ground of enemy's property, it is conclusive, that the property belongs to enemies, not only for the immediate purpose of such a sentence, but it is binding on all courts and as against all persons. (1) And the sentence is binding, whether it proceed to condemn the ship expressly as being enemy's property, or whether such a ground of decision can only be collected from other parts of the proceedings; and this, although it appear on the face of the sentence, that the prize-court arrived at the conclusion through the medium of rules of evidence and rules of presumption, established only by the particular ordinances of their own country, and not admis. sible on general principles. (2)(a) The sentence is conclusive evidence of the points, upon which it professes to decide. (3) Thus, for example, if it proceeded upon the ground of the property not being neutral, it is conclusive against the insured, that he has not complied with his warranty.(4)(b) If no special ground is stated, and the ship is condemned generally as lawful prize, it is to be presumed from the condemnation, as no other cause appears, that the sentence (1) Kindersly v. Chase, Pak. Ins. 490. (2) Bolton v. Gladstone, 5 East, 155. 2 Taunt. 85. Baring v. Roy. Ex. Ass. Comp. 5 East, 99. (3) Christie v. Secretan, 3 T. R. 196. Fisher v. Ogle, 1 Camp. 418. Everth v. Hannam, 2 Marshall, 72. See ante, p. 267. (4) Barzillay v. Lewis, Park Insur. 469. Baring v. Clagett, 3 Bos. & Pull. 201. in an action of trover. Wheelwright v Depeyster, 1 Johns. Rep. 471. The legis lature of Pennsylvania have settled the law in that state against the conclusive. ness of the sentences of Prize Courts, further than as respects the property. (a) The depositions contained in the proceedings of a foreign court of admiralty, condemning a vessel are not evidence in an action upon a policy of insurance on the vessel. Marine Ins. Co. v Hodgson, & Cranch Rep. 207, (b) Viden. (a) supra. So, if it proceed on a ground of blockade, it is conclusive of that fact. Croudson and others v Leonard, 4 Cranch 434. And where the sentence stated a condemnation for a breach of blockade, and for other suffi cient reasons, without stating them, the Court rejected the latter words as surplusage. Baxter et al. v New England Marine Insurance Company, 6 Mass. Rep. 277. proceeded on the ground of the property belonging to an enemy; and the sentence, in such a case, has been held to be conclusive evidence, that the property was not neutral.(1)(a) In the case of Bernardi v. Motteux, (2) where there was some ambiguity in the sentence, so that the precise ground of the determination could not be collected, the Court of King's Bench considered themselves at liberty to examine, whether the ground, on which the sentence proceeded, but which was not stated, actually falsified the warranty contained in the policy.(b) Hence it follows, that it does not lie on the (1) Saloucci v. Woodmass, Park Ins. 471. 8 T. R. 444. (2) 2 Doug. 574. 3. Bos. & Pull. 215. [269] * 251 (a) Sed vide Fisher v Ogle, 1 Campb. 418. Lord Ellenborough there held that as the sentence did not say that the ship was not American, it was not to be considered as evidence of what it did not specifically affirm. A verdict having been found for the insured, the Court of King's Bench refused to grant a rule to show cause why there should not be a new trial; and Lord Ellenborough said; "I must look to the adjudicative part of the sentence, and there I find nothing distinctly stated as to the ship or her cargo not being American. Have you any case in which it was held that judges must fish for a meaning, when a sentence of this kind is produced to them? Here the foreign court seems not to have formed any settled opinion upon the subject, and not to have known or cared on what grounds it proceeded to a condemnation. It is by an overstrained comity that these sentences are received as conclusive evidence of the facts which they positively aver and upon which they specifically profess to be founded." In a case in Massachusetts, subsequent to that of Baxter v N. E. Insurance Company cited supra, a majority of the court (Parsons, C. J. and Parker J.) lay down the rule, that when it does not appear by the decree itself on what particular ground the condemnation was bad, the case is to be open to evidence, as to all the points which it may be neces sary for parties in interest here to establish, except the fact of condemnation. "Now if we look," says the Ch. J. "to the adjudicative part of the sentence in this case, we find the ship was condemned as good and lawful prize: if we look for reasons, we shall find that she was so condemned, because she had been rescued, or otherwise: that is for the reason specifically set forth, or for some other reason which is not stated. Upon the whole I think that we go full far enough in holding sentences to be conclusive, when they distinctly and specifically state the causes of condemnation: but that parties in this country, to contracts made here, ought not to be bound by a trial in a foreigu forum, in any cases, but those which come strictly within the judicial decisions upon the subject." Robinson and another v. Jones, 8 Mass. Rep. 536. Et vide Vassee v. Ball, 2 Yeates, Rep. 278. (b) Where the property was warranted neutral, and the libel stated several grounds of forfeiture, and the sentence of condemnation was general, without speeifying any particular cause of forfeiture, it was held that the assured, notwith party, who produces the sentence, to shew that it has proceeded on the ground of enemy's property; but it is incumbent on the other party, who objects to the sentence, to shew that it proceeded on some other ground.(1) Where the sentence professes to be made on particular grounds, which are set forth in the sentence, but which appear not to warrant the condemnation, the sentence will not be conclusive as to such facts.(2) Or if the sentence has not decided the question of property, nor declared whether it be neutral, but condemned the property as prize, solely on the ground that the ship had violated an ex parte ordinance, to which the neutral country had not assented, or on the ground of a foreign ordinance against the law of nations, such a sentence, though conclusive of the question of prize or no prize, would not be conclusive of the fact, whether or not the ship were neutral.(3) Lastly, sentences of condemnation in foreign courts of prize are admissible only where *such courts are constituted according to the law of nations, and exercise their functions either in the belligerent country, or in the country of a co-belligerent or al ly in the war.(4) It has, therefore, been determined, that a sentence pronounced by the authority of the capturing power, within the dominions of a neutral country, to which the prize may have been taken, is ille (1) Kindersly v. Chase, Park Ins. 490. (2) Calvert v. Bovil, 7 T.R. 523. T. R. 444. 8 (3) Pollard v. Bell. 8 T. R. 444. Bird v. Appleton, 8 T. R. 562. Baring v. Clagett, 3 Bos. and Pull. 215. Bolton v. Gladstone, 2 Taunt. 85. 95. See 2 Camph 154. (4) Oddy v. Bov il, 2 East, 473. standing the sentence might show that the property was American. Vasse v Ball, 2 Dall. 270., same case in Yeates Rep. where the libel stated one ground of forfeiture (as enemy's property) and the vessel was condemned on another ground, (as breach of blockade,) it was held that here was such uncertainty and ambiguisy that the parties might go into extrinsic evidence. Blacklock v Stewart, 2 Bay gal,(1) and consequently would not be admissible evi dence to falsify the warranty of neutrality.(u) *The sentence of any other foreign court of compe tent jurisdiction, directly deciding a question which was properly cognizable by the law of the country, seems to be conclusive here, if the same question arise incidental. ly between the same parties in this country. Thus the sentence of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, directly establishing a marriage in that country would be conclusive in any of our courts on the validity of the marriage.(2) So, where a party, having accepted a bill of exchange, drawn upon him at Leghorn, instituted a suit there, in which suit his acceptance was vacated, and upon his return to this country being sued again on his acceptance, applied to the Court of Chancery for an injunction and relief against the second action, Lord Chancellor King decided, that the cause was to be determined by the law of the country where the bill was negotiated, and, as the acceptance had been there declared void by a competent jurisdiction, he thought the sentence (1) Havelock v. Rockwood, 3 T. R. 263. Case of the Flad Oyen, 8 T. R. 270. n.(a) 1 Rob. Adın. Rep. 135. Donaldson v. Thompson, 1 Campb. 429. (a) It is not only necessary that the court should be constituted in conformity to the law of nations, but also that the subject matter should be within its jurisdiction; therefore a sentence of condemnation pronounced by a prize court, upon property lying in the ports of another nation, not an ally of the captor, is invalid, and does not work a change of the property. The want of jurisdiction, then, being an objection to the competency of the proceedings, it follows that the sentence is not conclusive as to the jurisdiction of the court pronouncing it, but that their au thority may be inquired into by another court, in another country, when called on to decide whether the right of property has been changed. Rose v Himely, 4 Cranch 211. Wheelwright v Depeyster, 1 Johns. Rep. 471. Sed vide Cheriot ▾ Foussat, 3 Binney 220., where it was held that it was not necessary in order to give jurisdiction to a prize court that the property captured should have been brought within the dominions of the captor: that seizure and safe possession are all that are necessary to give jurisdiction, and whether the possession be within the dominions of the captor, or of a neutral, is immaterial. The Court, however, expressly decided that they might inquire into the jurisdiction of the prize court, and if found to possess jurisdiction its decrees were conclusive. * 252 [270] must here also be conclusive.(1) So, on a criminal charge, as for murder committed in a foreign country, an acquittal in that country might be pleaded here in bar to an indictment for the same offence ;(2) because, says Mr. Justice Buller, a final determination in a court having competent jurisdiction is conclusive in all courts. of concurrent jurisdiction.(3) From the two last cases, the following principle seems to be properly deducible, namely, that a party, who has been once discharged from a criminal charge or a legal demand by the sentence of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, may protect himself by that sentence against any fresh suit or prosecution instituted here for the same cause. (a) If an action is brought in this country, as an action of debt or assumpsit, directly upon a foreign judgment, the sentence has been considered prima facie evidence of 253 the debt, but not conclusive.() Lord Kenyon, indeed, in the case of Galbraith v. Neville, (4) which was an action of debt on a judgment in the supreme court of Jamaica, said, he entertained serious doubts concerning the doctrine laid down in the case of Walker v. Witter,(5) that foreign judgments are not binding upon the parties here; and after referring to a case, which might (271) (1) Burrows v Jemino, 2 Stra. 733. (Bull. N. P. 215. Roche's ease, 1 Leach. Cr. C. 160. (4) Doug. Rep. 5 n. (2) and 5 East, 475.0. (b) S. C. (5) Doug. 1. (a) A vessel, having been captured by a French privateer, was carried into a port in one of the Spanish colonies, and there dismantled and abandoned. The vessel having stranded on the beach, was some months after sold at auction by the commanding officer of the port, and purchased by the defendant, who repaired her and brought her to New-York; in an action of trover brought by the original owner, it was held that the vessel being abandoned, and a wreck, and having been sold according to the laws of Spain, in cases of wreck or derelict, the property was transferred by the sale to the purchaser, who thereby acquired a valid title against all the world. Grant & Swift v M’Lachlin, 4 Johns. Rep. 34. (b) Vide Buttrick & Wife v Allen, 8 Mass. Rep. 273. 9 Mass. Rep. 464. Johns. Rep. 169. |