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the juror withdrawn under the impression that defendant consented.) See the opinion in full, in 8 Internal Revenue Record 170.

REVENUE ACTS. IMPORTS. BOND FOR GOODS SEIZED.-The U. S. v. Four Cases of Silk Ribbon, in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (May Term, 1867), and U. S. v. 12,347 Bags of Sugar (Nov. 1868), in the U. S. District Court, District of California, were both upon motion to instruct appraisers as to the mode of appraisement of goods and to deliver to claimants on filing bond for the proper amount. In both cases, the goods while in warehouse under the ordinary bond for duties, under the Acts of Aug. 30th 1842 and Aug. 6th 1846 (9 Stat. 53, Brightly's Dig. tit. Imports, § 282, &c.), had been seized for violation of the revenue acts, under the Act of May 28th 1830, § 4 (4 Stat. 410, Brightly's Dig. Imports, § 206), and March 3d 1863, § 2 (12 Stat. 739). The questions were whether the bond required by the Act of March 1st 1799, § 89 (1 Stat. 696), should be for the full market value of the goods or such value less the duties legally chargeable thereon, and whether the value should be estimated at the time of seizure or the time of delivery. In the New York case, BLATCHFORD, J., was of opinion :

1. That the bond should be for the full value of the goods to the importer at the time of seizure.

2. That when the goods are seized in his hands after the duties are paid, their value to him is the market value, which includes the amount of duties.

3. That where the goods are seized in warehouse, their value to the importer is the market value less the duties, and for this amount the bond must be given.

In the California case, HOFFMAN, J., dissenting from the preceding decision, held that the bond must be for the full market value at the time of appraisement and delivery to claimant, without deduction for duties. (In this connection see opinion of CADWALADER, J., in U. S. v. Segars, 3 Phila. Rep. 517.)

ADMIRALTY. FORFEITURE OF SEAMEN'S WAGES FOR DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS.-The case of The Bark Almatia, in the U. S. District Court, District of Oregon (Nov. Term, 1868), was a suit in rem for seamen's wages. The facts were, that libellants had shipped for a round voyage from San Francisco to Portland-on-Wallamet and back. While at the dock at Portland, on a Sunday morning, the second mate called the men up at six o'clock, and set them to work about the ship. He then ordered them to loose and refurl the foresail. The weather was calm and dry and the foresail had been furled the Tuesday before, by order and direction of the first mate. It was then half-past eight o'clock, and the custom was to have breakfast on Sunday morning at eight. There was no necessity of refurling the sail at that time. To this order, the men replied that it was after eight o'clock, and they wanted their breakfasts. The officer immediately reported this answer to the master, who had the men called aft. On coming aft, the master asked the men what was the matter. They answered that they wanted their breakfast. To this the master replied-You want your breakfast, do you? The master then asked the men if they would furl the sail. They replied that it was after eight o'clock, and they wanted

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their breakfasts. The master then said-You refuse duty then; mind you get nothing coming to you. The men replied-We don't refuse to do duty, but we want our breakfasts. The master then ordered the second officer to go ashore and get men to furl the sail. The officer did so, but none were obtained, and the sail was not refurled until the following Monday evening. No more notice was taken of the men. direction of the master, the men were given their meals on Sunday and slept on board, but were not called out on Monday, and on applying for breakfast were refused. The men went on shore and asked the master what he was going to do with them, to which he replied he did not know them; they had taken charge yesterday morning, and he would have nothing more to do with them. The men asked if they could go ashore; to which the master said, "I don't tell you to go ashore;" and to a request for payment, he said, "No; get it out of the ship if you can." They then brought this suit, and the claimants defended on the ground of desertion and disobedience of orders. The court (DEADY, J.) held that there was no desertion, and decreed for libellants for the estimated time of the round trip and the price of passage home to the port of shipment, but deducted one month's wages from the libellants on account of their misconduct in not obeying the order to refurl the foresail. The order, he thought, was not an extreme one, and even though they felt that it was given at the time with the intention to annoy and punish them, yet the officer had a right to have the sails furled to please his eye and in accordance with his own notions of what was seamanlike, and they should have obeyed.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.1

SUPREME COURT OF MAINE.2

COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.3

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.

ADMIRALTY.

Jurisdiction.-A cause of action, to be cognisable in admiralty, whether arising out of contract, claim, service, or obligation or liability of any kind, must relate to the business of commerce and navigation : People v. Steamer America, 34 Cal.

Mode of raising issue on.-The only mode of raising issue on the jurisdiction of a state court, on the ground that the cause of action pending

1 From J. E. Hale, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 34 Cal. Rep.

2 From W. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 55 Me. Rep.

3 From C. E. Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 4 of his Reports.

4 From Hon. O. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 51 of his Reports.

therein belongs to maritime jurisdiction, is by presenting in the pleadings the essential facts showing such cause to relate to the business of commerce and navigation: Id.

Where the State is Plaintiff.-Whether a state court would not hold its jurisdiction of an action brought in the name of the People and in aid of the public revenues of the state, even though the cause of action related to the business of commerce and navigation, suggested, but not decided: Id.

BANKS.

Spurious Notes.-The defendant having, on the 1st day of July 1863, paid out to the plaintiff a counterfeit bill, purporting to be issued by another bank, and the plaintiff having neglected to return it for redemption until the 17th day of September following: Held, that if the duty rested upon the plaintiff to return the bill and notify the bank of the forgery, within a reasonable time after its discovery, the question of negligence, under the circumstances, was for the jury to decide: Burrill v. The Watertown Bank and Loan Company, 51 Barb.

Held, also, that when the plaintiff was in doubt, and had no ready means of detecting the forgery, the duty of returning the bill immediately was not absolute, although its genuineness had been questioned; and that the duty of returning forged paper, in such a case, must begin, if at all, from the time the holder has what the jury shall deem satisfactory evidence of its spuriousness: Id.

Where a person receiving from a bank a spurious note pays it out to a third person supposing it to be genuine, and the latter neglects for an unreasonable time, after being informed that it is counterfeit, to return it, the bank cannot avail itself of such third person's neglect to defeat the action of the one to whom it had paid out such note: Id.

The decision in Flowers v. Todd, 6 Hill 340, requiring a creditor who takes forged bank paper in payment of his debt to return or offer to return it to his debtor, before he can maintain an action upon his original demand, questioned: Id.

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Dissolution-Comity in Courts of another State.-The judgment of another state, decreeing a dissolution, and appointing receivers to wind up the concerns, of a corporation created by its laws, will not prevent an action commenced against such corporation here, prior to such distribution, from proceeding to judgment, unless it be shown that the corporation is utterly extinct: Hunt v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me.

It is not sufficient to show that, by the law and usage in the court of the state where such decree of dissolution is passed, such corporation is permanently dissolved, although it still has a qualified existence, capable of being a party to a judgment there: Id.

The legal authority of receivers, duly appointed in another state, is co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the court by which they were appointed: Id.

Comity does not require the S. J. Court of this state to permit receivers appointed by the court of another state to exercise privileges

detrimental to our own citizens, while pursuing appropriate legal remedies here: Id.

CRIMINAL LAW.

Party as Witness.-The Act of 1864, ch. 280, allowing a person charged with crime to be called as a witness at the trial, "at his own request, but not otherwise," is constitutional: State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. The fact that he does not testify is a proper one for the consideration of the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused: Id.

Statement of Prisoner, as evidence against him, when not voluntarily made.-Where a prisoner, accused of robbery of certain money, promised to point out the place where the money was buried, and afterwards pointed out a place at which, it was proved by other witnesses, the stolen money was found: Held, that such statement, when taken in connection with said fact and proof, was admissible in evidence against him, although not voluntarily made: People v. Hoy Yen, 34 Cal.

But when, in such case, in connection with such promise, the prisoner further stated, "I buried the money there:" held, that this was inadmissible as evidence against him: Id.

DAMAGES.

Funeral Expenses. In an action under the statute for causing by wrongful act the death of a person, funeral expenses are not recoverable, except as special damages, if recoverable at all, and must be specially pleaded: Gay v. Winter, 34 Cal.

DEED.

Alteration and Re-delivery.-A deed of warranty duly executed and delivered, but unrecorded, of one undivided half of certain lands therein described, may, by consent of the parties thereto, be altered by erasing the words "one undivided half of;" and a re-delivery of such altered deed will render it effectual to convey the whole of the premises without a re-acknowledgment: Bassett v. Bassett, 55 Me.

Reading to an illiterate Grantor.-The omission to read an instrument to an illiterate marksman renders the certificate of acknowledgment of no value as proof where the dispute is whether the paper so certified is the paper that was actually read, or whether it was correctly read to the party executing it: Suffern v. Butler, 4 C. E. Green.

Ordinarily the burden of proof is upon a party impeaching his own deed, to show that it is not his deed after it is formally proved. But where it appears beyond doubt that the grantors are illiterate marksmen, and that the deed was read to them by the grantee himself, and by him only, the burden of proof is shifted: Id.

EASEMENT. See Water Right.

ELECTIONS.

Returns not to be rejected for Irregularity not resulting in Injury.Election returns should not be rejected for any irregularity in the appointment of the officers of election, where it does not appear that any injurious results accrued therefrom, either by the reception of illegal

votes or the rejection of legal votes, or that either of the candidates lost or gained votes thereby: Keller v. Chapman, 34 Cal.

Counting Votes not cast.—It was manifest error for the county court, when trying a contested election case, to allow to one of the contestants votes not in fact received, although offered to and rejected by the election board; and this, whether the proffered votes were properly or improperly rejected: Webster v. Byrnes, 34 Cal.

EXECUTOR.

Suit by-In an action of assumpsit, brought by one who sues as administrator, the general issue admits the capacity of the plaintiff. The question of the plaintiff's capacity can be raised only by plea in abatement: Brown, Admx., v. Nourse, 55 Me.

In this state, the rule does not require that the writ should set out where, or by what authority, the administration was granted: Id.

Power of Court over.-When an executor is also trustee, and the matters in his charge as trustee can be separated from those confided to him as executor, this court may remove or supersede him as trustee, but in such case he will be left to execute and perform any duty devolving upon him as executor: Leddel's Executor v. Starr and Wife and Others, 4 C. E. Green.

In proper cases this court will enjoin an executor from proceeding further in the execution of his duties as executor, and will appoint a receiver, and direct him to pay over the estate in his hands to the receiver to be administered under the direction of the court, but in such case he is not removed or superseded as executor: Id.

Generally, a receiver will only be appointed on bill filed for that purpose, and rarely before answer, except under provisions by particular statutes. He will be appointed on petition only in the cases of infants whose position as wards of the court gives them the right to apply by petitition, or in cases similarly situated: Id.

A receiver will not be appointed as against a complainant upon the application of a defendant: Id.

EXPRESS COMPANIES. See Stamp.

Liability as Common Carriers.-An express company is to be regarded as a common carrier, and its responsibility for the safe delivery of property intrusted to it is the same as that of a carrier. It cannot by a notice, or by an exception in a receipt, which is not shown to have come to the knowledge of the shipper or holder, exempt itself from liability in whole or in part, if goods are lost through its negligence: Belger v. Dinsmore, Pres't, &c., 51 Barb.

Nor will proof, even, that such notice was brought to the knowledge of the owner, be sufficient to relieve the carrier's liability; but an express contract must be proven: Id.

Receipt limiting Liability.-An express company, sued for the value of a trunk and its contents, which it had undertaken to transport, gave in evidence a receipt given at the time of receiving such trunk, in which the liability of the company was limited to the sum of $50. There was no evidence that knowledge of the contents of the receipt ever came to

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