it would not follow, as contended by the counsel, that actual locomotive intercourse was necessary in order to affect the contract between these parties. Such actual locomotive intercourse accomplished or attempted, would doubtless be necessary, as under the general law of war, to subject property to forfeiture. But the prohibition of intercourse thus made by Congress, must be construed with reference to the object it was designed to effect, and so enforced as to accomplish the policy on which it was founded. It was obviously dictated by the same policy and designed to effect the same ends as the like prohibition in the international law, and any contract which would be regarded as a violation of the one, ought to be regarded as a violation of the other. But even if this Act of Congress did not operate as a law to the parties to this suit, at the date of their contract, I apprehend that no court of the United States or of a state should lend its aid for the enforcement of a contract, made in violation of the policy of that act. This court must deal with this case just as a court of the United States would deal with it.1

The argument that Billgery had a right, which was guaranteed to him by the Constitution, to go to New Orleans at his pleasure, which was only suspended by the war, seems to me to have no force. The suspension was accompanied by an absolute interdict of all commercial intercourse in the mean time, and a consequent disability to enforce any contract made during the war, which

Note by Judge Joynes.-Substantially the same question involved in this case was decided by Chief Justice CHASE, in the Circuit Court, at Richmond, June 1868, in the case of Moore & Bro. v. Foster & Moore, of which I have obtained an authentic account since this opinion was delivered.

The action was brought to recover the amount of certain negotiable notes. The defendants pleaded payment and accord and satisfaction, and to sustain their defence gave in evidence a draft drawn by the Bank of North Carolina, at its branch in Winslow, in that state, on the branch of the Bank of Virginia at Portsmouth, bearing date the 10th day of December 1862, which draft, it was contended, was delivered by the defendants to the plaintiffs, and accepted by them in payment of the debt. At the date of the draft, Portsmouth was in the permanent occupation and control of the forces of the United States, but the condition of Winslow in that respect was a subject of dispute. The Chief Justice instructed the jury, "that if they should find that Winslow was not, at the time of the making and issuing of the draft, in the occupation or control of the national forces, then the draft in controversy, being an act of prohibited commercial intercourse, was not valid negotiable paper." Whether Winslow was so occupied or controlled, he left to the jury.

tended to produce a violation of that interdict. The interdict was as absolute, while it lasted, and as fatal to all contracts in violation of its policy, as if it had been perpetual, or as if there had been no such general right of intercourse under the Con

stitution.

It was argued, too, that Billgery might have intended to keep these checks until it should become lawful to present them for payment, and that the court ought rather to presume a lawful than an unlawful intent. I doubt whether a party who makes a contract during war, which, upon its face, and according to the usual intent and import of such contracts, is a violation of the policy of non-intercourse, ought to be allowed to say that he did not design any such violation. It would be difficult to determine whether such an averment was founded in truth, and to permit such defences to be alleged, would cripple the efficiency of the rule, which, we are told, admits no exception (6 Wallace R. 535), and which declares "a strict and rigorous" policy, which no artifice is permitted to evade.

But what are the facts? Billgery parted with his money to Branch & Sons, in February 1863. He would necessarily lose interest until he could collect the money on the checks. He has been examined as a witness, as have also the only two of the defendants who were cognisant of the transaction. Neither of them testifies that there was any understanding or expectation that the presentment of the checks would be withheld, much less any contract that they should be withheld until it should be lawful to present them. On the contrary, John P. Branch, who conducted the transaction with Billgery, shows his understanding and expectation, when he says that he "judged Billgery to be a blockaderunner." And not only does Billgery nowhere say that there was any understanding with Branch, or any intention on his own part, that presentment would be delayed, but he admits that after he bought the checks, he tried to find somebody by whom he could send them to New Orleans for collection, but could not. The checks indeed seem to have remained in Virginia from August 1862, when they were drawn, to February 1863, when they were sold to Billgery. But that fact throws no light on the contract between Billgery and Branch & Sons. It may be accounted for by supposing that nobody had been found, in that interval, who wanted funds in New Orleans, or who would pay enough for them.

When we remember how much activity and enterprise were displayed during the war in "running the blockade," and the large profits that were made by it, we should require pretty strong proof to convince us that a party who drew a sight draft on a point where Federal money was to be had, contemplated that it would be withheld from presentment for the indefinite period of the war, or that a party who laid out a large sum in the purchase of such a draft, intended so to withhold it.

It follows from these views that, upon the evidence, judgment was properly rendered for the defendants. They also show that the demurrers to the special counts were properly sustained. Each of these counts sets out the drawing of a check by a bank in Richmond upon a bank in New Orleans, and the endorsement of the check by the defendants to the plaintiff, at periods when we know that the war was flagrant, and all commercial and other intercourse between Richmond and New Orleans were unlawful.

But even if the contract could be held valid, there is another ground which is fatal to the case of the plaintiff, both upon the pleadings and the evidence. In order to charge the defendants as endorsers, it was necessary that the checks should he presented to the Canal Bank, and payment thereof demanded, and, in case of dishonor, that due notice thereof should be given to the defendants. The only presentment and demand set out in the pleadings, or proved by the evidence, were made on the 27th day of October 1863, when all commercial intercourse between Vicksburg, where the plaintiff resided, and New Orleans, where the checks were payable, was unlawful. By the proclamation of the President dated August 16th 1861, prohibiting intercourse with the states in rebellion, an exception was made of "such parts of states as may be from time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the United States engaged in the dispersion of the insurgents." This exception is set out in the amended declaration and was relied on in the argument, as authorizing Billgery to go to New Orleans after the fall of Vicksburg. But this exception was repealed by the proclamation of April 2d 1863. That proclamation declared the same states to be in insurrection, and revoked all the exceptions made in the former proclamation, but again made certain local exceptions, of which "the port of New Orleans" was one. This proclamation declares "that all commercial intercourse not licensed and conducted as is provided in said act, between the said states

and the inhabitants thereof, with the exceptions aforesaid, is unlawful, and will remain unlawful until such insurrection shall cease or has been suppressed, and notice thereof has been given by proclamation." Vicksburg was not excepted from the operation of this proclamation, so that commercial intercourse, except with the license of the President, between Vicksburg and New Orleans was unlawful at the time at which presentment of these checks was made. The license given to Billgery by the military authorities was a nullity: Ouachita Cotton, 6 Wall. R. 521. The demand. of payment, therefore, which was made, was one which the plaintiff could not lawfully make, and which the Canal Bank could not lawfully comply with. A demand to charge the endorsers should have been one which the Bank might lawfully have complied with.

In respect to the question of notice of dishonor, very little need be said. To give any effect to the notice deposited in the postoffice in New Orleans in October 1863, it should at least have been shown that the law, or a general usage, required that the letter containing the notice should be preserved by the postmaster until the restoration of intercourse, and then forward it to its destination. In the absence of such proof, the deposit of a notice in the post-office at New Orleans, addressed to Petersburg, in the midst of the war, was of no avail. It is not necessary to express an opinion as to whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that due notice was given to the defendants after the close of the war. Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the judgment ought to be affirmed.

MONCURE, P., concurred.
RIVES, J., dissented.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

EMMA SCHNEIDER v. THE PROVIDENT LIFE INSURANCE CO. An "accident" within the meaning of a policy of insurance means an event which happens from some external violence or vis major, and which is unexpected, because it is from an unknown cause, or is an unusual result of a known cause. Negligence of the person injured does not prevent it from being an accident. Therefore in an action on a policy of insurance against accident, the negligence of the insured is no defence.

A policy of insurance against accident contained a clause against liability for

injury resulting from the assured "wilfully and wantonly exposing himself to any unnecessary danger." The assured attempted to get on a train of cars while in slow motion, and fell and was killed. Held, that the negligence was not wilful or wanton, and the company were liable.

THIS was an action on a policy, by which Bruno Schneider was insured against injury or death by accident. The policy contained a clause that the company should not be liable for any injury happening to the assured by reason of his "wilfully and wantonly exposing himself to any unnecessary danger or peril."

The assured attempted to get on a train of cars after it had started, but was moving slowly, but fell and was killed. On the trial the plaintiff was nonsuited, on the ground that the evidence showed the case to be within the exception as to wilful exposure to danger.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PAINE, J.-The position most strongly urged by the respondent's counsel in this court, was that inasmuch as the negligence of the deceased contributed to produce the injury, therefore the death was not occasioned by an accident at all, within the meaning of the policy. I cannot assent to this proposition. It would establish a limitation to the meaning of the word "accident" which has never been established either in law or in common understanding. A very large proportion of those events which are universally called accidents happen through some carelessness of the party injured, which contributes to produce them. Thus men are injured by the careless use of firearms, of explosive substances, of machinery, the careless management of horses, and in a thousand ways, when it can readily be seen afterwards that a little greater care on their part would have prevented it. Yet such injuries having been unexpected and not caused intentionally or by design, are always called accidents, and properly so. Nothing is more common than items in the newspapers under the heading, "Accidents through carelessness.'

There is nothing in the definition of the word that excludes the negligence of the assured party as one of the elements contributing to produce the result. An accident is defined as "an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an event which proceeds from an unknown cause; or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and therefore not expected."