the shares of the banks organized under state authority. No peculiar or particular banks are described, and it is just to infer that Congress did not use the word in any restrictive sense, but left it to include all moneyed associations, savings and banking institutions. There are many of these banks chartered by the state, some of them with capital perhaps exceeding in amount the capital of the banks in issue, and with privileges just as valuable, with the exception of the power to emit paper. They are banks to all intents and purposes, and their shareholders are all taxed at the same prescribed rates as the shareholders in the national associations. There is, then, no discrimination or distinction made between the two classes of shareholders.

"That the two banks which have retained their distinctive state organizations are taxed to a less amount according to their contract, cannot in the least alter the case. They create no repugnance whatever. They are exceptional cases, and not within the rule, spirit, or intention of the Act of Congress. It can never be tolerated, the idea cannot for a moment be entertained, that because two banking institutions choose to rely on their charter and avail themselves of a special privilege guaranteed to them, that therefore Congress ever contemplated that the whole moneyed capital of the state should be secured in a like exemption."

TAXATION OF NON-RESIDENT HOLDERS OF NATIONAL BANK SHARES.-LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS.-The legislature of Massachusetts having passed an act (June 11th 1868), taxing shares of non-resident holders, the Boston Clearing House submitted the question of its validity to counsel, and Hon. Benjamin F. Thomas (late a judge of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,) has given an opinion (printed in full in Bankers' Magazine for December 1868) that the law is unconstitutional.

PATENT-RIGHT.-HARD RUBBER.-In Goodyear's Adm'r. v. Berry et al., in the United States Circuit Court, Southern District of Ohio, the complainant filed a bill alleging an infringement of the reissued patent of Henry B. Goodyear, administrator of Nelson Goodyear, for hard or vulcanized india rubber, in the making of plates for artificial teeth. The principal grounds of defence were:—

1. That the reissued patents to Henry B. Goodyear are void, as not being for the same invention as the original.

2. That the reissues were improperly granted.

3. That no infringement is proved.

LEAVITT, J., delivered (November 14th 1868, an elaborate opinion detailing the facts and history of the invention. The original patent to Nelson Goodyear was for the process of hardening or "vulcanizing" the plastic rubber produced by the process patented by Charles Goodyear. In the reissued patent of Nelson Goodyear's administrator the words "or other vulcanizable gums," are added after the words india rubber, which defendants argued made the reissue for a different and broader invention than the original patent, and therefore void.

The court was of opinion, however, that on a fair construction the reissued patent claimed substantially the same invention as the original, and that the words or other vulcanizable gums," were merely added from abundant caution to cover the different varieties of india rubber or caoutchouc already known to commerce and more or less adapted to vulcanization.

On the subject of the reissue the court held that the judgment of the commissioner of patents in granting the reissue, though not conclusive of the substantial identity of the invention claimed in the original and the reissue, afforded a strong presumption to that effect, and in this case the court, for reasons above stated, was of opinion that the inventions were the same.

The court held, further, that the infringement was established, and in this part of the opinion discussed the vulcanizing process patented by Edward L. Simpson October 16th 1866, holding that the latter is merely an improved method, requiring the use of Goodyear's method and therefore an infringement of the latter.

EXTRADITION. In the case of Reno and Anderson, the express robbers, charged with assault with intent to murder, Chief Justice DRAPER, of the Court of Queen's Bench of Upper Canada (since promoted to the presidency of the Court of Appeal of the New Dominion), delivered at Toronto, October 1868, an elaborate opinion, marked with strong common sense and a liberal and statesmanlike view of the Extradition Laws. Of the merits of the numerous technical points as to the authority of the committing magistrate and the regularity of returns, &c., under the laws of Canada, we do not assume to speak; but on the point most strenuously urged, to wit, that the evidence for the prisoner clearly established an alibi, the Chief Justice puts his decision with great force and clearness on the true view of the law, that the duty of the magistrate is to inquire whether a case exists which would justify commitment if the crime had been alleged as done in Canada; the weighing of the evidence so as to decide on the prisoners' guilt, is no part of his duty, but of the jury's. The prisoners therefore were held for extradition.

The same remarks will apply also to the cases of Morton and Thompson, before the Court of Common Pleas of Canada, November 27th 1868. The principal point of law urged for the prisoners was, that the warrant issued in the United States after the arrest in Canada, and therefore the depositions on which it issued could not be read as evidence on the proceedings in Canada. The court, however, HAGARTY, C. J., and WILSON, J., delivering opinions, overruled the point, and held the prisoners.

INDIAN MARRIAGES.-In the case of Jacob Smith v. James H. Brown, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of Kansas, a question arose as to the validity of Indian marriages. GILCHRIST, J., charged the jury that under the Treaty of 1825 with the Kansas Nation, and the Acts of Congress, the marriage of a white man residing in the Indian country and an Indian woman, according to the customs and ceremonies of the Kansas Nation, was valid, and the descent of lands in the Kansas Indian reservation must be governed by the Indian law.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE.-The case of Southard v. Railway Passengers' Assurance Co., decided (July 1868) by Hon. WM. D. SHIPMAN, Judge of the U. S. District Court for Connecticut, acting as arbitrator, presents a question likely hereafter frequently to arise, viz., What is an accident?

The company had insured plaintiff against loss from "bodily injuries effected through violent and accidental means," and subject to certain conditions, one of which was as follows: "Provided always, that this

insurance shall not extend to any injury of which there shall be no visible sign, nor to any death or disability which may have been caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease."

The facts were, that plaintiff being on business at Newcastle, Del., made an engagement to meet a person at the depot, and on going there and not meeting him, got on board the train of cars; but, on being informed that there was another depot, some distance off, concluded to leave the train, and somewhat excited, as he says, jumped off from the rear end of the train. He felt no shock, and walked briskly to the other depot, where he found the man he was in search of. He remained there till about time for the next train, and then returned to the other depot. While going back, he heard what he supposed to be the train coming in, started suddenly, and ran to where he could see, and found that it was not the train, when he walked the rest of the way to the depot, took the cars, and returned to Philadelphia.

Some time during the journey from Newcastle to Philadelphia, and on the same day, he felt pain about one knee, but did not refer it to his movements at Newcastle.

After he arrived at Philadelphia, and had transacted some business, he called on a physician, and consulted him about dyspepsia, an old complaint with which he had for some time been more or less afflicted. The physician, while examining his person, found a partially-developed rupture on his right loin. Southard then referred it to his jumping off the cars, or to his running, at Newcastle.

This rupture increased, and, finally, for several weeks, disabled him from business. For this disability he claimed a weekly compensation, under his policy, for the time it continued.

The arbitrator held that this was not an accident within the policy.

STRIKING AN ATTORNEY FROM THE ROLL.-We have received a pamphlet report of the proceedings in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, ending in striking the name of Joseph Clark from the list of attorneys of that court. As the evidence proved a long series of crimes and misdemeanors, including what is perhaps the climax of professional villany, accepting a fee from a client and treacherously advising the adverse party, we only wonder that the court did not take this action long ago. J. T. M.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.'

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.2

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.3

BAILEE.

Conversion by-Where a bailee of goods absolutely refuses to deliver them to the owner, on demand; or assumes to be himself the owner; or

1 From the Judges; to appear in 47 or 48 N. H. Reports.

2 From Hon. O. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 51 of his reports. From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 56 Penna. State Reports.

interposes an unreasonable objection to delivering them; or exhibits bad faith in regard to the transaction; a conversion of the property may be inferred: Carroll v. Mix, 51 Barb.

But where the defendant received goods from B. without knowing who was the owner, but having every reason to suppose B. to be the owner, and, on demand being made by a third person claiming to be the owner, did not set up any claim to them, nor dispute the claimant's right; but stated, in substance, that he did not know the claimant was the owner; that the property was left by B., and that he desired the order of his father, or B., before delivering the same, or an opportunity to confer with his father in regard thereto; Held, that this was not such a refusal as amounted to a conversion of the goods: Id.

BILLS AND NOTES.

Interest-By what Law computed. The law of the place where a note, which stipulates for the payment of interest, is made, will govern as to the rate and rule for casting interest thereon, unless some other place of payment is stipulated, in which case the law of the place of payment will govern in that respect: Chase v. Dow, S. C. N. H.

But where, by the terms of a note, no interest is payable, the rule might be different: Id.

This rule would not be affected by the notes being secured by a mortgage on lands in another state where the rate of interest or the rule for casting it differed from that where the note was given, unless the circumstances show that the parties had in view the laws of the place where the land was located, in respect to the interest: Id.

BROKER.

His Authority-An agent employed to sell goods on commission is a mere broker. As such, he is authorized to make contracts for the sale and delivery of the goods, but is not authorized to make such contracts in his own name; nor to receive payment for the property so sold: Dunn v. Wright, 51 Barb.

Set-off by Purchaser, of Debt due from Broker.-Where goods thus sold by a broker are not intrusted to his possession, but are sent by the seller to the purchaser directly, with a bill or invoice thereof, and the purchaser receives the goods with notice that the broker does not own them and has no right to receive payment for them, he cannot set off a debt due to him from the broker, against the claim of the vendor, for the price Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Obligation of Contracts.-Alterations may be made in remedies, though the creditor may thereby be hindered and delayed, if they do not substantially deprive him of the right he had when the contract was made: Penrose v. The Erie Canal Company, 56 Penna.

A state legislature cannot enact that a debtor's property shall not be taken to satisfy his debt, if it was so liable when the debt was incurred: Id.

CRIMINAL LAW.

Searching the Persons and taking away Property of Prisoners.—If an

officer unlawfully obtains possession of a debtor's property, as by breaking into his dwelling-house, or arresting his person without proper authority to do so, for the purpose of attaching such property on mesne process or levying upon it on execution, such attachment or levy will be void Closson v. Morrison, S. C. N. H.

An officer who has arrested a prisoner on a warrant charging him with the commission of a crime, may ordinarily search him so far as to ascertain if he have deadly or dangerous weapons on his person or in his possession, and if such are found he may seize them and hold them until they can be safely returned or otherwise properly disposed of, if in good faith he believes such course necessary for his own or the public safety, or for the safe-keeping of the prisoner: Id.

If a prisoner has about his person money or other articles of value by means of which, if left in his possession, he might obtain tools or implements, or assistance or weapons, with which to effect his escape, the officer arresting him may seize and hold such for a time without being liable for a conversion of the property, if he acts in good faith and for the purposes aforesaid: Id.

It is a question of fact, in such cases, for the jury whether the officer taking such property from his prisoner acted in good faith or for a proper purpose, or in bad faith, with an improper and unlawful purpose: Id.

If an officer, having arrested a prisoner upon a warrant, should take money from his person simply for the purpose of getting possession of it, so that he might attach it on writs which he then held or was expecting to receive against the prisoner, his possession of the property being obtained fraudulently and unlawfully, the attachment which he might thus make would be void: Id.

But if the officer took the money from his prisoner in good faith and solely to secure his safe-keeping, and while he was thus properly and lawfully holding the money, a writ be put into his hands against the prisoner, he may lawfully attach the money, and such attachment will be valid: Id.

In such case, if there were no evidence upon the question of good faith in taking the money, or if, upon all the evidence, the jury should be unable to find a preponderance either way upon that question, the presumption should be in favor of the officer: Id.

ELECTIONS. See Quo Warranto.

ESTOPPEL.

A party who claims that another, seeking to enforce his rights, shall not be permitted to allege and show the truth, must establish that he had been induced by his faith in, or reliance upon, the assertions or acts of such party to the contrary, to do some act or incur some liability which would make it injurious to, or a fraud upon, him to allow such truth to be shown: Genlinghouse v. Whitwell, 51 Barb.

A party setting up an estoppel must be personally misled or deceived by the acts which constitute the estoppel alleged; and he must have a particular interest in such acts, more than the public at large. He must have trusted to them, and confided in them, in some particular business transaction: Id.