it aspired to nothing else, it was certainly of a most uncommon and unrivalled character.

But the general style of argument in this court is losing much of that conversational air which gave it such a charm thirty years ago, and which still prevails, to a great extent, in Westminster Hall. The present style of forensic debate there is more like that of Pinkney, and Emmett, and Lowndes, than the school that followed these great masters of forensic eloquence, which was far less ornate and discursive. Each has its advantages and its followers. But the present style of forensic debate in America is rather French than English, and is based, perhaps, somewhat upon Rufus Choate's theory, that if you would move the court and jury, you must first electrify the bystanders, and the audience generally.

But we are very far from any assurance that the ablest, and purest, and most learned courts, and the judges of this court possess all these qualities in an eminent degree, are sure to be. most effectually convinced, upon a great constitutional question, by merely dry legal views. There was something so stirring in the many eloquent illustrations and appeals of the Attorney-General, that we could not but feel that very likely they would effect a lodgment in the sternest legal minds, where no force of pure cold logic could reach. We believe the ablest, and most experienced, and learned judges are more frequently induced to reconsider a over-established opinion, upon the force of a pertinent illustration, or an argument ab inconvenienti, or the reductio ad absurdum, than by any amount of mere deductive reasoning. But it is fair to say that, taking the pure legal view of Mr. Curtis, and the mixed legal and practical view of the Attorney-General, there was nothing more to be desired on that side.

The argument upon the other side was considerably weakened in its force, upon the general question of the validity of the legal tender clause in the act, by the fact that the validity of gold contracts, under the law, was also involved in the cases, and this of course caused considerable diversion and consequent loss of force upon the main issue. One of the speakers, too,-whose argument was in the main very able and happy,- -we are bound to say fell into the common fault of diffuse and ready speakers generally, of loading his argument with an infinite number of illustrations, drawn from every source of supposed analogy, many of which were far more doubtful than the main proposition, thus dividing

attention of the court and dissipating the intrinsic force of his argument. Mr. Townsend, whose case was that of a gold contract, in terms, made a very close and learned argument, which we should be surprised to have overruled by the court, even if they maintain the entire validity of the act. Having spoken so much at length upon the argument in these cases, we shall be able to say less in regard to the questions involved than we had desired, or intended. But we shall present a brief resumé of the points, not much relied upon in the argument before the court, but which appear to us worthy of consideration.

The argument against the validity of the act seems to be placed largely upon the injustice and severity of its operation upon past transactions. This argument, as it seems to us, is completely answered by the consideration that the validity of an act of legislation does not, in any sense, depend upon its innate wisdom or justice. Where the power of legislation exists, it is equally operative, whether its exercise be wise or unwise, just or unjust. And the same injustice is confessedly within the power of Congress, in regard to the currency, by debasement of the metallic coinage as by issuing bills of credit. The Acts of Congress have more than once lowered the standard of the established coinage, and thus lessened the amount of standard gold or silver which subsisting contracts would require for their performance. And if this can be done in a small degree, it can equally be done to any extent which the government shall deem expedient, and thus effect the same depreciation complained of by making legal tender notes, so that this argument is thus effectually answered. It is a power which the National Legislature always possesses, and may

exercise at will.

Again, much stress is often placed upon the historical fact that it was proposed in the convention framing the Constitution to give the express power to the National Government to issue bills of credit, and that this was not accepted, or, as it is called, was rejected. Now this is not by any means the same thing as if the power to make the Constitution had resided in the convention. It is not the same as if the proposition to emit bills of credit had been submitted to the people and rejected. The most that can fairly be argued from this fact is, that the convention could not agree to submit to the people any express provision to enable the National Government to issue bills of credit. If this

had been done, it must have been accepted in that form, or the whole Constitution would have been rejected. This might have been the prevailing reason which induced the convention not to embrace that specific provision in the frame of government submitted. It merely shows then, that, for some reason, the convention could not agree to submit that express provision.

But it by no means leaves the Constitution, as adopted, subject to any implications against the provision being virtually implied in what was submitted and adopted, because this express provision was not embraced in it. The people had no knowledge of the discussions of the convention, or of the propositions discussed by it and not embodied in the Constitution, but acted upon the document as presented to them; and it is therefore fairly entitled to receive its construction upon what appears in it, without reference to any discussions or propositions before the convention, and which did not result in any affirmative action. It is much like the case of a contract, since the passing of the Legal Tender Act, in which the parties, in their preliminary action, had attempted to define the currency, either gold or greenback, in which it should be payable, but could not agree, and therefore left it to legal implication. There would surely be no ground of argument, in such a case, that the parties had virtually fixed the currency in which payment should be made, or that because the parties failed to agree either upon gold or currency, both must be excluded. No principle of legal construction is more familiar, than that none of the preliminary negotiations can be received or considered in fixing the construction of the contract. And the same is true in regard to any written instrument, whether a contract, a testament, or a constitution. Each must speak by its own words, construed with reference to its subject-matter and the purpose of its creation.

If then the United States Constitution, like ordinary written instruments, is entitled to be construed by its language, with reference to those allowable aids to which resort is always made in such cases, we shall find less embarrassment in reaching a satisfactory conclusion than if we were compelled to regard the views of the framers or of the people, then or now, or any other outside influences, in the matter. No doubt tradition, or contemporary history, may, in many instances, afford great aid in learning the import of terms, or the general purpose and intent of an act or instrument, or contract.

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In that view the known and declared facts recited in the amble of the Constitution, wherein the transaction is declared to be the work or act of the people of the whole United States, is a very significant intimation that the purpose was to create a national sovereignty, and not a mere confederation among the states. The other portions of the preamble look in the same direction. To form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," are all objects not to be expected from any thing less than the establishment of a national and consolidated sovereignty.

Then the general frame of the instrument shows that the new government was expected to embrace all the important, certainly all the indispensable, powers and functions of national sovereignty, and that it was to be automatic, possessing all the functions and resources of sovereign states, viz., executive, legislative, and judicial.

As showing too the paramount and supreme power of the newly-created national government, the national judiciary is given the supreme function of defining and measuring all the national powers, and at the same time of defining and measuring the powers reserved to the several states under the National Constitution, by allowing writs of error to the highest judicial tribunal in the state from the Supreme Court of the nation in all matters affecting any power or function derived from or under any Act of Congress or the National Constitution, or where it was claimed that any conflict had arisen in regard to the validity of any state law by reason of its conflict with the powers and functions of the national government under its Constitution, and the decisions of the state court had been adverse to the national claim of authority.

Under such a distribution of the powers of sovereignty, it would be natural to find that the power of making money and declaring the value of the same should be reposed in the national government, as a clearly national function. This we do find to be the fact, either fully or subject to limitations. There can be no doubt that before creating the national sovereignty the general and unlimited power of making money, in all modes known to the law of free states, did exist in the fullest possible form in each of the

states. And although the history of free states shows, that for commercial purposes a circulating medium of the precious metals is regarded as the most desirable, and the only desirable one, yet it is certain this has never been regarded as the exclusive currency of even commercial states. Almost all the European states have, in emergencies of great pressure, during war or in other great commercial crises, resorted to the issue of national bills of credit, by declaring them part of the money or circulating medium of the country. This question was incidentally involved in a recent case in the English courts of equity, where the Emperor of Austria sought to enjoin Louis Kossuth and one Day, the manufacturers, from preparing and issuing bills of credit in the name of the kingdom, or the king, of Hungary. No question seems there seriously to have been made by counsel or entertained by the court but that such bills, when lawfully issued, would constitute a portion of the lawful money of the empire: Emperor of Austria v. Kossuth et al., 7 Jur. N. S. 483, before V. C. STUART; s. c. before Court of Ch. Appeal, Id. 639; 2 Story Eq. Ju. § 951 e.

It is declared in Craig v. State of Missouri, 4 Pet. 410, and is a fact in history familiarly known, that the states, before the adoption of the Constitution, had repeatedly exercised the power of issuing bills of credit and declaring them lawful tender for private debts, that is, making them lawful money. The confederacy, before the adoption of the Constitution, possessed no power over the subject of lawful tender, and were compelled to, as they repeatedly did, appeal to the states to declare the national bills of credit lawful tender.

This was one of the defects in the national authority, which it was the purpose of the Constitution to remedy. This was done by prohibiting the states from coining money or issuing bills of credit, or making any thing but gold and silver a tender for private debts. This in effect took from the states all power over the subjects, both of making money and declaring legal tender. This seems to be so regarded by Ch. J. MARSHALL, in Craig v. Missouri, supra, where he shows very clearly that both these functions are prohibited to the states. This must be so if the states could neither coin money or issue bills of credit, since this covers the whole subject of tender laws. And accordingly we find that Congress has always controlled the subject of tender since the adoption of the Constitution, and the states have never attempted to interfere. This, of itself, is such a practical construction of the