It will not affect the validity of the record of a deed, that such deed is not recorded till after the death of the grantor. Terry v. Briggs, 12 Met. 17, 23.

"By any person having authority to convey." These words "are material, and indicate the intention of the statutes that the right of the grantor only should pass by such conveyance. If the grantor had no right, then nothing would pass by the deed." Bates v. Norcross, 14 Pick. 224, 230.

By St. 1869, c. 463, s. 2, it was provided that all Indians should thereafter have the same rights as other citizens to take, hold, convey, or transmit real estate.

SECT. 2. The right of a person to erect and maintain a mill-dam on land of another is an "estate or interest in land" within the meaning of this section. Stevens v. Stevens, 11 Met. 251, 254.- Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533, 536. So of a right to flow the land of another. Fitch v. Seymour, 9 Met. 462, 466.

A mortgagee, by an oral assent to a lease given by the mortgagor after the execution of the mortgage, will not make such lease valid as against himself. Haven v. Adams, 4 Allen 80, 93.

Oral leases are not absolutely void. "They regulate the terms of payment of rent, and length of time for giving notice to quit, and are to some extent efficacious." They may also determine the time when the tenancy will expire by its own limitation. Elliott v. Stone, 1 Gray 571, 574.

On the question whether, in case of an oral contract affecting an interest in real estate, there would be any remedy by an action upon the contract, though no right to the premises, see Burton v. Scherpf, 1 Allen 133.

SECT. 3. For a consideration of the general intent of this section, see Dole v. Thurlow, 12 Met. 157, 162

An unrecorded deed made by a man before his marriage, and of which his wife has no notice, will be valid and effectual as against her claim for dower in the estate conveyed by such deed. Blood v. Blood, 23 Pick. 80, 85.

The laws requiring the recording of deeds apply to assignments of mortgages. Wolcott v. Winchester, 15 Gray 461, 463. Clark v. Jenkins, 5 Pick. 280.

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"Against any person other than the grantor," &c. It seems that an assignee in insolvency of one who is the grantor in an unrecorded deed, stands in the same position as the insolvent himself, and cannot set up a title in opposition to such deed. Stetson v. Gulliver, 2 Cush. 494, 498. See also Pratt v. Wheeler, 6 Gray 520, 523. — Audenried v. Betterley, 5 Allen 382, 386. But see, contra, Bingham v. Jordan, 1 Allen 373.- Briggs v. Parkman, 2 Met. 258.

"And persons having actual notice thereof." This clause was first inserted in the Revised Statutes of 1836, the legislature then adopting an exception which had been engrafted upon the law by judicial exposition. See Lawrence v. Stratton, 6 Cush. 163, 166, 167.

It seems that, even as against persons having actual notice, a deed must be recorded before the trial of an action brought for the recovery of the land conveyed by it. Wolcott v. Winchester, 15 Gray 461, 467.

By" actual notice" is not meant certain and positive knowledge, such as one would acquire by seeing the deed or being told thereof by the grantor, but such notice as men usually act upon in the ordinary affairs of life. Curtis v. Mundy, 3 Met. 405.

In George v. Kent, 7 Allen 16, 18, however, it was said that "The case of Curtis v. Mundy is to some extent overruled by the later cases; yet none of them hold it to be necessary that the notice shall be by actual exhibition of the deed. Intelligible information of a fact, either verbally or in writing, and coming from a source which a party ought to give heed to, is generally considered as notice of it, except in cases where particular forms are necessary.'

Prior to the Revised Statutes an implied or constructive notice was held to be sufficient, but now no such notice is of any

effect. Parker v. Osgood, 3 Allen 487, 489.- Pomroy v. Stevens, 11 Met. 244, 247. — Farnsworth v. Child, 4 Mass. 637, 639. - Marshall v. Fisk, 6 Mass. 24, 30.- M'Mechan v. Griffing, 3 Pick. 149, 154. See also Reading of Judge Trowbridge, 3 Mass. 575, 579.

Thus, the open occupation, possession, cultivation, and fencing of land by one who has an unrecorded deed thereof, will not of itself be evidence of "actual notice" of such deed. Pomroy v. Stevens, 11 Met. 244.- Mara v. Pierce, 9 Gray 306. -Dooley v. Wolcott, 4 Allen 406. But proof of such facts will be competent for the consideration of the jury, if accompanied by other evidence of actual notice. Sibley v. Leffingwell, 8 Allen 584. — Mara v. Pierce, 9 Gray 306, 307.

Nor is the fact that land is assessed to one who holds an unrecorded deed, evidence of such notice. Parker v. Osgood, 3 Allen 487, 490.

Nor the fact that the party to be affected with notice had heard a report that his grantor had conveyed all his property to another for the payment of his debts. Richardson v. Smith, 11 Allen 134.

But where A. takes a deed which describes the land conveyed as bounding" on land of B.," this will amount to actual notice to A. of B.'s unrecorded deed to such adjoining land. Pike v. Goodnow, 12 Allen 472, 474. - George v. Kent, 7 Allen 16, 18.

When the whole interest of a mortgagee in the mortgaged premises is assigned or conveyed without any transfer of the note secured by the mortgage, the absence of such transfer of the note will amount to notice, to the grantee, of a prior unrecorded assignment of the mortgage. Otherwise, however, of a conveyance or release, by a mortgagee, of a portion of the mortgaged premises to the owner of the equity in such portion. Wolcott v. Winchester, 15 Gray 461, 463.

Where a mortgagor gave a quitclaim deed of the mortgaged premises to the mortgagee, describing them in the deed as subject to the mortgage to the latter, and excepting such mortgage

under the covenant against encumbrances, it was held to be a question for the jury whether an attaching creditor of the mortgagee had, by reason of such references in the deed to the mortgagee, notice of an unrecorded assignment of the mortgage. Clark v. Jenkins, 5 Pick. 280.

Where a creditor, knowing that his debtor was making a deed of his real estate, attached such real estate before the deed was recorded, but not before it was executed and delivered, it was held that the attachment was good. Cushing v. Hurd,

4 Pick. 252.

It seems that, when one has notice of the existence of an unrecorded deed, he has notice of all its contents. George v. Kent, 7 Allen 16. Pike v. Goodnow, 12 Allen 472, 474.

If a grantee who takes with notice of a prior unregistered deed, conveys to a second grantee, who has like notice, the latter, as well as the former, is precluded from setting up his title as against the prior unregistered deed. Adams v. Cuddy, 13 Pick. 460, 464.

But though the grantee of an estate have notice of a prior unregistered deed thereof, his attaching creditor, who has no such notice, will hold the estate as against such unregistered deed. Coffin v. Ray, 1 Met. 212.

And where the title has once passed into one in whom it is valid by reason of his want of notice of the unregistered deed, it will remain valid in the hands of subsequent purchasers, even though they have full notice of such deed. Glidden v. Hunt, 24 Pick. 221, 225.- Trull v. Bigelow, 16 Mass. 406, 419. The same rule holds in the case of an encumbrance which does not appear of record. Boynton v. Rees, 8 Pick. 329, 332.

It has been held in two early cases that one, whose title is invalid as against a prior unrecorded deed of which he has notice, may, even after the recording of such prior deed, convey a good title to one who has no actual notice of such deed. Connecticut v. Bradish, 14 Mass. 296, 303.- Trull v. Bigelow,

16 Mass. 406, 418. See also Adams v. Cuddy, 13 Pick. 460, 464. Gliddin v. Hunt, 24 Pick. 221, 225. But see Flynt v. Arnold, 2 Met. 619, 624, where these decisions are doubted. The point involved in these cases is a difficult one,—for if the law be held in accordance with the above cases of Connecticut v. Bradish and Trull v. Bigelow, then one who by delay in recording his deed has enabled a fraudulent grantee of the same estate to anticipate him at the registry, will, even after the recording of his own deed, hold a title liable to be divested whenever the fraudulent grantee can find an innocent purchaser. If, on the other hand, the innocent purchaser cannot hold the estate under these circumstances, then in searching the title of an estate it becomes important to examine the conveyances made by each owner, even subsequently to the recording of the deed from him, through which the title is traced.

One whose title is voidable for the reason that he obtained his deed from his grantor by fraud and without consideration, may, after his deed has been duly recorded, convey to a party, who has no notice of the fraud and want of consideration, a title valid as against the original grantor. Dodd v. Cook, 11 Gray 495. Somes v. Brewer, 2 Pick. 184, 191.

The registry of a deed is constructive notice only to those subsequently acquiring title under the same grantor. George v. Wood, 9 Allen 80, 83.- Bates v. Norcross, 14 Pick. 224, 231.- Tyler v. Hammond, 11 Pick. 193, 216. Thus it has been held that the owner of land is not supposed to know of recorded deeds thereof made by strangers. Bates v. Norcross, 14 Pick. 224, 231. And a mortgagee, releasing a portion of the premises covered by his mortgage, is not bound to take notice of conveyances from the mortgagor recorded subsequent to his own mortgage. George v. Wood, 9 Allen 80.

Where a conveyance was made to one who on the next day, and without having had any actual possession of the estate, conveyed it to a third party, and afterwards, but before either of the deeds had been recorded, all the real estate of the