empted under these laws to an amount not exceeding $300 in each case. CADWALADER, D. J.-The opinion of the learned assessors appears from proceedings of the registers, and of assignees who were lawyers, to coincide with prevalent views of members of the legal profession in the state. I fully concur. In these cases, therefore, the respective exemptions are sustained. In Erben's Case several questions present themselves for consideration, one only of which, by the suggestion of CADWALADER, J., was argued before and decided by the judges. These questions are as follows: tent: Chambers v. Spencer, 5 Watts 404, 409. And this was probably one of the reasons why the court refused to hear argument upon the point until the second question had been disposed of. If the 1st. Was the policy in question the policy, however, once became vested in property of Mr. or Mrs. Erben ? 2d. Supposing it to have been Mr. Erben's, was it not exempt under the Bankrupt Act by virtue of the Acts of Assembly of Pennsylvania of 9th April 1849 or of 8th April 1859 ? 3d. If not exempt by virtue of either of these acts was it not exempt by the Act of April 15th 1868 ? 1st. It is conceded that at the time the policy was taken out Mr. Erben was solvent and so continued for about nine years, during which time he paid all the premiums falling due. (After that time he paid part of them only; the remainder being paid by Mrs. Erben out of money given to her by friends.) That a man may convey property to his wife whilst he is solvent, provided there is no intention on his part to defraud his creditors, may be considered as settled in many of the states; and by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States it is valid, at least, as to subsequent creditors. See Story's Eq. Jur. 8 359 (n.), 428; Posten v. Posten, 4 Whart. 27; Saxten v. Wheaton, 8 Wheaton 247. But this being admitted it is not the province of the court, but of the jury, to say whether there is a fraudulent in Mrs. Erben it could hardly be contended that the payment of some of the premiums by Mr. Erben, after his insolvency, dirested her interest and vested it in him. There may have been a right of action by Mr. Erben's assignee against Mrs. Erben for money paid to her use; and in a judgment obtained against her, perhaps, her interest in the policy could be attached: Girard Fire Ins. Co. v. Fields, 9 Wright 129; Mills v. Auriol, Smith's Lead. Cases 910; Godsall v. Boldero, 2 Id. 292; Dalby v. Ins. Co., Id. 297. * * * 1 2d. Was the policy excepted from the operation of the 14th section of the Bankrupt Act, which gives to the assignee the property and rights of the bankrupt, but excepts from the operation of this section the "household and kitchen furniture and such other property * * as is exempt from levy and sale upon execution or other process, or order of any court, by the laws of the state in which the bankrupt has his domicil at the time of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy to an amount not exceeding that allowed by such state exemption laws in force in the year 1864." The Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania of April 9th * 舍 * * 1849 provides "that property his claim. On April 14th 1851, the to the value of $300 of any "Widows' Act" was approved, whose debtor shall be exempt from levy and language and general purpose was the sale on execution or by distress for rent." same as that of the Act of 1849; and The act then goes on to provide a man- in 1860 the Supreme Court held that ner of appraising the property which the under that act "the widow of a decedent "debtor may elect to retain." The may elect to take $300 as against the early decisions of the Supreme Court creditors of her husband, out of any upon the construction of the term "pro- money or evidence of debt belonging to perty" in this act were very strict, and the estate; and in such case there is no declared "money," among other things, necessity for an appraisement:" Larrinot to be included within it: Hammer v. son's Appeal, 12 Casey 130. Frees, 7 Harris 255 (1852); Knabb v. Drake, 11 Id. 489 (1854). It was also said that nothing would come within the terms of the law that did not require or was not susceptible of appraisement; it being required that the whole law should be construed together. In 1857, however, the court held that, "Where the real estate of a debtor is seized and sold under a judgment obtained on a mortgage given for the balance of the purchase-money of such real estate, and before the sale the debtor notifies the sheriff that he claims the benefit of the Exemption Law of 1849, and desires to have an appraisement made, such debtor is entitled to the balance of the proceeds after the pay ment of the mortgage-debt and costs, it not exceeding $300, in preference to judgments obtained for debts contracted since July 4th 1849 (the law having provided that no debts contracted prior to that date should be affected by the act). ARMSTRONG, J., remarked, in the opinion of the court delivered by him, that the law "should receive a construction favorable to the benevolent object of its enactment," that being "not only for the benefit of the debtor but for his family:" Hill v. Johnson & Park, 5 Casey 362. BLACK, C. J. (in 1852) had said it should be strictly construed because, among other reasons, it was in derogation of the common-law rights of the ereditor to take his debtor's property for It may be noticed, however, that the widow in this case chose promissory notes, and after selecting them the money for which they called was paid to the executors. But the evident liberal tendency of the Supreme Court in construing the law of 1849 seemed insufficient to satisfy the legislature, the early decisions not being yet overruled, and they therefore passed the Act of 8th April 1859, which extended to the class of persons named in the Acts of 1849 and 1851, the right to exempt "bank notes, money, stocks, judgments, or other indebtedness to such person." The question then was, in this case, whether the term " property," in the Act of 1849, or the term "indebtedness," in the Act of 1859, included a policy of life insurance. pro The court have not given the reasons upon which they decided it to be " perty," but it can hardly be doubted that the liberal tendency of the Supreme Court in its late decisions in construing those acts and the evident liberal intent of the legislature, as showed in the Act of 1859, induced them to so extend the term. It has been said that "property" in a will includes every species of property, is a nomen generalissimum, "and comprehends all earthly possessions :" Rosetter v. Simmons, 6 S. & R. 455. Although this would be a very comprehensive definition to give the term in the statute in question, it yet shows how comprehensive a term it may be held to be where the intent is manifested by concurrent circumstances. It was contended upon argument, also, that the policy was an "indebtedness" within the meaning of the Act of 1859-a debitum in presenti solvendum in futuro. It has been held in England that a life policy will pass under a will by the term "debentures and debts:" Lloyd & Gould, Cases temp. Sugden 289–294; Reynolds on Life Insurance 173. And although the Chancellor said he did not wish to be considered as deciding the "abstract point" that a life policy is a debt," the reasoning is very strong in support of this view. Many definitions of "debts," too, may be found in the books sufficiently comprehensive to cover a life policy. See Bouvier's Dictionary, Debt; Gray v. Bennett, 3 Met. 522, 526; 1 Bell Appeal Cases 295. And the text-books on insurance and on bankrupt law speak of policies of life insurance continually as "debts" and "contingent debts:" Shaw's Ellis on Insurance 299; Cooke's Bankrupt Laws 190. As was suggested above, it is believed, too, that it would be the subject of an attachment execution: Lancaster Bank v. Stouffer, 10 Barr 398; Girard Fire Ins. Co. v. Fields, 9 Wright 129; Mahon v. Kunkle, 14 Id. 216; Mills v. Auriol, 1 Smith's Lead. Cases 910. If this be true, it is a strong circumstance in favor of its exemption as it would seem to be brought within the clause "exempt from levy and sale on execution," which was at first said to be necessary, though the late decisions are less strict. But a very important point upon the general subject is whether it is not exempted by the Act of 15th April 1868, which provides that "all policies of life insurance or annuities upon the life of any person which may hereafter mature and which have been or shall be taken out for the benefit of, or bona fide assigned to the wife of such person * shall be vested in such wife * * * *full and clear from all claims of the creditors of such person." If, therefore, the value of the policy taken out by a husband for the benefit of his wife does not exceed the "amount" which was exempted by the state laws in force in "1864," it would seem that it might be exempted under this later act; even if the title to the policy were vested in the husband at the time he was declared bankrupt. In other words, the state laws exempting property from levy and sale, may be changed with reference to the articles exempted if no change is made with reference to the money value of the exemption. The difficulty in Mr. Erben's case with reference to this point was, that the Act of 15th April 1868, had been passed after he had been declared bankrupt and the title to the policy, if in him at that time, might be considered as at once vested in his assignee so that no subsequent act of the legislature could take it out of him; for the Bankrupt Act provides "That the foregoing exceptions shall operate as a limitation upon the conveyance of the property of the bankrupt to the assignee; and in no case shall the property hereby excepted pass to the assignee, or the title of the bankrupt thereto be impaired or affected by any of the provisions of this act.” If the title had vested in the assignee, therefore, it would require a very liberal construction to hold that it might be taken out of him by a subsequent act of the legislature. I. S. S. United States District Court.-District of Oregon. MATTER OF ROBERT SUTHERLAND, A BANKRUPT.1 A judgment for a fine imposed as a penalty for crime is not a debt within the meaning of the Bankrupt Act, and not being included in the special provisions allowing certain claims to be proved as debts, it cannot be proved against the estate of a bankrupt. THE state of Oregon proved a debt against the estate of the bankrupt, amounting to $1394.46. Upon the motion of the assignee, the claim was set down for examination before the court. From the evidence and admissions of the counsel for the state and assignee, it appeared that on December 3d and 4th 1861, two several judgments were given in the Circuit Court of the state for the county of Multnomah, sentencing the bankrupt to pay two certain fines, and that he be committed until the same be paid. The debt proved before the register is a part of the sum for which these judgments were given, the remainder having been paid. Opinion by DEADY, J.-It is understood from the admission of the counsel that these fines were imposed upon the bankrupt as a punishment prescribed by law for the commission of a crime, of which he had been duly convicted. Indeed, a judgment that a party pay a fine, in the absence of anything to the contrary, must be presumed to have been given as a punishment for the commission of a crime. The State Act of January 25th 1854, in force when these judgments were given, provides that "any convict" confined in jail "for the non-payment of a fine," may be discharged from such imprisonment by the commissioners of the county, if he is unable to pay the fine; "but such convict shall not thereby be released. from the payment of such fine, but the same may be collected by execution at any future time." Under this act the bankrupt was discharged from imprisonment soon after the judgments were given. Section 19 of the act declares that all debts due and payable from the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy *** may be proved against the estate of the bankrupt. Does the term debt include a judgment for a fine? Blackstone (vol. 3, We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of Hon. M. P. DEADY.-EDS. AM. LAW REG. 154) says, "the legal acceptation of debt is, a sum of money due by certain and express agreement." This, however, is not the popular acceptation of the word. Says the Supreme Court of Massachusetts (3 Met. 526): "The word debt is of large import, including not only debts of record, or judgments, and debts of specialty, but also obligations under simple contracts to a very wide extent; and in its popular sense includes all that is due to a man under any form of obligation or promise." This view of the subject was approved by Justice Story (2 Story's R. 432). To ascertain, then, whether the word debt is here used in the legal or popular sense, recourse must be had to the subject-matter and the context. Immediately following the general clause of section 19, concerning debts, as above quoted, it is provided that, "All demands against the bankrupt for or account of any goods or chattels wrongfully taken, converted, or withheld by him may be proved or allowed as debts, to the amount of the value of the property so taken or withheld, with interest." The section then proceeds to provide for the case of contingent debts and liabilities, as well as unliquidated damages upon a contract or promise, and then concludes: "No debts other than those above specified shall be proved or allowed against the estate." From all the provisions of the section, it is apparent that the word debt is used in the legal or limited sense. If it were used in the popular sense, it would not have been necessary to have specially provided that "demands for goods wrongfully taken, &c., may be proved or allowed as debts." In the popular sense, such demands are debts, and would have been included in the preceding clause providing for the proving "all debts." A discharge in bankruptcy releases the bankrupt from all debts which were or might have been proved against his estate: Sect. 34 Bankrupt Act. These fines were imposed upon the bankrupt as a punishment for crimes of which he was convicted. If provable against his estate, he may be discharged from the payment of them and from arrest made to enforce such payment. In effect, this would be allowing the National Government, through its courts, to grant pardons for crimes committed against the state. A person convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to pay a fine of a thousand dollars, would be relieved, by a discharge in bankruptcy, from the punishment affixed by law to his crime. I do not think that the act, while it reasonably admits of any other |