than three years, by the events of the Revolution of 1688, which brought William and Mary to the throne. After the Prince of Orange landed in England, King James commenced a retraction of the worst of those fatal measures by which he had disaffected the whole kingdom, and he made various concessions for the ostensible purpose of regaining the affections of his people. Among these concessions were the calling of a Parliament, and the grant, by proclamation, of a free pardon to all who were in rebellion against him: Macaulay's History of England, vol. 2, pp. 354-356; but, whatever effect these concessions might otherwise have had, the folly and misconduct of the king was such that nothing which he yielded or promised could sensibly arrest or stay the progress of the Revolution. In the fourth year of his exile (1692), King James published a declaration to all his "loving subjects," renewing his claim to the crown, and announcing his intentions in respect to those who had assisted in overthrowing his authority and were instrumental in effecting the other results. of the Revolution. In the following year (1693), he published another declaration, in which he promised, inter alia, that he would grant a free pardon to all his subjects who should not oppose him after he should land in England. It was the object of the Declaration of Rights (1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2), one of the earliest Acts of Parliament in the Revolution, and the instrument by which William and Mary were called to the vacant throne, and which settled the order of succession to the crown, to set forth in the most distinct and solemn manner the fundamental principles of the English constitution. It was prepared by a committee of which Somers was chairman. As a constitutional lawyer, he was honored with the highest rank in his own age, and it may safely be said that no other age of English history has produced his superior. In this Declaration of Rights is contained a recapitulation of the errors and crimes of King James which had made the Revolution necessary, and an assertion of the rights which had been by those errors and crimes violated. It complained of the assumption and exercise by the king of an illegal dispensing power, or the power of dispensing with or suspending the execution of penal laws, and especially of those laws which prevented Papists from filling offices in the state and the church,—of his levying taxes without grant of Parliament,-of his maintaining a standing army in time of peace without consent of Parliament,-and of many other breaches of the royal prerogatives; but it contains no word of censure, nor even an allusion in respect to his exercise of the power to grant a general pardon by proclamation. No intimation is made by any lawyer, statesman, or historian of the time, or by any writer on English constitutional history, “as it is believed," that in exercising this power King James exceeded the limits of the royal prerogative. On the contrary, Macaulay (vol. iv., p. 170, vol. ii., p. 386), in referring to the declaration of King James in 1692, censures it in that while it denounced vengeance against large classes of people, it did not offer a general amnesty to the rest. Why should King James offer a general amnesty if he had no lawful power to grant it, or if, without the consent of Parliament, he could not make it effectual? There is no instance in which the exercise by the king of the power to grant a general pardon by proclamation was ever made the subject of complaint, censure, or question by Parliament; and it is very clear from the cases which have been referred to that the power to grant a general pardon or amnesty has uniformly been treated in England as being included within the royal prerogative of pardon, even when exercised under and by Acts of Parliament. In other words, the power to grant pardon in England has uniformly been treated as being a generic power, while an act of amnesty is merely one of the forms in which that power is exercised; and, so far is an act of amnesty from being “a widely different thing" from a pardon, that the essential and distinguishing feature of every act of amnesty is the fact of pardon. The whole matter may be summed up in the declaration of Lord BACON, before referred to, that "a general pardon may proceed either from the king alone, or from the king with the authority of Parliament in addition," with the declaration of Lord HOLT in Rookwood's Case, ubi supra, that when the king grants a pardon under the great seal, "it has the full effect of the Parliament pardon." L. C. K. (To be continued.) RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. Superior Court, Eastern District of Georgia. STATE OF GEORGIA EX RELATIONE JAMES J. WARING v. Membership of a club which is purely literary or social or scientific, and does not own property, cannot be considered a right of property; nor is the right of meeting the other members a vested right of which courts can take cognisance. Mandamus is not the proper form of remedy for a member of such a club who is expelled. THE relator filed his petition in the Superior Court of Chatham county, alleging that the respondent, The Georgia Medical Society, had deprived him of his privileges as a member of that body, by an attempt at his expulsion, for causes which he alleged to be insufficient in law, and in a manner not in accordance with law. The facts appeared to be that the relator being a member of the defendant society was charged substantially, 1. With having "forfeited his position as a gentleman of respectable social standing," in that he had become surety on the bond of one White, a person of color, elected clerk of the court in opposition to the wishes of the entire respectable community, and then under indictment for larceny, thereby facilitating the qualification for office of a disreputable person, and also in that he had become surety on the bonds of various persons of color charged with riot, thus upholding persons of dangerous character; 2dly. With having "conducted himself in such manner as would render him ineligible to membership," setting forth the same acts as above charged, with others of which he was found guiltless. The constitution of the society provided that "the resident members of this society shall be composed of regular graduates of medicine, and shall be gentlemen of respectable social position." A by-law of the society also provided that: Any member who shall be guilty of ungentlemanly conduct during the session of the society, or who shall conduct himself, out of the society, in such a manner as would render him ineligible to membership, shall be expelled from the society according to the wishes of two-thirds of the members of the society present: Provided, that in every instance specific charges We are indebted for this case to John H. Thomas, Esq., of Savannah.-EDS. AM. L. R. be set forth and handed to the individual at least one month before the society take action thereon." Notice of the foregoing charges was duly given to relator, and at a subsequent meeting of the society he was tried and adjudged guilty, the relator objecting to the proceedings as against law. A vote was then taken to expel relator but was defeated, and a resolution passed that he be censured by the president. The relator, on being requested, came to the meeting, and the president was proceeding to censure him when he arose and objected and then left the room, but returned in a few minutes and stated that he would receive the censure. A resolution was then passed requesting him to resign, which he declined to do. At a regular meeting of the society on October 14th 1868, a resolution was passed reciting the principal facts, and also that the relator had at two previous meetings behaved discourteously to the society, and in such a manner as would render him ineligible to membership, and that at the next regular meeting in November the society would vote upon expelling him. Of this the relator had due notice one month previous to the November meeting, and at this meeting he was expelled by a vote of two-thirds of the members present. The relator was not present at this meeting but made a written communication stating that he was unable to attend by reason of severe indisposition, disclaiming any intentional discourtesy to the society, and protesting against any proceedings on the resolution sent to him, as unlawful and unjust. Hartridge and Chisholm, for relator, cited the following authorities 1 Black. Com. 471, 476, 481; 2 Johns. Chan. R. 335; 6 Conn. 544; 4 Wheat. 657, 674, 699; 20 Pick. 495; 1 S. & R. 254; 2 Id. 141; 6 Conn. 532; 5 Watts 152; 10 Wend. 293; 1 Cowen 423; 12 John. 414; 2 Binney 448; 1 Strange 1051; 1 Cranch 168; 2 Esp. N. P. 682; 2 Burr. 723, 731, 738, 1045; 3 Id. 1265, 1267; 4 Id. 2186; 1 Id. 538; 2 L. Raym. 1564; 4 Geo. 44, 117; 2 Esp. N. P. 317-8; 2 Esp. R. 677; 1 Strange 557; 6 S. & R. 469; 4 Bac. Ab. 507; 12 Geo. 178; 26 Id. 665, 676; 2 Esp. N. P. 677, n. 3; Const. of Georgia, §§ 3, 9, 10; 10 Mod. 76; Cowp. 503; 2 Burr. 731; 6 S. & R. 476; Angel & Ames on Corp., chap. xii., §§ 408, 409; 2 Kent's Com. 298; 1 Sumner 301; 2 Term R. 181; 4 Bac. Ab. 500; 2 Selw. N. P. 1083, n.; 2 Black. Com. 21, 37; 3 Term R. 651; 3 East 188; 31 Geo. 206; 8 Term R. 352; 1 Black. Com. 4460; 1 Bish. Crim. Law, §§ 55, 58, 114; Eden on Pen. Laws 309; Tapp. on Man. 119,201, 358, 374, 392-4; Angel & A. on Corp. 597, 683, 711; T. U. P. Charl. (Ga.) 235; Grant on Corp.; Willcock on Mun. Corp. 150; Code of Georgia, §§ 1679, 3142, 4227, 712; 2 Barn. & Ald. 620; 5 Id. 899. Thos. E. Lloyd, and Jackson, Lawton & Basinger, for respondent, cited the following authorities: Code of Georgia, § 1416-1424; 14 Geo. 388, 9; Ang. & Ames on Corp. 3, 602; 7 Eng. Com. L. 295; 1 Sumner 284, 299; Code of Georgia, §§ 1671-2, 3, 3143-4; Ang. & Am. on Corp. 615; 26 Geo. 675; 1 Keb. 84; Carthew 92; 2 Shower 191; Tapp. on Man. 69, 70, 145-6; 2 Black. Com. 266; 2 Term R. 352-6; 2 Kent's Com. 294; Black. Com. 471; 1 Kent's Com. 297; 3 Wend. 476; 2 Binney 148; 5 Burr. 2761; 1 Black. 25-58; 23 Eng. Com. L. 66, 71; Code of Georgia, § 3706; 7 East 353; 36 Geo. 461; 1 Sumner 284, 299; 2 Kent's Com. 304; 2 Term R. 182, 356; Ang. & Am. on Corp. 602; 2 Term R. 177; 2 Cowp. 523; 7 Eng. Com. L. 245; Code of Georgia, § 3145; 1 Mod. 82; 4 Burr. 2186; Tapp. on Man. 137, 138, 216; 7 Term R. 391; 4 Geo. 26; Code of Georgia, § 3142. SCHLEY, J.-This cause came on to be heard, and after elaborate argument the court is called upon to decide the legal points made, which are to control ultimately this case; and after analyzing its merits, I have resolved it into two questions. The first is, had or has Dr. James J. Waring any vested rights as a member of The Georgia Medical Society? And, second, if he had or has, is mandamus the proper remedy for the enforcement of his rights? The only rights which the relator can have, as a member of the society, are either, first, a right to property; second, a right to membership, with a view to the improvement of the science of medicine; third, a right to practice his profession and collect his fees; or, fourth, a right to meet the members of said society on social equality. In reference to the first right, to wit, the right to property, it may be well to look to the charter to ascertain what the object of this society is. It is clearly not to acquire property. No right |