seem to point against his opinion, he added, "that is not an authority for saying that we can revise the judgments of the lowest courts in foreign countries, where they have competent jurisdiction." However, Mr. Justice Buller, in the same case, said, "The doctrine which was laid down in the case of Sinclair v. Fraser, has always been considered the true line ever since, namely, that the foreign judgment shall be prima facie evidence of the debt, and conclusive, till it be impeached by the other party." "As to actions of this sort," he continued, "see how far the Court would go, if what was said in the case of Walker v. Witter were departed from. It was there held, that the foreign judgment was only taken to be prima facie evidence, that is, we will allow the same force to a foreign judgment,that we do to those of our own courts not of record :(1) but if the matter were carried farther, we should give them more credit; we should give them equal force with those of courts of record here.Now a foreign judgment has never been considered as a record it cannot be declared on as such, and a plea of nul tiel record in such a case is a mere nullity. How then can it have the same obligatory force? In short, the result is this; that it is prima facie evidence of the justice of the demand in an action of assumpsit, having no more credit than is given to every species of written agreements, namely, that it shall be considered as good, till it is impeached." And, in the case of Philips v. Hunter(2), Eyre, C. J. said, "It is in one way only that the sentence or judgment of the court of a foreign state is examinable in our courts, and that is, when the party who claims the benefit of it applies to our courts to enforce it. When it is thus voluntarily submitted to our jurisdiction, we treat it not as obligatory to the extent, to which it would be obligatory perhaps in the country in which it was pronounced, nor as obligatory to the extent, to which by our law sentences and judgments are obligato (1) Acc. Ld. Mansfield in Herbert v (2) 2 H. Black. 410. in error. Coof, Willes Rep. 37. u. (a) * 254 (272) ry, not as conclusive, but as matter in pais, as a consideration prima facie suficient to raise a promise. We examine it, as we do all other considerations of promises, and for that purpose we receive evidence of what the law of the foreign state is, and whether the judgment is warranted by the law."(a) It is now fully established, that a judgment in a foreign court is only prima facie evidence of a debt, and has the force of a simple contract between the parties. But although the foreign judgment is only prima facie evidence of a debt, for which the suit abroad was instituted, yet for many purposes it will be conclusive between the parties, according to the nature of the subjectmatter and the purposes to which the evidence is applied. Thus, where a covenant had been made by the defendant to indemnify the plaintiff from all debts due from a late partnership subsisting between the plaintiff, the defendant, and a third person, and from all suits on account of non-payment, proof on the part of the plaintiff, (2) The 1st sect. of the 4th article of the constitution of the United States deelares that, "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." By virtue of the power granted them, congress, by an act of May 26, 1790, (Laws U. S. vol. 1. p. 115.) after prescribing the mode of authentication of public acts, &c. declare, that "the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from where the said records are, or shall be taken." What is the construction of this act of congress; what is the effect of a judgment in one state, when produced in evidence in another; whether it is to be received as conclusive evidence of a debt, or to be regarded in the same light as foreign judgments are by the English courts? are questions in the decision of which the. courts in different states have essentially varied from each other. Where an action was brought in the circuit court of Pennsylvania district on a judgment obtained in New-Jersey, the plea of nil debet was held bad. If the plea, says Wilson, J. would be bad in the courts of New-Jersey, it is bad here; for whatever doubts there might be on the words of the constitution, the act of congress effectually removes them; declaring in direct terms, that the record shall have the same effect in this court, as in the court from which it was taken. In the courts of New-Jersey no such plea would be sustained: and, therefore, it is înad- misssible in any court sitting in Pennsylvania. Armstrong v Carson's Eer's.. Dall. 302, that proceedings had been instituted in a foreign court against the late partners for the recovery of a partnership debt, and that a decree passed against them for want of an answer, (in consequence of which a sequestration issued against the estate of the plaintiff, and he was obliged to pay the debt,) is conclusive evidence, in an action on the covenant against the defendant, who was a party to the foreign suit, and having notice ought to have appeared and made his defence; and the defendant is not at liberty to shew, that the proceedings are erroneous.(1) (1) Tarleton v Tarleton, 4 Maule & Selw. 21. Molony v Gibbons, 2 Campb. 502. In an action of debt brought in Massachusetts, on a judgment recovered in New Hampshire, on a promissory note, the defendant pleaded, that at the time of signing the note and making the promise, he was an infant, and that during all the time between the time of making the note and promise, and the recovery of the judgment, he was an inhabitant of, and resident in, Massachusetts: the plaintif demurred to the defendant's pleas, and judgment was given against the demurrer. Bartlety Knight, 1 Mass. Rep. 401. But in a subsequent case in the same court, which was an action on a judgment in New-Hampshire, in which process had been personally served on the defendant, a majority of the court, (Parsons, C. J. and Parker, J.; contra Sedgwick, J. who relied on the authority of Bartlett v Knight,) held that the defendant should not be permitted to impeach the judgment. "Judg ments, says Parsons, Ch. J. rendered in any other of the United States are not when produced here as the foundation of actions, to be considered as foreign juðg. ments, the merits of which are to be inquired into, as well as the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them. Neither are they to be considered as domestic judg ments, rendered in our courts of record, because the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them is a subject of inquiry. But such judgments, so far as the court rendering them had jurisdiction, are to have in our courts full faith and credit. They may therefore be declared upon as evidences of debts or promises, and on the general issue the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them is put in issue, but not the merits of the judgment." Bissell v Briggs, 9 Mass. Rep. 462. The law on this subject was settled in the state of New-York, in the case of Hitchcock & Fitch v Aicken, † Caines' Rep. 460; in which it was held by three justices, (Lewis, Ch. J. Kent, and Radcliff, Js.) against two, (Livingston, J. and Thompson, J.) that a judgment in another state, in an action on that judgment, was to be regarded as a foreign judgment; and that the constitution and act of congress merely required that credit should be given to its contents, but that the effect or operation of it remained as at common law. Such a judgment, therefore, is only prima facie evidence of a debt. Taylor v Bryden, 8 Johns. Rep. 173. An action of assumpsit will lie upon it, and the defendaut may plead, whether the action be debt or assumpsit, the statute of limitations. Hubbell v Coudrey, 5 Johns. Rep. 132. But in the case of Mills v Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481. Nil debet When it is said that a foreign judgment is evidence of a debt, the rule must obviously be understood with this limitation, that nothing appears in the record of proceed ings, on which the judgment is founded, contrary to reason and justice. If the judgment, for example, should was held not a good plea to an action founded on a judgment of another state. This was a case on a writ of error, to the circuit court of the district of Columbia, in an action of debt, upon a judgment of the Supreme Court of the state of New. York, to which the defendant below pleaded nil debet. Judge Story in delivering the opinion of the court says, "It is argued, that the act of the 26th May, 1790, provides only for the admission of such records as evidence, but does not declare the effect of such evidence when admitted. This argument cannot be supported; the act declares that the records duly authenticated, shall have such faith and credit as it has in the state court, from whence it is taken. If in such court, it has the faith and credit of evidence of the highest nature, viz. record evidence, it must have the same faith and credit in every other court. Congress have therefore declared the effect of the record, by declaring what faith and credit shall be given to it. It remains only then to inquire in every case, what is the effect of a judgment in the state where it is rendered? In the present case, the defendant had full notice of the suit, for he was arrested and gave bail, and it is beyond all doubt, that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York, was conclusive upon the parties in that state. It must therefore be conclusive here also." Vide Clark's Ex'r. v Carrington, 7 Cranch Rep. 308. Hampton v Mc Connel, 3 Wheaton Rep. 234 Green v Sarmiento, 1 Peters Rep. 74 Buford v Buford, 4 Mumford Rep. 241. And in the state of New-York, in the case of Borden v Fitch, 15 Johns. Rep. 121. it was held, that a judgment obtained in the courts of another state, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit, and in which the defendant had been duly notified to appear, was conclusive in the courts of that state. A judgment obtained in another country or in another state, in a suit commenced without per sonal service of process on the defendant, is not even prima facie evidence of a debt; on such a judgment no assumpsit can be implied. Buchanan ▾ Rucker, 9 East 192. Kibbe v Kibbe, Kirby 119. Buttrick & Wife & Allen, 8 Mass. Rep. 273. Panling et ux v Wilson & Smith, 13 Johns. Rep. 192. Borden v Fitch, cited above. As where the suit is commenced by attachment on the defendant's goods, who is himself a non-resident. Kilburn v Woodworth, 5 Johns. Rep. 37. Phelps Holker, Dall. 261. Robinson v Exr's of Ward, 8 Johns. Rep. 86. And it has been held in the state of New-York that no action would lie upon a judgment obtained in another state against a person resident in New-York, in an action commenced by the service on the defendant, while in the state of New-York of a rule to show cause, such service being void, as well on general principles, as by the statute to preserve and support the jurisdiction of the state, although the rule to show cause was in the nature of a sci, fa. to charge the defendant de bonis propriis, grounded on a previous judgment obtained against him in a representative capacity. Fenton v Garlick, 8 Johns. Rep. 194. But where the defendant pleaded in an action brought in Connecticut on a judgment recovered in Massachusetts, that at the time the former suit was commenced he was not an inhabitant of Massachu setts, or resided or had property there, the plea was held bad because it did not deny notice. Smith v Rhoades, 1 Day, 168. appear to have passed against a defendant, who had not been served with process, nor had any opportunity to defend the action, such a judgment would not be enforc ed by courts of justice in this country. This point occurred in the case of Buchanan v. Rucker,(1) where it appeared from the proceedings, that the summons had been served by nailing up a copy of the declaration.on the door of the court-house; and it was adjudged, that although such might be the practice abroad, it was a practice inconsistent with all principles of justice, and that the judgment therefore could not be made the ground of an action of assumpsit. (273) SECT. III. Of Judgments in rem in the Exchequer, and by Commissioners of Excise. A JUDGMENT of condemnation in the court of Exchequer, where proceedings in rem have been instituted is conclusive evidence in any other court, as to all the world, that the goods were liable to be seized.(2) The jurisdiction of the court of Exchequer in this case is not ..only competent, but sole and exclusive: and though no formal or express notice is given to the owner of the goods in person, yet he has sufficient notice to try the point of forfeiture, by the seizure of his property, by the proclamations according to the course of the court, and by the writ of appraisement. Whether a condemnation by the commissioners of excise ought to have the same conclusive operation, as a judgment of condemnation in the court of Exchequer, has not been clearly settled. In the case of Henshaw v. Pleasance, which was an action of trespass, brought | (1) 1 Campb. 63. 9 East, 192, S. C. (2) Scott v Shearman, 2 Black. Rep. 979. By Ld. Kenyon C. J. in Geyer |