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that the defendant resided in another county, but he did not plead that fact, nor would he make an affidavit of it: Held, that the defendant, by answering, waived any defence on the ground of residence, and thus gave the justice jurisdiction of his person: Osburne v. Gilbert, 52 Barb.

LEGAL TENDER NOTES.

Where a bond was conditioned to pay "in gold or silver coin of the standard by which the coins of the United States were regulated by the laws existing on the 26th day of May 1846, the sum of $4000," in three years, with interest: Held, that the bond, and a mortgage given in connection therewith, were paid and satisfied by a payment in legal tender notes: Murray v. Gale, adm'x., &c., 52 Barb.

LIMITATIONS.

Special Act.-Action upon notes issued by the Kirksville branch of the Bank of St. Louis. By the Act of February 16th 1864, provisions were made for winding up the branch banks throughout the state. In this act it was provided that all claims, dues, and demands against said banks not presented within two years, should be for ever barred, saving the usual disabilities. Held that this special limitation was legal, and that the notes in suit not being presented within the two years were barred: Stevens v. St. Louis National Bank, 43 Mo.

MARRIED WOMEN.

Actions by. Since the acts of the legislature of 1860, chap. 90, and of 1862, chap. 172, a married woman may bring an action in her own name against a wrong-doer, for a wrong committed upon her person, without joining her husband with her as a party: Ball v. Bullard, 52 Barb.

To the damages which are recoverable for a personal injury to the wife, committed previous to the statute of 1860, the husband has no vested or other interest or right, legal or natural. Hence there is no ground for making him a party to an action therefor: Id.

As to the right to bring such an action, the statute of 1860 makes a married woman a feme sole. By suing as a feme sole, she accepts its provisions, and takes it subject to its letter, its spirit and intent, limita

tions and liabilities: Id.

And treating her as a feme sole, with the disability removed, the Statute of Limitations applies to the case, and if the action is not brought within one year, nor within six years, after the removal of her disability to sue, by the Act of 1860, it will be barred: Id.

NEGLIGENCE.

Adjoining Tenants.-The occupant of a second story is liable for the negligence of his servants in allowing a hydrant to flood the story below, and damage the goods of the occupant of said story: Gass v. Callunry, 43 Mo.

Contributing to the Injury.-The negligence of the deceased, in order to defeat an action in favor of his widow for the injury causing his

death, must be direct and proximate in contributing to the injury; and an instruction referring to negligence generally was properly refused: Meyer v. People's Railway, 43 Mo.

Evidence. In an action against an overseer of highways, for causing embankments or breaks to be made across the road, on a hill, whereby the plaintiff was thrown from his wagon and injured, evidence to show that within a week of the time of the accident, a person was upset at the same place, and a lady was thrown out of a wagon; and that about the time or within two or three months of the plaintiff's injury, several accidents of a similar kind occurred from the same cause at the place in question, is not admissible: Sherman v. Kortright, 52 Barb.

Where, in such an action, the plaintiff alleged, in one count of his complaint, that the defendant was fully informed and knew of the danger of the embankments placed by him upon the highway, and that he wilfully and wrongfully persisted in erecting and maintaining them across the highway: Held, that an issue being raised as to the defendant's malice and intentions, it was not erroneous to permit him to prove that he had no malice or ill will, or intention to injure the plaintiff: Id.

NUISANCE.

Action against Continuer of-Every continuance of a nuisance is, in judgment of law, a fresh nuisance. An action can be maintained against the party continuing the nuisance; whether he be the original wrong-doer, or his alienee: The Conhocton Stone Company v. The Buffalo, New York and Erie Railroad Company, 52 Barb.

Although a corporation erecting or continuing a nuisance had leased the premises on which the same was erected to another, and given possession prior to the happening of an injury occasioned by it, it is liable for the damages sustained: Id.

An action for damages will lie against the continuer of a nuisance, without averring or proving a previous notice to him, of the existence and extent of the nuisance, and a request to abate and remove it: Id.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

Duty of Agent to his Principal.-An agent, while in his principal's employ, can accept no employment hostile to the interest of his employer. If he does so, and receives remuneration therefor, it constitutes a breach of the contract between him and the company, and affords good and sufficient ground for his discharge. Nor can an agent act in the business of his agency, for himself and his principal at the same time: Morrison v. The Ogdensburgh and Lake Champlain Railroad Company, 52 Barb.

Thus, an individual employed by a railroad company, as its agent, to purchase wood and timber for its use, has no right, while purchasing woodland for the company, as such agent, to receive from the vendor a commission for promoting the sale. And if the company is compelled, through the agent's neglect of duty, to pay more for the land than it otherwise would have paid, the difference, being the amount of the agent's commissions, in equity belongs to the company: Id.

SALE.

Passing of Title to Personalty.-The defendants agreed to furnish the plaintiff's intestate with tobacco of a certain grade, and at a fixed price per pound, for resale by the latter. The plaintiff's testimony tended to show that the tobacco was to be paid for "when sold" by the said intestate, the defendant's testimony tended to show that payment was to be made at "the end of the month" in which the tobacco was delivered, and if not resold by the said intestate at that time, then payment might be made another month. Under this state of circumstances the defendants delivered to said intestate 940 pounds of tobacco at the agreed price. Sales of it were made amounting to $318, when the store of said intestate was consumed by fire and the residue of the tobacco destroyed. At a subsequent date the plaintiff's clerk paid the defendants the full amount of the tobacco, having no knowledge of the nature of the transaction. This suit was brought to recover $622, the amount of the over-payment. Held that the transaction was a sale of the tobacco, and that the title passed at the time of delivery, and that an instruction referring the consummation of the sale to the time of payment after resale was erroneous: Blow, adm'r. v. Spear et al., 43 Mo.

TAXATION.

Special Tax Bills.-Under the charter of St. Louis city the cost of sewers may be assessed as a tax against the adjoining property. This assessment is made by the city engineer, who apportions it as a special tax against the property, and certifies in the form of special tax bills, the amount against each lot. The charter requires that this assessment shall be "against each lot," in the name of the owner. In an action to enforce one of these tax bills as a lien against the property, it was held that the clause as to ownership was only directory, and that the assessment against the lot was not vitiated by an error in respect to the ownership. An assessment. against the lot of E. B. H. de Nouè, who owned it in her separate right, was valid, although made out in the name of L. de Nouè her husband: City of St. Louis to use of Rotchford v. De Nouè et al., 43 Mo.

Under the same charter, a special tax bill for the construction of a sewer is properly assessed in the name of Mrs. Bernondy, she being the beneficiary of the lot, although the naked legal title was held in the name of Mr. Garesche for her use and benefit. There would be no law for rendering a personal judgment against Mr. Garesche. Nor could a personal judgment be rendered against Mrs. Bernondy, she being a married lady. The tax could be enforced only as a special lien against her separate estate: Creamer v. Bernondy et al., 43 Mo.

State Income Tax-Legality of.-By the Act of February 1865, it was provided that a tax of 2 per cent. upon incomes should be collected for the year 1865. It was also provided that the assessment should be based upon the amount of income received in the year next preceding the time of assessment. Held that an assessment for the year 1865, upon the amount of income received in the year ending March 31st

1865, was irregular, but not void, except as to part of the time covered by it. An officer executing such a tax bill is not liable for trespass. Held also that such an income tax is not in violation of that provision in the Constitution, which requires all property subject to taxation to be taxed in proportion to its value: Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo.

TAXES.

A village tax collector, leaving a tax warrant in due form of law made out against the tax payers of the village, among whom are various stockholders in a bank, some of whom refuse to pay their taxes, and others direct him to call at the bank and receive their taxes, has no right to take from a drawer in the bank, without the consent of the officers, sufficient money to pay the taxes of such stockholders; even though each person named as a stockholder on the assessment roll and tax warrant may have left with the bank dividends unpaid, sufficient to pay his taxes: The First National Bank of Sandy Hill v. Fancher, 52 Barb.

LIST OF NEW LAW BOOKS.

LOUISIANA. Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court. Vol. 20, for the year 1868. J. HAWKINS, Reporter. New Orleans: Caxton Press. 1868.

MICHIGAN. Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court. By WILLIAM JENNISON. Vol. 4, being vol. XVII. of the series. Detroit: W. A. Throop & Co. 1869.

MISSOURI.-Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of Missouri. By T. A. POST. Vol. 42. St. Louis: McKee, Fishback & Co. Shp. $6.00.

NEW JERSEY.-Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court and the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. By P. D. VROOM. Vol. 3, being 32 N. J. Law Reps. Trenton: Hough & Gillespie, Prs. 1869.

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE AND MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE. Edited by WM. A. HAMMOND, M. D. Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1869. New York: D. Appleton & Co. $5.00 per annum.

Publiée

REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE. par MM. T. M. C. ASSER, Avocat et Professeur de Droit, à Amsterdam, G. ROLIN JACQUEMYNS, Avocat près la Cour d'Appel, á Gand, et J. WESTLAKE, Barrister at Law, Londres. Vol. 1, No. 1, New York: B. Westerman & Co., 471 Broadway. $5.00 per annum.

WESTERN JURIST.-Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1869. Des Moines: Mills & Co. $3.00 per annum.

THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.

JULY, 1869.

FORENSIC AND LEGISLATIVE DEBATE IN AMERICA, AS COMPARED WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE. COMPARISON OF THE PRESENT AND THE PAST IN OUR OWN COUNTRY.

THERE is a pretty general opinion prevailing among the most thoughtful and observing in this country, that, for some reason, forensic eloquence and the power of public debate is not, and has not been for the last thirty years, much on the advance; and there are not a few among us who declare that it is on the positive decline, from year to year, and almost from day to day. There is no doubt some allowance to be made for this opinion among those considerably advanced in life, on the score of the effect of novelty and familiarity, in the estimate of everything. The familiar maxim, that no one is a hero to his valet de chambre, has a wide application. It is upon this principle that, to an old man, almost everything is upon the decline. We have a keener relish for everything in the outset of life, and we more readily give in our adhesion to the theories and opinions of others then than after our own opinions and theories are more fully established, and thus we naturally pass a higher estimate upon all we meet in early life than afterwards.

But there is something more than this required to account for the contrast we everywhere notice, in Congress, and at the bar, and in state legislative assemblies, between the manner and effect (385)

VOL. XVII.-25

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