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An accident may happen from an unknown cause. But it is not essential that the cause should be unknown. It
may unusual result of a known cause, and therefore unexpected to the party. And such was the case here, conceding that the negligence of the deceased was the cause of the accident.
It is true that accidents often happen from such kinds of negligence. But still it is equally true that they are not the usual result. If they were, people would cease to be guilty of such negligence. But cases in which accidents occur are very rare in comparison with the number in which there is the same negligence without any accident. A man draws his loaded gun toward him by the muzzle—the servant fills the lighted lamp with kerosene, a hundred times without injury. The next time the gun is discharged, or the lamp explodes. The result was unusual, and therefore unexpected. So there are undoubtedly thousands of persons who get on and off from cars in motion without accident, where one is injured. And therefore when an injury occurs it is an unusual result, and unexpected, and strictly an accident. There are not many authorities on the point. The respondent's counsel cites Theobald v. The Railway Passengers' Assurance Co., 26 E. Law & Eq. 432, not as a direct authority, but as containing an implication that the negligence of the injured party would prevent a recovery. I do not think it can be construed as conveying any such intimation. The insurance there was against a particular kind of accident; that was a railway accident, and the only question was, whether the injury was occasioned by an accident of that kind. The court held that it was, and although it mentions the fact that there was no negligence on the part of the assured, that cannot be considered as any intimation what would have been the effect of negligence if it had existed.
The general question as to what constituted an accident was considered in two subsequent cases in England. The first was Sinclair v. The Maritime Passengers' Assurance Co., 3 El. & El. 478 (E. C. L. R. vol. 107), in which the question was, whether a sunstroke was an accident within the meaning of the policy. The court held that it was not, but was rather to be classed among diseases occasioned by natural causes, like exposure to malaria, &c., and while admitting the difficulty of giving a definition to the term accident which would be of universal application, they say they may safely assume that some violence, casualty, or vis major
is necessarily involved.” There could be no question in this case that all these were involved.
In the subsequent case of Trew v. Railway Passengers' Assurance Co., 6 Hurl. & Nor. 839, the question was, whether a death by drowning was accidental. The counsel relied on the language of the former case, and urged that there was no external force or violence. But the court held that if the death was occasioned by drowning, it was accidental within the meaning of the policy. And in answer to the argument of counsel they said: “If a man fell from a housetop, or overboard from a ship, and was killed; or if a man was suffocated by the smoke of a house on fire, such cases would be excluded from the policy, and the effect would be, that policies of this kind, in many cases where death resulted from accident, would afford no protection whatever to the assured. We ought not to give to these policies a construction which will defeat the protection of the assured in a large class of cases."
There was no suggestion that there was any question to be made as to the negligence of the deceased, and yet the court said: “We think it ought to be submitted to the jury to say whether the deceased died from the action of the water, or natural causes. If they are of the opinion that he died from the action of the water, causing asphyxia, that is a death from external violence within the meaning of the policy, whether he swam to a distance and had not strength enough to regain the shore, or on going into the water got out of his depth.”
Now either of these facts would seem to raise as strong an inference of negligence as an attempt to get upon cars in slow motion. Yet the court said that although the drowning was occasioned by either one of them, it would have been a death within the meaning of the policy, and the plaintiffs entitled to recover. I cannot conceive that it would have made such a remark except upon the assumption that the question, whether the injured party was guilty of negligence contributing to the accident, does not arise at all in this class of cases. I think that is the true conclusion, both upon principle and authority, so far as there is any upon the subject; and the only questions are, first, whether the death or injury was occasioned by an accident within the general meaning of the policy, and if so, whether it was within any of the exceptions.
This conclusion is also very strongly supported by that provision of the policy under which the plaintiff was nonsuited. That
necessarily implies that any degree of negligence falling short of “ wilful and wanton exposure to unnecessary danger" would not prevent a recovery. Such a provision would be entirely superfluous and unmeaning in such a contract, if the observance of due care and skill on the part of the assured constituted an element to his right of action, as it does in actions for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the defendant.
The question therefore remains whether the attempt of the deceased to get upon the train was within this provision, and constituted a " wilful and wanton exposure
of himself to unnecessary danger ?” I cannot think so. The evidence showed that the train having once been to the platform, had backed so that the cars stood at some little distance from it; while it was waiting there the deceased was walking back and forth on the platform (of the depot). It is very probable that he expected the train to stop there again before finally leaving. But it did not. It came along, and while moving at a slow rate, or as fast as a man could walk, he attempted to get on and by some means fell either under or by the side of the cars and was crushed to death.
have been imprudent. It may have been such negligence as would have prevented a recovery in an action based upon the negligence of the company if there had been any. But it does not seem to have contained those elements which could be justly characterized as wilful or wanton. The deceased was in the regular prosecution of his business. He desired and expected to leave on that train. Finding that he would be left unless he got on while it was in motion, it was natural enough for him to make the attempt. The strong disinclination which people have to being left, would impel him to do so. The railroad employees were getting on at about the same time. Imprudent though it is, it is a common practice for others to get on and off in the same manner.
He had undoubtedly seen it done, if he had not done it himself, many times with out injury. I cannot regard it, therefore, as a wilful and wanton exposure of himself to unnecessary danger within the meaning of the policy.
The judgment is reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.
The act may
Supreme Court of the United States.
WILLIAM WARD ET AL. v. FRANCIS L. SMITH.
The fact that an instrument is made payable at a bank does not make the bank an agent of payee to receive payment, unless he actually deposits the instrument there, or in some express manner authorizes the bank to act for him.
When an instrument is lodged with a bank for collection, the bank becomes the agent of the payee or obligee to receive payment. The agency extends no further, and without special authority an agent can only receive payment of the debt due his principal in the legal currency of the country, or in bills which pass as money at their par value by the common consent of the community.
The doctrine that bank bills are a good tender unless objected to at the time, only applies to current bills which are redeemed at the counter of the bank, and pass at par value in business transactions in the place where offered.
Payment of a check in the bills of a suspended bank, not known to the parties to be suspended, is not a satisfaction.
Where the debtor and the creditor's known agent to receive the money, reside in the same jurisdiction, the fact that the creditor is a citizen of a power at war with the debtor's government, and resident in the hostile state, does not absolve the debtor from his obligation to pay, and if he does not, he is liable for interest.
IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Dis. trict of Maryland.
In August 1860, the plaintiff in error, William Ward, purchased of Smith certain property in Virginia, and gave him for the consideration-money the three joint and several bonds of himself and co-defendant, upon which the present action was brought. These bonds, each for a sum exceeding four thousand dollars, bear date of the 22d of that month, payable, with interest, in six, twelve, and eighteen months after date," at the office of discount and deposit of the Farmers' Bank of Virginia, at Alexandria.”
In February 1861 the first bond was deposited at the bank designated for collection. At the time there was endorsed upon it a credit of over five hundred dollars; and it was admitted that subsequently the further sum of twenty-five hundred dollars was received by Smith, and that the amount of certain taxes on the estate purchased, paid by Ward, was to be deducted.
In May 1861, Smith left Alexandria, and remained within the Confederate military lines during the continuance of the civil war. He took with him the other two bonds, which were never deposited at the Farmers' Bank for collection. Whilst he was thus absent from Alexandria, Ward deposited with the bank to his credit, at different times between June 1861 and April 1862, various sums
in notes of different banks of Virginia, the nominal amount of which exceeded by several thousand dollars the balance due on the first bond. These notes were at a discount at the times they were deposited, varying from eleven to twenty-three per cent. The cashier of the bank endorsed the several sums thus received as credits on the first bond; but he testifies that he made the endorsement without the knowledge or request of the plaintiff. It was not until June 1865 that the plaintiff Smith was informed of the deposits to his credit, and he at once refused to sanction the transaction and accept the deposits, and gave notice to the cashier of the bank and the defendants of his refusal. The cashier thereupon erased the endorsements made by him on the bond.
The defendants (plaintiffs in error) claimed that they were entitled to have the amounts thus deposited and endorsed credited to them on the bonds, and allowed as a set-off to the demand of the plaintiff. They made this claim upon these grounds: That by the provision in the bonds, making them payable at the Farmers' Bank, in Alexandria, the parties contracted that the bonds should be deposited there for collection either before or at maturity; that the bank was thereby constituted—whether the instruments were or were not deposited with it—the agent of the plaintiff for their collection; and that as such agent it could receive in payment equally with gold and silver the notes of any banks, whether circulating at par or below par, and discharge the obligors.
A. G. Browne and F. W. Brune, for plaintiffs in error.
R. J. & J. L. Brent, for defendants in error.
FIELD, J. (after reciting the facts].—It is undoubtedly true that the designation of the place of payment in the bonds imported a stipulation that their holder should have them at the bank when due to receive payment, and that the obligors would produce there the funds to pay them. It was inserted for the mutual convenience of the parties. And it is the general usage in such cases for the holder of the instrument to lodge it with the bank for collection, and the party bound for its payment can call there and take it up. If the instrument be not there lodged, and the obligor is there at its maturity with the necessary funds to pay it, he so far satisfies the contract that he cannot be made responsible for any