BANKRUPTCY.

78. May fill up blank, issue summons, &c., and proceed the same as the
judge when there is no controversy. Re Brandt, 243.

79. Has power to order the payment of fees and expenses out of funds in
the hands of assignee. Re Lane, 243.

80. Must exercise proper legal discretion to prevent unnecessary and unrea-
sonable delays. Re Hyman, 243.

XI. Costs.

81. Compensation of counsel for petitioning creditors in involuntary bank-
ruptcy, is taxable as part of the costs of the proceedings, and payable out of
the fund realized. Matter of O'Hara, 113.

82. But the principle does not extend to give petitioning creditors a right
to contribution from the other creditors in case of failure to realize a sufficient
fund to pay expenses and counsel fees. Id.

83. Bankrupt summoned by creditor as a witness is not entitled to witness
fees. Re McNair, 243.

84. Party for whom services are performed by the officers of the court,
must pay the fees incident to such services. Re Mealy, 243.

85. Travel by United States marshal as messenger to make return, is
necessary, and five cents a mile is proper charge therefor. Re Talbot, 243.

86. Charge of ten cents per folio for preparing notices is not proper. Id.
87. An item for attendance is improper charge. Id.

BILLS AND NOTES. See ASSIGNMENT; CHECK, 1; EVIDENCE, 13; EXE-
CUTION, 7; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8; STAMPS, 2-4-6; SURETY, 4.

I. Rights and Liabilities of Parties.

1. The law of the place, where note stipulating for payment of interest is
made, will govern as to rate and rule of casting interest thereon.
Chase v.
Dow, 59.

2. A note payable on demand, and negotiated ten months after it was exe-
cuted, is subject to the equities of the original parties, in the hands of an
innocent holder. Morey v. Wakefield, 510.

3. A note due one day after date, with an agreement in writing that the
obligees in the note shall have five years to pay it in, cannot be sued on until
the expiration of the time, and the Statute of Limitations will not begin to run
until then. Round v. Donnell, 575.

4. Guaranty of a note, not distinguishable from a general letter of credit,
and suit may be maintained in name of person given credit on its faith.
Northumberland Bk. v. Eyer, 630.

5. A guaranty is not assignable so as to enable the assignee to sue on it in
his own name. ld.

6. B. made a note payable to J. S. endorsed it: afterwards J. endorsed.
it and it was discounted by a bank for J. Held, that S. was not liable either
to the bank or to J. without evidence dehors that he had assumed the liability.
Schafer v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 684.

7. The mere endorsement in such case did not authorize the holder to write
a guaranty over it, but a special original agreement might be established by
proof.
Id.

8. The payee, who was also an endorser, was incompetent to testify to
such a special agreement of the irregular endorser. Id.

9. The endorsement is not a note in writing, as required by the Act of April
26th 1855 (Frauds). Id.

10. The proof of a collateral liability for the debt of the maker different
from that which the endorsement imports cannot be made by parol. Id.
II. Demand and Notice.

11. Any act of endorser tending to put holder of note off his guard, is in
law a waiver of demand and notice. Sheldon v. Horton, 575.

12. Notice of dishonour left at post office where there is daily delivery suf-
ficient. Shoemaker v. Mechanics' Bank, 693.

BOND. See PARTNERSHIP, 4; STAMPS, 5.

Recovery on bond assigned as collateral security, for amount less than face

BOND.

of bond does not satisfy and extinguish the bond as against the obligee.
Brumagin v. Chew, 125.

BOUNTY. See PARENT AND CHILD, 2.

1. The right of a person who has enlisted, on a promise to be paid such
bounty as a town may vote, cannot be defeated by a subsequent vote to rescind.
Haven v. Town of Ludlow, 502.

2. A commissioned officer is not entitled to bounty. Hilliard v. Stewarts-
town, 569.

BRIDGE. See NEGLIGENCE, 1-2.

BROKER.

1. An agent employed to sell goods on commission is a mere broker, and
as such is authorized to make contracts for the sale and delivery, but cannot
make them in his own name nor receive payment therefor. Dunn v. Wright,

59.

2. Can sign contract of sale. Pringle v. Spaulding, 569.

3. Where an agent is interested as for commissions as a factor or broker,
and a contract is made in his name, he may maintain an action on it in his own
name. Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 692.

4. Where a broker sent by telegraph, in his name, an order for the purchase
of gold on behalf of his principal, which was never transmitted, he may sue in
his own name and recover the full amount of damages resulting from the
breach of contract.

Id.

5. Is only entitled to commissions when the purchase is completed as
agreed on. Kimberly v. Henderson, 754.

CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, &c.

Commonwealth. Shelby, 13 S. & R. 354, explained. Okeson's Appeal,

1. Received in payment of a draft, if not paid, will not make the draft in-

valid as an obligation. Kelty v. National Bank of Erie, 438.

2. Is subject to the same rule as draft, as to time of presentment. Id.

CHARITABLE USES. See WILL, 2.

The object of the statute of charitable uses in England was not to restrain
gifts to such uses, but to enforce and make valid such gifts in certain cases in
which they had before been held void because the object was too vague and in-
definite. Norris et al. v. Thompson's Ex'rs. et al., 244.

CITIZEN. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, 11; NUISANCE, 1.

COIN. See LEGAL TENDER NOTES, 2-3; BANK, 4.

1. Gold paid into Court, on a conditional verdict in ejectment, prior to the

COIN.

Legal Tender Law, cannot be recovered in an action of trover subsequently
to the passage of the Law. Aurentz v. Porter, 61.

2. The clause in the Act of Congress of February 25th 1862, and two sub-
sequent acts, making notes of United States a legal tender for debts, has no
reference to taxes imposed by state authority. Lane County v. Oregon, 251.
3. A contract to pay in gold and silver coin is a contract to deliver a cer-
tain weight of gold and silver. Butler v. Horwitz, 443.

4. Where it appears to be the clear intent of a contract that payment is to
be made in gold or silver, damages should be assessed in coin, and judgment
entered accordingly. Id.

5. Whether the Legal Tender Acts of Congress be constitutional or other-
wise, a contract which provides for payment in coin, may be enforced in
conformity with its stipulations, and judgment may be rendered for the
amount in coin, and the same enforced by execution, on which coin only shall
be collected. Chesapeake Bank v. Swain, 754.

COMMON CARRIER. See RAILROAD, 10.

1. The responsibility of an express company is the same as that of a car-
rier, and it cannot exempt itself from liability for loss from negligence, by
an exception in a receipt. Belger v. Dinsmore, 185.

2. The owners of a steamboat, employed in towing boats for hire, are not
common carriers and hence not insurers. Wooden v. Austin, 189.

3. Parties undertaking to tow a boat from one place to another are bound
to do so, unless prevented by causes to which at least gross negligence on
their part does not contribute. Id.

4. Will not be liable for breach of contract to tow a vessel, where he was
prevented by the freezing of the river, that being an act of God. Worth v.
Edmonds, 308.

5. One transportation company, receiving freight from another, is entitled
to the benefit of all stipulations affecting its liability made by the latter with
the owner. Manhattan Oil Co. v. Camden and Amboy Railroad,*309.

6. The holder of a railway passenger ticket is only entitled to passage with
such personal baggage as he carries with him at the time. Baggage sent by
an after train will be at his risk, and not that of the company. Wilson v.
Railway Co., 398.

7. Of passengers is bound to exercise the very highest degree of care and
diligence, and liable for the smallest negligence. Taylor v. Grand Trunk
Railway, 575.

8. Where goods were delivered to one company in a connected line of trans-
portation, dividing the freight according to their respective services, and were
described in the bill of lading, as received by the company to whom delivered
and to be transported throughout the line, that company was held responsible
for any damage occurring upon any portion of the line, on the ground of an
implied contract to deliver safely at the end of the route. Morse v. Brainerd,

604.

9. A steamboat towing three loaded barges down the Mississippi river, in
approaching bridge piers too closely to back or stop, the tow is driven against
a pier by a sudden and unanticipated gust of wind: the carrier is not liable
for loss or injury of the cargo of one of the barges. Insurance Co. v. Steam-
boat Lady Pike, 614.

CARRIERS BY WATER, 641.

CONFEDERATE STATES. See FRAUD, 4; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5.

1. A purchaser at a judicial sale under the judgment of the state court who
has paid only in Confederate notes cannot be regarded as a bona fide purchaser
who has paid. Cuyler v. Ferrill, 100.

2. A contract, the consideration of which was Confederate treasury notes,
made by citizens residing within the lines of the so-called Confederacy, is legal
and valid. Miller v. Gould, 310.

3. The so-called Confederate Government was not in the proper legal sense
a de facto governnment during the late rebellion. Chisholm v. Coleman, 693,
4. A judge of the Circuit Court of Alabama, who entered the service of the

CONFEDERATE STATES.

Confederate States, forfeited and vacated his office of judge under the state.
Chisholm v. Coleman, 693.

5. The Act of Congress of 1862, ch. 195, does not prevent a party who was
in the Confederate army from acquiring property after the close of the war.
Thomas v. Hunter, 699.

6. The Confederate States, though not a de facto government in the highest
sense of that term, were a government of paramount force having actual su-
premacy within certain territorial limits, and therefore a de facto government
in such a sense as madc civil obedience to their authority the duty of the inhabit-
ants of the territory under their control. Thorington v. Smith, 739.

7. Confederate notes as contracts in themselves are nullities, but they must
be regarded as a currency imposed on the citizens of the insurrectionary states
by irresistible force, and therefore contracts for payment in such currency,
made between citizens of the Confederacy in the ordinary course of civil busi-
ness and without direct intent to assist the insurrection, are valid, and will be
enforced by the courts of the United States. Id.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

Debt contracted in foreign country is payable there, and in the legal cur-
rency of such country. Benners v. Clemens, 630.

CONGRESS.

A lawyer who is a candidate for Congress, but has no certificate of election,
receiving compensation for professional services before a department, between
the time of his election and taking his seat, is not within the Act of June 11th
1864. Bowman v. Coffroth, 755.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

I. Power of the Executive.

THE PRESIDENT'S POWER OF GENERAL AMNESTY, 513, 577.

II. Power of Legislature. See VESSEL, 2; WITNESS, 2.

1. The Act of the Legislature of Connecticut of 1864, called the Flowage
Act, is not unconstitutional. Todd v. Austin, 9.

2. It is no objection to proceedings under the Flowage Act, that the mill is
not on the same tract of land upon which the dam is sought to be erected. Id.
3. The act entitled "An act making the county treasurer of San Joaquin
county ex officio tax collector," passed April 2d 1866, was not designed to
fill a vacancy in the office of tax collector, but it was to make the treasurer,
instead of the sheriff, of San Joaquin county tax collector. In so far as the
act provides for the transfer of said office to take place before an election of
such treasurer occurs, it is unconstitutional and void. People v. Kelsey, 119.
4. The legislature has the constitutional power by enactment to divest an
officer of an ex officio office to which he had been elected and duly qualified,
by a repeal of the law under which he became invested therewith, provided,
where such office be created under the Constitution, such repeal does not in
effect abolish such office. Id.

5. In such case, however, this power does not extend to the transfer of an
ex officio office which, under the Constitution, is required to be filled by election,
to the incumbent of another office who has not been elected to such ex officio
office. Id.

6. The constitutional right of the citizens of one state to sue the citizens of
another in the Federal Courts, cannot be defeated by statutory limitation.
Cowles v. Mercer, 247.

7. The Act of July 3d 1863, of the legislature of New Hampshire, so far as
it deprives the owner of a dog of a trial by jury, is unconstitutional. East
Kingston v. Towle, 569.

8. Land taken by the public for a highway and paid for, cannot be donated
to former owner without any consideration. People v. Commissioners of
Highways of Palatine, 630.

9. A right conferred by the Constitution is beyond legislative interference.
McCafferty v. Guyer, 694.

10. The Act of June 11th 1866 (for disfranchising deserters) is unconsti-
tutional. Id.

VOL. XVII.-49

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

III. Judicial Power.

11. Where a person was regularly indicted, convicted, and sentenced under
proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction, the fact that the judge who
presided at the trial and passed sentence was within the class prohibited from
holding office by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, does not make the sentence a nullity nor entitle the prisoner to
a discharge on habeas corpus. Ex parte Griffin, 358.

12. The third section of the fourteenth amendment did not by its own
direct and immediate effect, remove from office persons lawfully appointed or
elected before its passage, though they may have been ineligible to hold such
office under the prohibition of the amendment. Legislation by Congress was
necessary to give effect to the prohibition by providing for removal. Id.

13. The exercise of their official functions by these officers until femoved
in pursuance of such legislation is lawful and valid. Id.

14. The government of Virginia formed at Wheeling by the loyal citizens
of the state after the passage of the ordinance of secession by the convention
at Richmond, having been recognised by the executive and legislative depart-
ments of the national government, must be treated by the courts of the United
States as the lawful government of the state. Id.

15. The Supreme Court of the United States cannot acquire jurisdiction
of a cause through an order of a circuit court. The Alicia, 446.
IV. Regulation of Commerce.

66

16. The term commerce," as employed in section 8, art. 1, of the Con-
stitution of the United States, is not limited to an exchange of commodities
only, but includes the transportation of passengers. People v. Raymond, 118.

17. When the Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional right, has by
its legislation established regulations of commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, its authority is paramount and exclusive, and its
enactments supersede all state legislation on those subjects. Id.

18. By the enactment of section 285 of the United States Internal Revenue
Act, 2 Bright. Dig. 271, the Act of August 30th 1852, and the Act of March
6th 1855, 10 U. S. Stat. at Large 61, 715, Congress has undertaken to regu-
late the entire business of transporting passengers by sea. Id.

19. The act entitled "an act to provide revenue for the support of the
government of the state of California, from a tax upon foreign and inland bills,
passengers, insurances, and other matters, passed May 14th 1862, is a regula-
tion of commerce within the meaning of section 8, Art I. of the Federal Con-
stitution, and therefore unconstitutional and void. Id.

V. Obligation of Contracts.

20. Alterations may be made in remedies, if they do not deprive a creditor
of rights he had when the contract was made. Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 59.
VI. Taking Private Property.

21. The provision of the state constitution of Connecticut, that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is not a
grant of power to the legislature, but a restriction upon the right of eminent
domain. Todd v. Austin, 9.

22. The legislature may lawfully grant rights of easement to individuals or
corporations, to enable them to erect and operate structures, the result of
which will be beneficial to the public. Id.

CONTRACT. See COIN, 3-4, 5; COMMON CARRIER, 4; CONFEDERATE STATES,
2; STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 3.

1. The rule of comity adopts the law of the country where the contract is
made, in determining its nature, construction, and validity, unless such con-
struction is contra bonos mores, or against some positive law of the place
where the contract is sought to be enforced. B. & O. Railroad Co. v. Glenn,

247.

2. No right can be derived under any contract made in express opposition
to the laws of the place in which such contract is made. Id.

3. A simple request to do an act, will not constitute a contract which is bind-
Wells v. Mann, 378.

ing.