which seems to prevail concerning the jurisdiction of this court upon appeals. Returning, then, to the order mentioned in the petition, and finding it, as already stated, to be one from which no appeal can be taken, the conclusion is inevitable that it is one which may be reviewed in the exercise of the power of general superintendence, or that it cannot be reviewed at all. It may be said that the superintending jurisdiction does not extend to decisions of the District Court, or of the district judge at chambers; and certainly if it does not extend to both, it extends to neither; for the 1st section of the act gives the same jurisdiction to the district judge at chambers as to the District Court. This construction would limit the revisory jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to that given in the 8th section. But it is plain that this construction is not the correct one. It would indeed nullify the operation of the most important clause of the 2d section, for it would limit the superintending jurisdiction to the proceedings of assignees and registers; and these seem to be already placed by the 1st clause under the supervision of the District Court. The better, and indeed, as it seems to me, the only construction which gives due effect to all parts of the act relating to revisory jurisdiction, seems to be that which on the one hand excludes from the category of general superintendence and jurisdiction of the Circuit Court the appellate jurisdiction defined by the 8th section; and, on the other, brings within that category all decisions of the District Court, or the district judge at chambers, which cannot be reviewed upon appeal or writ of error under the provisions of that section. The exercise of this general jurisdiction is not placed by the act under specific regulations and restrictions, like the proceeding by appeal or writ of error. It was doubtless thought most advisable to leave its regulation to the discretion of the court and to the rules to be prescribed by the Supreme Court. As yet, the Supreme Court has prescribed no rule concerning it; nor has this court. In the case before us its exercise must depend on the sound discretion of this tribunal. Unreasonable delay in invoking the superintending jurisdiction should certainly not be allowed. Nor, on the other hand, should such excessive rigor be exercised that the ends of justice will probably be defeated. Leave is given to file the petition, and other questions are reserved until the coming in of affidavits; and in the mean time let further proceedings under the order of the District Court be suspended. United States Circuit Court. Southern District of Ohio. WILLIAM II. LANGLEY v. LEMUEL PERRY. The Circuit Court under the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act has jurisdiction to revise the rulings and judgment of the District Court in proceedings in bankruptcy upon bill filed. A general assignment of all a debtor's property for the benefit of his creditors, is not necessarily a conveyance with intent to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors. And where such an assignment is made with intent to secure an equal distribution of all the debtor's property among all his creditors, it is not necessarily a conveyance of property with intent to defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act. To make such an assignment an act of bankruptcy, it must be made with intent to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors within the meaning of the statute of 13 Elizabeth, or with intent to defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act. THIS was a bill in equity, filed by Langley against Perry, to revise and reverse an adjudication of bankruptcy, by the District Court, on the petition of Perry against Langley. The bill set out the proceedings in the District Court. At the hearing it was agreed by counsel, with the assent of the court, that the complainant should amend his bill by making copies of all the proceedings in the District Court, including a bill of exceptions embodying all the testimony, &c., part of the bill, to the end that the whole case of Perry v. Langley, in the District Court, from the filing of the petition, should be before the Circuit Court; and thereupon the bill was so amended. The defendant, Perry, demurred. Langley was a resident of Gallia county, Ohio. Among other creditors, he owed Perry, who brought suit against him, and recovered a judgment at a term of the court commencing on May 27th 1867. On the 25th of May 1867, Langley, being insolvent, made a general assignment of all his property, in trust for all his cre ditors. The assignees accepted the trust, and, on the 25th of May 1867, filed the deed in the Probate Court of Gallia county, under the statutes of Ohio, and proceeded to administer the trust. On the 17th of July 1867, Perry filed a petition against Langley in the District Court, setting forth the assignment, and claiming that it was made with intent to hinder and delay him in the collection of his debt; and also with intent, by such disposition, to defeat and delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act, and was, therefore, an act of bankruptcy. Langley answered, denying the intent charged. Perry proceeded to take testimony, and it is set forth in the bill of exceptions. Langley offered no testimony, and the case was heard upon the testimony offered by Perry only. The District Court held the assignment an act of bankruptcy, and declared Langley a bankrupt. The opinion of the judge is reported in 7 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 429. This bill was filed to reverse that judgment. C. D. Coffin, for Langley. Nash & Lincoln, for Perry. SWAYNE, Circuit J., held1: 1. That the Circuit Court, under the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act, had jurisdiction in this manner to revise and correct and reverse the rulings and judgment of the District Court in proceedings in bankruptcy. 2. That where a creditor is about to recover a judgment against his debtor in Ohio, and the debtor makes a general assignment of all his property, for the benefit of all his creditors, before the judgment is rendered, such conveyance is not necessarily a conveyance with intent to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors. 3. And where such an assignment is made under like circumstances, with intent to secure an equal distribution of all the debtor's property among all his creditors, it is not necessarily a conveyance of property with intent to defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act. 4. To make such an assignment an act of bankruptcy, it must be made with intent to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors within The opinion of Justice SWAYNE was delivered orally; but we are furnished with the above abstract by counsel, and are assured that it is reliable.-EDS. AM. LAW REG. defeat or delay the the meaning of the statute of 13 Elizabeth, or with intent to operation of the Bankrupt Act. It becomes a question of fact. The innocence or guilt of the act depends on the mind of him who did it, and it is not a fraud within the meaning of the Bankrupt Law, unless it was meant to be so. Here the proof submitted in the case is clear that the assignment was an honest act, and was not intended either to defraud creditors or defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act. The demurrer is overruled; judgment of the District Court reversed, and the cause remanded to the District Court. In the still later case of THOMAS W. FARRIN V. JOHN CRAWFORD, in the same court, Justice SWAYNE affirmed his ruling in the principal case, that an assignment for the benefit of creditors is not, ipso facto, an act of bankruptcy; and that the Circuit Court would review the adjudication of the District Court in bankruptcy cases on the facts under the supervisory power given by the act. In this last-mentioned case the Circuit Judge reviewed the testimony at some length, and while dissenting from the conclusion of the district judge that an assignment was per se an act of bankruptcy, held the transaction in this case to be such an act, because it was not in fact an assignment of all the debtor's property. These cases, and the foregoing (Matter of Alexander, ante, p. 423), are among the few in which the supervisory powers of the Circuit Courts have been passed upon by a judge of the Supreme Court, and the liberal construction given to section 2, by the Chief Justice and Justice SWAYNE, renders this a very extensive and important jurisdiction to which perhaps the attention of the profession has not been very much directed. In Ex parte O'Brien, 6 Int. Rev. Rec. 182, the decision of the District Court that a feme covert trader is within the Bankrupt Act, and may be declared a bankrupt, was sought to be reviewed on appeal. Justice NELSON, of the Supreme Court, held that the adjudication could not be reviewed on appeal, and his language would appear to favor a very restricted construction of the power granted by section 2; but, in connection with the foregoing decisions, it may be understood as applying only to the form in which the case was then presented. In the Matter of John M. Reed, 2 Bank. Reg. 2, the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio, JJ. SWAYNE and SHERMAN held that the supervisory power was to be exercised by petition and not by appeal. In Ruddick v. Billings, 2 West. Jur. 275, Justice MILLER, of the Supreme Court, expressed great doubt if an adjudication of bankruptcy could be reviewed by appeal or writ of error under section 8, but was clearly of opinion that any creditor considering himself aggrieved by the discharge of a bankrupt, could be heard upon petition under section 2. The whole subject of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in bankruptcy, will be found elaborately treated by a very distinguished Ohio jurist, in an article in our pages, ante vol. 7, N. S. p. 641. J. T. M. Supreme Court of California. THE PEOPLE v. TYLER. Where a statute authorizes but does not compel a party indicted to become a witness in his own behalf, it is improper for the prosecution to comment to the jury on the prisoner's refusal to offer himself as a witness, and the court should when requested charge that no inference was to be drawn against the prisoner from his refusal. THE opinion of the court was delivered by SAWYER, C. J. (after disposing of some local points affecting the regularity of the proceedings).-The highly important question in the case arises under the Act of April 2d 1866, entitled "An Act relating to criminal prosecutions," which provides as follows: "Section 1. In the trial of all indictments, complaints, and other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes or offences, the person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness, the credit to be given to his testimony being left solely to the jury, under the instructions of the court. Section 2. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as compelling any such person to testify:" Stat. 1865-6, p. 865. At the trial the defendant did not avail himself of the right conferred by this act to offer himself as a witness on his own behalf. During the argument of the case, the District Attorney called the attention of the jury to the fact, that the defendant had not testified in his own behalf, and argued and insisted before said jury that the silence of the defendant was a circumstance strongly indicative of defendant's guilt. Defendant's counsel objected to this course of argument, and requested the court to require the District Attorney to refrain from urging such inference, but the court declined to interfere, and intimated that the law justified the counsel in the course pursued. The District Attorney thereupon continued to urge before the jury, that the silence of the defendant was a circumstance tending strongly to prove his guilt, and the counsel for the prisoner excepted. At the close of the argument of the case to the jury, the defendant's counsel asked the court to give to the jury the following instruction: "The jury should not draw any inference to the |