESSES (2).
1. If plaintiff was wrongfully deprived of his right to act as manager and to receive compensation therefor he has an adequate remedy at law for his damages. Palmer v. Pokorny, 284.
2. While, in proceedings under the workmen's compensation act, the findings of fact by the industrial accident board, in the absence of fraud, are conclusive under section 12, pt. 3, of the act, the Supreme Court, on certiorari, will review such findings to ascertain whether they are sup- ported by competent evidence or inferences fairly de- ducible therefrom. Kirkley v. General Baking Co., 307. 3. Although the board erroneously found that defendants had waived proof that claim for compensation was made with- in six months of the date of the accident, as required by the act (section 16, pt. 2), an award to plaintiff will be
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
affirmed, on certiorari, notwithstanding said erroneous finding, where it appears by undisputed testimony that the claim was seasonably made, and the board should have so found; it being the duty of this court, under section 12, pt. 3, of the act, "to make such further orders in respect thereto as justice may require." Id.
4. Where the words, "justifiable cause," have a well-defined meaning in this State when applied to the separation of husband and wife, it must be assumed that the legislature intended that said words should be interpreted and un- derstood as so used in Act No. 64, Pub. Acts 1919, amend- ing the workmen's compensation act, providing that a wife is wholly dependent for support upon a husband from whom she was "living apart for justifiable cause" at the time of his death, in the absence of anything in said act to show a contrary intention. Id. 308.
5. Testimony that, about 15 years before his death, deceased husband left his home, and, without plaintiff wife's con- sent, made his home in another city; that he visited her occasionally for a few days at a time, at which times marital relations were resumed; that his last visit was made about two years prior to his death; that he brought and sent money and provisions for her support, the last contribution being made within a year of his death; that plaintiff was at all times ready and willing to have him return to her home or she to go to his home had he so requested, held, to justify a finding by the board that plaintiff was "living apart from her said husband for justifiable cause," and was a dependent under the pro- visions of the workmen's compensation act as amended by Act No. 64, Public Acts 1919. Id.
6. Defendants' contention that the delegation of power to the board to determine when a wife was so "living apart" from her husband for "justifiable cause" is a delegation of judicial power contrary to section 1, Art. 7, of the Constitution, providing that the judicial power of the State shall be vested in the courts, cannot be sustained, since such quasi-judicial powers are necessary to the board to carry into effect the purposes of the act, and the question is controlled by the decision in Mackin v. Detroit- Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8. Id.
7. Where an employee was injured in the course of his em- ployment, and both he and the employer were subject to the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, his remedy was a claim for compensation thereunder, and he is barred from maintaining an action at law for any damages resulting from said injury (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5426). Oleszek v. Ford Motor Co., 318.
8. Where the immediate agency causing the death or second injury is one which the first injury rendered it essential to employ, the employer is liable, under the workmen's compensation act, for the resulting death or injury. Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
9. The loss of plaintiff's leg, due to infection in a wound received during the course of his employment, was direct- ly traceable to the original injury, and was not an in- dependent cause, and failure of the hospital employees to so treat the wound as to prevent or arrest the infection would not defeat his right to compensation under the act, which makes it the employer's duty to provide medical or hospital services to an injured employee (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5434). Id.
10. On certiorari to review a further award to an injured employee on his petition for review of an award under the workmen's compensation act, the finding of the industrial accident board that plaintiff's injuries were more serious than had at first been apprehended, held, supported by the record. Norbut v. I. Stephenson Co., 345.
11. Although an award to plaintiff of $1 a week for 154 weeks was paid by a lump sum settlement under the provisions of 2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5452, the board was not thereby precluded from reviewing said award under 2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5467, and awarding further com- pensation on a showing that plaintiff's injuries were more serious than had at first been apprehended, where said lump sum settlement amounted to no more than a com- mutation of deferred weekly payments under the second provision of said section 5452. Id.
12. To justify an award under the workmen's compensation act, the requirements that the accident arise out of and in the course of the employment must both be met. Sich- terman v. Kent Storage Co., 364.
13. Where a traveling salesman, covering his territory by automobile, while on his way to his home city at night, got out of his automobile for the purpose of rendering assistance to another traveler who had met with an acci- dent, and while on the highway was struck by another automobile and injured, the accident did not arise out of the employment, and an award of compensation therefor is not justifiable under the workmen's compensation act. Id.
14. Where, shortly after an employee was accidentally killed in the course of his employment, a claim on behalf of his de- pendents living in a foreign country was made by an at- torney, and the employer answered the claim without at- tacking its sufficiency, such claim was sufficient to stop the running of limitations, although the authority of the at- torney to make the claim was afterwards repudiated by the attorney in fact of the dependents. Kottari v. Empire Iron Co., 376.
15. Where a workman standing on a ledge five feet above the floor fell through a hole therein to the bottom of a tunnel 20 feet below, and was dead when picked up, evidence supporting plaintiff's theory that death was
« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια » |