HUSBAND AND WIFE.

and the latter move on the land with the assistance of A., pay part of the
taxes, make valuable improvements and continue to reside on it for six years,
the gift will be treated in equity as in the nature of a contract executed, and
A. will not be allowed to recover possession of the land during the life of B.
or his wife. Freeman v. Freeman, 29.

9. If B. should abandon the land and either directly or by neglecting to
appear and defend, connive with A. to eject the wife, the latter will neverthe-
less be entitled to a judgment in her favor for her own life.

Id.

10. A husband's appropriation of money belonging to his wife's separate
estate, does not make them debtor and creditor, even when done with the
wife's consent. Kuhn v. Stansfield, 312.

11. A conveyance to husband and wife and their heirs prior to 1850, con-
stituted in Kentucky, as at common law, an estate by entireties, which neither
husband nor wife could sever or make liable for debts as against the other.
Elliott v. Nichols, 433.

12. The statute of 1850, abolishing the right of survivorship and turning
the estate into a tenancy in common, is not retrospective. Id.

13. The husband and wife cannot enter into a mortgage of her statutory
separate estate for the purpose of subjecting it to sale for the payment of the
husband's debts; and if they do, a court of chancery will not permit the
mortgage to be enforced by sale of the wife's separate estate, if she objects to
it. Bibb v. Pope, 490.

IV. Actions by and against Husband and Wife. See SPECIFIC PERFORM-
ANCE, 2.

14. Since the acts of the legislature of New York of 1860, chap. 90, and
of 1862, chap. 172, a married woman may bring an action in her own name
against a wrong-doer, for a wrong committed upon her person, without join-
ing her husband with her as a party. Ball v. Bullard, 381.

INFANT.

See PARENT AND CHILD, 3; REVERSION And Remainder.

1. May recover for an injury caused partly by his own imprudent act, but
the father cannot. Glassey v. Hestonville Railway Co., 315.

2. To a child of tender years no contributory negligence can be imputed.
North Penna. Railroad v. Mahony, 315.

3. The contracts of infants are:-

(1). Binding-when for necessaries at fair rates;

(2). Void-when manifestly and necessarily prejudicial; and

(3). Voidable, at the infants' election, either during minority or within a
reasonable time after attaining majority: including all executory agreements
not for necessaries, and all executed contracts of this sort wherein the other
party can be placed substantially in statu quo. Robinson v. Weeks, 554.

4. May recover for what he has done in execution of a voidable contract,
by restoring what he received under it. Heath v. Steevens, 574.
INJUNCTION. See EQUITY, 5-6; NUISANCE, 2; TRADE-MARK, 5; WASTE.
INNKEEPER.

A guest is not relieved from all responsibility in respect to his goods on
entering an inn. He is bound to use reasonable care and prudence in respect
to their safety, so as not to expose them to unnecessary danger of loss.
Read v. Amidon, 507.

INSOLVENT. See BANKRUPTCY, 1; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, II.
INSURANCE. See DAMAGES, 7; PARTNERSHIP, 16.

1. The words "totally disabled from the prosecution of his usual employ-
ment," in an accident insurance policy, mean wholly disabled from doing
substantially all kinds of his accustomed labor, to some extent. A disability
that prevents his doing as much in a day's work as before is not total, but one
that entirely prevents his doing certain portions of his accustomed work is
total, though there are other portions that he is able to do. Sawyer v. U. S.
Casualty Co., 233.

2. Making brooms by hand, does not come within the prohibition "mills

INSURANCE.

and manufactories," in a policy of insurance. Franklin Ins. Co v. Brock,

312.

3. A premium above the usual rate, is some evidence that a more than
usual risk was assumed. Id. 313.

5. An "accident" within the meaning of a policy of insurance means an
event which happens from some external violence or vis major, and which is
unexpected, because it is from an unknown cause, or is an unusual result of a
known cause. Schneider v. Life Ins. Co., 349.

6. Negligence of the person injured does not prevent it from being an
accident. Id.

7. Therefore in an action on a policy of insurance against accident, the
the negligence of the insured is no defence. Id.

8. A policy of insurance against accident contained a clause against liability
for injury resulting from the assured" wilfully and wantonly exposing him-
self to any unnecessary danger." The assured attempted to get on a train of
cars while in slow motion, and fell and was killed. Held, that the negligence
was not wilful or wanton, and the company were liable. Id.

9. Under an agreement to insure generally, an agent should obtain full
insurance if possible. Beardesley v. Davis, 378.

10. The assignee, of a payee who had an insurable interest, is entitled to
recover for a loss. Franklin v. National Ins. Co., 380.

11. A temporary insurance, effected without notice to the original insurer,
but not existing at the time of the loss, will not invalidate the policy.
meyer v. Globe Ins. Co., 380.

Ober-

12. The maxim of "causa proxima non remota spectatur," applied in insur-
ance cases. Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 442.

13. Insurance effected in the name of one of two owners of goods, upon the
representation of an agent that such is correct, may be recovered in case of
loss, by a suit in the nume of the party to whom the policy is issued. Man-
hattan Ins. Co. v. Webster, 757.

INTEREST. See FRAUD, 3; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 10.

1. Agreement to call at obligor's office for interest on bond and mortgage,
does not make the office the only legal place for payment.
McCotter v. De
Groot, 125.

2. Equity will relieve obligor against breach of condition in consequence
of such agreement.

Id.

3. Interest warrants or coupons in a negotiable form, draw interest after
payment of them is unjustly neglected or refused. Aurora v. West, 250.
INTERNAL REVENUE.

A written protest signed by the party, is a condition precedent to the right
to sue for the recovery of duties paid under the Act of February 26th 1845.
Nichols v. United States, 255.

INTERNATIONAL LAW. See PRIZE.

1. An officer commanding troops of the United States in an insurgent state,
during the late civil war, scized property of a citizen of the state, and after
acquiring firm possession, sold it to a third person. After the war the owner
at the time of the seizure brought an action of trover for the value of the
cotton against the purchaser, in the Circuit Court of the United States. Held,
that the Court had no jurisdiction, the seizure was made as an act of war, and
its validity was not triable in a municipal court, in a common-law proceeding.
Coolidge v. Gutherie, 22.

2. That this defence was admissible under the general issue in trover. Id.
3. That after complete possession of the cotton by the captor for twenty-four
hours it became booty by the laws of war, and the title of the hostile owner
was completely extinct. If the plaintiff in this case had any right it was
against the United States. Id.

4. All species of contracts or commercial intercourse, whether direct or
indirect, between subjects of different powers at war, are invalid. Billgery
v. Branch, 334.

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

5. The late contest between the United States and the Confederate States
was a war. Bitgery v. Branch, 334.

6. The government of the Confederate States being a government de facto
only, had jurisdiction and gave national character only to such parts of the
territory of the several states as were under its actual control. Id.

7. While therefore the city of New Orleans was under the authority of the
Confederacy, its citizens were citizens of the Confederacy and enemies of the
United States; but when the city passed into the hands of the Federal forces,
it became again part of the United States, and its citizens became enemies to
the Confederate States. Id.

8. Where a citizen of Richmond drew a draft upon a citizen of New Orleans
in 1862, after the capture of the latter city by the United States forces, and
the payce, in February 1863, endorsed the draft to another, a citizen of Vicks-
burg, within the Confederate States, who held it until October 1863, and then
presented it to drawee, at New Orleans, who refused payment, and the draft
was then protested: Held, that this was an illegal act, and the holder could
not recover. Id.

9. This is so whether the contract be held void under the general rules of
international law or under the Act of Congress of July 13th 1861. Id.

10. Where the debtor and the creditor's known agent to receive the money,
reside in the same jurisdiction, the fact that the creditor is a citizen of a
power at war with the debtor's government, and resident in the hostile state,
does not absolve the debtor from his obligation to pay, and if he does not, he
is liable for interest. Ward v. Smith. 354.

11. When the United States forces, during the late war, acquired firm oc-
cupation of part of an insurrectionary state, the citizens of that part occupied
were restored to their relations as citizens of the United States, and contracts
between them and other citizens became valid. Graham v. Merrill, 477.

12. The Act of July 13th 1861, and the Proclamation of the President of
August 16th 1861, authorized, 1. Unrestricted commercial intercourse between
the citizens of loyal states and of those parts of insurgent states in occupation
of the Federal forces; and 2. Intercourse between citizens of the loyal and
insurgent states, subject to the license of the President and the regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the Treasury; and the President's order of Febru-
arv 28th 1862 was a general license to such intercourse. But by the Pre-
sident's Proclamation of March 31st 1863, the distinction was abolished, and
all intercourse between the citizens of loyal and insurgent states was made
subject to license by the President and the regulations of the Secretary of the
Treasury. Id.

13. It was not necessary to the lawfulness of such intercourse that the party
engaging in it should have a special license to himself by name under the
President's own sign manual. The President's power to license might be
delegated or might be exercised by a general proclamation, such as those of
February 28th 1862 and March 31st 1863. Id.

14. The late rebellion was such a war as suspended the right of a citizen of
Mississippi to sue on a policy of insurance in a Connecticut company. Semmes
v. Ins. Co. 673.

15. In addition to this consequence of a state of war, the right to sue on
such a policy was suspended by the Proclamation of the President, of August
16th 1861. ld.

16. Where a policy contained an express provision that in any action under
it commenced more than a year from the time of loss, the lapse of time should
be conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim, the period of the war
must be omitted in computing the year. Id.

17. The condition of war existed as regards the state of Mississippi, at
least from 16th August 1861, when the President, in pursuance of the Act of
Congress of July 13th 1861, declared that state in insurrection. Whether
the war commenced, in contemplation of law, before that date, not decided.
Id.

18. The legal period of the termination of the war depends not on the con-
tinuance or cessation of active hostilities, but on the acts of the departments

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

of the government to which political powers are intrusted. The Proclamation
of the President of June 13th 1865, removing the restrictions on trade as to
the states theretofore in insurrection, was a valid act of recognition by the ex-
ecutive department of the government of the termination of the war, and the
right of plaintiff in this action, to sue, revived from that date. Semmes v.
Ins. Co., 673.

JOINT LIABILITY. See PARTNERSHIP, 13.

One who previously assents to the commission of an act is jointly liable
with the one committing it. Treat v. Reilly, 505.

JUDGE. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 4.

JUDGMENT. See COURTS, 16; ESTOPPEL, 3-10.

1. The judgment of a court of superior jurisdiction may be collaterally
attacked upon the ground that the court by which it was rendered had no
jurisdiction, either of the subject matter or of the person of the defendant, or
both. Hahn v. Kelly and Morse, 122.

2. Such facts must appear affirmatively on the record. Id.

3 May be taken to secure future advances when such is a constituent part
of the original agreement. Neidig, Adm. of Neidig, v. Whiteford, 695.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

1. Omission by a justice to keep a docket will not render his judgment
void. Baker v. Brintnall, 380.

2. Non-residence must be pleaded to avoid the jurisdiction of a justice.
Osburne v. Gilbert, 381.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. See FIXTURES, 3; NUISANCE, 4.

1. Where the owner of land leased, is to receive part of the produce, instead
of rent, the lessor and lessee become tenants in common of the crops. Brown
v. Lincoln, 61.

2. A tenant's remedy against his landlord, for abandoning his first distress
without cause, and levying a second, is trespass, case or trover. Everett,
Adm., v. Neff, 251.

3. The lease of land for a term of years, with the exclusive right to bore
for and collect oil, passes a corporeal interest. Chicago Oil Co. v. United
States Co., 314.

4. A person is not liable for the negligent act of his tenants, in throwing
coal-dirt into a river, unless done by his authority or command. Little
Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Richards, 315.

5. Where tenant agrees to pay the rent in "certain specified repairs on the
house," and is expelled before the lease expires, he may recover the value
of the repairs, if they exceed the rent, in assumpsit. Smith v. Newcastle, 443.
6. Tenant at will entitled to the manure. Corey v. Bishop, 443.

7. A tenant is confined to the remedies specified in his lease, and a cove-
nant that the landlord will repair is not to be implied. Sheets v. Selden, 443.
8. Tenant cannot set up want of repairs, on a bill, to enjoin a writ of pos-
session issued by landlord. Id.

9. An injury caused to demised premises by a storm, is to be regarded as
an act of God. Polack v. Pioche, 501.

10. A tenant cannot dispute his landlord's title before surrendering posses-
sion. Tewksbury v. Magraff, 506.

11. A general covenant of the tenant to repair the demised premises is
binding upon the tenant under all circumstances, even if the injury proceeds
from the act of God, from the elements, or from the act of a stranger.
Polack v. Pioche, 508.

12. Tenant not entitled to remove manure from farm, at the expiration of
lease, though more there than when he came. Hill v. De Rochemont, 574.
LEGACY. See WILL, 5.

1. Where the real and personal estate of the testator have been blended in
one common fund, and the personalty is insufficient to pay debts, and the
words "not herein otherwise disposed of" are added to the residuary clause,
legacies will be charged upon the real estate. Dey v. Dey's Admr., 127.

LEGACY.

2. In determining whether a legacy is chargeable upon the real estate, the
court will consider the circumstances of the testator, and the nature and
amount of his property. Day v. Day's Admr., 127.

LEGAL TENDER NOTES. See COIN, 5.

1. LEGAL TENder Notes beFORE THE SUPREME COURT, 193.

2. A bond payable in gold and silver coin, cannot be discharged by a ten-
der of United States notes, issued under the Act of February 25th 1862.
Bronson v. Rhodes, 251.

3. A bond payable, "in gold or silver coin," is satisfied by a payment in
legal tender notes. Murray v. Gale, 381.

4. United States notes are exempt from state taxation. Bank v. Supervi-
sors, 443.

1. Where A. gave B. a parol license to cut timber on his land, and B. a
like license to flow his lands by a dam: it was held that though mutual, the
licenses were independent, and either party might revoke his so far as it was
unexecuted. Dodge v. McClintock, 62.

2. A license at law creates no estate in the lands of the licensor, but will
justify or excuse any act done under it. It is revocable even when given for
a consideration, but not if once executed. Veghte v. The Raritan Water
Power Co., 191.

LIEN. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 3; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 7.

1. The rights of the mortgagor and mortgagee are reciprocal, and when
one is barred by the Statute of Limitations the other is also. Arrington v.
Liscom, 123.

2. A party who has been in the exclusive adverse possession of lands for a
period of time which, under the Statute of Limitations, vests him with a title
thereto, may maintain an action against a party claiming under a record title,
to have said adverse claim determined and adjudged null and void as against
him. Id.

3. The Statute of Limitations is no bar to an action in this state (Maine)
on a note made in another state, when the defendant has not resided here.
Brown v. Nourse, 187.

4. A special statute enacting that demands against a bank must be pre-
sented within two years is legal. Stevens v. St. Louis National Bank, 381.
5. A petition that shows upon its face that the cause of action is barred by
the Statute of Limitations, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. Zane v. Zane, 444.

6. Will not run, between the death of the party and appointment of an
administrator in another state, as to claims prosecuted there. Hicks v.
Clark, 504.

7. The Maryland Code of Public Laws does not prevent a new promise to
pay, made on Sunday, from removing the bar of the Statute of Limitations.
Thomas v. Hunter, 699.

LIS PENDENS. See COURTS, 13.

1. Unless the parties to the actions are the same, a stay of proceedings will
not be granted on the ground of lis pendens. People v. Northern Railroad,

638.

2. The plea of, must show that the same title, the same injury, and the
same subject-matter are in controversy, in an action to recover land. Larco
v. Clements, 699.

MANDAMUS.

1. A return to a mandamus should be sufficiently clear and full to enable
the court to judge if the facts set forth, are all that are necessary. Benbou v.
Iowa City, 252.

VOL. XVII.-50