agents insuring for others, sanctioned as it was claimed by the New York Chamber of Commerce, that all dividends should belong to the agent in lieu of other compensation. The court, per MULLEN, J., held that the custom was not satisfactorily proved, but, whether it was or not, no custom could avail against the positive rule of law, that an agent cannot appropriate to his own use any portion of the profits arising from the business of the agency. REVENUE LAW-LANDING OF GOODS WITHOUT PERMIT. United States v. Twenty Cases of Matches, in the United States District Court for Wisconsin, was an information under section 50 of the Act of March 2d 1799, 1 Stat. 665, on a seizure of matches at Milwaukee for being unladen at that port from a vessel from Canada, without a permit. Claimants alleged that the matches were manufactured at Portland, Maine, and shipped in close packages via the Grand Trunk Railway, a corporation of Canada, to Chicago, that they were not intended to be opened between Portland and Chicago, and that the unlading of them at Milwaukee was without claimant's knowledge or consent. The Act of March 2d 1861, § 68, 12 Stat. 197, exempts from duty goods manufactured in the United States, exported to a foreign country, and brought back in the same condition as when exported. MILLER, D. J., held that the goods were subject to forfeiture. "The regulations of the treasury department relate to the transportation of goods while in their transit through the foreign country. These regulations may have been strictly complied with, but they have no relation to the duty imposed on the vessel to procure a permit for unlading the matches at the port of Milwaukee. "The law under which this information is brought, prohibits the unlading or delivery of goods, wares, or merchandise brought from any foreign port or place, whether they be dutiable or not, without the permit of the collector. Nor is it any excuse or defence, that the master of the vessel put the goods ashore without the knowledge or consent of the owner or consignee. The revenue laws leave all errors or mistakes of shippers and carriers to be settled among the parties interested." CRIMINAL LAW-PUNISHMENT AFTER REPEAL OF STATUTE CREATING THE OFFENCE-INTERNAL REVENUE. In United States v. Finlay, in the District Court of the United States, Western District of Pennsylvania, defendant was indicted under the Acts of June 30th 1864, sects. 15, 42, and 82, and March 2d 1867, sects. 94 (2 Brightly's Dig. title Internal Revenue, pl. 27, 48, 140), for making false returns of woollen manufactures with intent to violate the Internal Revenue Laws. The tax on woollen goods was repealed by the Act of March 31st 1868. On motion, MCCANDLESS, D. J., quashed the indictment, holding that after a repeal of the law creating an offence, there is no jurisdiction to punish a violation of the act during its existence: Comm. v. Duane, 1 Bin. 601. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE-LIABILITY ON HIS BOND. The United States v. Thorn et al., in the United States District Court of New Jersey, February 1869, was an action on the official bond of a collector of internal revenue. The declaration averred that defendant had violated the first condition of the bond, that he shall " 'faithfully discharge the duties of his office," by granting permits for the removal of distilled spirits from bonded warehouses in his district to bonded warehouses in another district, without exacting transportation bonds with sufficient sureties, in double the amount of taxes imposed on the spirits, as required by the Act of June 30th 1864, sect. 61, and the regulations of the treasury department. The evidence was that permits had been given for the removal of nearly one thousand barrels of whiskey, and on suing out the bond the sureties could not be found. No residence was attached to their names on the bond, and in some cases only the initials of their first names were given. The defence was that defendant had relied on a clerk, and therefore could not be held on the ground of negligence, and there was no evidence of corruption or any dishonest purpose. The evidence, however, failed to show that the clerk had been intrusted with the duty of examining the sufficiency of the sureties, and in some instances the permits had been issued before the bonds were handed to him. Under the charge of FIELD, J., jury found a verdict for the United States for $100,000, the full amount of the defendant's bond. J. T. M. the ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.1 SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK." ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. Factors, who had agreed to insure property consigned to them, effected insurance to the amount of 41 per cent. only, and the property being destroyed by fire, they wrote to the consignors conceding their liability to account for all they had received from the insurers, and placed the amount to the credit of the consignors, hoping it would prove satisfactory. The consignors replied: "We supposed you were nearly insured in full; but if this is all we are entitled to, we must submit." And they drew a draft upon the factors for the amount received by them on account of insurance, which was paid: Held that, there being no dispute between the parties about the facts, or about the claim, this did not amount to an accord and satisfaction: Beardsley et al. v. Davis, 52 Barb. AGREEMENT. Acceptance of Proposition.-To constitute an agreement, it is not necessary that a proposition made by one party to another by letter, should be accepted expressly. If it is acted upon, and complied with, that is a sufficient acceptance: Beardsley et al. v. Davis, 52 Barb. Thus, where the defendants, factors and produce commission mer 1 From T. A. Post, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 43 Mo. Reports. chants, addressed a letter to the plaintiffs, who were maltsters, soliciting their business, or a continuance thereof, stating their terms and inviting consignments of malt, and the plaintiffs, without replying to the letter, or expressly accepting the proposition made therein, made several shipments of malt to the defendants: Held, that this was an acceptance of the terms proposed; and that it was not material that the plaintiffs had previously done business with the defendants without any knowledge of their terms: Id. Held, also, that on receiving such letter from the defendants, stating that their charges for selling were 5 per cent., which covered all expenses-insurance, storage, &c., and a guaranty of the sales the plaintiffs were at liberty to withdraw their business, or continue it as they pleased; and that the making of further shipments by them, after that, was evidence that the terms were satisfactory, and that they were accepted: Id. Held, further, that these facts justified a finding by the referee, that there was an agreement between the parties that the defendants should cause the property of the plaintiffs to be insured: Id. To Insure; Construction of.-When an agreement to insure is general, and there is no difficulty in procuring full insurance, and such is the general practice in the particular matter embraced in the contract, the fair and reasonable construction of the agreement is that the party undertook to procure a contract for a full indemnity: Id. In the absence of any evidence, aside from the general agreement to insure, the court, in fixing the amount of the insurance, would not, it seems, stop short of a full insurance; unless it was shown that in the particular matter or business it is not the practice to fully insure: Id. Validity. A simple request, from one person to another, to do an act from which the former can derive no sort of benefit, made under an entire misapprehension of his rights, does not constitute a lawful contract which is obligatory upon him: Wells v. Mann, 52 Barb. Void within the Statute of Frauds.-Where the defence of a suit brought against A. upon a promissory note, is of no benefit to B., he not being liable therein, a request from B. to A. to go on and defend the suit, if it can be considered a contract, is an independent promise on the part of B. to answer for the debt of another, which he is not otherwise liable to pay; and if not in writing, is void within the Statute of Frauds Id. ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS. Attaching Creditor excluded.—A creditor who attaches and sells the goods of his debtor, after they have been assigned under the statute for the benefit of all the creditors, will not be allowed to prove up his claim before the assignee, nor to avail himself of any of the benefits of the assignment: Valentine v. Decker, 43 Mo. ATTACHMENT. Garnishee. If it appears that the contract of a garnishee is to pay in property, a judgment cannot be rendered against him as being indebted to the defendant, unless there has been a demand and failure to pay according to the contract: Weil v. Tyler, 43 Mo. Where set aside as irregular, no Protection.-After an attachment, under which goods have been seized, has been set aside. as irregular, it affords no shield or protection to the plaintiffs, for such taking. The moment it is set aside, they stand as though no process had ever been issued, and become trespassers ab initio : Lyon v. Yates et al., 52 Barb. Having taken the property as trespassers, they cannot, in an action against them for the tort, show that they subsequently caused it to be levied upon by virtue of a valid execution in their favor: Id. BANKS. Subscription for Stock.-Where, upon the organization of a bank, individuals make and sign a certificate, stating that they have associated themselves under and pursuant to the Act of 1838, to authorize the business of banking, &c., which certificate contains the name of the bank, &c., and is, in other respects, according to the requirements of the statute, and declares that the subscribers have respectively subscribed and set their hands and seals, &c., and the number of shares taken and held by each, and such numbers are affixed to the several signatures; this, without any other subscription, is sufficient to render the subscribers stockholders, and severally liable to the bank to take and pay for the number of shares set opposite each signature: Cole, Receiver, &c. v. Ryan, 52 Barb. Action by Receiver of Bank, to recover Subscription.-Where one who has agreed to take stock, but has not paid for it, transfers the same in good faith and without fraud, to an apparently responsible person, and no debts of the bank existing at the time of such transfer, are outstanding at the time a receiver of the bank is appointed, such receiver is bound by the acts of the bank in recognising the transferee as the owner of the stock and the debtor thereon; and cannot maintain an action against the transferor to recover the amount of his subscription for the stock: Id. CRIMINAL LAW. Gambling-Evidence of-The defendant was found with others around a card-table, with a faro-box and cards in his hands. Checks and money passed between them. No rebutting testimony. Held that this evidence was sufficient to warrant a conviction for gambling: Missouri v. Andrews, 43 Mo. DAMAGES. Measure of-In an action against an agent for negligence, in not procuring full insurance, the measure of damages is the value of the property destroyed; to be reduced by any amount received under a partial insurance: Beardsley et al. v. Davis, 52 Barb. EJECTMENT. Evidence of Title.-In an action of ejectment, prior possession, accompanied with a claim of the fee, raises a presumption of title; and is sufficient to sustain an ejectment against one who shows only naked possession: Dale v. Faivre, 43 Mo. EXECUTION. Exempt Property; Burden of Proof-Where, in an action against a constable, for returning an execution unsatisfied, when it might have been collected, the question arises whether certain property of the defendant in the execution was exempt from levy or sale, the affirmative is with the officer claiming the exemption. Prima facie all property is liable to execution: Baker v. Brintnall, 52 Barb. Exemption is a statutory privilege, and is strictly personal. It therefore will not avail an officer sued for neglect of duty in not levying on property: Id. The question of exemption being one that a constable cannot raise in his defence, when sued for not levying and selling, his acceptance of the execution, and a bond of indemnity, with his consent to act upon the execution, and his action so far as to take an inventory of the property of the defendant in the execution, estops him, in law, from returning the execution unsatisfied: Id. If he is not satisfied with the bond of indemnity he should refuse it. Having accepted it, he is bound to go on and act as instructed: Id. INSURANCE. Assignment of Policy.-A policy of insurance was issued to John Franklin, payable to P. H. French. After loss French assigned to the Union Savings Association, and the latter assigned to John Franklin. In an action on the policy by Franklin as assignee of French, it was held that French as payee of the policy had a sufficient interest in the contract to sustain the validity of the policy. It is to be regarded in the same light as if assigned at its inception to French with the consent of the company: Franklin v. National Ins. Co., 43 Mo. Subsequent Insurance.-A policy of insurance contained the usual stipulation requiring notice and endorsement upon the policy or acknowledgment in writing of all previous and subsequent insurances, in default of which the policy should cease and be of no effect. Held that a subsequent temporary insurance effected after the issuing of the policy, without notice, but not existing at the time of the loss, did not avoid the policy under this stipulation: Obermeyer v. Globe Ins. Co., 43 Mo. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. Docket.-Although the statute directs that every justice shall keep a book called a docket, and also directs what entries he shall make therein, the omission, by a justice, so to keep his book will not render his judgment void. Proceedings before him can still be proved by himself: Baker v. Brintnall, 52 Barb. For certain purposes, the docket fails to be evidence, if not kept as the statute directs, but the omission so to keep it is not jurisdictional: Id. JUSTICE'S COURT. Jurisdiction of the Person.-Where a defendant, sued by long summons in a justice's court, in a different county from that in which he resided, appeared by attorney and put in an answer, the attorney stating |