We might better have no courts, than to have them echo the varying surges of an ever-changing and baseless public sentiment. In a case like the present, it would be far better to have the court instruct the jury, in so many words, that the plaintiff's disregard of the common courtesies and decencies of life, justified the defendants in inflicting such punishment upon him, as would teach him not to repeat the offence, and to conduct with more circumspection in the future, than to have left the case to the jury, in such a slipshod way, as to bring about the same result exactly, but without any technical violation of the rules of law. And we must say, it seems to us that the charge of the court below, and the opinion of the full court, although clearly not so intended, must have operated in that direction. Possibly some may claim, that upon a nice construction, there was no error in law, and all agree that courts cannot be expected always to control the waywardness or the prejudices of juries. But this is generally urged, where courts desire to throw their own responsibility upon the irresponsibility of the jury. And it seems to us the charge to the jury, in this case, afforded the jury an excellent opportunity to punish the plaintiff, and at the same time to compliment the defendants for taking the plaintiff in hand, and applying the rules of Lynch law to him, in the summary mode they did. This was all very well, provided it were the business of courts to administer Lynch law, or to moderate the strictness of the existing law. But as that is not the fact, but the contrary, it seems a peculiarly unfortunate distinction which the court have attempted to make in this case, between compensatory and exemplary damages, and to allow of the mitigation of one and not of the other. If there be, in fact, any such distinction in the law, it should certainly be differently stated from what it seems to have been in the trial of this case, or it would be very likely to be misapplied by the jury, as it certainly was here. The error in the charge seems to be in treating "the injury to the plaintiff's feelings, the indignity and the public exposure," as forming no part of the actual damages in the action. Nothing could be further from the truth; since these things not only constitute a portion of the actual damages, but the principal portion. It is scarcely possible to conceive any proposition more unjust or unreasonable-not to say absurd-than to suppose that in a transaction like that, through which the plaintiff was dragged by the defendants, that the actual injury to his person and his detention" embraced all for which he was entitled to compensation under the head of actual damages. It is not probable, indeed, that the plaintiff was of that delicate organization, that he would be likely to suffer any irreparable damage merely from the insult and indignity, for if so, he could not have said what he did. But there are many persons who, from similar treatment, might have been ruined for life; and the rule of law is the same in all such cases. And there is no case, except the present, so far as we have noticed, which attempts to discriminate between corporeal and external injuries, and those which affect the sensibilities. These latter, are those which form the chief ingredient of damages in this class of actions. If these latter are to be excluded from consideration, or justified by public sentiment, there might better come an end of all pretence of the administration of justice. It is the direct and sure mode of encouraging a resort to force for remedy and redress. We know that some very able writers, and among them the late Prof. Greenleaf (2 Evidence, 253 and n. et seq.), contend for the rule, that in no case are exemplary or punitive damages to be given, but that in all cases they should be confined to making compensation to the plaintiff. But no writer, or judge, to our knowledge, has ever before attempted to limit the actual damages to which the plaintiff was in all cases entitled by way of compensation, to loss of time and injury to the person, in cases of trespass and false imprisonment. Mr. Sedgwick (Dam. 665, n. 1), says, that "all rules, or rather definite principles of damages in civil actions, must be referred either to compensation or punishment." No one, we suppose, would for a moment deny that the plaintiff, in an action of this character, is entitled to recover damages for "the injury to his feelings, the indignity, and the public exposure;" and it would seem to be equally improbable, that any one should hold, that such damages were in the nature of punishment to the defendant, and only recoverable under that head. The truth unquestionably is, in the present case, that the court have mistaken the application of their own rule, and thus, as it seems to us, have presented the whole case in a most unfortunate aspect-very much in that of an excuse and an apology, if not a full justification of Lynch law, than which nothing could have been further from its intention. We hope no one will be simple enough to suppose that we feel any other than the most unqualified disgust and contempt for such sentiments as were expressed by the plaintiff, on the occurrence of the most disgraceful, as well as the most unfortunate event, which has ever occurred in our past history. The only possible mode of accounting for such folly, in speech, is that folly on one side naturally leads to counter folly upon the other, and despotic public opinion naturally provokes foolish words. we trust it is not needful to inform the But profession, and especially the courts, in this country, that the high privilege of free speech is not created, or maintained, for the exclusive, or the chief benefit of wise and discreet men. They will do very well without any such protection. But it is intended for the protection of every class of the most ranting fools, and the vilest blackguards, and the most infamous blasphemers, except as they are liable to some restraint by the firm and wise administrators of the criminal and civil law of the land. These are the only men who require protection at the hands of the administrators of the law; and when we allow ourselves to be cheated with the delusion that the simple and degraded, or the offensive and coarse-grained, do not deserve the highest protection of the law, we approach a point of timeserving, which is but one degree removed from actual corruption, of which we already begin to hear charges, in some quarters, but we trust wholly without foundation. We regret, in this case, the affirmance of the principles of the charge in the court below by a court of such high character, although done in a mode, and for reasons, which show the high dignity and purity of the tribunal, and do also show, as it appears to us, that an unfortunate misapplication of the very principle upon which the case is decided, must have occurred in the court below. We know the learning and ability of the court from which the decision comes; and we are always proud to welcome its members among our most esteemed friends; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that the substantial damages in this action were blinked out of sight, and disregarded by the jury, upon grounds which are flagrantly in violation of the leading doctrine of the decision, viz., that actual and compensatory damages cannot be denied upon any ground of provocation short of an actual justification of the assault, battery, and false imprisonment, which was not attempted in this action. The testimony offered and received in mitigation of damages in this action, might well enough have been received, upon the question of punitive or exemplary damages, but it was not of a very satisfactory character upon that head even. The only portion of it which seems to afford any just apology for the flagrant misconduct of the defendants, was the stupid blunder of the provostmarshal in directing the plaintiff to be "detained." This had some fair tendency to vindicate the good faith of the defendants in arresting the plaintiff. But what can be said of their after-conduct in forcibly carrying the plaintiff three miles, and dragging him before a town meeting, and sentencing him to take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States? They might, with the same propriety, have sentenced him to be hanged, or burned to death. And if they had done so and carried the sentence into execution, and been indicted for murder, they should, so far as we can see, upon the principle of this decision, have been permitted to show the plaintiff's provoking bravado talk in mitigation of punishment-or possibly to reduce the verdict from murder to manslaughter. It does not seem to us that such evidence should have been permitted to go to the jury, upon either the first or second point made in the plaintiff's re quest to charge, and not upon the third, except so far as it tended to show that the defendants acted under a misapprehension of the law, and in good faith; for punitive or exemplary damages are not given with any reference to the plaintiff's misconduct, within the limits of the law, but solely on account of the malice and wanton misconduct of the defendants, and to admonish them, and others in like case, not to repeat the misconduct. Is there anything in the plaintiff's folly and bravado, naturally calculated to induce the defendants to believe they had any legal right to deal with him in the manner they did? Was not then the charge of the court, and the result of the trial, directly calculated to encourage such abuses of right, such flagrant breaches of the law? the conduct of the defendants malicious, wanton, and intentionally insulting and abusive? Can there be more than one opinion on these subjects? And was not the charge in the court below, the verdict of the jury, and the overruling of the exceptions, all calculated to encourage such conduct, and to discourage such actions? If so, can we fairly expect parties suffering like indignities to appeal to the tribunals for redress? And will not the result of such experiences, in courts of justice, sooner or later, end in a resort to force in all such cases? These are plain questions, but they are fundamental to the very existence of free states and private liberty, both of person and speech. I. F. R. Was not Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. GILLIS v. THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO.1 The platform of a railroad company at a station is in no sense a public highway. There is no dedication to public use as such. The platform is for the accommodation of passengers, and being unenclosed, persons have the privilege but have not the legal right of walking over it for other purposes. The owner of property is not liable to a trespasser or to one who is on it by mere permission or sufferance, for negligence of himself or servants, or for that which would be a nuisance in a public street or common. To persons who come on to a platform to meet or part with passengers, or who stand in such relation to the company as requires care, the company is bound to have the structure strong enough to bear all who could stand upon it. The owner is bound to have the approach to his house sufficient for all visitors on business or otherwise, but if a crowd gathers on it to witness a passing parade, &c., and it breaks down, though not sufficient for its ordinary use, he is not liable to one of the crowd who might be injured. ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria county. This was an action on the case for injuries sustained by the plaintiff by the breaking down of a platform of the defendants at the Johnstown station, Cambria county. The declaration contained four counts. The first count charged that the defendants, being a corporation for conveying freight and passengers, and having the sole control of the passenger depots, platforms, &c., along the road for the mutual accommodation of themselves and the public, built a platform at the Johnstown station, bridging a chasm over the bed of an abandoned canal, on which large numbers of people were in the habit of congregating, "as a matter of general custom;" and it was the duty of the defendant to construct the platform so as to make it safe and keep it in good repair; that it had come to the knowledge of the defendants that the timbers of the platform were rotten, and "insufficient to support a large multitude of people," but that they notwithstanding insufficiently repaired it; that on the 14th of September 1866, "on the occasion of the visit of Andrew Johnson, President, &c., and suite, to Johnstown," the defendants furnished a special train, and made a special time-schedule for their accommodation, by which the train was required to stop a longer We are indebted for this case to P. F. Smith, Esq., State Reporter.-ED. AM. L. R. time than usual for passenger trains at Johnstown, &c., the company notifying the people at Johnstown and vicinity of the time. of arrival and departure of the train at Johnstown, the stoppages being made by the direction of the defendants to give the people an opportunity of receiving Mr. Johnson and hearing him; that it had been publicly made known that wherever Mr. Johnson and his company had stopped large numbers of people congregated, and thereupon it became the duty of the defendants "to have the platform aforesaid made sufficiently strong to bear and uphold as many people as might congregate thereon on the occasion aforesaid;" that the defendants, knowing the insecure condition of the platform, did not use due diligence to have it made secure, but permitted and invited "a large multitude of people to congregate" thereon without notifying them or the plaintiff of its insecure condition; that the platform broke and precipitated the multitude with the plaintiff into the chasm, by which he was injured and wounded. The second count averred that the company carried Mr. Johnson and his party by agreement and for hire, and that the platform was part of the company's highway; the count was otherwise substantially as the first. The fourth count averred that the plaintiff went to the station on the occasion of Mr. Johnson's visit, at the defendants' special instance and request; that the train was not stopped at the usual place of stopping, but about two hundred yards beyond it, without giving notice to the people assembled, and to the plaintiff, and that the "plaintiff and the multitude were compelled to change their position to get a better view of the party," thereby causing them to congregate more numerously "on the insecure part of the platform;"-otherwise substantially as in the first count. The third count averred that the plaintiff was a passenger on the train, and got off the train on to the platform which broke, &c. The facts necessary for an understanding of this case appear to be substantially the following: At or near the Johnstown station of the defendants, their railroad crosses the canal constructed by the state, at an angle of about 25 degrees the canal being now abandoned; the passenger station and its platform are further west than the canal; eastwardly of this platform is a township bridge over the canal; that part of the canal between the railroad track and the township bridge is also planked over, making a continuous platform from the passen |