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himself, as the judge of all, and as their father, "shall reward them openly," and will thus give publicity to the alms-deeds, the prayers, and the fasting, which they keep secret.

SECTION III.-RIGHTEOUSNESS DISCRIMINATED AS REGARDS THE PERFORMANCE OF POSITIVE DUTY-REFERENCE TO

OUR HEAVENLY INTERESTS.--(C. d. f.)—vi. 19–21.

1. We are influenced by motives, as moral, as social, and as sentient creatures. As moral creatures we are influenced by the consideration of moral qualities—we love and hate on moral grounds, and act accordingly. The great motive or impelling affection by which we should be influenced, as being thus constituted, is supreme love to God. And, further, by the arrangements of the divine government with respect to us, we are brought under judicial treatment, which, though specially based on the moral, applies itself to the social and the sentient in the constitution of our nature. God regards us, and will deal with us, according to our deeds. In dealing thus with us, he employs to a considerable extent the judgments pronounced respecting us by our fellow-men, and their procedure towards us upon those judgments. To adapt us to the position which we thus occupy, he has formed us to pay a certain regard to their judgments, and has placed us in such circumstances that we may be materially affected by them. Being thus the subjects of moral government, and of moral government thus administered, we should have supreme respect to God-to the judgments which he pronounces, and to his visitations, and we should have respect to man's judgments, whether only pronounced or also executed, according to the importance given to them in the divine plan; but the tendency of our fallen nature is to have supreme and exclusive regard to these latter. This is the deviation from true righteousness, against which our Lord warns his dis

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ciples, in the passage which engaged our attention in last section.

2. As sentient creatures we are influenced by a regard to such things as affect, or, as we suppose, will affect us with pleasure or pain; or, in other words, to such things as we view as sources of happiness. Here the contest lies between a supreme regard to things on earth, and a supreme regard to things in heaven-the two classes of things that present themselves to us as sources of happiness. Things in heaven are the true source of happiness, and a due regard to these is the great motive by which we should be influenced as sentient creatures. The deviation from righteousness, against which the passage now under consideration is directed, is that of substituting for this motive regard to things on earth.

3. Things on earth may be viewed in their relation to our temporal wants, and, viewed in this light, we are constrained, and it is our duty, to bestow upon them a certain regard. But they may be viewed also as the source of happiness; and it is when, viewing them in this light, we labour to acquire and accumulate them, that we pursue the course forbidden in our passage that of laying up for ourselves treasures on earth. It is not, however, those only who professedly disregard things in heaven, or deny their existence, and devote themselves wholly to things on earth, that pursue this course, but also those who, though as regards their belief they own things in heaven, yet, in the meantime, and so long as they can, occupy themselves exclusively with things on earth, as the only things for which they have any relish. Multitudes attend to heavenly things as a man pays the yearly premium for the insurance of his house. He has no longing, if he is acting honestly in the matter, for the sum in which his house is insured; what he desires is, the comfortable occupation of his house uninterrupted by any casualty, and he insures only to provide against casualties; so they have no longing or relish for heavenly things,

-what they desire is, the continued enjoyment of earthly things, and it is only to provide against the cessation of the enjoyment of them that they attend to heavenly things. Such being the case, it is evident that earthly things are their "treasures," and they would confine their attention to them, but that they know their possession of them must be resigned. The attention they give to heavenly things they give not from choice but from necessity; it is only to earthly things they attend from choice.

4. Those who lay up for themselves treasures in heaven, relish and value heavenly things. They regard them as their portion; while they regard earthly things in no higher light than as necessary for their present accommodation. Earthly things are rendered necessary for them by their present wants; and it is only as being thus necessary for them that they value them; but they have a relish and craving for heavenly things, and desire, therefore, the present enjoyment of them, so far as it may be attainable, and, ultimately, the full and eternal possession of them. They view and employ earthly things as means of attaining to this enjoyment and possession. Such being the position which they assign to them, they are ready to forego or forfeit them to any extent for the sake of heavenly things. It is to the securing of heavenly things that, so far as their own advantage is concerned, their whole activity is directed.

5. The exhortation that we lay up for ourselves treasures in heaven, and not on earth, is enforced by the consideration, that things on earth are corruptible and insecure, while it is otherwise with things in heaven. Things on earth are adapted to a temporary state, and, therefore, are themselves temporary, they pass away; moth and rust assail them, and under various agencies they perish. And, even though they were not liable to present corruption and decay, the time will come when the earth and the works that are therein shall be burned up. And, further, our possession of

them is insecure. In the present state, things are not adjusted and reduced to their permanent condition. On the contrary, there is much derangement and conflict, and consequently unceasing changes,-changes for the exercise, development, and trial of character, and changes for purposes of judgment. To indicate this insecurity, our Lord refers to one of its causes,-"thieves break through and steal."

6. On the other hand, things in heaven are not perishable or insecure. Pertaining to a permanent state, they bear a corresponding character of permanency. They are not subject in any respect to a law of decay; the divine determination with respect to them is, that they shall endure for ever. And no insecurity attaches to the possession of them; in heaven thieves do not break through and steal.

7. Such are the rival and competing portions; and surely it is the greatest folly for an immortal being to choose a portion that is transitory and insecure, and to reject a portion that is stable and enduring. Nor can the earthly treasure, when it passes away, be replaced with the heavenly treasure, "for where the treasure is, there will the heart be also." Those who devote themselves to earthly things would be incapable of enjoying heavenly things, though they had unrestricted access to them. Thus, apart altogether from any positive penal inflictions, they should be miserable; their chosen portion vanishing, while they had no relish for the only remaining portion, they should necessarily endure the deep and unmitigated wretchedness of eternal destitution.

SECT. IV.-RIGHTEOUSNESS DISCRIMINATED AS REGARDS THE PERFORMANCE OF POSITIVE DUTY-DIVIDED REGARDS

IMPOSSIBLE. (C. d. f.)—vi. 22–34.

1. But, though our regard to things on earth may not be exclusive, may it not operate co-ordinately with our regard to things in heaven? This view our Lord rejects in the

passage now under consideration, as at once unsound and impracticable. If the heart bestowed co-ordinate regards on things in heaven and things on earth, its state would be attended with a practical evil similar to that which attends double vision. When the eye sees double, instead of presenting distinctly and alone the object to be examined, and directing the whole attention to it, it diverts and distracts the attention by presenting two objects. Thus the design of vision is frustrated, and, the proper organ for supplying light failing to fulfil its office, the body is in a state of darkness; its movements and operations are performed not only without the advantage of the proper guidance, but under the influence of misinformation. Where one object is entitled to the entire undivided attention, a second object is presented as having an equal claim to consideration. like manner, if the heart divided its regards between heavenly and earthly treasures, what is really, as respects our interests as sentient creatures, the object of supreme regard, would no longer be presented and viewed as such; another object would be placed side by side with it, as having independent and co-ordinate claims. Thus, a sort of double vision would arise, in consequence of which the soul would be full of darkness, and life would proceed upon an erroneous view of the bearing that should be given to its efforts.

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2. But, while this distribution of our regards, if it actually took place, would plunge us, not into the darkness of mere ignorance, but into the deeper darkness of error, and would impart to our whole course the character of one fatal wandering, the real fact is, that it cannot take place. The only allotment of our regards that is practicable, that can be maintained or even realised, is the bestowal of them on one object as supreme, and on all others that have any claim to them as subordinate. If we attempt to make two independent objects co-ordinately supreme objects of regard, the result will be that one of them will be sunk to the rank of

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