The question to be considered by the court, on motion to quash the partition, is, whether the inequality is more than can be fairly accounted for by the difference in judgment between men of discretion in valuing the property: Id.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR.

Authority to administer on a particular Estate.-The public administrator of the city and county of San Francisco can take upon himself the duties of an administrator of a given estate only by virtue of a special grant from the Probate Court, made upon a petition therefor filed in the matter of such estate. He does not, by virtue of his office, acquire the right to administer upon any particular estate: In the Matter of the Estate of Hamilton, 34 Cal.

While one administrator of an estate is in office, there is no power in the probate judge or court to appoint a new one: Id.

The order for the appointment, as provided in section 62 of the Probate Act, the qualification of the appointee, and the issuing of letters to him thereon, are all necessary proceedings to invest such appointee with the office of administrator of an estate. The appointment is in fieri until the appointee has qualified and received his letters: Id.

Under our statute, an administrator can only establish his official character, when denied, by the production of his letters with the oath of office annexed, or of a certified copy of the record thereof, made according to the requirements of section 72 of the Probate Act: Id.

RAILROAD.

Contract between Connecting Roads as to Division of Fares.-In a contract between companies owning connecting lines of railroad, for the continuous transportation of passengers and freight over both lines, it is lawful to agree upon a division of the fares, by which one company allows part of the fares earned on its line to the other company: Sussex Railroad Co. v. Morris and Essex Railroad Co., 4 C. E. Green.

Such contract is valid as to future extensions of the road, even as to such as may be authorized by future legislation: Id.

A contract made by a railroad company which by its terms includes any future extension of the road, will include in its operation not only such as were authorized by law at the making of the contract, but such as were afterwards authorized by subsequent legislation: Id.

A contract between railroad companies using the same gauge, to transport passengers and freight continuously over both lines, does not imply a contract on the part of either company that it will not change the gauge of its road: Id.

A bill for an account of fares received according to a contract previously made between the parties, is not technically a bill for specific performance so as to induce a court of equity to refuse relief on the ground that the contract is inequitable: Id.

REVERSION. See Tenant for Life.

TENANT FOR LIFE.

Waste-Sale of Reversion.-A life tenant is bound to keep the premises in repair, not excepting dilapidations occasioned by ordinary

wear and tear in the proper use of the premises: In Matter of Sale of Lands of Mary E. Steele, an Infant, 4 C. E. Green.

The reversionary estate of an infant will not be sold because there may be a great advantage in the sale to the tenant for life, when the benefit to the infant is doubtful or inappreciable: Id.

TENANT IN COMMON.

Partition between-Parol Promise to Convey.-A verbal agreement by one co-tenant with another that he will convey to him his interest in the premises, is no bar to a suit for partition: Polhemus and Wife v. Hodson and Wife, 4 C. E. Green.

WASTE. See Tenant for Life.

Injunction against Cutting down Shade-trees, &c.-The unlawful cutting down of fences, shade-trees, and ornamental shrubbery, is an irreparable injury, and, where established, will be suppressed by the preventive powers of this court: Tainter v. The Mayor of Morristown, 4 C. E. Green.

WILL.

Legacy-Chargeable on Real Estate.-Where the real and personal estate of the testator have been blended in one common fund, and the personalty is insufficient to pay debts, and the words "not herein otherwise disposed of" are added to the residuary clause, legacies will be charged upon the real estate: Dey v. Dey's Admr., 4 C. E. Green.

In determining whether a legacy is chargeable upon the real estate, the court will consider the circumstances of the testator, and the nature and amount of his property: Id.

A legacy to a widow, evidently intended by the testator to be paid to her, before the proceeds of his property were invested (in accordance with the directions of the will) for her use, will not be abated in case of a deficiency, in favor of legacies not payable till two years after the death of the widow: Id. '

Direction to sell Land-Power of Executor.-An executor has no power to sell the lands of his testator, unless directed to do so by the will, either expressly or by implication: Lippincott's Executor v. Lippincott, 4 C. E. Green.

The appointment of one as executor of a will that directs lands to be sold, does not, of itself, confer on him the power to sell. But if the executor is directed by the will, or bound by law, to see to the application of the proceeds of the sale, or if the proceeds in the disposition of them are mixed up and blended with the personalty, which it is the duty of the executor to dispose of and pay over, then a power of sale is conferred on the executor by implication: Id.

Power of Sale.-If a will direct executors to sell a certain tract after the death of a certain legatee, and contains no other power of sale, a sale in the lifetime of such legatee is void: Booraem v. Wells, 4 C. E. Green.

A direction to rent out the house and lands devised for the use of a legatee during his life, and to make such other arrangement as the executors might deem expedient for his support on the same, does not by implication give the executors power to sell: Id.

An auction sale by executors, and a conveyance in execution of it on which no money is paid, but made to carry out an arrangement in itself unlawful, will be set aside; and a conveyance without consideration to third parties to carry out that illegal arrangement, will be set aside: Id.

If a bona fide purchaser obtains title through one who buys at a sale by a trustee or executor, so conducted as to be voidable by the cestui que trust, and has no notice of the facts which constitute the illegality, his title will not be set aside, although in the deed through which he claims it appears that another tract was by it illegally conveyed: Id.

WITNESS.

Time of objecting to Competency.-Objection to a witness incompetent by reason of interest, whose interest may be released by the party offering him, need not be made at the very time of examination; but it must be made in time for the party to remove the incompetency of the witness, if practicable, or supply by other evidence the want of his testimony: Graham v. Berryman, 4 C. E. Green.

LIST OF NEW LAW BOOKS.

CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS. Published by Myra Bradwell, Chicago, weekly at $2 per annum.

DEAN. A History of Civilization. By AMOS DEAN, LL.D., late Professor of Law in the University of Albany. Vol. 1, Portr. 8vo. pp. xxiv., 695. Albany: J. Munsell. Cl. $4.

DELAWARE. Rules of Practice in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, as revised and established, at the Spring Sessions, 1868; with some approved forms of Chancery Proceedings. 8vo. pp. 110. Dover: James Kirk, Pr. 1868.

EDMONDS. Reports of Select Cases in the Courts of New York. By JOHN W. EDMONDS. Vol. 1. 8vo. pp. 631. N. Y.: Diossy & Co. Shp. $6.50.

INTERNAL REVENUE RECORD. New York: P. V. Van Wyck. Weekly, $5. LAW TRANSCRIPT. Edited by A. B. MAGRUDER. Baltimore: P. T. Eaton & Co. Weekly, $4 per annum.

MILLER. Pleading and Practice under the Code of Iowa. By Hon. W. E. MILLER. 8vo. pp. 796. Davenport: Luse & Griggs. $6.

NEW YORK. Reports of Cases in the Court of Appeals of New York. With Notes, References and Index. By E. W. KEYES. Vol. 39. Svo. pp. 724. Albany: W. C. Little. Shp. $5.

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE AND MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE. Edited by WM. A. HAMMOND, M. D. Vol. 3. No. 1. Jan. 1869. 8vo. pp. 208. New York: D. Appleton & Co. $5 per annum.

VIRGINIA. Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. By P. R. GRATTAN. Vol. 18. 8vo. pp. xxv., 1026. Richmond: Ferguson & Rady, Prs. Shp. $6.50.

THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.

MARCH, 1869.

PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT.-THE CASE OF MR. BRADLEY AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

ALTERCATIONS between judges and counsel in the conduct of a cause so rarely get beyond a momentary disturbance of the regularity of proceedings, except in petty tribunals, having no proper professional character either in their judges or their bar, that they may be best allowed to pass quietly into oblivion with the close of the day. But the case of Mr. Bradley and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has had such prominence given it by the nature of the trial in which the dispute first arose, and the unfortunate habit of the newspapers to call the court "the Supreme Court at Washington," that it is hardly proper to pass it by without some notice in a professional journal.

The facts seem to have been as follows:

On the 2d of July, 1867, during the trial of the case of The United States v. John H. Surratt, in the Criminal Court of the District of Columbia, just after the adjournment of the court for the day, a difficulty occurred between the Presiding Judge, FISHER, and Joseph H. Bradley, Sr., the prisoner's counsel. The judge's account is, that as he was descending from the bench, Mr. Bradley accosted him in a rude and insulting manner, charging the judge with having offered him a series of insults from the bench from the commencement of the trial. The judge disclaimed any intention to insult, and assured Mr. Bradley that he entertained no (129)

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feelings towards him but those of respect. Mr. Bradley, instead of accepting this explanation, or disclaimer, thereupon threatened the judge with personal chastisement.

Mr. Bradley's account differs very materially. He says that the court had not only been adjourned, but that the people had left the room, and Judge FISHER himself had gone out, but came back again for his umbrella, and, as he passed Bradley, the latter said, "Judge, what do you mean by treating me as you have done to-day?" The judge replied, in great excitement, shaking his finger insultingly in Bradley's face, and, after some altercation, the judge said, "Step out with me, step out, if you dare." Whereupon Bradley stepped towards him, but was seized by some members of the bar and held, and the judge, holding his clinched hand towards Bradley, said, "You know where to find me-I am responsible, in every form, for whatever I say or do," &c., with other abusive language.

With two such different versions before us, neither supported by the testimony of any but the interested and excited parties, it is impossible to form an opinion on the real facts as to the original aggressor, and in a question of insult, where manner and the relations of the parties are everything, it is, perhaps, impossible to do more than assume the safe general proposition that both were in the wrong.

The subsequent facts are sufficiently certain. On the conclusion of the trial, August 10th, Judge FISHER made an order reciting his version of the case as above given, and concluding with striking Mr. Bradley's name from the list of attorneys of this court. These words, as will be seen, subsequently became important.

Immediately on the announcement of the foregoing order, Mr. Bradley addressed the judge, saying, "Has the court adjourned yet?"

Judge FISHER." No, sir."

Mr. Bradley." Then, before it does adjourn, I desire to say, in the presence of this audience, that the statement you have read is utterly false, from beginning to end."

On the same day, August 10th, immediately after the adjournment, Mr. Bradley followed Judge FISHER into a street car, and handed him the following note: