if a bill of lading has been given, the shipper must also indemnify the master or owner for the difference, if any, between the value of the goods when shipped and the amount which he may be compelled to pay to an assignee of the bill of lading: Bartlett v. Darnley, 6 Duer 194.

Disputes have sometimes arisen as to the amount of freight to be paid, generally either from a variation in the measurement of the cargo, or else from a discrepancy between the charter-party ⚫ or other written contract of affreightment and the bill of lading. In one case a vessel agreed to carry a cargo of cotton at an agreed rate "per ton of fifty cubic feet delivered." Previously to being loaded the cotton had been subjected to a high pressure, and so expanded considerably on being taken from the ship; whereupon the shipowners claimed freight according to the measurement when delivered. A custom was proved to pay freight, under such circumstances, according to the measurement when shipped; and it was held that, independently of such custom, freight was demandable only on the measurement shipped: Buckle v. Knoop, Law Rep. 2 Exch. 125 & 333; s. P. in Gibson v. Sturge, 10 Exch. 622. In these cases, had the cargoes shrunk instead of expanding, there can be no doubt that the ship would not have been liable to deliver more than it had received. In another late case a shipowner at L. requested the defendants to purchase goods for him at C.; and as the goods were to be on the owner's account he consented to a nominal rate of freight being inserted in the bills of lading. Before the order was completed he transferred the ship to the plaintiffs; but neither the defendants nor the shipmaster had any notice of this transfer. The defendants. accordingly procured and shipped the goods; and the master signed bills of lading therefor, with the clause, "Freight on said goods free on owner's account." Before the vessel arrived the consignee stopped payment, and the defendants thereupon claimed to stop the goods in transitu without paying anything for freight. Held, that they were not liable for any freight: Mercantile Bank v. Gladstone, Law Rep. 3 Exch. 233. Although the price named in the bill of lading is generally conclusive, Foster v. Colby, 3 H. & N. 705, Palmer v. Gracie, 4 Wash. C. C. 410, yet one party is not bound by it where the other knew that the master had no right to insert such a rate: Barnard v. Wheeler, 24 Me. 412.

The mortgagee of a vessel, who intervenes by taking possession,

or, where that is impossible, by giving notice to the mortgagor and the charterers before the freight is payable, but after it is earned, is entitled to the freight as against the assignee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor: Rusden v. Pope, Law Rep. 3 Exch. 269. The general question of the priority of claims has been much discussed in some late English cases: The Great Eastern, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 88; The Feronia, Id. 65; The Scio, 1 Id. 353; The Edward Oliver, 1 Id. 379; Brown v. Tanner, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 597; Bell v. Blyth, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 201.

As the right of lien upon the goods carried depends upon possession, it often becomes important to determine whether, under a charter-party, the possession and control of the ship remain in the general owners, or have passed to the charterers, who thus become owners for the voyage, or pro hac vice: Sandeman v. Scurr, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 86; Trinity House v. Clark, 4 M. & S. 288; Colvin v. Newberry, 1 Cl. & Fin. 283; Dean v. Hogg, 10 Bing. 345; Lucas v. Nockells, 4 Bing. 729; Reynolds v. Toppan, 15 Mass. 370; Pickman v. Woods, 6 Pick. 248; Drinkwater v. The Spartan, 1 Ware 149; Pitkin v. Brainard, 5 Conn. 451; Emery v. Hersey, 4 Greenl. 407; Clarkson v. Edes, 4 Cow. 470; Schooner Argyle v. Worthington, 17 Ohio 460; Holmes v. Pavenstedt, 5 Sandf. 497; McLellan v. Reed, 35 Maine 172; Eames v. Cavaroc, 1 Newb. Adm. 528; The Golden Gate, Id. 308; The Aberfoyle, 1 Abbott Adm. 242. In one case it was provided that the ship should receive on board at London all such goods as the freighter thought fit to load, proceed therewith to Madras, there deliver the outward cargo, receive from the freighter's agents a homeward cargo, and deliver the same in London. All the cabins but one, which was reserved for the captain, to be at the disposal of the freighter, who was to appoint the supercargo; the captain and crew were employed and paid by the owners. The court held that as there were no actual words of demise in the charter-party, the possession remained in the general owners: Saville v. Campion, 2 B. & Ald. 503. But in another case, although the charter-party did contain express words of present demise, yet taking the whole instrument into consideration, it was held that the possession did not pass to the freighters, but remained in the general owners: Christie v. Lewis, 5 Moore 211; s. c. 2 Brod. & B. 440. And the general rule is to follow the

intention of the parties, as they have expressed it in their written

contracts.

The principal questions that have arisen in regard to passengercarriers by water have concerned the treatment of the passengers by the officers of the ship. The master of the vessel is liable for any injury to a passenger caused by his negligence or wrongful act, either towards the passenger or in the management of the ship: Nieto v. Clark, 1 Cliff. C. C. 85; Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason 242; Young v. Fewson, 8 Car. & P. 55; Boyce v. Bayliffe, 1 Camp. 58; Malton v. Nesbitt, 1 Car. & P. 70. The ship is bound to furnish a good and sufficient supply of provisions; but an action for breach of this duty will not be sustained except for a real grievance: Young v. Fewson, 8 Car. & P. 55; The Aberfoyle, 1 Blatchf. C. C. 360. The captain may exclude passengers from the cabin-table for ungentlemanly conduct, though it would be hard to define the precise degree of want of polish which would justify such exclusion: Prendergast v. Compton, 8 Car. & P. 454. For an unlawful exclusion, the captain is liable: Ibid. And conversely; the passengers are entitled to courteous and proper treatment from the officers and crew of the vessel: West v. Steamer Uncle Sam, 1 McAll. C. C. 505; Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason 242; see McGuire v. Steamship Golden Gate, 1 McAll. C. C. 104. There is some doubt as to the extent of the authority of the captain of a merchant vessel to imprison a passenger for refusing, upon the approach of an enemy, to take the post assigned him: Boyce v. Bayliffe, 1 Campb. 58. But a passenger, by reason solely of his character as such, is under no such obligation to the ship as will deprive him of the right to recover for meritorious salvage services performed by him: Newman v. Walters, 3 Bos. & P. 612. But the services must be extraordinary. See 2 Parsons, Shipping & Admiralty, 2d ed., 268, note 5. A passenger assaulted by the shipmaster, has his remedy against the shipowners; but he can recover only his actual, and not vindictive damages: McGuire v. Steamship Golden Gate, 1 McAll. C. C. 104; Pearson v. Duane, 4 Wall. U. S. It has been held that the sale of a passage-ticket by a certain steamer does not constitute an unconditional contract to carry the person purchasing such ticket by that steamer; and if at the time of the sale, and without the knowledge of either party, the steamer was lost at sea, the holder of the ticket can recover no more than he paid

therefor: Bonsteel v. Vanderbilt, 21 Barb. 26; Briggs v. Same, 19 Id. 22; Williams v. Same, 29 Id. 491. See Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217; West v. Steamer Uncle Sam, 1 McAll. C. C. 505.

In some cases the liability of shipowners has been limited by statute to the value of the ship and freight at the time of the loss or injury: 7 Geo. 2, c. 15; 26 Geo. 3, c. 86; 53 Geo. 3, c. 159; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, § 503; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, § 54; 9 U. S. Stats. at Large 635; Mass. Gen. Stats. c. 52, §§ 18-21; Maine Rev. Stats. (1857), c. 35, §§ 5 & 6.

In a late case (Duckett v. Latterfield, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 227; see 13 C. B. N. S. 616) in England, it appears that by charter· party the charterer agreed to load a full and complete cargo of sugar in cases, or other lawful merchandise, at a certain rate per ton for sugar, and for other produce a rate proportionate to sugar in casks with sufficient bags, agreeably to the custom of the port for loading. The charterer loaded a full cargo of cotton, with sixty-one tons of stone for ballast, which would have been unnecessary if sugar had been loaded: Held, that a full cargo had been loaded, and that the charterers were not bound to furnish any bags for broken stowage with this cargo: Ibid. And under a charter-party, providing that a ship should proceed to a certain port "with all convenient speed, on being ready," delay for a few days from a deviation, unaccompanied by any serious loss to the freighters, does not justify them in abandoning the contract: McAndrew v. Chapple, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 643.

H. N. S.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

AMELIA A. KNIGHT v. THE PORTLAND, SACO, AND PORTSMOUTH RAILROAD COMPANY.

A through ticket over three several distinct lines of passenger transportation, issued in the form of three tickets on one piece of paper, and recognised by the proprietors of each line, is to be regarded as a distinct ticket for each line.

The rights of a passenger purchasing such a ticket, and the liabilities of the proprietors of the several lines recognising its validity, are the same as if the purchase had been made at the ticket office of the respective lines.

Common carriers of passengers are not bound to insure the absolute safety of their passengers; but they are required to exercise the strictest care consistent with the reasonable performance of their contract of transportation.

To render them liable for an injury to a passenger while under their charge, it is enough if it was caused solely by any negligence on their part, however slight, if, by the exercise of the strictest care and precaution, reasonably within their power, the injury would not have been sustained.

Where the plaintiff's ticket entitled her to a passage over the defendants' road to Portland, and by steamboat from Portland to Belfast; and the defendants had built their track upon their wharf down to the steamboat, and had run their passenger train upon it for a time, and still continued to run their baggage train there; and they directed their passengers verbally, or by printed sign, to use the wharf as a passage-way to the boat, and they did so use it; and they made the wharf subsidiary and necessary to the proper use and enjoyment of their road; in an action by the plaintiff to recover for an injury upon the wharf :- Held,

1. That the defendants are bound to exercise the same degree of care, in making the wharf safe and convenient for their through passengers to travel over, as is required of common carriers of passengers, although they required them to disembark at their depot, forty rods distant from the steamboat; and,

2. That this liability continued until, in the ordinary course of their passage over the wharf, they reached the point where the liability of the steamboat company commenced.

ON exceptions, and motion to set aside the verdict as being against the weight of evidence and excessive in amount of damages.

Case, for injury received at the slip on the defendants' wharf in Portland.

The defendants requested the presiding judge to instruct the jury:

1. That the defendants were under no obligations to carry the plaintiff beyond the point at which they regularly received and discharged passengers in Portland:

2. That, when they had safely carried the plaintiff from their station in Berwick to their station in Portland, and had safely delivered her from their depot in the latter place, their duty as carriers of passengers ceased:

3. That the wharf in Portland, used by the steamboat company for the purposes of its business, though owned by the defendants, was not such a part of the appliance of the defendants' railroad as the defendants, in their capacity of carriers of passengers, are responsible for the condition of:

4. That, if the jury should find that a slip or drop was neces sarv for the transaction of the business of the wharf, and it was