to state the fact of the receiving and the conveying of the real estate, the consideration, if any, he gave or received therefor, and what was said and done on the occasion. His testimony, if given, cannot do injustice to any one. The same facts have been proven by James Milligan in these proceedings. The deeds can be given in evidence, and although Mrs. Milligan cannot be compelled to testify to these facts in bankruptcy, still she can be made to do so by a bill in equity on the part of the assignee against herself, her husband and the witness to set aside said conveyance as fraudulent, &c., &c., as against the assignee in bankruptcy: 30 Barb. 506. The Court of Appeals in Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330, SELDEN, J., holds that the rule which protects professional communications of clients to their attorneys or counsel from disclosure should only extend to such communications as have relation to some suit or other judicial proceeding either existing or contemplated.

The testimony in this case is claimed only for the bankrupt, which brings it within the cases of Griffith v. Davis, 5 Barn. & Ald. 502; Shore v. Bedford, 5 Man. & G. 271; Weeks v. Argent, 16 M. & W. 816. In 30 N. Y. 342, INGRAHAM, J., says, "If he was only the counsel of Barney, then the decisions settle that the disclosures being made in the presence of a third party, they are not privileged." I think that for the purposes of this case Mrs. Milligan, the wife of the petitioner, who received the conveyance from the witness as property to her sole and separate use, must be considered as a third person. I have given the authorities as they were previous to the legislative enactments in this state in relation to the examination of parties as witnesses, which enactments are as follows: Any party in any civil suit or proceeding, either in law or equity, had before any court or officers, may require any adverse party, whether complainant, plaintiff, petitioner or defendant, or any one of said adverse party, any and every person who is beneficially interested in said suit or proceedings, though not nominally as parties, to give testimony under oath in such suit or proceeding; and such adverse party may be examined orally, or under a commission, in the same manner as persons not parties to such suit or proceeding, and who are com petent witnesses therein; and such party may be subpoenaed and his attendance as a witness compelled, or he may be examined by a commission, or conditionally, or his testimony perpetuated in the same manner as any competent witness.

"The court or officer before whom such suit or proceeding may be had, shall have power to dismiss the bill, petition, or proceeding of any party, or any part thereof, with costs, or nonsuit any party, or strike out or disregard any defence or any part thereof of any party who shall refuse to testify.

"Any party in any suit or proceeding as aforesaid shall be required, to entitle him to examine the adverse party as a witness in any suit or proceeding, to give testimony therein in the same manner as the attendance of witnesses in ordinary cases."

The Act of Congress, July 16th 1862, provides :—

"That the laws of the state in which the court shall be held, shall be the rules * * * as to the competency of witnesses in the court of the United States."

In this case the rights and privileges of the attorney and his duty to his clients, are entirely separate and distinguished from his rights and duties as purchaser and vendor. The transaction in relation to the purchase and sale of the real estate was not a part and parcel of, or in and about any lawsuit in which he was counsel for either the petitioner or his wife. It therefore stands as a transaction of purchase and sale of real estate, the witness purchasing the real estate of Mr. Milligan, and selling the same to Mrs. Milligan, his wife, two days thereafter.

It is claimed by the assignee in bankruptcy that this was a mere fraud and cover, that it was a mere formal transfer of the real estate from the husband to the wife, using the name of the witness as a mere go-between, so that the conveyance might technically conform to the letter of the Act of 1849 regulating the property-rights of married women, and at the same time defeat the spirit and intent of the law; that the wife acquired no legal or vested rights therein by said conveyance other than her contingent right of dower to which she was previously entitled.

I find that previous to the Act of 1847, and the acts amendatory thereunto, an attorney occupied the same position as his client in relation to giving testimony, and was privileged as to all matters which his client could not be compelled to disclose. But now, whenever and wherever the client can be compelled as a witness to testify to any fact, then the attorney must also testify; the statutes of this state having abrogated the former common-law rule to that effect.

That the witness in this case is not privileged, as the mere act of receiving and conveying the title to real estate about which there has not been any action pending, does not bring him within the former common-law rule, as to privileged communications to attorneys and counsel, and since the enactment of 1847 no such privilege exists which can be claimed for the witness in this case. That the questions are pertinent to the issue and proper, and the witness must answer.

BLATCHFORD, J.-On the facts stated by the Register, the five questions set forth were proper, and must be answered by the witness, and are not within the privilege of confidential communications between attorney and client.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.1

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.2

ASSUMPSIT.

Transfer of Contract.-Thompson contracted to buy an interest in two oil-wells, afterwards an oil company was incorporated to which Thompson transferred his interest, the vendors in the mean time receiving and selling the oil; by agreement, the vendors made the deed to the corporation, and dated it back to the date of the contract, agreeing to deliver Thompson's share of the oil to the company: Held, that assumpsit in the name of the company for oil received by the vendors between the contract and the incorporation could be maintained: Snow v. Thompson Oil Co., 59 Pa.

The facts constituted an original contract between the vendors and the company: Id.

BANKS.

Usage-Special Deposits-Contracts for Payment in Coin. On the 30th of December, 1861, A. sent to the Chesapeake Bank $3000, in gold coin of the United States, which in accordance with a previous agreement, was received as a special deposit, and entered on the bankbook of A., as follows: "1861, Dec. 30th, Cash (coin) $3000." At the date of this deposit, the banks of the state had suspended specie payments, and gold coin was at a small premium. A. drew two checks

From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 29 Md. Rep. 2 From P. Frazer Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 59 Pa. Rep. VOL. XVII.-48

on the bank for the amount so deposited-one dated the 27th of May, 1864, for $3000, in gold coin," the other dated 28th May 1864, for $3000, “in coin." When the first was presented gold was refused, and notes were offered, which were declined; and the like occurred with the second check. The bank-book of A. was balanced at different times between the date of the deposit and the dates of the checks, and the balance of money in bank to A's credit was never under $3000. On the 28th of May 1864, gold was at eighty-five and eighty-six-and-a-half premium. On the 2d of July 1864, A. brought his action against the bank to recover the amount of the deposit in specie. Held:

That the single entry in the bank-book of the plaintiff of the deposit made on the 30th of December 1861, apart from the other entries in the book, was admissible as evidence on his behalf for the purpose of verifying the testimony of the witness, who testified as to the circumstances of the deposit, and of showing the nature of the entry itself, as indicative of the character of the deposit-the defendant being at liberty to use the other entries;

That the plaintiff could properly introduce evidence to show, that according to the general and well-known usage of the banks in the city of Baltimore, existing before and at the time of the deposit, and ever since, the entry in his bank-book imported an agreement on the part of the defendant to return the deposit in kind;

That the subsequent payment of checks, and the striking of balances in the bank-book of the plaintiff, from time to time, did not necessarily extinguish the special deposit;

That if the contract between the plaintiff and defendant be established, as alleged by the former, then he is entitled to recover in specie the amount of the coin so deposited, with interest thereon payable in like currency, from the time of the demand;

Whether the Legal Tender Acts of Congress be constitutional or otherwise, a contract which provides for payment in coin, may be enforced in conformity with its stipulations, and judgment may be rendered for the amount in coin, and the same enforced by execution, on which coin only shall be collected: Chesapeake Bank v. Swain, 29 Md.

BROKER.

Commissions. A broker, to be entitled to his commissions for negotiating a sale of property, must find a purchaser in a situation, and ready and willing to complete the purchase according to the terms agreed on, and who ultimately becomes the purchaser: Kimberly v. Henderson, 29 Md.

CONGRESS.

Act of 1864 as to Compensation to Members for Services.-A., a lawyer, was a candidate for Congress at the election in 1864: neither he nor his competitor received a certificate of election. On the 20th of April 1865 he procured from the war department the discharge of a drafted man, under a contract previously made. On the 19th of February 1866, he obtained his seat on his prima facie case and was ousted July 16. Held, that the contract was not in violation of the Act of Congress of June 11th 1864, prohibiting members of Congress, &c., from receiv

ing compensation for services before a department, &c.: Bowman v. Coffroth, 59 Pa.

A. was not a member of Congress within the meaning of the act: Id. The contract was against public policy and void, whether compensasation for the services was fixed or contingent: Id.

CONTRACT. See Congress.

Privilege on Another's Land.-Cowan by writing granted to Johnston and others as partners, the privilege to take clay from his land for twenty years at 12 cents per ton; to pay $150 at the end of every six months, although they should not then have taken away so much clay as would amount to that sum. Held, that the writing was an instrument for the payment of money within the Affidavit of Defence Law: Johnston et al. v. Cowan, 59 Pa.

The plaintiff by a special count set out that the defendants agreed in writing to pay him "$150 on the 1st of October 1866, $150 on the 1st of April 1867, $150 on the 1st of October 1867, and $150 on said days semi-annually thereafter, a copy of which agreement is hereto attached," &c. Held, to be sufficiently specific for the court to order a liquidation by the prothonotary: Id.

Filing the agreement was of itself a copy of the claim, and no more could be recovered than was due on it: Id.

The writing was an agreement to pay for the privilege of taking clay whether exercised or not: Id.

The sums to be paid if the minimum of clay was not taken out were liquidated damages, being a payment for a privilege and the contract not being a mere license: Id.

The agreement was signed by the grantor, and the firm name was signed " per J. R.," one of them. Held, that if the grant of an interest in land, it was a sufficient signing within the Statute of Frauds: the owner having signed and that bound him: Id.

The owner who conveys must be bound by writing, but the other party for anything contained in the statute need not so be bound: Id.

CORPORATIONS. See Railroad.

Contracts ultra vires.-The Maryland Hospital agreed with F., in consideration of $1200, to support his sister, then a lunatic patient in the institution, for the remainder of her life. The money was paid. F. also fully paid for the support of his sister to the 1st of July 1863, and the sum paid in commutation relieved him from that date from any further charge in the future for her support. The lunatic died on the 12th of August 1864. Subsequently, F. sued the hospital to recover back the sum he had paid under the contract, less the necessary expenses incurred in the support of his sister, from the 1st of July 1863 to the 12th of August 1864. Held: :

1st. That the hospital had no power under its charter to make this contract with F.; it was ultra vires not binding on the corporation, and could not have been enforced in favor of F.;

2d. That the contract was neither malum in se nor malum prohibitum, and the parties to it were not in pari delicto, and F. was entitled to recover back the sum paid by him, less the amount properly charge