or was brought home to the plaintiff. Held, that a refusal by the court to submit to the jury the question whether there was any evidence of a contract between the parties, and a ruling that the receipt was a binding contract between the parties, and limited the defendant's liability to $50 and interest, for which sum, with interest, a verdict was directed, were erroneous: Id.

FRAUD.

Concealment of Facts by Purchaser of Land.-If a purchaser of land represent to the vendor that a certain mortgage is an encumbrance on the land, when it is known to him but not to the vendor that the mortgage was not as to him an encumbrance, and pays on that account so much less for the land, this is a fraud on the vendor, and such purchaser will be compelled to pay to the vendor that amount with interest: Winans v. Winans, 4 C. E. Green.

Facts set up in an answer as a justification of a misrepresentation admitted to be untrue must be proved by the defendant; the burden of proof is on him: Id.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

What is Conversion of Wife's Property by Husband. The erection of buildings by the husband on the leasehold lands of his wife, and collecting the rents, is not such disposition of them as will take away the wife's right of survivorship, and enable the husband to dispose of the leasehold estate by will: Riley's Administrator v. Riley, 4 C. E. Green.

An actual disposition by sale, lease or mortgage, or contract for such object, is necessary to take away the wife's right of survivorship in a leasehold estate. A mortgage or a sale of part, or a lease of part, or for a less term, only bars the wife pro tanto: her right of survivorship remains in the equity of redemption, and the residue of the premises or term: Id.

LIBEL.

Liability of Corporation for Acts of its Directors. The directors of a corporation are its chosen representatives, and constitute the corporation, to all purposes of dealing with others. What they do within the scope of the objects and purposes of the corporation, the corporation does. If they do an injury to another, though it necessarily involves in its commission a malicious intent, the corporation must be deemed, by imputation, to be guilty of the wrong, and answerable for it, as an individual would be in such case: Maynard v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Company, 34 Cal.

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A corporation is liable for acts done by its agents in delicto as well as contractu, in the course of its business and their employment; and the corporation is responsible therefor, as an individual is responsible under similar circumstances: Id.

A corporation aggregate has the capacity to compose and publish a libel, and by reason thereof, when done, becomes liable to an action for damages by the person of and concerning whom the words are composed and published: Id.

LICENSE. See Water Right.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Suit in one State on Note barred in another.-The Statute of Limitations is no bar to an action in this state, upon a promissory note made in another state, when the defendant has not resided here since the note was given: Brown v. Nourse, 55 Me.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Estoppel.—A person, arrested on a special writ, subsequently and for the purpose of procuring his discharge, paying under protest a portion of the sum claimed in the writ, is not thereby estopped from showing, in the trial of an action for malicious prosecution, the want of probable cause in the original suit: Morton v. Young, 55 Me.

MORTGAGE. See Vessel.

Right of Tenant for Years to redeem.-A tenant for years who offers to pay off a mortgage-debt has the right to redeem. Like a second mortgagee or judgment-creditor having a right to redeem, he has not perhaps strictly the right to demand a written assignment of the bond and mortgage, but he stands by redemption in the place of the mortgagee, and will be subrogated to his rights against the mortgagor and the reversioner. He has the right to have the bond and mortgage delivered to him uncancelled, which, in such a case, is in equity, and may be at law, a complete assignment: Hamilton v. Dobbs, 4 C. E. Green.

PARTNERSHIP.

Account. A partner bound to account, must give a clear, distinct, and intelligible statement of the results of the business, referring also to particular books, and to the page if necessary, so that a party entitled thereto may inquire into and investigate its correctness. A reference to the books of the concern generally, and to former accounts, is not sufficient: Gordon's Adm. v. Hammell, 4 C. E. Green.

RAILROAD COMPANY.

Tender of Fare. In actions for a breach of duty by a railroad company in not conveying a passenger, it is not necessary for plaintiff to allege in complaint a strict legal tender of his fare: Tarbell v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 34 Cal.

It is sufficient to allege that plaintiff was ready and willing and offered to pay such sum of money as the defendant was legally entitled to charge. The transportation and payment of the fare are contemporaneous acts: Id.

If the passenger is ready and willing and offers to pay the legal fare when demanded by the conductor of the train, the railroad company is bound to carry him, provided there is room in the cars and the passenger is a fit person to be admitted: Id.

Rule of Damages for Injuries to Land by diversion of Water.-In an action to recover damages for injuries done to the plaintiff's premises by the diversion of a stream from its channel by the defendant, in constructing a culvert, the legal rule of damages has no reference to the cost of removing a bar of gravel carried there by a flood. The measure of damages, in that class of cases, is the depreciation in the value of the plaintiff's premises occasioned by the injury resulting from the

defendant's acts: Easterbrook v. The Erie Railroad Company, 51 Barb.

In a case where the deposit is comparatively extensive, and the cost of removing it would probably equal if not greatly exceed the value of the soil covered by it, the rule contemplates that the material deposited by the flood is to remain upon the land; and one of the items of damage is the depreciation in the value of the land in consequence of its remaining. The owner of the land is therefore under no obligation to remove the gravel so deposited by reason of his having received compensation for his damages from the wrongdoer; nor does he incur any peril, in a legal sense, by suffering it to remain: Id.

Hence his negleet to remove such gravel bar will not preclude an action by him for damages done by a subsequent flood, in consequence of the improper and unskilful location and construction of the culvert by the defendants; although such gravel bar may have had some effect in deflecting the course of the flood. The case will be the same in that respect as if the flood had been thus diverted by the natural formation of the surface of the plaintiff's land, or as if the bar had been deposited there before the culvert was made: Id.

RECORDS.

Of Public Office of another State. The records in public offices of other states of matters which are not judicial proceedings, may be proved by a sworn copy or by certificate, according to the Act of Congress. But when received, their effect is the same as in the state of which they were records. That effect must be shown by proving the law of such state upon the subject; it cannot be presumed: Condit v. Blackwell, 4 C. E. Green.

STAMPS.

On Express Company's Receipt.-A receipt, such as is usually given by express companies for goods delivered to them for transportation, is not subject to any stamp duty, but is covered by the exception in the Act of Congress of 1865: Belger v. Dinsmore, Pres't, &c., 51 Barb.

Stamp on Note.-An internal revenue stamp is no part of the note, and a demurrer will not lie to a complaint which fails to aver that the note was duly stamped: Hallock v. Jaudin, 34 Cal.

In order to defeat a recovery on an unstamped note, it must appear that the stamp has been fraudulently omitted: Id.

STREAM. See Railroad Company.

SURETY.

Water Right.

Signing of Note does not make Joint Liability.-Two or more persons severally signing a promissory note as sureties do not thereby incur a joint liability: Bunker v. Tufts, 55 Me.

Such sureties cannot maintain a joint action on the case against a person who subsequently "aids or assists" their principal "in a fraudulent transfer or concealment of his property, to secure it from creditors," although, after such conveyance, they became joint creditors by the joint payment of said note: Id.

When several sureties pay the debt of their principal, and there is no

evidence of a partnership or joint interest, or of payment from a joint fund, the presumption of law is that each paid his proportion of the debt: Id.

TENANT FOR LIFE. See Trust.

TOW-BOATS.

Owners not Carriers.-The owners of a steamboat employed in the business of towing boats for hire are not common carriers, and hence not insurers. But they are liable if guilty of gross carelessness, if not for a failure to exercise ordinary care in the management of the steamer and the boats towed: Wooden v. Austin, 51 Barb.

Liability of Owners.-A provision in a contract for towing that the boat shall be towed "at the risk of the master and owner" of such boat, refers to the perils of navigation simply, and cannot properly be construed to excuse the negligence of the proprietors of the towing vessel, or those in charge thereof: Id.

Parties undertaking to tow a boat from one place to another are bound to do so, unless prevented by causes to which at least gross negligence on their part does not contribute: Id.

The defendants agreed to tow the plaintiff's boat from Albany to New York. After proceeding three or four miles the defendant's hawser broke, and set the plaintiff's boat, with others, adrift, which floated down the river some 14 miles, without any attempt to regain it. There was no explanation offered in respect to the strength of the hawser, or the immediate cause of its breaking, or in regard to the management of the steamer, or why an effort was not made to again take the plaintiff's boat in tow; although there was evidence to the effect that there was no difficulty in the steamer taking the entire tow through to New York. In an action against the defendants for damages occasioned by their negligence: Held, that the plaintiff was improperly nonsuited: Id.

TROVER. See Vessel.

What is Conversion.-A person is guilty of a conversion who sells the property of another, without authority from the owner, notwithstanding he acts as the agent or servant of one claiming to be the owner, and is ignorant of his principal's want of title: Kimball, Exec'x., v. Billings, 55 Me.

And it is no defence to an action of trover that the property sold was government bonds payable to bearer, provided the principal was not the bona fide purchaser.

TRUST.

Capital and Income of Stock Dividends.-Where trust-funds, of which the income, interest, or profits are given to one person for life, and the principal bequeathed over upon the death of the life tenant, are invested either by the trustce or at the death of the testator in stock or shares of an incorporated company, the value of which consists in part of an accumulated surplus or undivided earnings laid up by the company, such additional value is part of the capital. This, as well as par value of the shares, must be kept by the trustee intact for the benefit of the remainder man; but the earnings on such capital, as well as upon the par value of the shares, belong to the life tenant: Van Doren v. Van Doren's Trustee, 4 C. E. Green.

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When an extra dividend is declared out of the earnings or profits of such company, such extra dividend belongs to the life tenant, unless part of it was earnings carried to account of accumulated profits or surplus earnings at the death of the testator or at the time of the investment, if made since his death, in which case so much must be considered as part of the capital: Id.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Forfeiture. When the time for payment of the purchase-money has been extended with the assent of the vendor, and no certain time fixed when payment will be required, the vendor cannot afterwards forfeit the contract by requiring immediate payment; but the vendee is entitled to a reasonable time, after notice, to make his payment: Cythe v. La Fontain, 51 Barb.

It seems that the vendor may deprive himself of the right to exact a forfeiture, by afterwards refusing to accept payment upon another and untenable ground: Id.

Rescinding Contract.-On a sale of a quantity of wood, the purchaser, after he had drawn away a portion, discovered that the quality of a part of the wood was different from what the contract called for: Held, that he could not rescind the contract of sale, except by restoring, or offering to restore, what he had received under it: Woodruff v. Peterson, 51 Barb.

Recoupment by Purchaser.-On an executory contract of sale, the vendee, if he keeps the article, may, it seems, recoup his damages, in case of fraud, but not for breach of contract: Id.

Fraudulent Representation.-An unconditional delivery of goods without payment, at a cash sale, does not pass the title, and bind the sale as to a purchaser upon false and fraudulent misrepresentations : Hicks & Hathaway v. Campbell and Others, 4 C. E. Green.

VESSEL.

Registration and Mortgage of-By virtue of the Constitution of the United States, Congress has the exclusive power to provide where the evidences of title of registered and enrolled vessels, in certain cases, shall be recorded: Wood v. Stockwell, 55 Me.

The state legislature has no authority, directly or indirectly, to add to or dispense with the requirements of section 1 of the Act of Congress of July 29th 1850, entitled an "Act to provide for recording the conveyances of vessels:" Id.

R. S. c. 91, § 1, providing for the registration of chattel mortgages, does not apply to property in vessels which are duly registered or enrolled according to the laws of the United States: Id.

The plaintiff, as mortgagee of one-eighth of a vessel, demanded it of the assignee of the mortgagor, who refused to comply, denying title in the plaintiff, and claiming title in himself. The defendant, both before and after the demand, received one-eighth of the net earnings and had paid one-eighth of the repairs. In trover: Held,

1. That the foregoing facts constitute a conversion.

2. That the amount paid for repairs should not be deducted in mitigation of damages: Id.